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Abstract 
 
For Martin Heidegger, the essence of technology—Ge-stell—is a framing and 
ordering of the world that valorises instrumental-calculative thinking at the direct 
expense of other forms of thought. As being-in-the-world—a notion that the later 
Heidegger would re-interpret as belonging-to Being as the mortal of the 
fourfold—human being is given over to the logos of framing and ordering: 
technology. In the technological age, human being is ordered into an inauthentic 
relationship with itself, its environment, and with Being itself. Yet the gathering-
saying of the modern logos is more than a framing of the cosmos into standing 
reserve, it is also a peculiarly gendered framing of human being. 
 
In this thesis I claim that while Heidegger was oblivious to the inherently 
masculinist aspect of the Western tradition, his thought provides an effective 
theoretical basis to interrogate invisible systemic gender inequality. In order to 
demonstrate this I develop an account of Heidegger’s critique of technology by 
tracing the origins of the critique from Heidegger’s early thinking in Being and 
Time onwards. This genealogical approach demonstrates the centrality of 
Heidegger’s critique of technology to his broader project, and facilitates an 
exploration of the fourfold as a heuristic from which an originary sense of Being 
(as dwelling) can emerge. By employing Heidegger’s critique of technology to 
highlight the metaphysical assumptions that frame mainstream debates on 
pornography, I demonstrate that the pornification of popular culture—now largely 
synonymous with rape culture—can be interpreted as a significant aspect of the 
logos of Ge-stell. I argue that rather than remain the purview of masculine 
privilege, the seeming impossibility of dwelling in the modern age reveals the 
techno-misogynological framing of Ge-stell.
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Introduction 	 1 
Introduction 
 
Preparatory Note 
The concerns of feminist thinkers such as Simone de Beauvoir and Andrea 
Dworkin seem an unlikely beginning point for an exploration of Heidegger’s 
critique of technology.1 Equally, Heidegger’s thinking seems a dubious foundation 
for an interpretation of feminist issues. The essays found in Nancy J. Holland and 
Patricia Huntington’s Feminist Interpretations of Heidegger demonstrate the 
fraught relationship of feminism and Heidegger’s thinking. In her Introduction, 
Huntington notes that Heidegger’s work lacks any immediate practical application 
for feminism (2001, 2). Yet, as Huntington and Kevin Aho (2009) note, 
Heidegger’s thinking offers a number of important possibilities for exploring 
many contemporary ethical, political, and feminist issues. While I do not 
intentionally adopt a feminist position, this thesis demonstrates the deep “affinity” 
(Huntington 2001, 10) between Heidegger’s critique of technology and certain 
aspects of feminist thinking.2  
 
In concert with Heidegger, much feminist thought is suspicious of the Cartesian 
model of the self. The significance of one’s social, cultural, and historical 
context—a context that Heidegger called “the world” (2008a, 91),3 discussed 
further in Chapter One—in forming a sense of self is a common theme for 																																																								
1 Technology is a loaded word for Heidegger, and Chapters One and Two are dedicated to 
exploring the depth of meaning the term has in Heidegger’s lexicon. 
2 For example, Carol Bigwood’s Earth Muse (1993) demonstrates the potential of Heidegger’s 
critique of technology—a critique that contains both critical and constructive aspects, discussed 
throughout Chapter One, Two, Four, and Five of this thesis—for diagnosing, and redressing, the 
modern human relationship to the earth. Bigwood’s work is significant in that it demonstrates how 
readily Heidegger’s later thinking (appearing in its mature form in the late 1940s and throughout 
the 1950s, Heidegger’s critique of technology is central to his later thinking) can be adopted by 
those seeking to step outside the traditionally male dominated Western philosophical tradition, 
despite Heidegger’s own “masculine bias” (Bigwood 1993, 209). In her Introduction to Feminist 
Interpretations of Heidegger, Huntington claims that Earth Muse is one of six books published in 
the 1990s that facilitated “the genuine emergence of a seriously Heideggerian-inflected feminism” 
(2001, 5). In particular, Huntington claims that the scholarly and historical-ethical-political 
ramifications of Bigwood’s thinking marked the latter’s work as “[o]f decisive importance [due to 
the fact that] Bigwood finds a more woman-friendly ethos in Heidegger than in more popular 
strains of deconstructive and poststructuralist feminist theorizing” (2001, 14, my insertion).  
3 For Heidegger, the world is more than a social-cultural-historical context; it is an ontological 
phenomenon. The distinction between these two will become apparent throughout my discussion 
of subject-object metaphysics and Heidegger’s phenomenology in Chapter One. 
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feminist thinkers. In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir compels the reader to consider 
how the feminine—both as gender and embodied physiological woman—is 
constructed and evaluated in the modern Western world. While de Beauvoir 
features only briefly in my thesis (see Chapter Six), a cursory discussion of the 
resonance between her thinking in The Second Sex and the account of Heidegger I 
develop will prepare the reader for the trajectory of this thesis. While de Beauvoir 
and Jean-Paul Sartre were both influenced by Heidegger to varying degrees, Sartre 
retains (what Heidegger characterises as) the essential features of the Western 
philosophical tradition, a tradition that Heidegger attempts to think beyond. By 
comparison, de Beauvoir embraces Heidegger’s distinction between each person’s 
ontological freedom, and their finite historical-factical-ontic4 freedom (a 
distinction discussed in chapters One and Three). In recognising this distinction, 
one acknowledges that an individual does not step outside the values, norms, and 
expectations of her situation by simply choosing to do so: those who do not face 
systemic oppression can meaningfully embrace the freedom of a “for-itself” 
(Sartre 2003, 101) with less risk of unjust violence and exclusion than those who 
do. 
 
Eva Gothlin (2003) outlines many of the similarities between de Beauvoir and 
Heidegger. De Beauvoir is largely influenced by the Heidegger of Being and 
Time: human being as Dasein, always constitutively thrown in-the-world—
concepts I discuss in Chapter One. Gothlin notes that where “Sartre’s philosophy 
has picked up many Heideggerian themes … he remained essentially within the 																																																								
4 This phrase, ‘historical-factical-ontic’, refers to each person’s specific and personal 
circumstances and the way that these circumstances reflect the ontological constitution of human 
being. In using this phrase, I bring together the two aspects of the ontic-ontological distinction 
(that I discuss in Chapter One). While ‘ontic’ refers to the tangible physical phenomena that 
pertain to a specific person (or object) and the circumstances in which they find themselves, both 
‘historical’ and ‘factical’ are ontological features that pertain to human being in a verbal sense: 
they are the fundamental ontological aspects of human being that allow each person’s specific 
circumstance to be informed by that person’s sense of themselves as historically-temporally placed 
in a specific factual situation. The factual aspects of any situation—the weather, the political 
climate, and the number of people I am surrounded by—affect human being due to our facticity; 
our being is factically affected by the factual. Similarly, the human sense of belonging to (or 
feeling out of step with) a culture or a particular era, such as modernity, derives from human 
historicity, our being-historical. The ontic-ontological distinction will be clarified in Chapter One, 
making further sense of these concepts, but this cursory discussion introduces the notion that 
people find themselves entangled in an ontic situation that is specific to each person due to her 
historical-factical constitution. 
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Cartesian tradition … Beauvoir, in contrast, is closer to the main tenet of 
Heidegger’s philosophy” (45). For de Beauvoir, the difference between a person’s 
ontological freedom and her historical-factical-ontic situatedness within a world of 
pre-existing norms and values is not a simple matter of making a resolute decision 
to overcome bad faith and willingly embody who she truly wants to be. Instead, 
each person is always constitutively in and of the world, constituted as a response 
to the norms and values that permeate language and shape the concept of what it 
means to be (for Heidegger, this is something deeper, or more primordial, than 
‘culture’, discussed in Chapter One). The modern technological world is never a 
neutral or benign space; it is always already full of certain meanings and values 
that act as an invisible horizon of intelligibility. As Heidegger goes on to 
demonstrate, the meanings and values that constitute the world are always biased 
in some sense, creating a number of discourses and norms that privilege certain 
ways of being over others. While I do not wish to over-emphasise the connection 
between de Beauvoir and Heidegger, the affinity between their thought rests on 
this understanding of the world: we do not escape the world, we are never not in-
the-world. As such, the world affects us in profound ways, no matter how we 
strive for authenticity.  
 
Heidegger and Sartre are often presented together as proponents of existentialism. 
Despite de Beauvoir’s more faithful, and arguably more compelling, interpretation 
of Heidegger’s thinking, she is frequently relegated to a footnote or passing 
comment. For example, in Julian Young’s treatment of Sartre in The Death of God 
and the Meaning of Life, de Beauvoir receives the following treatment: “In 1929 
he met Simone de Beauvoir, who remained his companion in a sexually open 
partnership for the rest of his life” (2010, 125). While factually correct—and I 
acknowledge that the chapter is devoted to Sartre, not de Beauvoir—this 
presentation of de Beauvoir does not allude to her academic prowess or 
significance to the existential movement. Instead, this brief passage relegates her 
to a passive role. While de Beauvoir and Sartre’s relationship is perhaps 
contextually significant for understanding how Sartre embodied his existentialism, 
it is equally important for revealing how de Beauvoir was thrown into hers: in a 
patriarchal society, a sexually open relationship has different implications for a 
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man in a position of fame and power than it does for the woman who is 
remembered first for being a companion, and a thinker second (if at all). I do not 
mean to single out Young here, yet this example is representative of what de 
Beauvoir herself knew to be true: that thinkers of the Western philosophical 
tradition were not just enamoured by presence (as Heidegger claims), but by 
masculinity. 
 
In this thesis I will demonstrate that although Heidegger believed we could 
achieve an authentic relationship with technology, such a relationship is 
predicated on the possibility of authentically cohering with the demands and 
standards of technology. Rather than submitting to technology, one must be able 
to engage with it naturally, in an unforced manner. One can only reconcile one’s 
self with the world if one is able to authentically belong in the world. However, 
this kind of authentic belonging is problematised once the modern technological 
world is revealed as inherently masculinist and patriarchal. In Chapter Six, I claim 
that Heidegger’s critique of technology is important for understanding the 
gendered bias of the Western tradition, and how it remains prevalent to this day. 
While Heidegger was oblivious of his own masculinst tendencies, his attempt to 
think beyond the Cartesian metaphysical model of the self, and to understand 
human being as profoundly affected by language and the worlding of the world, is 
an effective way of revealing otherwise invisible systemic oppression. While de 
Beauvoir was not explicitly Heideggerian, she appropriated certain aspects of his 
thinking to demonstrate that where the world itself is biased, ‘equality’ often 
means cohering with the norms and standards set by such bias:  
 
 It is not to be supposed, however, that the mere combination of the right to vote and a job 
 constitutes a complete emancipation: working, today, is not a liberty. The social structure
 has not been much modified by the changes in woman’s condition; this world, always
 belonging to men, still retains the form they have given it (1953, 641). 
 
While also reflecting a Marxist influence, here de Beauvoir builds on Heidegger’s 
thinking of each person as situated within an over-arching social, cultural, and 
historical context. Specifically, in the modern capitalist industrial-technological 
context, becoming a part of the workforce is not a meaningful freedom or symbol 
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of equality. When also bearing the socio-cultural expectations of traditional 
domestic duties and feminine roles, the need to grant “ethical meaning to 
thankless labour” (642) is symptomatic of an inauthentic existence that is framed 
by patriarchal-masculinist norms. Authentic being-in-the-world, a concept that lies 
at the heart of this thesis, is always a response to the world; it is not a phantasm of 
the will or a denial or rejection of the world. While I only discuss de Beauvoir 
briefly in Chapter Six, the present discussion is intended to demonstrate the 
ongoing resonance of her thought—as a foundational twentieth century feminist—
to the material covered in this thesis.  
 
Throughout the thesis I develop an account of Heidegger’s critique of technology. 
As I discuss in Chapter One, my account stresses the importance of interpreting 
Heidegger’s thinking as a response to particular problems of modernity. By 
framing Heidegger’s thinking in this manner, I am able to argue that Heidegger’s 
gender-blindness, and thus the masculinist failings in his thought, are 
hermeneutically surmountable. I am not claiming that Heidegger’s thinking is 
impervious to feminist criticism, rather that the thinking itself, set free of its 
author’s historical-factical-ontic situatedness, has a self-interrogating nature. 
Much of Heidegger’s thinking reflects a single motif: each phenomenon reveals 
something of its concealed origin, and the recognition of such creates an 
obligation to respond to the revelation. What is left hidden or concealed by a 
phenomenon, what it does not account for, and what its future possibilities might 
be, are all discoverable in the phenomenon itself, should one be receptive to such 
revealing. As such—and to introduce Heidegger’s appropriation of Friedrich 
Hölderlin (discussed at length in Chapter Five)—each phenomenon has both its 
danger and its saving power. 
 
Although the final form of this thesis reflects a strong feminist influence, this was 
not by design. In considering the ethical position5 in Heidegger’s thinking, I stress 
the importance of interpreting his thinking as a direct response to his 
characterisation of the perils and importunities of the modern world. I do not 																																																								
5 The possibility of drawing an ethical position from Heidegger’s thinking is a contested notion 
within Heidegger scholarship, discussed further in this chapter, and more extensively in Chapters 
Three and Six. 
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follow Heidegger’s path in using obviously technological examples such as 
atomic or hydro-electric power. As I discuss throughout the thesis, overtly 
technological examples (in the everyday sense of the word) serve to restrict the 
interpretation of what the logos of technology means for Heidegger. In her essay 
‘Revolutionary Thinking’, Gail Stenstad states that Heidegger’s thinking 
 
 is not just an abstract discussion of an abstruse history of metaphysics. Heidegger’s
 thinking points to the ways in which that history yet holds power and connects it to issues
 of deep concern to many: the drive for maximum organization and control, environmental
 devastation, and humans’ use and abuse of one another. Although he does not mention
 this, the latter would surely also pertain to male dominance or patriarchy, and thus be
 relevant to feminist thinking (2001, 335).  
 
In this passage, Stenstad articulates the resonance between Heidegger’s thinking 
and feminist concerns that underpins much of this thesis. Heidegger’s critique of 
technology is founded on his analysis of the Western metaphysical tradition; a 
tradition that he argued privileged the physical properties of an entity over its way 
of being. Further, according to Heidegger, thinkers of this tradition took the sheer 
existence of entities, indeed, existence itself, for granted. Heidegger is driven by a 
reverential awe that things are, that existence is. For Heidegger, neglecting the 
problem of Being not only leads to erroneous metaphysical models of the self and 
the nature of existence, it cheapens human being and reduces the world to a 
conglomeration of exploitable materials: the forgetting of Being has ethical and 
spiritual implications. As I demonstrate throughout this thesis, Heidegger’s 
position, particularly beyond Being and Time, was not simply an academic 
observation; it was a value judgment. Yet, as outlined in Chapter Six, and the 
passage from Stenstad above, privileging presence over being is only one 
characteristic of the Western tradition: this tradition is also founded on patriarchy. 
Stenstad notes that “[t]he beginning of patriarchal social structures is older, by at 
least two or three thousand years, and more geographically diverse than the 
beginning of Western philosophy that is Heidegger’s focus” (363). The Western 
tradition is almost exclusively comprised of relatively wealthy, relatively powerful 
men. Significantly, the Western tradition was also filtered through an extended 
period of ecclesiastical, hence overtly patriarchal, authority. Aside from the 
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obvious cultural and racial delimitations of the specifically Western tradition, the 
masculine bias within such a tradition is so complete, so ubiquitous, that it largely 
remains invisible to itself. As such, the manifestation of this bias can appear both 
explicit and subtle, and often entirely unintentional (think of Young’s reference to 
de Beauvoir in relation to Sartre above). Despite the inherently self-interrogating, 
self-correcting hermeneutic nature of Heidegger’s thought, Heidegger remained 
oblivious of his own masculine privilege. Yet, as I argue throughout the final 
chapters of the thesis, the hermeneutic nature of Heidegger’s thought allows for a 
reimagining of authentic human being as dwelling. By augmenting Heidegger’s 
critique of technology, the existential, ethical, and spiritual significance of 
Heidegger’s thought can be realised. 
 
The Existential, Ethical, Spiritual Hermeneutic 
In Chapters Three and Six I explore the ethical aspect of Heidegger’s work. The 
idea of any kind of ethics drawn from Heidegger’s work is often met with 
suspicion within Heidegger scholarship, largely due to Heidegger’s own 
denunciation of interpreting his work as such and his rejection of ethics more 
broadly. However, Heidegger is a determined and singular thinker, and it is worth 
noting early on that his rejection of ethics is not a rejection of thinking ethically 
(in the sense of systematic normative judgements about right or wrong, good or 
bad), but a rejection of ‘ethics’ as a formal mode of inquiry that is grounded in the 
Western philosophical tradition. For Heidegger, the Western philosophical 
tradition has taken the problem of Being for granted. In conflating Being with 
presence, Heidegger believes that the Western philosophical tradition has missed 
what is essential to the pre-Socratic Greek experience of existence. Heidegger’s 
position is not a simple philosophical observation of academic interest, however. 
Instead, much of Heidegger’s thinking throughout the 1930s and 1940s is 
concerned with a series of prevalent (ethical and political) problems in the modern 
world that he believes are a direct result of “the oblivion of Being” (Heidegger 
20082, 232). For Heidegger, the historical shift away from the pre-Socratic 
understanding of Being mirrors the shift from ēthos to ethics, and misses the 
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essence of ethical thinking in terms of how and why things matter to us.6 Rather 
than a formal system of thought that is established on first principles such as the 
Cartesian subject or a categorical imperative, Heidegger’s thinking exhibits a 
hermeneutic threefold of existential, ethical, and spiritual significance. As is the 
case with much of Heidegger’s thinking, I intend these concepts to largely retain 
their everyday sense, while their fundamental, root meanings are subtly 
reimagined. Although I refer to and discuss these terms throughout the thesis—
specifically in Chapters Three and Six—I will briefly outline their relationship 
here. 
 
Heidegger’s work is existentially significant in that it relates to existence itself. As 
Heidegger points out in Being and Time, the matter of one’s existence is 
conspicuous for human beings. As such, the matter of existence, both in the 
broader sense that things exist at all, and in the personal sense that my life matters 
to me, takes on a particular significance. It follows that Heidegger’s existentialism 
is concerned with the question of human existence, and, by implication, the 
meaning of life itself. In this regard, Heidegger is often considered one of a 
handful of prominent Western existential philosophers that includes Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, and Sartre (among many notable exceptions). It is 
important to note, however, that Heidegger’s primary concern is the recovery of 
the problem or question7 of Being, and the consideration of how to live a good life 
and what it means to be authentically human, while implicated in the exploration 
of this recovery, is often cast as a secondary theme.8 Never the less, Heidegger 
does explore human being, reminding the reader that the problem of Being offers 
the possibility of reimagining the concerns and considerations of the entire 
Western tradition. As such, Heidegger’s thinking is existentially significant in two 																																																								
6 See William McNeill’s The Time of Life: Heidegger and the Ēthos for a sustained treatment of 
the role of ēthos in Heidegger’s work, particularly its connection to logos and mythos. These are 
connections that I discuss in Chapter Eight. 
7 The German Frage is generally rendered as ‘question’ in English, but it carries multiple senses, 
including ‘problem’, ‘issue’, or ‘query’. All of these senses are present where I employ ‘the 
problem of Being’. 
8 Despite my emphasis on the twin existential aspects of Heidegger’s thinking, I am in concert with 
Richard Capobianco’s assertions in Engaging Heidegger and Heidegger’s Way of Being that Being 
remained the central concern of Heidegger’s thinking throughout his career. Despite Heidegger’s 
many ways of thinking and articulating the problem, question, or truth of Being, from at least 
Being and Time onwards, Being was the central focus of Heidegger’s thought.	
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senses. First, it pertains to existence and the manner in which extant entities are 
sustained in their presence. Secondly, it is significant to how each individual 
understands her self as an invested participant in her own existence. Heidegger 
frequently demonstrated the importance of the first concern, or illustrated the 
problems of taking this concern for granted, by emphasising the second. The 
problems of 20th century existentialists—how to live a meaningful life in the post-
Enlightenment absence of religious authority, how to find meaning in a post-War 
malaise, and so on—are present in Heidegger’s thinking, but often indirectly and 
by implication. Despite his investigation into the nothing, Heidegger is no nihilist, 
if by nihilism one means a system of thought that assumes an absence of order or 
meaning in the cosmos.9 That things exist is a matter of the utmost existential 
significance for Heidegger; that humans are inherently invested in their own 
existence compounds this significance. 
 
As invested in our own existence, human beings care. We do not just care about 
our selves or specific things: Heidegger claims that at a constitutive, foundational 
level human being is care. As beings that care, that are invested in their own 
existence and the fact that things exist at all, human beings are inherently 
predisposed towards ethical thinking. I understand ethical thinking to involve 
making judgements on what is good or right as a result of a systematic, 
deliberative process. While Heidegger’s thinking becomes increasingly poetic and 
difficult throughout the late 1930s and 1940s, his critique of modernity and 
technology—following his analysis of the Western philosophical tradition—
delivers a series of clear judgements on a number of issues. Further, these 
judgements are founded on a rigorous and systematic exploration of how the 
problem of Being has been forgotten in the West, and, in particular, the 
implications of this forgetting. In this sense, and referring to my brief definition of 
ethical thinking above, Heidegger’s thinking has a strong ethical element. I largely 
follow Heidegger’s example by avoiding using concepts such as good or right, 																																																								
9 I use the word ‘cosmos’ throughout the thesis for several reasons. First, words such as ‘world’ 
and ‘earth’ become technical Heideggerian terms and thus must be reserved. Where I refer to ‘the 
environment’ I am referring specifically to an ecological concern. Finally, I use cosmos—drawing 
on the Greek Kosmos—to indicate both the actual, tangible expanse of things in and of the 
universe (including the universe itself), but also to imply a kind of ordered or cohesive aspect to 
the existence of such. 
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due, again, to their grounding in the Western metaphysical tradition. However, as 
I demonstrate throughout the thesis, Heidegger’s thinking is ethically significant 
in that it isolates the essential features of ethical thinking from its metaphysical 
baggage. As existentially invested beings, human being is always predisposed 
towards ethical thinking, regardless of the form that it takes. However, ethical 
thinking is also motivated by a deep spirituality in Heidegger’s thinking. 
 
I discuss my interpretation of Heidegger’s thinking of spirit in depth in Chapter 
Eight. However, I introduce the concept here in order that the relation and 
distinction between existential, ethical, and spiritual significance is clear from the 
outset. While I claim that these three ideas are a hermeneutic whole, understood in 
their component parts, existential significance—grounded in human 
investedness—is the ontological foundation for the ontic manifestation of ethical 
and spiritual concerns. As described above, ethics is a systematic, deliberative 
thinking, a type of thinking that recognises that things matter—right from wrong, 
good from bad. While human existentiality is ontological, ethics is always ontic (a 
distinction I discuss in Chapter One) in that it pertains to specific, historical, and 
factual decisions, issues, and events. Grounded on ontological existential 
investedness, ethics is concerned with making sense of said investedness in terms 
of one’s dealing with the world and others. Spirituality, however, is something 
different again. Rather than signify a Kierkegaardian shift from the ethical to the 
religious,10 the spirit is ontological, and manifests as a personal and distinct 
feature of each individual. While we are invested in our own being, and we 																																																								
10 Throughout Either/Or and into Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard posits a transition from a 
hedonistic aesthetic existence, through to an ethical, and finally religious existence. Worthy of 
more detail than I can give it here—due, at least, partially, to the enormous influence of these 
writings on Heidegger—many of the themes that Kierkegaard explores across these three 
transitions are found in the existential tradition. What distinguishes Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
from the existential tradition more broadly is that each move beyond the ethical stage towards a 
faith or reverence for something that it utterly other than either humanism or nihilism. The ethical 
stage is characterised by the resolution to allow things in the world to matter, and to choose to take 
a stand on such (Kierkegaard 1992, 490-494). For both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, however, there 
is something beyond human will; something that is wholly other to human being that one must be 
sensitive towards, and, indeed, submit to in a certain sense. This concept becomes complex in 
Heidegger’s work as he tries to articulate the harmony or balance between a self-aware, invested 
being and the sense of reverence of something properly beyond human being. For Kierkegaard, 
one’s faith in God guides the stage beyond the ethical, and thus his thinking becomes guided by a 
theological tradition. While Heidegger’s thinking echoes this kind of faith or theological concern, 
it is not directly analogous to such. 
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recognise that things matter, it is spirit that motivates us to act, think, and feel in 
particular ways: ways that are guided by the human predisposition toward ethical 
thinking. From our existential investedness, our predisposition toward ethical 
concerns and our spiritual sense of passion and depth of feeling for said concerns 
emerges.  
 
Spirit can arguably be explained through existential investedness alone; that we 
are invested in our own existence is reason enough for us to exist as emotional, 
passionate, motivated beings. However, I retain the notion of spirit for three 
reasons. First, the three are hermeneutically unified as a whole: I am existentially 
invested, things matter to me, I understand things as having an ethical 
significance, but it is my spirituality that compels me to authentically grasp and 
strive to honour such ethical significance. My spirituality is a motivating force that 
allows me to feel the full depth of my existential investedness and the significance 
of ethics as the result of, but ultimately something more than, the outcome of 
systematic deliberative judgement. As I demonstrate in Chapter Eight, ethics 
without spirit in the modern technological age runs the risk of a particular type of 
inauthentic tranquility bound up with a masculinist bias. In this sense, spirit 
completes the threefold. Second, I retain the notion of spirit as it reflects the 
human attunement to the gods of the fourfold (discussed in Chapter Five). The 
ethical dimension in Heidegger’s thought is often connected to the allusive 
pointings and beckonings of gods and divinities (as ontological features of 
existence, aspects of Being itself, not theist deities as such), and it is the spirit that 
facilitates the correspondence between human being and this wholly other Being. 
Finally, I retain the notion of spirit as it resonates strongly with many thinkers in 
the feminist and eco-feminist tradition, a key feature of my thesis overall. 
 
Aims and Objectives 
This thesis has a number of primary and secondary aims and objectives. First, I 
want to demonstrate the continued efficacy of Heidegger’s thinking. By thinking 
with and beyond Heidegger—staying true to the thought, if not the thinker—this 
thesis aims to demonstrate how effectively Heidegger’s way of thinking can re-
frame and reimagine contemporary political and ethical problems. Second, my 
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application of Heidegger’s thinking to contemporary feminist issues demonstrates 
how Ge-stell and subject-object metaphysics continue to frame political debates in 
a way that is insensitive to the phenomenological in-the-worldness of human 
being. Corollary to these two objectives, the thesis also demonstrates the 
importance of the notion of authentic human being to political and ethical thinking 
in general: these kinds of thinking must be founded on an accurate portrayal of 
human being as historical and in-the-world. Both Heidegger and many feminist 
thinkers challenge ethical and political theories that structurally assume each 
person to be a fully autonomous and rational subject. Third, this thesis contributes 
to the body of Heidegger scholarship that is concerned with the notion of 
authenticity and the ongoing debate pertaining to authenticity as an ethical 
concern. In this thesis, I take a clear position on offering a definition of 
authenticity—demonstrating the essential continuity of the concept from Being 
and Time through to the 1950s and beyond—and provide evidence that the matter 
is an ethical and spiritual concern for Heidegger, as outlined above.  
 
A Note on Terminology 
I have chosen to leave two key terms, Ge-stell and Ereignis, untranslated and 
unitalicised. I believe that these two terms are analogous to ‘Dasein’ in Heidegger 
scholarship in that while they are approximately translatable, they are so 
foundational to Heidegger’s project that any one English translation does not do 
the concepts justice. These terms are used consistently throughout Heidegger’s 
project, but each with a multivalence that is dependent on context. Although I 
leave the terms untranslated, I describe their verbal qualities by employing a 
number of common English translations, discussed in Chapters Two and Four 
respectively. When describing Ge-stell I draw on ‘framing’ and ‘framed’ most 
regularly, but also employ ‘enframing/enframed’, ‘positioned/positioning’, and 
‘ordered/ordering’. Similarly, when describing the happening or ‘Ereignis-ing’ of 
Ereignis, I refer to appropriation or the event of appropriation. Many more 
convoluted and complex translations for each term have been offered by various 
scholars, yet the terms I have chosen reflect the concepts and the way they 
function within Heidegger’s thought, rather than trying to forcefully represent a 
multivalent concept with a single repetitive term or phrase. As I discuss in Chapter 
Introduction 	 13 
Four, for example, Ereignis is an intentionally ambiguous word that gathers 
together Heidegger’s thinking of Being, Beyng, thrownness, alētheia, Logos, 
mythos, poiēsis, and the fourfold. To demand that one English word or phrase 
could or should represent this concept is a mistake. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
In Chapter One I outline Heidegger’s characterisation of subject-object 
metaphysics, drawing largely from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. I then 
contrast this outline with Heidegger’s phenomenological position in order to 
demonstrate the distinction between Heidegger’s account of metaphysics and his 
own fundamental ontology. From here, I introduce the notion of equipmentality 
from Being and Time. I contend that equipmentality is one of the earliest and most 
overt aspects of Heidegger’s earlier thought that results in his later critique of 
technology. My discussion of equipmentality demonstrates that Heidegger’s 
project in Being and Time was a provisional exploration of a phenomenology that 
had abandoned the Cartesian metaphysical influence still at play in Husserl’s 
thinking, but was itself only a beginning point for a broader exploration of Being. 
In order to further stress the continuity of Heidegger’s thought from Being and 
Time to the critique of technology, I explore the themes central to Heidegger’s 
critique of modernity; themes that link his thinking from Being and Time to his 
later, post-Hölderlin output. Structurally, Chapter One outlines the foundations 
that the remainder of the thesis rests on, namely, that an account of Heidegger’s 
critique of technology must be interpreted in light of the development of his 
thinking of Being overall. 
 
In Chapter Two I introduce the central themes of Heidegger’s critique of 
technology: Ge-stell and Standing Reserve. However, in order to make sense of 
these themes I first discuss Heidegger’s “confrontation” (Heidegger 1991a, xxxix) 
with Nietzsche’s thinking. While Heidegger’s thinking had been profoundly 
affected by his earlier reading of Hölderlin, it is his confrontation with Nietzsche’s 
thought that solidifies much of the critique of technology. Building on his critique 
of modernity, Heidegger read Nietzsche as the culmination, rather than the 
overcoming, of the Western philosophical tradition. For Heidegger, the figure of 
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the Overman—I use the male pronoun intentionally—marked a decisive and final 
division between the subject and object, valorising the subject as the centre of 
experience and origin of all meaning and value. Because of its scientistic 
reduction of material things to their instrumental-calculable properties, Heidegger 
argued that the modern technological relation of human being to Being is 
oppressive and violent. This chapter introduces a number of key terms and 
completes my account of the critical aspect of the critique of technology. 
 
Chapter Three acts as a bridge between my account of the critical and constructive 
aspects of Heidegger’s critique of technology. Chapter Three highlights the ethical 
significance of Heidegger’s thinking by demonstrating the centrality of the notion 
of Eigentlichkeit, authenticity, to Heidegger’s project overall. I trace the 
development of authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking from anticipatory 
resoluteness in Being and Time to releasement in his thinking from the 1940s in 
order to demonstrate the continuity and centrality of the concept. I outline the 
connection between authenticity and ethics by demonstrating the ways in which 
Heidegger presents his thinking; that the issues he addressed were not simply 
observations or of intellectual interest, but were value judgments of existential, 
ethical, and spiritual import. As I have mentioned earlier in my introduction, the 
term ‘ethics’ is fraught and contentious in Heidegger scholarship and my 
discussion in Chapter Three further clarifies my position on this issue. As a 
bridging chapter, Chapter Three introduces many of the ideas found in Chapter 
Four with a view to linking these ideas with the content of earlier chapters. 
 
In Chapter Four I develop a reading of Ereignis. An integral concept for 
understanding Heidegger’s recovery of the problem of Being, Ereignis is a 
complex concept that describes the belonging-together of human being and Being. 
As such, the notion of authentic human being from Chapter Three is revisited. 
Ereignis is the more primordial function that underpins and makes further sense of 
Heidegger’s notion of Ge-stell. In hermeneutic fashion, Ge-stell, Ereignis, and 
authentic human being—thought of as ek-sistent Da-sein—are all related at a 
fundamental level, and an exploration of one helps clarify and enrich the others. 
Chapter Four is a culmination of the thesis up to that point, tying together the 
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authentic/inauthentic distinction with the distinction between Ge-stell and Ereignis 
to deepen the ethical significance of Heidegger’s thinking of technology.  
 
Chapter Five completes my account of Heidegger’s critique of technology. While 
Chapters One and Two outline the critical aspect, and Chapter Three outlines the 
ethical significance of the critique, Chapters Four and Five work together to 
demonstrate the constructive aspect of the critique: that Ereignis can be 
understood through the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities or gods and 
that authentic human being is poetic dwelling. In this chapter, Heidegger’s reading 
of Hölderlin is explored in detail. Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin is of particular 
hermeneutic significance in coming to understand the development of the critique 
of technology. As I demonstrate in this chapter, Heidegger’s encounter with 
Hölderlin gave him a new voice with which to articulate his concerns about the 
modern world. Chapter Five concludes with my account of the fourfold. Having 
traced the origins of each of the four components, Chapter Five marks the last of 
the chapters dedicated to establishing my reading of Heidegger. 
 
Chapter Six has two main divisions. In the first, I explore how the fourfold acts as 
a concept that facilitates dwelling. I contrast my account of the fourfold with the 
descriptive object-oriented ontology of Graham Harman in order to support my 
claim that the fourfold, as part of the broader critique of technology, was a matter 
of ethical significance for Heidegger, and can continue to be interpreted as such, 
independent of Heidegger’s examples. From here, I draw the basic outline of 
dwelling, claiming that the fourfold provides a way to reimagine an everyday 
encounter (with a person, technology, one’s self) to become an en-counter: a 
necessary condition for authenticity. However, at this point the trajectory of the 
thesis shifts slightly in light of the limitations of dwelling: limitations that stem 
from the framing of Ge-stell, but were left uninterrogated by Heidegger. The 
second division of Chapter Six engages with a number of feminist thinkers in 
order to highlight the patriarchal roots of the Western philosophical tradition. I 
argue that Ge-stell is gendered, in the sense that the framing of the world is not 
simply technological, but masculinist and misogynist. As a result of this, I 
conclude that dwelling is impossible for those unable to authentically cohere with 
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the standards and demands of Ge-stell. However, this impossibility does not lessen 
the significance of dwelling, but, rather, it reveals something important about the 
obligation of such. 
 
In Chapter Seven I explore a number of contemporary ethical and feminist issues 
to demonstrate the masculinist, misogynist framing of the modern technological 
world. I begin with a discussion of the pornography debate, and how the debate 
itself is metaphysically framed. From this discussion I explore the concept of 
pornification, suggesting that the phenomena it describes is, again, readily 
interpreted as an aspect of Ge-stell. I conclude with a discussion of rape culture, a 
concept that I argue is best understood in light of Heidegger’s phenomenological-
ontological position. Chapter Seven serves an important structural purpose for the 
thesis in that it demonstrates the possibilities of Heidegger’s thinking as a 
response to concrete and specific problems of the modern world. Chapter Seven 
further demonstrates that the impossibility of dwelling is valuable in an alethic 
sense. 
 
As the conclusion of my thesis, Chapter Eight ties together the content of the 
previous chapters. I introduce the notion of spirituality, and conclude that dwelling 
is best understood as a spiritual matter. I base this claim on the idea that 
Heidegger’s understanding of spirit overcomes much of the metaphysical baggage 
that the term ‘ethics’ continues to carry. In order to demonstrate that dwelling is a 
spiritual matter, I discuss and contrast Heidegger’s account of logos and mythos. 
Based on the human belonging to Being, I propose that the modern world is not 
simply technological; it is also misogynological. Chapter Eight demonstrates that 
the impossibility of dwelling is a symptom of, and can thus reveal, the techno-
misogynology of the Western philosophical tradition that continues to frame and 
order human being. In making Ge-stell visible as a techno-misogynological 
framing of human being, one can en-counter such framing. This en-counter 
reveals the spiritual obligation of dwelling. That dwelling appears impossible for 
many people is ‘the danger’, that this impossibility can be made conspicuous 
through the concept of misogynology is ‘the saving power’. 
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Chapter One — Modernity 
 
Metaphysics grounds an age in that, through a particular interpretation of beings and 
through a particular comprehension of truth, it provides that age with the grounds of its 
essential shape. This ground comprehensively governs all decisions distinctive of the age 
(Heidegger 2002a, 57). 
 
Ethical and political discourses, technological and media-based amusements, and 
one’s largely unexamined day-to-day comings and goings are grounded, and thus 
governed, by a metaphysical interpretation of the world. Affecting both socio-
cultural and individual norms, metaphysical assumptions affect the ways in which 
a human understands her self as a political entity, as a gendered entity, as bearing 
certain individual responsibilities and obligations to her self, others, and her 
environment. The ubiquity of unexamined metaphysical presuppositions in one’s 
everyday activities renders them invisible. Each person goes about his or her 
business in a largely pre-reflective manner. Even in moments of conscious 
deliberation, one rarely reflects on the metaphysical comprehension of truth that 
one takes for granted—how certain linguistic conventions shape our conceptual 
understanding of a given subject in advance of our exploration, for example. 
Instead, one deliberates within the taken-for-granted parameters of a pre-existing 
comprehension of truth. As I discuss further below, ‘metaphysics’ has a particular 
meaning for Martin Heidegger. Specifically, Heidegger claims that the 
technological manifestation of Western subject-object metaphysics creates 
important philosophical—ethical, political—problems. For Heidegger, the 
essential shape and distinctive decisions of the modern world are characterised by 
technology. Heidegger’s critique of technology, introduced below, forms the basis 
of this thesis. As I discuss in the second half of this thesis, Heidegger’s critique of 
technology is a productive theoretical framework to uncover the various ways that 
metaphysics shapes contemporary ethical-political problems pertaining to gender 
and sexuality. 
 
Where I refer to Heidegger’s critique of technology, I refer to his introduction and 
use of ‘Ge-stell’ and ‘Bestand’ (standing reserve), and the corollary notions of 
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Ereignis, dwelling, and the fourfold. I divide Heidegger’s critique of technology 
into critical and constructive aspects in order to highlight the hermeneutic 
significance of interpreting Ge-stell and Ereignis (and related concepts) in light of 
one another. Developed over two decades of thinking, this critique appears in the 
1949 Bremen Lecture series Insight Into That Which Is, and in essays from the 
mid 1950s, including ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ and ‘The Thing’ 
(both are re-worked sections of the aforementioned lecture series). As I will 
demonstrate throughout the first four chapters of the thesis, Heidegger’s critique 
of technology ties together the central aspects of his recovery of the problem of 
Being. As such, to comprehend the full nature of the constructive, as well as 
critical, aspects of his critique, one must also turn to other works from the mid 
1950s, including ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, and ‘…Poetically Man 
Dwells…’. A cursory outline of the critique will help develop the context of these 
chapters.  
 
Rather than a simplistic judgment on the reliance of human being on technology in 
the everyday sense of the word, Heidegger claims that technology—as logos, a 
fundamental saying that reveals the world, and thus the human relation to the 
world—is a peculiarly alienated and anthropocentric understanding of human 
being and the world. As the culmination of the Western philosophical tradition, 
Heidegger claims that technology drives the human comportment towards itself, 
the world, and others. As such, Heidegger argues that technology is disclosive; we 
understand things in a technological sense because they are revealed to us as 
inherently technological. The modern technological world is driven by a focus on 
the measurable aspects of a phenomenon at the cost of its immeasurable aspects. 
Encountering the instrumental, measurable or calculable properties of a forest 
alienates us from its existential, ethical, and spiritual significance. For Heidegger, 
technology is a violent disclosure of the world that conceals the possibility of 
more harmonious, authentic human being. As such, Heidegger’s critique of 
technology is central to his recovery of the problem of Being. The critique is 
central to his broader project in so far as it is concerned with understanding how 
and why Being has been forgotten. Of greater significance to my own project, 
Heidegger’s critique of technology explores the many ramifications of such 
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forgetting, as well as the aforementioned existential, ethical, and spiritual 
significance of recovering the problem of Being. 
 
This chapter is dedicated to developing the context and foundations of the critical 
aspect of Heidegger’s critique of technology (the critical aspect of the critique 
itself is the focus of Chapter Two). In this chapter I explore Heidegger’s 
observations and reflections on modernity, an era he defines as the culmination of 
subject-object metaphysics, discussed below. For Heidegger, modernity is 
characterised by five essential phenomena: science, machine technology, art as 
aesthetics, human practices as culture, and the flight of the gods. Before outlining 
Heidegger’s reflections on these phenomena, which I refer to cumulatively as 
Heidegger’s critique of modernity, I first develop the context for my interpretation 
of Heidegger’s thinking more generally. The context I develop is based on 
Heidegger’s encounter with subject-object metaphysics, and how this encounter 
contrasts with, and helps make sense of, Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. 
Developing this context outlines my account of Heidegger’s thinking, while 
simultaneously introducing themes that re-appear throughout the second half of 
the thesis.  
 
Subject-Object Metaphysics 
The distinction between Heidegger’s phenomenology, discussed below, and 
subject-object metaphysics, is a small but significant shift in understanding the 
self—the condition for the personal pronoun I—in its relation to the world. For 
Heidegger, the Western philosophical tradition erroneously emphasises the subject 
as the centre and origin of experience, meaning, and value.1 As I discuss 																																																								
1 It is important to note that while the significance of the subject-object distinction was made 
explicit by René Descartes and developed by Immanuel Kant—discussed further in the body of the 
chapter—Heidegger believed that the foundation of subject-object metaphysics was established by 
Greek metaphysics. In the translator’s introduction to The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
Albert Hoftstadter states that Heidegger was concerned with the introduction of an “unavoidable 
subjectivism into ontology” (Heidegger 1982a, xxx) and that throughout the aforementioned work, 
“Heidegger often recurs to the point that all of philosophy is, as he puts it, ‘oriented to the subject.’ 
Even what seems the most naively and immediately objectivistic thought, ancient Greek ontology, 
is nonetheless oriented to the subject” (ibid).  Heidegger states that “[d[irection towards the 
subject—or toward what is basically meant by it, namely, our Dasein—is also followed by 
ontological inquiry in antiquity, that of Plato and Aristotle…in their effort to elucidate being, the 
Greeks proceed in the same direction as Kant” (73). It is the essential similarity throughout the 
entirety of the Western tradition that Heidegger refers to when he states that “[w]e not only wish to 
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throughout the thesis, most explicitly in Chapter Three, Heidegger understands 
this emphasis as bearing significant ethical implications. In the lectures following 
the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger seeks to further emphasise the 
distinction between his phenomenological2 position and subject-object 
metaphysics. As part of this endeavour, Heidegger dedicates lectures to Immanuel 
Kant, a thinker he regards as closer to the problem of Being than most post-
Cartesian philosophers.3 It is Heidegger’s understanding of the distinction 
between his own thought and that of his predecessors that is of particular 
importance to my thesis, not whether his interpretation of Kant (or the other 
thinkers he engages with) is accurate or charitable. Despite the importance of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant—found in Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics and Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason—for the most part, I turn here to The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.4 
The latter text provides ample evidence of the distinction between Heidegger’s 																																																																																																																																																								
but must understand the Greeks better than they understood themselves” (111). Here, Heidegger 
asserts that in order to understand the easily overlooked significance of subject-object metaphysics, 
and how deeply it is entrenched in modern discourse, one must critically engage with the essential 
metaphysical similarity of the Western metaphysical tradition: the subject-object distinction. For 
further discussion of Heidegger’s reference to the continuity and essential similarity of the Western 
metaphysical tradition see The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (73-112) and Introduction to 
Metaphysics (145-146). 
2 For Heidegger, understanding the nature of phenomenology (as a concept, as a method of 
inquiry) involves an ontological reimagining of what might be understood by the Greek concepts 
of ‘phenomena’ and ‘logos’. Heidegger formulates a definition of phenomenology as “to let that 
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (2008a, 
58). This unhelpful definition gains more traction once Heidegger’s thinking is put to work, and 
the discussion throughout the remainder of the present chapter, in conjunction with Chapters Two, 
Three, and Four, helps make sense of this seemingly circular definition. See Being and Time, pages 
49-63 for Heidegger’s analysis of the term and concept ‘phenomenology’. 
3 Given the influential and contested nature of both Heidegger’s and Kant’s thought, a critical 
comparison of the two (and their many intersections) potentially offers insights into each. In her 
essay ‘Early Heidegger’s Appropriation of Kant’, Béatrice Han-Pile (2005) provides an outline of 
existing critical comparisons of the two thinkers. Camilla Serck-Hanssen (2015) defends 
Heidegger’s reading of Kant as valuable to both Heidegger and Kant scholarship, highlighting the 
significance of understanding Heidegger in relation to Kant. See also Daniel O. Dahlstrom’s 
outline of some of the aspects of Heidegger’s reading of Kant “that most enraged some scholars of 
Kant and enthused others” (1994, 296). In his introduction to the fourth English edition of Kant 
and the Problem of Metaphysics, translator Richard Taft claims that the book “is significant both 
as a major contribution to twentieth-century Kant scholarship and as a pivotal work in Heidegger’s 
own development” (1997, xi). Despite the potential contention of the former claim, the latter 
indicates the importance of understanding Heidegger’s project as a whole as a response to what I 
will eventually characterise, following Heidegger, as the violent hubris of subject-object 
metaphysics.  
4 Delivered as a summer semester course in 1927 following the publication of Being and Time, The 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology is significant in developing the context of Heidegger’s thinking 
of the period. Albert Hofstadter notes in his translator’s introduction that the material covered in 
this text at least partially comprises what could have been Division 3 of Being and Time. 
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characterisation of subject-object metaphysics and his own thinking. In this lecture 
series, Heidegger responds to a number of thinkers, including René Descartes, 
G.F. Hegel,5 and Heidegger’s own mentor, Edmund Husserl. However, in this 
same text, Heidegger privileges Kant, stating that the latter is “the decisive 
intermediate station between Descartes and Hegel” (1982, 125).  
 
Heidegger’s chief concerns with subject-object metaphysics are the primacy given 
to the distinction between subject and object, and the manner in which such a 
distinction is arrived at. Corollary to these concerns, Heidegger understands 
subject-object metaphysics as inevitably collapsing into ontotheology, a system of 
thought that accounts for a first cause such as God, and, in doing so, 
problematically reduces the notion of divinity to something calculable (able to be 
measured and accounted for).6 For Heidegger, the formulation of modern subject-
object metaphysics—stemming from Descartes’ solipsistic7 position that nothing 
																																																								
5 Hegel is only treated to a minor degree in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and often with 
great sympathy, possibly due to the fact that Hegel had already arrived at the notion that Being and 
Nothing are the same: a formulation that would be decisive for Heidegger in 1969’s Seminar in Le 
Thor but as yet untouched by the Heidegger of Being and Time. Of interest in The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology is that Heidegger has already marked Hegel as of importance for bringing the 
problem of Being and the problem of God together (1982a, 29): this becomes the basis of the 
concept of ontotheology discussed briefly in volume three of Nietzsche (1991c, 241), and receiving 
an extended treatment in 1957’s The Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics—see footnote 
6, below. Heidegger claims that Hegel “saw and was able to see in philosophy so much more than 
had ever seen before, because he had an uncommon power over language and wrested concealed 
things from their hiding places” (1982a, 159).  
6 Outlined in depth in 1957’s The Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics, ontotheology is a 
term that emphasises a particular aspect of subject-object metaphysics. For Heidegger, Hegel 
identified the problem of Being and the problem of God as inherently linked in a way that 
Descartes or Kant, for example, had not. In Heidegger’s interpretation of the Western 
philosophical tradition, God had been reduced to a first cause since Aristotle; the deity become 
knowable as a concept understood in terms of its causal properties. The significance of this 
interpretation will become evident as the thesis progresses. Although not explicitly articulated to 
this same degree in 1927, the same kind of concern existed in Heidegger’s early thinking. I shall 
demonstrate the links between his early and later thought in regards to this kind of ontotheological 
reduction/cheapening of the world throughout this chapter and the next. 
7 While Heidegger did not critique the Cartesian subject by explicitly employing the concept of 
solipsism—other than a brief reference in volume three of Nietzsche where, in his discussion of the 
Overman (übermensch), he deconstructs the subject-object distinction to demonstrate the 
artificiality of an “egoistic and solipsistic” (1991c, 221) version of the subject that removes it from 
the world (objects)—the notion that the subject is the centre, perhaps sole origin, of sensation and 
perception and is thus also the origin of meaning and value as interpretations of said perceptions is 
central to his argument. I employ the notion of solipsism throughout the present thesis to highlight 
the implications that come from accepting certain ethical positions (for example) as merely 
subjective — I do not invoke the term as part of a straw person, but rather to highlight the degree 
to which subject-object metaphysics can distort and lose the essence of certain phenomena: this 
will become evident in my discussion of Heidegger’s critique of technology below.   
Chapter One — Modernity 	 22 
outside the subject can be known, later refined and encapsulated by Kant—
overlooks a more fundamental ontological position (1982a, 27-76). Put simply, 
Heidegger argues that in order to ask the question “how is it that I can know 
anything that is outside or beyond my self?” one must already have taken for 
granted the tangible ontological fact that human being is always already immersed 
in a world of objects and other people. From Heidegger’s position, seeking proof 
for the existence of the chair one sits on creates a peculiarly detached and artificial 
relation between one’s self and the chair; one’s thinking of the chair becomes a 
representation, rather than a direct, unmediated encounter. In a particular sense, 
and I paraphrase Heidegger’s position here for the sake of emphasis, seeking such 
a proof is a contrivance that overlooks one’s fundamental being-with the chair 
itself. For Heidegger, then, Descartes’ beginning point—a position of radical 
subjective doubt which the latter hopes “liberates us from all prejudices” 
(Descartes 2008, 10)—as well as the ongoing influence of this position in 
modernity, rests on a mistaken premise. Rather than characterise the distinction 
between subject and object as problematic, it is the primacy of the distinction that 
is of concern in that it valorises the position of the subject. The primacy of this 
distinction stems from the manner in which the distinction was deduced. 
 
From Heidegger’s perspective, Kant establishes a more satisfactory beginning 
point from which to explore the subject-object relationship than Descartes or other 
thinkers before him. For Heidegger, Descartes’ subject, the cogito, is 
metaphysically and epistemologically alienated from its world. This alienation is a 
product of Descartes’ original premise and his intermediate conclusion that the 
existence of the I can be established only through the anchor-point of God. The 
alienation (between subject and its world) is subsequently entrenched through the 
firm distinction between mind and body in the sixth meditation (Heidegger 2008, 
51-64). From the Heideggerian position that I am developing, alienation from the 
world and the phenomenologically embodied self8 reduces or existentially 																																																								
8 See Kevin Aho’s (2009) and David R. Cerbone (2002) for a discussion of the manner in which 
Heidegger sought to avoid any focus on the body as a kind of material thing or object like any 
other. While Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed what is perhaps the most significant and 
influential early phenomenological position that sought to understand the body as “in” the world in 
a similar sense to Heidegger (discussed in the next section of this chapter), Heidegger’s “neglect” 
of the body is not an exclusion or rejection of human being as embodied and is not 
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cheapens—rather than neutrally describes—the material world as a series of 
mechanistic, calculable properties. This is an important point that echoes 
throughout all of Heidegger’s work from Being and Time onwards: by describing 
human being as a subject in a world of objects that are only knowable in 
mathematical, calculable terms, the self is valorised as the origin of meaning and 
value while objects are reduced to mere objects. For Kant, however, the subject is 
not alienated from the world in this same sense.  
 
Neither exclusively rationalist nor empiricist, Kant’s formulation of the subject 
can not ‘know’ the world as such, but is, for Heidegger, formulated in a manner 
that is less skeptical of the external world than the Cartesian ego.9  While 
Heidegger criticises Kant’s starting point, he also makes a habit of “meeting Kant 
halfway and interpreting him favourably” (1982a, 48). For Heidegger, Descartes 
alienated the subject from a mechanistic, calculable world of objects that are less 
valuable than the subject, whereas Kant recovered the significance of the external 
world as constitutive of the subject—at least, the experience of the subject—in 
particular ways. From Heidegger’s perspective, the external world is not reduced 
or cheapened by Kant in the same way that it is by Descartes, yet Kant still makes 
the mistake of valorising the role of the subject in terms of constituting meaning 
and value. As such, the primacy of the distinction between subject and object, and 
the manner in which this distinction is formed in Kant’s work is still a problem for 
Heidegger: 
 
 According to Kant all thinking is an I-think … The reason for the deficiency of the
 Kantian explication of concepts regarding existence lies open to view: Kant is still
 working with a very crude psychology (1982a, 50). 
 
For Heidegger, the positing of an I-think that stems from an ego is, again, a 																																																																																																																																																								
incommensurate with such a position, but is, rather, further evidence of his unwillingness to 
continue to focus on any kind of “self” that could be conflated with a metaphysical position that 
valorises the I (whether embodied or not) as the centre of meaning and experience.  
9 It must be noted that referring to Kant’s position as a cohesive, unambiguous whole is 
contentious. Not only did Kant revise a significant portion of the Critique of Pure Reason, leaving 
scholars in a position of having to cite version A and/or B where appropriate, but the ongoing 
implications of Kant’s thinking remain contested. See Henry E. Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (2004, 3-19) for a brief discussion of much of the contest. 
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contrived description of human being in that it first stipulates a fixed point and is 
thus susceptible to being considered an extant thing. In treating the self as a fixed 
point, one misses the verbal being of human being and instead tends towards a 
“crude psychology”. When considered as a fixed point in this fashion, it follows 
that the subject pre-exists experience, or somehow remains isolated from what it 
perceives and posits as part of its subjectivity. Rather than address the 
fundamental happening of human being in what Husserl, and then Heidegger 
(although with a different sense), would later call its “intentionality” (Husserl 
1970,82),10 the positing of the subject as an I-think continues to valorise the 
subject as the centre of experience. By valorising the subject as the centre, 
Heidegger believes that the role of the world—in terms of a series of extant 
objects, but also cultural and historical narratives—is reduced or cheapened to 
merely mediated representations, merely the objects of experience of a pre-
existing subject. The crude psychology that Heidegger refers to is this same 
positing of a pre-existing subject. However, objects and the world are arguably 
more significant for the Kantian, rather than Cartesian, subject in that without the 
phenomena the subject is not complete: this reflects Kant’s rejection of 
rationalism as incomplete (O’Neill 1999, 290-293). Never the less, Kant is unable 
to achieve many of the goals that he sets out towards, as, from Heidegger’s 
position, Kant’s model of the subject was “not adequately a priori … the ontology 
of the human Dasein was lacking” (1982a, 55).11  
 
For Heidegger, subject-object metaphysics fails to comprehensively capture the 
essence of what it means to be human. By following what Heidegger might 
characterise as an essentially Platonic-Cartesian12 division between mind (or soul, 
form) and body, subject-object metaphysical questions often rest on mistaken and 
paradoxical premises. Accepting the premise of a question that asks how we can 
know the external world, or if other people or animals experience the world in a 
comparable way to one’s self places the subject into an egocentric and 
																																																								
10 All italics are from the original source unless stated otherwise. 
11 Heidegger appropriated the word Dasein to refer specifically to the type of being that humans 
have. I discuss Heidegger’s use of Dasein in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
12 Although I do not make reference to Plato in the present discussion, Chapters Two and Three 
explore Heidegger’s genealogy of the Western tradition in more detail. 
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anthropocentric position from which it is epistemologically difficult to escape. 
Importantly, as I will discuss below (and again in Chapter Two), Heidegger 
attributes the rise of a peculiar form of hubris to this position; this is an important 
point to retain in considering the ethical aspect of Heidegger’s thinking.13 I 
introduced this discussion by claiming that the distinction between Heidegger’s 
phenomenology and subject-object metaphysics is a small but significant shift in 
understanding the self. Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is not simply a 
metaphysical or epistemological reconfiguration of the subject, nor is it an attempt 
to simply replace the subject with an alternative model that continues to 
essentially play the traditional role of the subject in subject-object metaphysics. 
The shift from a subject-centric position to Dasein carries political and ethical 
implications that respond to what Heidegger perceived as the hubris of the subject. 
In exploring what Heidegger considers to be the more primordial14 structure of 
Dasein—the many structures of which contribute to the metaphysical subject by 
describing the ontological basis of subjectivity—Heidegger attempts to 
demonstrate what he believes Kant could not: that human being is not an isolated, 
synthesising spectator, but is constitutively in the world. 
 
Heidegger’s Phenomenology 
While Heidegger responds to metaphysics across many lectures and texts, it is a 
specific form of subject-object metaphysics that is his target. Despite the 																																																								
13 In Greek tragedy, ‘hubris’ denotes an excessive and harmful pride as well as a rejection or 
defiance of the gods (Waldron 1987, 4-20). I use the term ‘hubris’ in this sense throughout the 
thesis in order to emphasise the ethical and spiritual aspects of Heidegger’s critique of technology. 
In Chapters Three, Four, and Five I demonstrate how Heidegger’s notion of authenticity involves 
relinquishing the metaphysical assumption of a willing, ego-centric subject in order to allow the 
possibilities of each phenomena to be revealed. For example, as I discuss in Chapter Two, a 
modern technological perspective reveals a tree in its utility: as timber, fuel, or perhaps shade and 
shelter. However, Heidegger’s Fourfold of earth, sky, mortals, and gods—discussed in Chapter 
Five—can reveal the tree in its multivalence, revealing any number of existential or spiritual 
meanings. Where Heidegger states “[h]umanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas 
of man high enough” (2008d, 233-234), he does so in order to establish the idea that human being 
is appropriated by Being, or of the spontaneous (not human-caused) unfolding of phenomena: 
“humanitas in the service of the truth of Being” (254), otherwise thought of as Ereignis (discussed 
in Chapter Four). Heidegger does not privilege humanitas in a hubristic sense, but in a sense that 
requires a meditative openness to existence, discussed further in Chapters Three and Four. See also 
Chapter Four, footnote four, for a discussion of world-forming Dasein as opposed to the world-
poor animal. 
14 Primordial, a translation of ursprünglich, is an important concept for Heidegger that refers to a 
more fundamental or deeper grounding. Ursprüng relates to an origin or original source, such as a 
stream bubbling up through the rock of a mountain. 
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importance of Husserl’s insights into the intentionality of human being—that we 
are not comported towards abstract shapes and sounds that we subsequently make 
intelligible, but towards meaningful things—for Heidegger’s project, Heidegger 
criticises his former mentor’s position for continuing to valorise the subject at the 
expense of the world (1982a, 28, 58, 124-125).15 Despite the important steps that 
Husserl made towards a phenomenology of the self, for Heidegger, Husserl would 
ultimately reduce the “human being whose life is involved in the world of things 
and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-
noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of 
consciousness” (21). Despite this continued emphasis on the primacy of the 
subject-object distinction, Husserl’s method afforded Heidegger the opportunity of 
“leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being … to the 
understanding of the being of this being” (ibid).16 As stated above, the recovery of 
the problem of Being—including the Being of beings in the twin sense of that 
they are and how they are—was Heidegger’s overall project from at least Being 
and Time onwards. The recovery of Being rests on a distinction between subject-
object metaphysics and Heidegger’s position in terms of what the word Being 
indicates. The distinction between subject-object metaphysics and Heidegger’s 
position is characterised by Heidegger as an ontic-ontological distinction; a 
distinction in the focus on beings and Being (2008a, 32-35), also called “the 
ontological difference—the differentiation between being and beings … not 
between one being and another being but between being and beings” (1982a, 
																																																								
15 See John Van Buren’s ‘The Young Heidegger and Phenomenology’ (2002) for a discussion of 
Heidegger’s relationship to Husserl’s thinking. 
16 The opening chapter of Richard Capobianco’s Engaging Heidegger (2001, 6-33) makes sense of 
the difficult German phrase das Sein des Seienden, translatable as the being of beings, or, more 
effectively as the Being of beings. Capobianco outlines the various contexts in which this phrase 
appears in order to distinguish Heidegger’s approach, concerned with Being, the very presence of 
things, from the being of things in terms of the calculable, causal, mechanistic properties. In 
distinguishing this sense of the term, Capobianco also justifies the continued use of capital-B 
Being in English: as the primary concern of Heidegger’s thinking, regardless of the many 
descriptions and concepts that Heidegger employs to describe the problem, Being remains an 
appropriate rendering of Heidegger’s core concern. This, of course, comes with the caveat that the 
word Being not be conflated with its conventional meaning in subject-object metaphysics. Thus, in 
concert with Capobianco (34-51), in Chapter Four I discuss the importance of Ereignis as an 
integral concept for Heidegger’s thinking, and one that helps justify the continued use of the word 
Being by providing a conceptual underpinning that prevents the metaphysical conflation. 
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17).17 
 
Based on Heidegger’s ontic-ontological distinction, subject-object metaphysics is 
concerned with the ontic characteristics of extant entities. The ontic characteristics 
of an entity or phenomenon are its calculable, objective, measurable, causal-
representable, and mechanistic features: the various aspects of its physical 
properties and their potential effects.18 Under this distinction, all ontic inquiry in 
modernity is characterised by its subject-object metaphysical underpinnings. 
Understanding human being in terms of physiology, neurology, or psychology, or 
an individual person in terms of weight, gender, and race, for example, are all 
ontic endeavours. Ontic inquiry always first takes for granted that the entity itself 
is extant, that it is at all, and is thus oblivious to the problem of Being. From 
Heidegger’s position, then, such inquiry is always also at risk of generating or 
facilitating subject-centric hubris and a peculiarly unethical anthropocentrism 
(discussed further below and in Chapters Two and Three). Heidegger’s recovery 
of the problem of Being is guided by the ontic-ontological distinction; guided by 
the idea that Being itself is, although it is not extant in the sense of a material 
																																																								
17 The original passages from the English translation of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology by 
Albert Hofstadter, such as those found in the paragraph above, further demonstrate the utility of 
rendering Sein as Being rather simply as being (a convention not followed by Hofstadter, thus 
making the passage that this footnote is attached to less clear than it could be). The concept of the 
ontological difference is more readily understood in English with the capital B Being as it further 
distinguishes the concept from an entity or from the ontic metaphysical understanding of the being 
of an entity as causal and measurable. To re-phrase this last citation, the ontological difference is 
the difference between beings as extant entities and the very presence/existence—Being—of extant 
things at all.  
18 As I discuss further in Chapters Two and Four, the ontic features that I describe above as 
“measurable” or “mechanistic” (for example) are not simply physical or empirical qualities. The 
ontic features of a phenomenon may be abstract or theoretical. What ties Heidegger’s early 
definition of the ontic to his critique of technology is that he believes that any subject matter that is 
subjected to ontic inquiry is, in some way, ‘reduced’ to something causal or quantitatively or 
qualitatively calculable (the way in which it is pejoratively ‘reduced’ relates to the hubris of 
modernity and is explored in Chapter Two and Four). For example, a psychometric test designed to 
generate a score on a scale for depression, or a theological discussion of the creation of free will, or 
an equation in theoretical physics all render the phenomena in question ‘measurable’ in so far as 
the phenomena becomes describable in terms of its effects or its properties, and is thus able to be 
understood in mechanistic terms (the attribution of phenomena to God’s will is to attribute a cause, 
analogous—from Heidegger’s position—in fundamental ways to the function of a sine wave, or 
the ability to measure emotions using an appropriate scale or construct). The connection between 
the ontic and the critique of technology is traced throughout the remainder of this Chapter and the 
following. 
Chapter One — Modernity 	 28 
entity and is thus outside the scope of ontic inquiry. From his early thinking,19 
Heidegger’s recovery of Being was guided by the ontic-ontological distinction in 
two senses. First, thinking outside the subject-centric frame of subject-object 
metaphysics means that Being cannot be reduced to a feature of experience, or 
attributable to the existence of the subject, or thought solely in terms of a 
foundational mechanistic first cause such as a God or big bang. Second, being 
guided by the ontological difference means seeking a more primordial approach to 
understanding the being of entities than is possible from within the ontic framing 
of subject-object metaphysics. Heidegger characterised his phenomenological 
position as “fundamental ontology” (2008a, 61): the inquiry into Being upon 
which other ontologies are founded (34).20 In order to demonstrate the workings of 
fundamental ontology as a method for the recovery of the problem of Being, 
Heidegger turns the focus of Being and Time to human being, Dasein. The 
analysis of Dasein in Being and Time is an early and important attempt to 
reconcile the experience of selfhood while simultaneously de-centring human 
being and destabilising the primacy of the subject-object distinction.21 
 
As conceptualised by Heidegger, Dasein is not an ontic feature of human being 
and is unable to be treated as such. Rather, Dasein—literally translated as there-
being or here-being—names human being in its constitutively ontological being. 
Heidegger began his fundamental ontological analysis with Dasein for the 
following reason: as an entity that is existentially self-aware—Dasein’s existence 
is conspicuous as a matter of concern for it (2008a, 67)—Dasein is capable of both 																																																								
19 Theodore Kisiel demonstrates that, in one form or another, the ontological difference also guided 
part of Heidegger’s pre-Being and Time thinking (1995, 24, 37, 372-375). 
20 While Heidegger did not continue to refer to his methodology as fundamental ontology, 
preferring instead to simply characterise his post-Being and Time approach as thinking, where I 
refer to fundamental ontology throughout the thesis, I do so in order to specifically acknowledge 
the sustained and intentional difference between Heidegger’s approach and subject-object 
metaphysics as outlined by Heidegger in the late 1920s. 
21 See Robert Pippin’s The Persistence of Subjectivity, particularly Chapters Two and Three, for a 
discussion of the relation between Heidegger and Kant in regards to how the subject-object 
distinction is understood, and how “Heidegger is closer than he knows to the Kantian and post-
Kantian tradition, once one breaks free from Heidegger’s Cartesian interpretation” (2005, 67, 
footnote 25). This is a similar position to what I have outlined above. There are several moments 
throughout this thesis where I understand Heidegger to parallel Kant in certain aspects; that they 
share many foundational gestures, but that the ontological difference always ensures that neither 
thinker can be read entirely in concert with the other. For a critical analysis of the incongruity 
between Kant and Heidegger, see Sacha Golob (2013). 
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ontic and ontological inquiry. As such, Dasein has privileged access to Being as a 
vague guiding concept (32). While I discuss the structures of Dasein22 in more 
depth in Chapters Three and Four, it is important for the context of this chapter to 
understand how the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time distinguishes 
Heidegger’s position from subject-object metaphysics. One of Dasein’s central 
ontological structures is “Being-in-the-world” (78). Although explored most 
rigorously in Being and Time, the basic phenomenological insight of Being-in-the-
world remains an unspoken assumption for Heidegger throughout his later 
thinking.23 Being-in-the-world is an umbrella term, “a unitary phenomenon”24 
(78) that encapsulates the many ontological structures that constitute Dasein, 
including the two central component structures of “Being-in” and “the world”. 
Making sense of these components both clarifies Being-in-the-world as the chief 
unitary ontological structure of Dasein that distinguishes Heidegger’s thinking 
from subject-object metaphysics, and demonstrates how the recovery of the 
problem of Being offers a radically different perspective on human being. 
 
The world in Being and Time is the ontological structure that names the 
culmination of ontic discourses, social norms, and general cultural practices and 
beliefs that each person is exposed to. In a factical-ontic25 sense, each person is 																																																								
22 Division one of Being and Time is titled “Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein” 
(Heidegger 2008a, vii). In order to investigate “the meaning of Being” (41), Heidegger states that 
“we must lay bare a fundamental structure in Dasein: Being-in-the-world” (ibid). Heidegger goes 
on to explore a number of different aspects of human being (the various structures) including 
Being-with, Being-in, and Being-one’s-self. The Dasein analytic continues throughout Division 
Two of Being and Time also, and serves as an example of Heidegger’s fundamental ontological 
analysis by describing human being (in the verbal sense of be-ing) in a non-metaphysical (i.e. a 
non-psychological, non-anthropological) manner. See Part One, Division One, Section One of 
Being and Time (67-77) for Heidegger’s justification of the Dasein analytic as the beginning point 
for fundamental ontology. As I explore throughout the thesis, Heidegger names the totality of 
Dasein’s structures Sorge, care. See Chapter Three, page 88 onwards for a discussion of care as it 
relates to Dasein and Heidegger’s conception of human being. 
23As will become evident in Chapter Four, the foundational notion of Being-in-the-world already 
conceptually points towards much of what Heidegger later articulated with Ereignis. 
24 The notion of a unitary phenomenon that must be conceived as an unbroken whole despite its 
having several structures is a motif that Heidegger returns to time and again. See especially 
Chapters Four and Five for the way this motif appears as Ereignis and the fourfold.  
25 Following the ontic-ontological distinction, and prefacing many similar distinctions to be 
discussed throughout this thesis, Heidegger makes a distinction between the factual and factical 
aspects of Dasein. While the former are clearly defined, categorical, objective (and are thus 
obtainable through ontic inquiry) aspects of existence—the chemical composition of a certain 
mineral—the latter refers to the more fundamental and ontological facticity of Dasein. That 
Dasein’s phenomenal existence is always already comprised of a number of meanings and values 
derived from its world is evidence of Dasein’s facticity: Dasein’s ontological structures include 
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born into a set of meanings and values where her gender, her race, and her class—
and, significantly, the way these things are judged or valued by her community—
are already largely determined for her. Heidegger calls this pre-existing network 
of meaning and value that frames each person’s existence the world.26 Dasein is 
in-the-world in a phenomenologically constitutive, ontological sense. While an 
individual may choose to move from one country to another, or to abandon society 
and live as an ascetic, these are ontic modifications of her constitutive in-the-
worldness. The manner that Dasein is ‘in’ the world, is entirely ontological. An 
astronaut in space is still always in-the-world: the ontic notion of in, such as water 
in a glass or a person in space, is here replaced with the ontological in of Being-in-
the-world. While a person is alive her ontological being is Dasein, Dasein is 
always Being-in-the-world. Indeed, Heidegger posits Dasein as inexorably 
“thrown” (174) into the world, a concept that becomes increasingly important for 
his later discussion of authenticity and Ereignis (discussed in chapters Three and 
Four respectively). The ontological structure of human being is Dasein,27 the 
ontological structure of world being is worlding. The world worlds, and Dasein, as 
there-being, is always Being-in the worlding of the world. Dasein’s “thrownness” 
(ibid), Geworfenheit, is an ontological characteristic that can best be understood 																																																																																																																																																								
historicity and facticity in that its embodied being is always factical and historical, rooted in a time 
and a place, thrown into a series of meanings and values. Where I write factical-ontic, and later 
historical-factical-ontic, I refer not only to Dasein’s ontic embodiment, but the many layers of 
meaning and value that is an inevitable consequence of a particular persons embodied existence in 
a particular series of circumstances and contexts. For Heidegger, “existing is always factical.  
Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity” (2008a, 236). That one’s existence is not 
simply a matter of metaphysical abstraction, but of historical, factical, and ontic (where the factual 
may manifest) concrete circumstances is, as I shall demonstrate, the foundation on which my 
reading of Heidegger rests. Also see footnote 49, below, for a distinction between historical and 
historiological in Heidegger’s work. 
26 Section 14 of Being and Time develops four senses of the world, all of which are to be taken into 
account in terms of in-the-worldness. These four senses include two ontical senses: the totality of 
things of the world and the actual factical-ontic geographical spatial world of an individual person, 
and; two ontological senses: the Being of the totality of ontic beings, and worldhood, the active 
worlding of the world into which Dasein is thrown and exists with-in (2008a, 93). 
27 Perhaps one of the weakest aspects of Heidegger’s Dasein analytic is its inability to account for 
animals—as found in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and discussed elsewhere in the 
thesis—and thus, by extension, falters when taking into account ontic realities such as the 
neurological development of children, or the status of human beings with severely impaired 
cerebral functioning. This weakness is exacerbated when considering the Dasein analytic to be 
Heidegger’s most important insight, rather than an example of how a traditional metaphysical 
discussion of the self can be radically re-imagined by the recovery of the problem of Being. By 
interpreting the recovery of Being as containing an ethical component that is articulated most 
strongly through his critique of technology, Heidegger’s thinking does not necessarily need to 
resolve the question of who does and does not have Dasein. 
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through the phenomenological understanding that each person is factically-
ontically in her world in particular ways. While it is possible to interpret the 
relation of Dasein and the world through the frame of subject-object metaphysics, 
Heidegger is not making a claim that the existence of the tangible stuff of the 
world pre-exists humans, and therefore that the subject-object relation is a 
constitutive relationship. Heidegger is not interested in this kind of ontic (causal, 
with tangible and objective implications), metaphysical interpretation of 
phenomenology. Instead, what Heidegger demonstrates with his attempt to 
recover the problem of Being is precisely that the subject-object 
distinction/relation itself fails to recognise the unitary phenomenon of Dasein and 
the world. For Heidegger, this unitary phenomenon dissolves the primacy of the 
subject-object distinction—and thus the alienation of human being from its 
worldly context—by abandoning subject-centric thinking and replacing it with the 
more primordial analysis of Being. The consideration of existence itself, and the 
manner in which Dasein is given over to the phenomenality of the world, are thus 
the grounds for ontic thinking.  
 
Although Heidegger later abandoned formal references to ‘fundamental ontology’, 
the foundational assumptions that this methodology is based on, and the insights 
that it generates throughout Being and Time, remain an important part of his later 
thinking. The analysis of Dasein in Being and Time remains a vital aspect of 
developing an account of Heidegger’s thinking, in that, in conjunction with a text 
such as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, it demonstrates how he attempts 
to move beyond the alienating anthropocentrism of subject-object metaphysics. In 
moving beyond subject-object metaphysics, Heidegger’s thinking dissolves many 
traditional philosophical problems by displacing the subject and recovering the 
importance of objects as ontic manifestations of the world in which human being 
is constitutively in (more on this in Chapter Six). Heidegger’s thinking, however, 
generates a number of new problems, including: how to understand the experience 
of being a self, and how to understand one’s experience of this self in relation to 
the world. In understanding the world as world, how are we to respond to its 
worlding? The remainder of this chapter traces Heidegger’s thinking of modernity, 
the technological worlding of the world. Chapters Two and Four expand on the 
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modern technological world, while Chapters Three and Four explore the notion of 
the self in relation to Dasein and its interpretation of the modern technological 
world. In order to develop an account of the modern technological world I first 
explore the notion of equipmentality from Being and Time. This exploration will 
demonstrate the continuity of Heidegger’s thought and develop my broader 
argument around the centrality of the critique of technology to Heidegger’s 
thinking. 
 
Human Immersion in Equipmentality 
In Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to recover the problem of Being by 
introducing and demonstrating his phenomenological method of fundamental 
ontology. The method is phenomenological in so far as human being is always 
constitutively in-the-world, and ontological in so far as it relates to human ways of 
being, rather than any purely quantitative or ontic aspect of our being—“only as 
phenomenology is ontology possible” (Heidegger 2008a, 60). In dissolving the 
primacy of the subject-object distinction with the unitary phenomenon of Being-
in-the-world, Heidegger’s phenomenological interrogation of Dasein reveals that 
the world in which we are in is not simply “bare perceptual cognition[s]” (95, my 
insertion), but meaningful phenomena.28 An ontic analysis of human being can 
reveal the significance of neuro-physiological structures in shaping our experience 
of our self and the world in terms of transforming abstract shapes, colours, or 
sounds into meaningful phenomena. However, this is not what we, as Dasein, feel 
or experience in our pre-reflective comings and goings and thus has limited 
existential significance to understanding human being. In short, our experience of 
ourselves is not as an isolated observer that interprets data, but of an always 
invested and intentional (comported towards objects, goals, and others) being. 
Rather than a complex system of structures that interpret data as meaningful 
phenomena—which, again, is correct in an ontic sense—Dasein is in-the-world in 
that a person witnesses a bird in flight, watches her neighbour mowing the lawn at 
dusk, hears her favourite song, makes value judgements on current affairs. An 
extrapolation of this basic phenomenological characteristic of our in-the-																																																								
28 Sheehan’s (2015a) reading of Heidegger as primarily a thinker of meaning is consistent with this 
phenomenological aspect of Heidegger’s thinking.  
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worldness reveals what Heidegger calls das Zeug, “equipment” (97).29 By 
equipment, Heidegger also means, more colloquially, something like stuff, 
paraphernalia, or gear in English (97, translators’ note). For example, when I refer 
to my fishing gear, I refer to rods, reels, water-proof waders, beach chairs, 
particular clothes, hats, and fishing line. However, the more colloquial English 
terms do not quite convey the special significance of das Zeug as equipment. 
 
Equipment has equipmentality, the ontological characteristic that defines it. 
Equipmentality is always referential and instrumental: pen, ink, paper, letter, 
correspondence; hammer, nail, building, roof, hearth, home, safety, warmth.30 The 
hammer refers to the nail in the context of a specific teleological31 “in-order-to” 
(2008a, 97). Equipmentality does not arise from an assembled body of extant 
objects that are merely vorhandenheit, present-at-hand, but is the more primordial 
(in a phenomenological sense) ontological property of zuhandenheit, readiness-to-
hand (Heidegger 2008a, 98).32 The distinction between these two ontological 
characteristics is part of Heidegger’s phenomenological response to subject-object 
metaphysics. For example, a scientific investigation of a rock proceeds by way of 
the calculable, ontic properties of the rock, intentionally isolating these properties 
from any referential network of meanings or values and thus by encountering the 
rock as a merely present-at-hand extant object. However, the bush-walker, 
wishing to start a small campfire—an activity that demonstrates Dasein’s 
“towards-which” (99), and that is concurrently driven by Dasein’s in-order-to—																																																								
29 Equipment is the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of das Zeug, translated by Stambaugh as 
“useful things” (Heidegger 2010a, 68). I prefer the Macquarrie Robinson terminology as it allows 
the formulation of ‘equipmentality’ rather than ‘utility’ and makes sense of the phrase “there ‘is’ 
no such thing as an equipment” (Heidegger 2008a, 97) as opposed to Stambaugh’s “no such thing 
as a useful thing” (Heidegger 2010a, 68), which, in English, does not convey the sense that 
Heidegger intends. Equipmentality, however, does not necessarily carry the same implications of 
utility. 
30 Equipmentality makes evident that the ontological analysis of Dasein (as a starting point for the 
recovery of Being) demonstrates that human be-ing, what it is to be human, 
 is always implicated in the Seinsfrage, the problem/issue/question of Being. Further, this 
implication carries with it the notion that meaning—in both a neutral descriptive and normative 
sense—is a matter of Being; we never encounter properly neutral things or non-entities, we are 
always immersed in a world that is a horizon of intelligibility and that carries with it descriptive 
and normative frameworks.  
31 I use teleological in the sense of having a human oriented goal or end—the in-order-to or 
toward-which—in mind, rather than in a specifically Aristotelian sense.  
32 Readiness-to hand for Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger 2008a), handiness for Stambaugh 
(Heidegger 2010a). 
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encounters the rock not as a present-at-hand extant object, but in its readiness-to-
hand, to form part of the small rock barrier in which the campfire will be lit.  
 
As Being-in-the-world, Dasein rarely, if ever, encounters the merely present-at-
hand. Instead, Dasein encounters the ready-to-hand in its equipmentality. Just as 
one hears a bird in flight rather than an abstract series of acoustic waves that one 
must intentionally interpret in order to transform the data into a meaningful 
phenomenon, equipmentality describes the manner in which Dasein is comported 
towards a world of useful—usable—things. The referential quality of 
equipmentality is pre-cognitive in the sense that it is an aspect of our Being-in-the-
world: we do not consciously consider the car when we pick up the keys, nor does 
the feel of the keys require that we deliberately reflect on which key is which; 
instead these small acts, as reliant as they may be on neuro-physiological 
structures, are phenomenologically-existentially invisible to us, withdrawn into 
the ready-to-handness of equipmentality. In equipmentality, “[t]he wood is a 
forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind 
is ‘wind in the sails’” (Heidegger 2008a, 100). These phenomena are encountered 
in their ready-to-handness. Yet to better understand the significance of 
equipmentality, it is necessary to explore the reason that equipmentality does not 
simply break down even when a piece of equipment is no longer ready-to-hand. 
That equipmentality can withstand an interruption in achieving the towards-which 
or in-order-to is of special significance to Heidegger’s later critique of technology: 
even in a mode of unready-to-hand, what is encountered still remains trapped in 
equipmentality, rather than becoming a present-at-hand object that offers the 
possibility of encountering the object on its own terms, free of what might be 
characterised as its anthropocentric utility.  
 
A broken or unsuitably heavy hammer does not simply withdraw its readiness-to-
hand and show itself as a bare present-at-hand extant object that ruptures one’s 
immersion in equipmentality. Rather, as unready-to-hand, equipmentality 
continues to prevail. The hammer is still equipment, but now “in the sense of 
something one would like to shove out of the way” (Heidegger 2008a, 104). In the 
case of unready-to-hand equipment, Heidegger makes a distinction between three 
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“modes of concern” (102) of equipment: conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and 
obstinancy. As the name suggests, conspicuousness is the mode in which 
equipment becomes conspicuous rather than invisible. Of conspicuousness we are 
told that “[t]his presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not 
devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in 
this way [the example is ‘broken’] is still not just a Thing which occurs 
somewhere” (Heidegger 2008a, 103, my insertion). Obtrusiveness occurs when 
the remaining functional equipment is foregrounded by the unready-to-handness 
of the missing, broken, or unsuitable item: “[w]hen we notice what is unready-to-
hand, that which is ready-to-hand enters the mode of obtrusiveness. The more 
urgently we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in 
its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive does that which is ready-to-hand 
become—so much so that it appears to lose its character of readiness-to-hand” 
(ibid). Obstinancy is the characteristic of whatever stands in the way of our 
making use of a functional equipmental whole, in the sense of clearing a 
workspace before being able to effectively occupy the workspace as a space for 
work. The ready-to-hand becomes un-ready through no fault or flaw (missing, 
broken, unsuitable) of the equipmental whole, but through some external object, 
force, or phenomenon (ibid). 
 
In order that a link between my discussion of equipmentality and Heidegger’s 
critique of technology become apparent, it is important to hear what Heidegger 
says, but also how he says it. First, equipmentality demonstrates that one of the 
main ramifications of the phenomenological fundamental ontological insight into 
human being is the manner in which the external world shows up in its ready-to-
handness. This comportment towards the world is not just evidence for the 
efficacy of the phenomenological perspective, but demonstrates a kind of utility-
driven, perhaps even anthropocentric outlook towards the world. While 
demonstrating that Dasein is in the world, Heidegger also demonstrates that 
Dasein has a particular kind of relationship to the world. In attempting to 
demonstrate that Dasein is in-the-world, rather than alienated from it in the 
manner suggested by subject-object metaphysics, the early Heidegger perhaps 
inadvertently demonstrates a different kind of alienation between Dasein and the 
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world that the later Heidegger builds on. While what Heidegger says demonstrates 
human Being-in-the-world, how he says it reflects the hubris and 
anthropocentrism of a subject that has reduced the external world to equipment fit 
for use. Making this claim in a more direct fashion, Michel Haar states that “when 
analysing equipmentality in Being and Time he [Heidegger] disregarded the epoch 
as well as the structures passed on in history” (Haar 1993, 79, my insertion), or, 
stronger still, from Gregory Morgan Swer: “Being and Time, to use the later 
Heidegger’s terminology is an ‘Enframed’ work. It is an account of the 
fundamental categories of existence as perceived from within the Enframing” 
(2008, 103). I revisit this notion in Chapter Six. 
 
Rather than demonstrate a flaw in the notion of equipmentality, the “enframed” 
work of Being and Time demonstrates Heidegger’s recovery of the problem of 
Being, while also laying some rudimentary groundwork for his critiques of 
modernity and technology. Said groundwork is not simply the observation of 
Dasein’s being-with the physical world in a largely instrumental manner, 
however. The discussion of equipmentality also offers the possibility of Dasein 
coming to understand equipmentality for what it is. In making equipmentality 
itself visible, the ready-to-hand can become conspicuous; not in the technical 
sense referred to above, but conspicuous as ready-to-hand in the first place, as a 
reflection of the human comportment towards certain objects. Although the 
referential network of equipment does not collapse in the face of a broken, 
missing, or unsuitable tool, an interruption to the network does offer this one 
important possibility: the possibility of seeing the referential network for what it 
is. This is a motif that is repeated throughout Heidegger’s thinking and plays an 
integral role in my own thesis. In moments of interruption, equipment retains its 
equipmentality as either ready or unready-to-hand, but these ontological 
characteristics, including equipmentality and the world itself, become—for the 
first time—visible to Dasein: “the world announces itself … [t]he environment 
announces itself afresh” (105). In announcing itself as world, the world allows 
Dasein to become visible to itself as Dasein, rather than as a subject in a world of 
instrumental objects. As I will discuss in Chapter Three, and again in Chapter Six, 
the motif of the world becoming visible as world, and Dasein as Dasein, is 
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perhaps the most significant ethical aspect of Heidegger’s thinking. In coming to 
understand world as world, and the self as Dasein—no matter how brief this 
moment may be—one is obliged to make a decision: how to respond to this 
insight. 
 
The discussion of equipmentality is foundational for Heidegger’s critique of 
technology. Disparate elements of the critique, although not drawn together, are 
already evident in Being and Time: the general mistrust of subject-object 
metaphysics and its prevalence in modernity; nature as ready-to-hand; the call of 
conscience to reflect on what is revealed from the recovery of the problem of 
Being (the moment of decision that follows the revealing of the world as world, 
and Dasein as Dasein).33 While many of the central elements of Heidegger’s 
critique of technology can be found throughout Being and Time, they are not yet a 
cohesive critique of anything more than subject-object metaphysics in a general 
sense. Whether these elements were already part of a loosely cohesive critique of 
modernity that Heidegger pushed to the background in order to emphasise his 
fundamental ontological method, or if he was unaware of the implications of these 
aspects of Being and Time, it is significant that connections between Being and 
Time and his mature critique of technology are able to be directly traced, rather 
than simply inferred. It is significant as it demonstrates that Being and Time is not 
a treatise on human being as Dasein, but on Being itself, and, corollary to this, that 
the problem of Being always implicates, but is not reducible to, human being.34  
 																																																								
33 For Heidegger, “the call of conscience” (2008a, 314) relates to authentic human being (discussed 
in Chapter Three). The call of conscience not only beckons each individual to take stock of who 
and what they are—as being-in a world full of pre-existing meaning and values—but demands a 
response to such beckoning (and it is through this response that authenticity is determined). 
Conscience, and the call of conscience, is not simply the psychological phenomena of guilt, but the 
ontological structure that allows for such a phenomena to emerge: “[h]earing the appeal [the call of 
conscience] correctly is thus tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one’s ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being—that is, to projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost authentic potentiality” 
(287, my insertion). See Part One, Division Two, Section Two of Being and Time for further 
discussion of conscience and its relation to authenticity. See Chapter Three of the present thesis for 
a discussion of the ethical significance of authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking. 
34 From my reading of Heidegger, this is one of the greatest risks that a reading such as Thomas 
Sheehan’s (2015a) contains. Shifting the emphasis back to Dasein as that which makes the 
meaningful presence of things possible disregards the limits and properties of the things of the 
world that have a decisive say in how they interact with human being. More on this throughout the 
thesis. 
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Modernity as the Culmination of Subject-Object Metaphysics: Introduction 
Tracing the development of Heidegger’s critique of technology, beginning with 
equipmentality, presents a peculiar challenge: how to best present the 
development of the critique given Heidegger’s prolific output through the 1930s. 
Some of Heidegger’s works appeared posthumously in the Gesamtausgabe35, 
having not appeared in lecture or essay form at the time they were written.36 In 
particular, exploratory works such as Contributions to Philosophy (Of the 
Event),37 Mindfulness, and Country Path Conversations, while only available in 
English within the last decade, are integral to developing an account of the 
critique of technology. In tracing the development of a critique delivered in 1949, 
and refined in shorter works in the mid 1950s, one must hermeneutically move 
between works of the decade or two before it. A chronological account of 
Heidegger’s critique of technology, while possible, is not as practical as a 
thematic account. As such, while the present chapter leaps forward to the late 
1930s, subsequent chapters, particularly Chapters Three and Five, cover the 
intervening years. As I demonstrate below, throughout the 1930s in particular, the 
foundations of Heidegger’s critique of technology appear as a critique of 
modernity. For Heidegger, modernity and technology are inextricably linked by 
way of their subject-object metaphysical foundations. As his thinking develops, 
Heidegger concludes that modernity is not characterised simply by machine 
technology, but by the ontological essence of technology itself. 
 
In 1953’s Introduction to Metaphysics, a re-worked lecture course from 1935, 
Heidegger builds on many notions that he introduced in Being and Time.38 																																																								
35 The official collected works of Heidegger, arranged and sanctioned by Heidegger and, later, his 
family. 
36 Much of the material that is explored in these posthumous publications did appear in lectures 
and essays at the time in condensed and often conspicuously dense or obfuscatory passages. For 
example (discussed in the body of the chapter), the concept of the Gigantic appears in ‘The Age of 
the World Picture’, but is understood more readily in light of the posthumously published 
Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event). 
37 Hereafter referred to simply as Contributions. 
38 Throughout Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger re-visits questions from Being and Time, 
‘On the Essence of Truth’, ‘The Self Assertion of the German University’, and, obviously, for 
much of the first half of the entire work he revisits the themes that comprise the introduction and 
basis of 1929’s ‘What is Metaphysics’ (19, 41, 43, 52, 88). One of the major stylistics differences 
between these two texts is that by the time he wrote and delivered Introduction to Metaphysics, 
Heidegger’s thinking had been affected by his extended engagement with Hölderlin’s poetry 
(discussed in Chapter Five). 
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Introduction to Metaphysics is where Heidegger develops an explicit account of 
modernity as founded on subject-object metaphysics. In this work, Heidegger 
places the subject, and subject-object metaphysics, at the very heart of modernity. 
He illustrates this point by demonstrating how the contemporary Western use of 
language and understanding of our world and our selves is founded on a loss of an 
originary sense of Being and Being-in-the-world: 
 
But with … Latin translation, the originary content of the Greek word … is already thrust 
aside, the authentic philosophical naming force of the Greek word is destroyed. This is 
true … of all … translations of Greek philosophical language into Roman. This 
translation of Greek into Roman was not an arbitrary and innocuous process but was the 
first stage in the isolation and alienation of the originary sense of Greek philosophy. The 
Roman translation then became definitive for Christianity and the Christian Middle Ages. 
The Middle Ages trans-lated themselves into modern philosophy, which moves within the 
conceptual world of the Middle Ages and then creates those familiar representations and 
conceptual terms that are used even today to understand the inception of Western 
philosophy. This inception is something that we have left behind long ago and supposedly 
overcome (Heidegger 2000a, 14). 
 
The inception that Heidegger refers to in this passage is (what he sees as) the early 
Greek understanding, or at least problematising, of Being, that he is attempting to 
revive. Heidegger claims here that the translation of Greek philosophical concepts 
into Latin is the beginning of the oblivion of Being in the Western tradition. For 
Heidegger, language plays an enormously important role in shaping human being; 
this is discussed in more depth in Chapter Five (and alluded to at the beginning of 
this chapter in relation to technology as a particular form of logos). In forgetting 
or taking Being for granted, the subject-object distinction in its more nebulous, 
pre-Cartesian form flourished through the middle ages. For Heidegger, the 
linguistic shift from Greek to Latin involved interpretive and conceptual violence. 
The process is violent because it results in the loss of an “originary” sense of the 
Greek words. Heidegger believes that the Greeks were in tune with something 
akin to his own phenomenological fundamental ontological understanding of the 
self and the world; a less mediated Being-in-the-world, rather than 
epistemologically and metaphysically alienated subject-observers-interpreters of 
the world. An originary sense of Being, as I discuss in Chapters Two and Three, is 
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a sense of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, where the world and one’s sense of 
belonging to it is not only conspicuous, but acts as a kind of yardstick for guiding 
one’s everyday comportment. However, an originary sense of Being—including 
the ethical, spiritual, political, and theological implications that I discuss 
throughout the second half of this thesis—was, according to Heidegger, lost in 
translation. By comparison, the Latin, and particularly Christian, form of the same 
series of concepts and ideas (that pertain to human being and one’s understanding 
of self, world, and others) become framed by the subject-object distinction that 
valorises the subject as the centre of meaning and value, and reduces the world to 
representable, calculable, and instrumental objects. 
 
The final sentence of the passage above demonstrates Heidegger’s mistrust of 
(what he sees as) the drive of subject-object metaphysics, and the suspicion that he 
holds towards the notion of objective truth.39 The reference to what we have left 
behind and overcome is a direct reference to the notion that subject-object 
metaphysics determines objective truths, but in doing so devalues other possible 
truths as merely subjective. This idea is expanded on below. The originary sense 
of Greek philosophy that Heidegger refers to above is a common refrain 
throughout his later work and is significant for, although reconfigured in, the 
present thesis. An originary sense of Being is both a sensibility and a sensitivity, 
but contains none of the subject-oriented connotations of these terms. As 
originary, it is an unmediated cor-respondence40 to and with Being, instead of a 
reflection on one’s merely subjective experiences. In ‘The Age of the World 
Picture’ Heidegger stated “[t]he Greeks at the Olympic festivals could never have 
had ‘experiences’” (2002a, 71).41 As stated above, for Heidegger, the Greeks42 																																																								
39 The notion of truth receives an extended treatment below in the section titled ‘Art (and Poetry) 
as Aesthetics’. 
40 Throughout Heidegger’s Way of Being, Capobianco uses various forms of the neologism “cor-
respond” (see, for example, 48, 63, 67) to articulate the belonging-together of human being and 
Being; a concept I explore in depth in Chapter Four. The sense that I have employed the term 
above is appropriate in so far as I am demonstrating the under-pinnings of the fourfold which is, in 
turn, the fully fleshed out form of Ereignis and belonging-together. For Capobianco, the term cor-
respond is particularly important as it further demonstrates the distinction (that yet must always be 
thought as a unitary whole) between human being and Being. The two are always co-implicated, 
but Being is never reducible simply to a projection of human consciousness, or a projection of 
meaning and language that originates solely from human being. 
41 Heidegger’s pejorative use of “experience” in this passage refers to Erlebnis. Also translated as 
“lived experience”, Erlebnis, occasionally hyphenated as Er-lebnis, is used by Heidegger in 
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were not alienated from Being by the subject-object distinction but had an 
unmediated and originary sense of belonging to Being. As such, the Greeks did 
not fall prey to the kind of hubris and anthropocentrism that places the subject at 
the centre of existence and reduces the external world to calculable, instrumental 
objects. Only an “I” with a default position that is metaphysically alienated from 
its context (its world, its being, Being itself) can experience the world in this 
sense. Heidegger attempts to demonstrate that this notion of the subject is so 
deeply ingrained in Western culture that to attempt to think or speak outside the 
notion of experience is linguistically and conceptually difficult. It is important to 
note that it is an originary experience, rather than a specifically Greek experience, 
that Heidegger seeks and encourages each person to find. Indeed, in The Ister, 
Heidegger implores modern day thinkers to think and become “more Greek than 
the Greeks themselves” (1996, 81). 
 
For Heidegger, modernity is the culmination of subject-object metaphysics. As 
such, modernity has a number of defining characteristics. In Introduction to 
Metaphysics, these characteristics are referred to as “the darkening of the world, 
the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth” (2000a, 40). The “flight of the 																																																																																																																																																								
contrast to Erfahrung (also able to be translated into English as experience). The former term 
concerns Heidegger in that it carries with it the association of subject-object metaphysics. For 
Heidegger, Erlebnis describes the experiences of a subject that is metaphysically alienated from 
the world, a subject for whom objects can only be understood in their representable, calculable 
form, rather than as phenomena that contribute meaningfully to Dasein’s being-in-the-world. This 
notion can be understood more fully in the context of Chapters Three and Four where a discussion 
of the event of appropriation demonstrates the constitutive belonging-together of Da-sein and 
Being. The notion of a lived experience as Erlebnis would presuppose a kind of intrinsic or 
essential distinction or difference—a belonging-together—between the two. By comparison, 
Erfahrung is used more freely by Heidegger to describe the often-transformative originary sense of 
Being that one might describe as an experience of Dasein. For a contrast of Erlebnis with 
Erfahrung see Robert Bernasconi’s The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being 
(1985, 81-85). Also see Chapter Three of Richard Capobianco’s Heidegger’s Way of Being (2014, 
38-49) for a discussion of how Erfahrung, and the notion of experience functions within 
Heidegger’s thought beyond the lived experience of a subject. 
42 Heidegger’s relation to the ancient Greek thinkers is complex. While he is heavily influenced by 
Aristotle, he never the less attributes the beginning of metaphysics to Plato and Aristotle. In Early 
Greek Thinking, Heidegger’s encounter with Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus privileges 
these pre-Socratic thinkers in his interpretation of what they say from their pre-metaphysical 
positions. In his introduction to the above named text, translator David Farrell Krell characterises 
Heidegger’s position thus: “[w]e cannot hide ourselves from what is in these fragments, since what 
they say or do not say to Plato and Aristotle, and through them to the Schoolmen and to all modern 
science and philosophy, shapes our thoughts about Being and man. These in turn determine the 
character of our world” (1984, 10). Despite the importance of Plato and Aristotle, coming to terms 
with the pre-Socratic thinkers and their experience of Being is of great importance for Heidegger. 
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gods” is a specific reference to the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin, and is treated in 
depth in Chapter Five of the thesis. Due to the multivalence of the word ‘earth’,43 
the “destruction of the earth” has two meanings: first, the literal ontic sense that 
refers to what Heidegger saw as the violent technological domination of humans 
over the environment—perhaps the first explicit reference to the environment that 
builds on the passage discussed in the above section on equipmentality—and 
second, that the earth represents a kind of limit to human hubris that is being 
destroyed and forgotten in modernity. In a characteristically poetic turn of phrase, 
“the darkening of the world” is, for Heidegger, a general loss of a sense of non-
anthropocentric meaning, a “spiritual decline” (ibid), marking the seeming 
impossibility of recovering an originary sense of our being: 
  
[T]he … hopeless frenzy of unchained technology …When the farthest corner of the 
globe has been conquered technologically and can be exploited economically; when any 
incident you like, in any place you like, at any time you like, becomes accessible as fast as 
you like … when time is nothing but speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity … what then? 
(Heidegger 2000a, 40). 
 
The eschatological44 timbre of this passage is echoed in the exploratory writing of 
Contributions, where Heidegger answers his rhetorical “what then?” with the call 																																																								
43 The multiple senses of the earth are discussed in Chapter Five. 
44 In the posthumously published interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger famously states “[o]nly a 
god can save us” (Richardson 1981, 57). In this sense, Heidegger’s thinking is eschatological in 
that it is concerned with the end of modernity and the alienation of the human from Being, and the 
commencement of what is often referred to in Contributions as “the other beginning” (Heidegger 
2012b, 136). The other beginning is not a completion or overcoming of metaphysics in the same 
way that Heidegger would characterise Nietzsche’s work (discussed in Chapter Two), but is, 
rather, the dawning of an epoch founded on an originary sense of Being; an epoch attuned to 
fundamental ontology, outside the framing of subject-object metaphysics. The concept of the other 
beginning and the eschatological aspect of Heidegger’s thinking (and associated language) are 
especially prone to criticisms of mysticism and/or obfuscation. The chief problem with this aspect 
of “Heideggergegacker (“Heidegger Cackling”)” (Sheehan 2015a, xix) is that it can be employed 
in vacuous or non-sensical ways, i.e. sentences can be constructed in a manner that ostensibly 
sounds Heideggerian, but that say very little. Thomas Sheehan is particularly suspicious of much 
contemporary Anglo Heidegger scholarship for this reason, expressing his distrust of poetic 
technical terms and dense Heideggerian language. For example, in reference to the notion of 
Ereignis as developed in Contributions, Sheehan rhetorically warns those who relish Heidegger’s 
dense, poetic, technical language that “Heidegger is not talking about an event in future history, 
when the authentic among us will ‘enter Ereignis’ as if crossing the bridge into a post-
metaphysical Valhalla” (263). However, if there is a failing in Heidegger scholarship in leaning too 
heavily on Heidegger’s language to deploy his thinking, Heidegger bears only part of 
responsibility for such a failing. Heidegger’s thinking is an attempt to radically break free from 
entrenched subject-object metaphysics, and, as such, it requires that those who wish to engage with 
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toward the “other beginning” (2012b, 7). The other beginning is Heidegger’s 
name for the dawning of an age free from the culminating conceptual oppression 
of subject-object metaphysics. In the above passage, Heidegger explicitly refers to 
the manner in which modern technology is intrinsically related to both economic 
exploitation and a profound shift in the ways in which people in developed 
Western nations are able to interact and engage with their surroundings—with the 
implication that things can be however “you like”.45 From Heidegger’s 
perspective, this human comportment towards the cosmos is characteristic of 
modernity and is the result of over two millennia of Western subject-object 
metaphysics. The reference to time in this passage pre-empts the introduction to 
1949’s Insight Into That Which Is lectures by gesturing to the difference between 
an ontological understanding of time in which nearness and distance, or the 
experience of a moment or happening are unable to be reduced to purely 
objective, quantitative understandings of time. This kind of distinction—a direct 
reflection of the ontological difference—will go on to play a highly significant 
role in the critique of technology, where Heidegger argued that qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of human existence must be understood on their own terms, 
rather than forced into a subject-object metaphysical framework. More on this 
below. 
 
Modernity as the Culmination of Subject-Object Metaphysics: Five Phenomena 
Published while composing a number of other lectures and manuscripts, 1938’s 
‘The Age of the World Picture’ condenses much of what Heidegger explored in 
Introduction to Metaphysics, and is quite clearly indebted to the exploratory 
thinking found throughout Contributions. At the commencement of ‘The Age of 
																																																																																																																																																								
his thinking remain conscious of the baggage that comes with certain words, concepts, and 
linguistic devices. While it is possible to make some of Heidegger’s central phenomenological 
insights familiar by using conventional language and concepts, this making-familiar loses much of 
what Heidegger attempted to extrapolate from art and poetry. See Chapter Five for a discussion of 
the gods and poetry and the manner in which making-familiar risks losing the possibility of a 
genuinely new encounter. 
45 This glorification of having things however you like is inconsistent with Heidegger’s thought. 
The link between having things as you like and the valorisation of the subject is central to my own 
project in that it again assumes that meaning and value and a worthwhile existence revolves around 
the subject and its subjective preferences. The notions of earth and gods that have either been 
destroyed or are in flight play an important role in providing limits in our day-to-day lives. These 
ideas will be woven together in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.  
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the World Picture’, Heidegger defined modernity by its “essential phenomena” 
(2002a, 57): 
 
1. Science	 
2. Machine technology 
3. Art as aesthetics 
4. Human practices as culture 
5. The loss of the gods 
 
Many of the key features that underpin Heidegger’s mature critique of technology 
are found in his discussion of these five phenomena (they are also treated at length 
in Contributions).46 These five phenomena share a common root: subject-object 
metaphysics. A hermeneutic interpretation of Heidegger’s treatment of these 
phenomena in light of his critique of technology clarifies his later claim that the 
essence of technology is nothing technological. Further, such an interpretation 
demonstrates the efficacy of his critique in highlighting the many ways that 
human being is framed, or ordered by a prevailing series of metaphysical 
assumptions. Although he lists five distinct phenomena, there is a striking 
continuity throughout. Indeed, regardless of the content or subject matter that he 
turns to, all of Heidegger’s thinking, including the critique of technology, revolves 
around the recovery of the problem of Being. The following discussion focuses on 
the first three phenomena. I omit the fourth and fifth phenomena here due to a 
more extensive exploration of the loss of the gods and the gods in general in 
Chapters Five and Six, while the observation of “human practices as [or reduced 
to] culture” forms part of the broader framework for the second half of the thesis 
overall.47 
 																																																								
46 Contributions offers an extended insight into modernity as the darkening of the world (from 
Introduction to Metaphysics), but in a manner so convoluted that a full treatment of it here is 
impractical and unnecessary for the argument that I am developing. Instead, I will generally 
extrapolate from ‘The Age of the World Picture’ and note supporting pagination from 
Contributions. 
47 Discussed at length in Chapter Five, the language of gods is difficult in that while it stems from 
Heidegger’s engagement with Hölderlin, the gods take on a non-theistic—rather than any kind of 
a/theistic—ontological meaning. The gods exist wholly outside subject-object metaphysics and, as 
such, are wholly incalculable. The flight of the gods does not simply represent the triumph of 
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1. Science 
In his introduction to What Is Called Thinking? translator J. Glen Gray notes that 
it is important to understand that the word ‘science’ is the English translation of 
the broader German term Wissenshcaft and thus incorporates “history, literature, 
and philosophy as well as the natural sciences” (Gray 2004, viii). For Heidegger, 
the essential feature of science is that it is a particular type of inquiry that is 
founded on, and subsequently further entrenches, subject-object metaphysics. For 
Heidegger, then, scientific thinking contains the same risks as subject-object 
metaphysics, namely the oblivion of Being, and the valorisation of the subject as 
the centre and origin of meaning and value, leading to hubristic anthropocentrism 
and a cheapening of the external world to equipmental instrumentality and 
calculability. To scientifically investigate an object, entity or phenomenon is to 
address it in terms of its objective calculable properties. The object is represented 
to the subject (rather than occurring as a constitutive phenomenological event that 
corresponds to Dasein’s thrownness) in such a way that any qualitative 
characteristics that can be attributed to the object are precisely that: attributed to 																																																																																																																																																								
science over superstition, but indicates that the possibility of finding value or meaning from 
anything outside the scientistic perspective has become (mostly) invisible. In this manner, the 
flight of the gods is symptomatic of modernity in the same way that art, poetry, and language have 
lost their disclosive power (discussed in section Three, below) and are reduced to subjective 
conjecture. “Human practices as culture” is a complex phenomenon that I indirectly refer to in 
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight. It relates to the manner in which Heidegger believes that, in 
modernity, the hubris of subject-object metaphysics discloses modernity itself as a supremely 
objective and a-historical age. From a perceived position of neutrality, one is able to make 
objective anthropological observations on the various ways that groups of human beings manifest 
their relation to Being (think of physical and/or symbolic expressions of a significant sense of 
belonging to the land by first nations peoples, for example). From a perceived position of objective 
neutrality, one is unable to view the adoption of this very position as a human practice like any 
other, i.e. as containing a number of symbolic and uninterrogated value judgments and 
metaphysical presuppositions. Only from this position, and while this position itself remains 
invisible, can human practices be reduced to culture. This last point is more thoroughly developed 
in section Three below, in that the reduction of human practices to culture rests on the same 
mechanisms that reduce art to aesthetics. In Parmenides, a lecture course delivered in 1942-43, 
Heidegger claimed that “There has been ‘culture’ only since the beginning of the modern period; it 
began the moment veritas became certitudo, when man posited himself for himself and made 
himself, by his own ‘cultivation’, cultura, and be his own ‘creative work’ a creator, i.e., a genius 
… From the standpoint of the Greeks, what is called ‘culture’ in the modern period is an 
organization of the ‘spiritual world’ produced by the willful power of man. ‘Culture’ is the same in 
essence as modern technology” (1992, 70). Human practices as culture, and the loss of the gods 
share the same feature as the three I address in the body of the text, namely that they are features of 
modernity that reflect modernity as an historical era that is defined by its historiological outlook, 
thus perceiving itself as a-historical. An important aspect of the perceived a-historicality of 
modernity, is the manner in which its supposedly objectively true observations are in fact already 
the product of a number of systemic race, gender, and class biases that then become entrenched as 
fact, as unexamined presuppositions. This is discussed in depth in Chapters Six and Seven. 
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the object by the subject, rather than stemming from the object itself. The success 
of the natural sciences rests on this ontic mode of inquiry and is proper to it. 
Heidegger’s concern, however, is that the success of the natural sciences creates 
an ongoing tension that extends beyond academia and is manifest—politically, 
culturally, ethically—in modernity. This tension stems from the notion that other 
modes of thinking and inquiry should be brought into line with the natural 
sciences. Heidegger sees a danger here with respect to areas of inquiry that are 
able to offer insight into human being: history, anthropology, psychology, 
aesthetics, and theology, for example, are violently transformed by science in the 
same way that Greek concepts are when translated into Latin. 
 
 Mathematical knowledge is no more rigorous than philological-historical knowledge. It 
 merely has the character of “exactness”, which does not coincide with rigor. To demand 
 exactness in the study of history is to violate the idea of the specific rigor of the
 humanities (2008b, 94). 
 
In this passage, from 1929’s ‘What is Metaphysics’, Heidegger indicates that 
critical thinking can take different forms. Despite the success of the natural 
sciences the “rigor of the humanities” does not necessarily rely on the reduction of 
phenomena into objectively calculable properties. Heidegger’s mistrust of science 
is based on the primacy of the subject-object distinction, and the valorisation of 
the subject. Heidegger grants science the status of “essential phenomenon” 
precisely because he reasons that scientific thinking inherently, albeit unwittingly, 
devalues un- or non-scientific thinking. Accepting the success of science in a field 
such as physics does not mean that one should apply the same measures of 
objective truth or the same method of inquiry with respect to art, history, or 
therapeutic measures for emotionally traumatised people (although science can 
augment or complement these things). Yet in the wake of the Enlightenment, and 
the subsequent challenge to the authority of the church, an uncritical reliance on 
scientific inquiry has become entrenched in modernity. In particular, Heidegger is 
concerned that this general shift toward science—at the expense of other modes of 
thinking—comes at an ethical and spiritual cost. Accepting only objective, 
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calculable facts as properly true inherently devalues other forms of knowledge and 
becomes itself a kind of bias when used outside its proper domain.48 Through this 
kind of scientism “[m]an becomes the referential center of beings as such” (2002a, 
66). 
 
From his reading of the Western philosophical tradition, and specifically the 
manner in which subject-object metaphysics developed into an invisible, 
ubiquitous, overarching perspective that informs Western thinkers to various 
degrees, Heidegger considers scientific thinking a mode of inquiry that inherently 
over-reaches its legitimate jurisdiction. Heidegger does not deny the pragmatic 
utility of the scientific method, but laments the notion that in adopting the method 
(and its underlying metaphysical assumptions) such pragmatic utility comes to 
define the human relation to its world at the exclusion of other possibilities. In 
‘The Nature of Language’, Heidegger employs Nietzsche in order to express this 
same sentiment:  
 
 The sciences know the way to language by the term ‘method.’ Method, especially in
 today’s modern scientific thought, is not a mere instrument serving the sciences; rather, it
 has pressed the sciences into its own service. Nietzsche was the first to recognise this
 situation, with all its vast implications, and to give it expression in the notes that follow.
 These notes are found in his literary remains, as number 466 and 469 of The Will to
 Power. The first note runs: ‘It is not the victory of science that distinguishes our
 nineteenth century, but the victory of scientific method over science (1982b, 74). 
 
In this passage, Heidegger argues that the widespread socio-cultural adoption of 
the scientific method simultaneously marks the adoption of a scientistic bias. 
While the scientific method is used in order to overcome personal bias on the 
behalf of the researcher, for Heidegger, the adoption of the scientific method 
beyond the natural sciences and into the humanities (where the method is not 
strictly employed, so much as its assumptions of validity are retained) indicates a 
far deeper metaphysical bias that privileges the subject at the expense of the 
world. In modernity, the scientific method has “pressed the sciences into its own 																																																								
48 In Chapter Six I will demonstrate that the devaluation of “subjective” knowledge is also a 
peculiarly gendered phenomenon, and that subject-object metaphysics more broadly is a 
historically masculinist endeavour. 
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service” in such a way that a critical thinker within a formal academic or 
vocational setting is unable to move beyond the role of an ontic researcher, unable 
to extrapolate meaningful qualitative information from quantitative data without 
the risk of such qualitative information being dismissed as merely subjective 
conjecture. The prevalence of scientism is such that “the researcher presses 
forward into the sphere occupied by the figure of … the technologist. Only in this 
way can he remain capable of being effective, and only then, in the eyes of his 
age, is he real” (2002a, 64).49 In modernity, only a thinker whose work conforms 
to the epistemological constraints of science—where the subject-object distinction 
plays a normative role; the subjective is speculative conjecture, the objective is 
genuine knowledge—is validated by her peers. This “establishment of the 
precedence of methodology over the beings (of nature and history) … The 
decisive unfolding of the character of modern science … produces … a human 
being of another stamp” (2002a, 64). For Heidegger, it produces a human being 
that is invariably alienated from her world, who assumes that—in the absence of 
divine grounding or religious authority—the individual is the sole origin of 
meaning and value. 
 
2. Machine Technology: Machination, the Gigantic 
From Heidegger’s perspective, machine technology is the physical manifestation 
of scientism in that it reflects an already existing human comportment towards the 
world. From this perspective, machine technology is not just an offshoot of 
science, but “an autonomous transformation of praxis, a transformation which first 
demands the employment of mathematical science” (2002a, 57). Machine 
technology both reflects and perpetuates the scientistic reduction of the cosmos to 
its calculable, properties,50 it is “the most visible outgrowth of the essence of 
																																																								
49 Heidegger pejoratively describes the reduction of a scientist to a researcher, and the researcher 
into a technologist in the sense that working within the confines of ontic inquiry does not—in the 
absence of a prevailing attitude of scientism—necessarily mean shutting oneself off from 
discussing the ontological (or indeed existential in the sense of pertaining to one’s human 
existence) implications of one’s work. As part of his critique of modernity, Heidegger was 
explicitly critical of the academic institution of his time that, from his perspective, bowed to the 
pressure of modernity and perpetuated and sustained the scientism of the age rather than inspiring 
new and revolutionary thinkers. 
50 In The Ister, Heidegger stated “[t]he machine of modern technology is essentially distinct from 
every kind of ‘tool’ … What is distinctive about modern technology is that it is no longer a mere 
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modern technology, an essence which is identical with the essence of modern 
metaphysics” (ibid). In Contributions, the identical essence of modern (subject-
object) metaphysics and modern technology, is referred to as “machination” 
(2012b, 32), and expressed in the final moments of ‘The Age of the World 
Picture’ as “the gigantic” (2002a, 71). Machination is “a mode of the essential 
occurrence of being…the distorted essence of being” (2012b, 99).51 This claim, 
published posthumously, demonstrates that by the late 1930s, Heidegger had 
largely developed his mature critique of technology in terms of what he would 
finally name Ge-stell (discussed in Chapter Two), but suggests that he had not yet 
found a satisfactory way to articulate the later concepts of Ge-stell and Ereignis.52 
Machination refers to a mode of production, a method of  
 
 making … which we assuredly know as a human activity. This latter, however, is itself 
 precisely only on the grounds of an interpretation of beings in which their makeability
 comes to the fore, so much so that constancy and presence become the specific
 determinations of beingness (100).  
 
Machination is a mode of production that can only recognise and reproduce 
calculable, quantitative characteristics. The “makeability” of things—which 
reflects their objective, calculable, and ultimately instrumental properties—echoes 
the notion of readiness-to-hand and equipmentality. In one’s everyday being in the 
world, one rarely sees the things around us as simply present-at-hand. Instead, 
Dasein is chiefly absorbed in non-thematic circumspection, where objects are 
disclosed by machination in a peculiar way: objects remain invisible to Dasein as 
either abstract shapes/colours, or as independent entities containing an excess of 
possible meanings in themselves, and instead disappear into a referential 
equipmental whole that exists for instrumental ends. As is the case with a break 																																																																																																																																																								
‘means’… but that it itself is unfolding a kind of domination on its own” (1996, 44), recognising 
that “[c]onceived metaphysically, technology is a special kind of ‘truth’…” (44). 
51 The lower case ‘being’ here is still Being, the appropriating-giving that is the grounds for 
presence. The notion of a distorted essence of being becomes increasingly important for the 
critique of technology and is fleshed out further in my discussion of Ereignis in Chapter Four.  
52 In Chapter Four I refer to the lecture-essay ‘Time and Being’, the supporting notes from which 
demonstrate that Heidegger’s thinking of Ge-stell and Ereignis had manifested in his thinking 
since the 1930s, but that it was these later formulations that he was most satisfied with. In Chapters 
Two and Four I will discuss the manner in which the notions of Ge-stell and Ereignis make sense 
of these earlier formulations of the “essential occurrence of being” and the “distorted essence of 
being”. 
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down in an equipmental referential whole, making machination visible affords the 
possibility of understanding that the disclosure of objects in their makeability is a 
glimpse of “the essential occurrence of beyng” (Heidegger 2012b, 101).53 As 
such, coming face to face with the worlding of the world and one’s own Dasein 
creates the obligation to make a decision in regards to one’s continued existence. 
In understanding machination qua machination each person is faced with a 
decision to accept, reject, or reconfigure such a disclosure of objects. Each is 
offered the chance to see the environment afresh, and one’s attention is drawn to 
the now-conspicuous fact that things are (in an extant sense), as well as that one’s 
understanding of how (and what) one identifies as ‘the self’ is the result of the 
way each person is contextualised—framed—by the world. 
 
Machination is a disclosive mode of production. As disclosive, however, this 
mode is also “distorted” in some sense. Note that with the introduction of the 
“distorted essence of being”, Heidegger does not create a conceptual binary, only 
a linguistic one. The distorted essence of being is always still the essence of being, 
it is not the un-essence or non-essence of being, and the tension—rather than a 
categorical distinction—between the two will becomes increasingly important 
when understanding how this early thinking ties directly to the later notion of Ge-
stell. Machination, as with scientism, is purely concerned with objects in their 
quantitative calculability. Further, and as already discussed above, machination 
enforces the notion of the subject by sharing a “common root” (Heidegger 2012b, 
101) with what Heidegger pejoratively refers to as “lived experience” (101):54 the 
notion of experience as thought from the mediated position of the metaphysically 
alienated subject. Discussed throughout much of Contributions, and appearing 
briefly in ‘The Age of the World Picture’, ‘lived experience’ is a phrase used by 
Heidegger to indicate that it is the subject—thus the subject-object distinction, 
thus the subject as alienated from its world (antithetical to the manner in which 
Dasein is in and of the world)—that is at the heart of modernity. Scientism and 																																																								
53 The archaic spelling of Sein as Seyn (rendered as beyng in this passage) represents Heidegger’s 
attempt to think Being in an originary sense, where “originary” refers to fundamental ontology: the 
attempt to think Being outside the framing of subject-object metaphysics. See the translator’s 
introduction to Mindfulness (2008c, xxviii-xxix) and Daniela Vallega-Neu’s Heidegger’s 
Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction (2003, 7, footnote 1). 
54 See footnote 35 above for a discussion of “lived experience” as Erlebnis. 
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machine technology are properly anthropocentric in this sense. This 
anthropocentrism does not just alienate the subject from its surroundings thus 
reducing those surroundings to an essentially instrumental totality, but in 
conjunction with the attitude of scientism, it devalues any form of knowing or 
being-with this totality that understands it in any other manner. 
 
[M]achination and lived experience … drive each other to the extreme and thereby extend 
the deformations of beingness, and of humans in their relation to beings as well as to 
themselves, into their most extreme abandonment … The coming together of machination 
and lived experience contains a peculiar event within the hidden history of beyng. Yet 
there is no sign anywhere that the present era has the least knowledge of it (Heidegger 
2012b, 105). 
 
The “deformations” spoken of here are the same distortion of the essence of Being 
referred to previously; they are discussed further in Chapter Three. What is 
evident in this passage, however, is that for Heidegger, machination represents an 
aspect of modernity that encompasses a scientistic perspective of the world that 
manifests in machine technology as well as the human understanding of her own 
being in relation to her world, other people, and her self in terms of “extreme 
abandonment”; the divide between subject and object. Further, as a mode of being, 
machination is so deeply entrenched, so ubiquitous, that it remains invisible. This 
last point is particularly important when applying Heidegger’s thinking to 
contemporary issues. 
 
Machine technology and machination are also characterised by “the gigantic”. The 
gigantic is not a literal reference to size, but a figurative reference to an attitude of 
extremes and excess: making the big bigger, the small smaller, and the fast faster. 
The off-road vehicle with the biggest wheels and most powerful engine, the tallest 
building in the Southern hemisphere, the smallest camera phone, the fastest train, 
the smoothest ride, the loudest speaker with the smallest diameter, the most 
‘silent’ dishwasher; all reflect the gigantic. The gigantic is Heidegger’s name for 
the disclosive aspect of machine technology where the quantitative becomes 
qualitative; where the sheer capacity of a phenomenon is regarded as a value of 
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great importance.  
 
 The gigantic presses forward in a form which seems to make it disappear: in destruction
 of great distances by the airplane, in the representation of foreign and remote worlds in
 their everydayness produced at will at the flick of a switch … One thinks too
 superficially, however, if one takes the gigantic to be merely an endlessly extended
 emptiness of the purely quantitative …The gigantic is, rather, that through which the
 quantitative acquires its own kind of quality, becoming thereby, a remarkable form of the
 great (Heidegger 2002a, 71-72).  
 
For Heidegger, the gigantic actively conceals itself: in making the world smaller, 
the way we relate to the world through technology is hidden behind its own 
enormity. The gigantic is concerned with sheer quantity; a radical shift in quantity, 
whether increase or decrease, is the quality of the gigantic. The gigantic is a 
sensibility that stems specifically from the subject-object metaphysics that 
pervades modernity: it represents a kind of celebratory hubris where the “basic 
character of the quale, of the ‘what’, of the essence, of beyng itself” (Heidegger 
2012b, 106) can be characterised—through machination as a distortion of the 
essence of Being—as quantifiable. The gigantic, machination, and the “world 
picture” itself are specifically historical features of modernity that are rigidly 
historiological in nature.55 In modernity, the scientistic aspect of machination and 
the gigantic erases the possibility of a historical relation to the past, and with it, an 
originary sense of Being.  
 
 A historical age is not only great in a different way from others; it also has, in every case,
 its own concept of greatness. As soon, however, as the gigantic, in planning, calculating, 																																																								
55 History, historicality, and historicity are terms used by Heidegger to indicate a kind of epistemic 
perspective that is rooted in a time and place, with the last referring to Dasein’s ontological 
character as a historical being. To understand the Greeks historically we must understand their 
relation to Being from within their perspective, rather than from our own; commenting on the 
Greek experience from our own contemporary perspective as anthropologists or historians, for 
example, is, instead, to speak historiologically (Macquarrie and Robinson) or historiographically 
(Stambaugh). The distinction in the German is between Historie as a scientific understanding of 
history performed as historiological analyses, while Geschicte is “the kind of ‘history’ that actually 
happens” (Heidegger 2008a, 30, translators’ note). See Contributions for an example of how the 
distinction plays out: the historiological understanding of the past creates a self perpetuating 
understanding of the present, and confirms what we already know to be true, “[t]he gigantic shows 
that every kind of  ‘greatness’ in history arises from the implicit ‘metaphysical’ interpretation of 
occurrences (ideals, actions, creations, sacrifices) and therefore is not of a properly historical 
essence but is merely historiological” (Heidegger 2012b, 349). 
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 establishing, and securing, changes from the quantitative and becomes its own special
 quality, then the gigantic and the seemingly completely calculable become, through this
 shift, incalculable. This incalculability becomes the invisible shadow cast over all things
 when man has become the subjectum and world has become picture (ibid). 
 
For Heidegger, modernity is an “historical age” in that subject-object metaphysics 
has culminated in the scientistic disclosure of beings solely in their instrumental-
calculable makeability (through machination), and that such disclosure is 
qualitatively celebrated. As such, Heidegger interprets machine technology, 
machination, and the gigantic, as symptoms of a metaphysical position that 
alienates the subject from its external world. Further, this metaphysical position 
privileges the subject as the centre and origin of meaning and value, leading to a 
peculiar relation of human being to itself and its surroundings; a relation 
condemned by Heidegger for its hubris and anthropocentrism. The “world picture” 
can exist only where the primacy of the subject-object distinction holds sway; 
where the world is a representation of objects to a subject. In such a picture, only 
objective, calculable properties are considered true in any meaningful sense. 
  
3. Art as Aesthetics: the Power of Poetry 
As with the other essential phenomena of modernity, Heidegger’s characterisation 
of aesthetics, found most explicitly in Volume One of Nietzsche, stems from his 
genealogy of the Western philosophical tradition. Heidegger argues that there 
were significant shifts between pre-Kantian, Kantian, and post-Kantian aesthetics. 
It is the last of these shifts, from the nineteenth century, that is his primary 
concern. Heidegger considers “art as aesthetics” an essential phenomenon of 
modernity corollary to his characterisation of science and machination: art is 
unable to be objectively, calculably quantified. Art is thus passed over by 
scientism, dismissed as little more than subjective conjecture. For Heidegger, 
however, art has special significance. Just as machination is disclosive of beings 
in their makeability, Heidegger claims that art also discloses the world in certain 
ways. From Heidegger’s position, all forms of art, including the deliberate and 
considered use of language itself (as in poetry and prose), disclose the world in 
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certain ways.56 In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, as in Volume One of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger expands on ideas that he first explored in his Hölderlin 
lectures from 1933. As with machination, art is disclosive: it reveals beings in 
certain ways. In contrast to the inherent invisibility of scientism, machination, and 
the gigantic, Heidegger attempts to demonstrate that art not only contains the 
capacity to make its revealing conspicuous, but should actively attempt to render 
the invisible visible. Just as the interruption of a referential equipmental whole can 
allow the world to announce itself, art can (and should), by its very definition, 
induce this same kind of interruption in one’s everyday existence. Heidegger 
describes the interruption of art in a number of ways.57 The interruption of art 
invokes the motif that I have earlier introduced: art calls each person to a moment 
of decision in terms of what has been made visible or revealed through the 
interruption, whether it is the manner in which machination and the gigantic reveal 
extant entities solely in their instrumental exploitability, or how language has 
conceptually shaped one’s understanding of what it is to be (a subject or Dasein). 
This essential feature of art is lost when the realm of aesthetics is understood 
through the scientistic perspective of modernity as little more than subjective 
conjecture. 
 
The worlding of the world, the disclosure of art, and the revealing of machination 
are all differently the “essence of being” in that they are alethic. Alētheia is 
understood by Heidegger as “the unconcealment of beings” (2008c, 176) or as 
“unconcealment and revealing” (1991c, 238). It is the process of a truth coming to 
be, but also refers to the possibility of multiple truths and the idea that each 
																																																								
56 In Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” we are told that “[i]t is not we who have 
language; rather, language has us” (2014, 24). Language shapes our understanding of the world 
that we are in, thus shaping our understanding of ourselves. Note how this runs contrary to the 
shaping of the world that begins from the subject and/or a specifically scientistic perspective. 
57 In Being and Time, the “interruption” is the breakdown of a referential network such as 
equipmentality that puts each person into a position where they must reflect and decide on what 
has been revealed by the interruption, i.e. equipmentality qua equipmentality, world qua world and 
so on. In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ the interruption is characterised as the irruption of earth 
into world. The irruption of earth into world is important as it retains the notion of interruption—
which, as discussed in Chapters Three and Six, becomes the basis for an ethically significant 
decision concerned with one’s authentic mode of being—but introduces the equally important 
notion of the earth, an aspect of the fourfold that plays a similar ontological role to the gods (these 
ideas are discussed in depth in Chapter Five). 
Chapter One — Modernity 	 55 
revealing is also a concealing.58 When Heidegger claims that art or machination is 
disclosive of truth, and is wary of any objective notion of truth, he is speaking 
against a correspondence theory of truth. For example, from a correspondence 
theory of truth, the truth of the claim “the cat sat on the mat” is measured against 
the reality of a cat, its posture and location: “the conformity of knowledge with 
matter” (2008c, 176). The correspondence version of truth relies on the subject-
object distinction and scientific objectivity: that which is objectively, measurably 
true. Unconcealment, however, implies that any given phenomenon or entity 
contains an excess or plenitude of meanings, any of which might be unconcealed 
by framing or encountering the phenomenon in a particular context or 
circumstance. It is true that we can encounter nature as ready-to-hand (or as 
present-to-hand, or unready-to hand), but it is always first revealed to us as such 
from a particular viewpoint, depending on context or circumstance. 
 
But is unconcealment just relativism dressed in ontological clothing? Are the 
multiple possibilities of truth contained within a phenomenon really just a 																																																								
58 One of the distinctive points of Thomas Sheehan’s Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm 
Shift is his claim that “[w]e should reserve the word ‘truth’ (Wahreit) for such adequatio or 
correctness and refuse to follow Heidegger in his misleading use of that word for the disclosedness 
of things” (2015a, 61). This is part of Sheehan’s broader argument that Heidegger was concerned 
with “meaningful presence” (26) as it relates to Dasein, and that Heidegger’s overall project is 
misunderstood, confused, or taken in unnecessarily obfuscatory trajectories when locating the 
matter of his thought beyond the Da of Dasein. Sheehan’s account is thoughtful and productive in 
a number of ways, but is ultimately inconsistent with my own reading of Heidegger due to its 
continued Dasein-centrism, as though Heidegger’s project was to reconfigure the subject of 
subject-object metaphysics and to re-interpret philosophy from this point. As early as Being and 
Time it is made clear that the exploration of Dasein is finite and provisional, rather than the central 
focus of his thought. Indeed, Heidegger explicitly states “the analytic of Dasein remains wholly 
oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of Being. Its limits are thus 
determined. It cannot attempt to provide a complete ontology of Dasein…Our analysis of Dasein is 
not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance provisional. It merely brings out the Being of 
this entity, without Interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the 
horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare.” (2008a, 38). In 
regards to the notion of truth, I am sympathetic to Sheehan’s attempt to clarify or render 
Heidegger’s thinking more accessible, but in shifting the concept of truth away from alētheia back 
to a correspondence theory, Sheehan risks diminishing the importance of language and how it 
shapes us, our world, and our understandings of such: central and highly significant aspects of 
Heidegger’s thinking. Sheehan also rejects Heidegger’s analysis of the Western tradition and the 
notion that modernity is the culmination of subject-object metaphysics (266-267), and also 
explicitly rejects the later Heidegger’s talk of Ereignis and the gods as redemptive or powerful 
concepts—central themes of the present thesis—and boils these matters down to the rudimentary 
understanding of (what he does not name) authenticity as “embracing one’s existential fate as 
thrown-open” (263). This last brief passage is one that I endorse, but to leave the matter of 
authenticity or the essence of human being at that point is overly simplistic and loses both the 
illocutionary and existential force of the concept. While I do not directly respond to Sheehan in the 
body of my text, these issues are addressed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. 
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reflection of subjectivity, or a subjective and thus local and specifically relative 
truth? Truth as unconcealment is not relativism for the simple fact that the truth of 
a phenomenon, a tree for example, does not stem from (is not solely relative to) 
the subject. Neither is the truth of the tree (should we consider it as such) singular. 
Instead, the truth of the tree is always plural, always concealing as many or more 
truths as are revealed. The context or circumstance is not simply subjective, but 
reflects the worlding of the world. Dasein is in the world, is of the world and is 
thus constituted by the world. In this sense, the alethic nature of truth evident in 
the worlding of the world59 implicates, but does not stem solely from, Dasein. For 
Dasein, the tree itself contains multiple but finite possibilities depending on its 
height, species, accessibility and so forth—my discussion of the earth in Chapter 
Five expands on this. As such, it is Dasein’s world that frames and reveals the tree 
in a certain light, yet the tree itself also has a decisive say: some trees will resist 
being made into a canoe more than others. Importantly, such resistance might not 
be able to withstand the revealing of machination and the gigantic. This discussion 
of truth as unconcealment is developed further throughout Chapters Two and Five 
where further Greek concepts that relate to and makes sense of alētheia become 
the explicit focus of the investigation. 
 
Rather than a merely subjective, qualitative phenomenon, art is disclosive; it is 
alethic.60 While scientism, machination, and machine technology conceal their 																																																								
59 See footnote 21, above, for the multiple senses that world carries in Being and Time. As the 
ontic totality of beings, the world becomes reshaped through the introduction of the earth in ‘The 
Origin of the Work of Art’ and in the fourfold as the manifestation of earth, sky, gods, and mortals. 
The sense of world that I am describing here as playing an active role in the constitution of truth 
for Dasein is, as will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six, actually the manifestation of the 
fourfold. 
60 As discussed earlier in the chapter, in Introduction to Metaphysics, and following directly from 
his first sustained engagement with Hölderlin, Heidegger discusses the importance of multiple 
meanings within language. This is particularly relevant to Heidegger’s claim that subject-object 
metaphysics has flattened out language by taking the originary—in the sense that they can be 
thought in terms of fundamental ontology, outside the frame of subject-object metaphysics—Greek 
concepts and reduced them to singular meanings—the shift from alētheia to veritas, from 
unconcealment to a fixed correspondence of knowledge and reality, for example: “This multiple 
meaning of the word [here he is referring to doxa, but the notion extends beyond this word] is not 
looseness of language but a play in deep foundations of the mature wisdom of a great language, a 
multiplicity that preserves the essential traits of Being in the word. In order to see correctly from 
the very start here, we must guard ourselves against cavalierly taking seeming as something just 
‘imaginary’, ‘subjective’, and thereby falsifying it” (Heidegger 2000a, 110). “Seeming” here refers 
to one of the four aspects of doxa that came to be regarded as a pejorative, something that was 
“untrue” in a single, fixed sense, rather than as an element of the continual process unconcealment-
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disclosive nature behind the auspice of objective truth, the alethic nature of art is 
always conspicuous. The interruption of art reveals the worlding of the world; it 
gathers a world in the sense of disclosing a referential network of meaning and 
value that is otherwise taken for granted. As such, art offers insight into the world 
and to one’s self; the essence of art eludes scientific analysis. Art speaks to 
something existential—something spiritual—within the audience, interrupting 
one’s everyday experience of the world. What is denounced as merely subjective 
by scientism, according to the reading of Heidegger I am developing, potentially 
offers profound insight into otherwise uninterrogated aspects of human being, 
including the many hidden metaphysical assumptions that underpin political and 
ethical discourses. Echoing the epigraph of this chapter, Heidegger states that an 
interpretation of aesthetics “is decisive for the way art shapes the history of that 
era—or remains irrelevant for it” (1991a, 79). For Heidegger, modernity is the 
consummate age of subject-object metaphysics; an age in which the reduction of 
the external world to instrumentality, and the reduction of art to subjective 
conjecture, is indicative of a greater throttling of unconcealment down to an 
objective, scientifically-derived truth that is oblivious to its own concealing. 
 
Moving Forward 
At the beginning of this chapter I presented an outline of Heidegger’s 
characterisation of subject-object metaphysics, and contrasted this with a brief 
account of Heidegger’s phenomenologically derived fundamental ontological 
position. Heidegger’s criticisms of subject-object metaphysics—including placing 
the subject as the centre and origin of experience, and attempting to understand 
the ontology of the subject in an ontic manner—act as a horizon for the recovery 
of the problem of Being. Heidegger responds to subject-object metaphysics by 
building on Husserl’s phenomenological insights. In shifting the emphasis from a 
subject-object distinction, to a subject-object relation, Husserl demonstrates that 
we are never in a world of bare perceptual cognitions, but a world of meaningful 
phenomena. Heidegger re-configures this notion in order to overcome problems he 
believes stem from subject-object metaphysics, to instead claim that ontological 																																																																																																																																																								
withdrawal. “Only with the Sophists and Plato was seeming explained as, and thus reduced to, 
mere seeming” (111). Poetry, art, and language as disclosive of truth are connected to alētheia in 
the sense of the possibility of revealing multiple truths. This is discussed further in Chapter Two. 
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human being is a being-there, a constitutive happening of being rather than a 
being in the sense of an extant entity. Further, the being-there, Dasein, of each 
person is a Being-in-the-world, where ‘in’ refers to the ontological constitution of 
Dasein’s immersion in meaningful activities, events, and self-reflections, and ‘the 
world’ refers to the ontological happening or worlding of the world that gives pre-
existing meaning and values to Dasein’s immersion. With Dasein and the world, 
Heidegger developed a more fundamental ontology of the self and the world than 
preceding subject-object metaphysicians. He did this by demonstrating that, at a 
fundamental ontological level, the distinction between the subject and object, even 
when considered as a constitutive relation, can only hold in an ontic sense. The 
implications of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world would go on to play a major role in 
Heidegger’s de-centring of human being. His introduction of the fourfold, an 
important aspect of his thinking that is introduced in the lecture ‘The Thing’, 
articulates this de-centring in full. One of the major implications of the shift from 
ontic subject to ontological Dasein is the making-visible of the hubris and 
anthropocentrism that Heidegger believes stems directly from subject-object 
metaphysics.  
 
What I have referred to as the violent and oppressive hubris of modernity stems 
from the five essential phenomena that Heidegger considers to be essential 
features of modernity: science, machine technology, art as aesthetics, human 
practices as culture, and the flight of the gods. In my discussion of science I have 
clarified that it is not simply the natural sciences, but the extrapolation of the 
epistemological standards of the natural sciences to other modes of thinking that is 
Heidegger’s concern; it is scientism, rather than science or the scientific method 
that is here made problematic. Yet, as I discuss further in Chapter Two, the 
difficulty in establishing this distinction arises from the inherently over-reaching 
character of the scientific method; a character inherited from two and a half 
millennia of subject-object metaphysics. Scientism is a corollary of the gigantic: 
the general sensibility of modernity that raises science from a methodology into a 
normatively valued standard by which the truth of the world can be known, and 
known especially through machine technology. Machine technology reveals the 
world in its purely instrumental makeability, an extension of the ontic scientific 
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revealing of things, and based deeper still on the alienation of the subject in the 
subject-object distinction. Machination, the ontological way of being of machine 
technology, science and scientism, and the reduction of art (and all non-ontic, 
incalculable ways of understanding and relating to the world) to biased subjective 
conjecture all share a common root: the alienated subject of the subject-object 
distinction.
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Chapter Two — Ge-stell 
 
Chronologically, Heidegger’s critique of modernity is the basis for his later 
critique of technology. The later critique solidifies his earlier thinking, facilitating 
a hermeneutic reading of the earlier work. For Heidegger, the five essential 
phenomena that characterise modernity share a central tendency: an oppressive 
scientistic bias. Heidegger traces this bias to subject-object metaphysics, claiming 
it is both an ongoing symptom and result of the oblivion of Being. Despite the 
continuity of his thinking through the 1930s and 1940s, it is not until the 1949 
lecture series Insight Into That Which Is that Heidegger introduces Ge-stell and 
Bestand, standing reserve. These two concepts are the central features of (the 
critical aspect) of Heidegger’s critique of technology. While these concepts are 
greatly refined in comparison to his earlier thinking of modernity, they account 
for—in that they offer a cohesive structure that makes sense of—the five essential 
phenomena discussed in Chapter One. In particular, Ge-stell marks the 
culmination of Heidegger’s attempt to think what he previously characterised as 
the “distorted” essence of Being. As a concept, Ge-stell helps make sense of the 
alethic nature of machination and the gigantic. However, before I discuss these 
concepts in depth, the present chapter opens with a discussion of Heidegger’s 
“confrontation” (Heidegger 1991a, xxxix) with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche.1  
 
In his reading of Nietzsche, following similar readings of Kant and Hölderlin, 
Heidegger demonstrates his methodological and thematic consistency. 
Heidegger’s readings of other thinkers are always related to the recovery of the 
problem of Being. As such—as I indicated in Chapter One in regards to 
Heidegger’s reading of Kant—his readings of other thinkers, including the pre-
Socratic Greeks, always reflects his own project, rather than the intentions of 
those whose work he is reading. Many of Nietzsche’s thoughts on modernity and 
science resonate with Heidegger’s thinking, yet the two formulate different 																																																								
1 While many readers of Heidegger are aware of the importance of Hölderlin to his later thinking, 
the importance of Heidegger’s sustained encounter with Nietzsche’s work in the late 1930s is also 
significant. See Brett Davis’ Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit for an account of 
Heidegger and Nietzsche, and Babbette Babich’s Words In Blood, Like Flowers for a comparison 
of the two thinkers in relation to Hölderlin. 
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responses. This chapter outlines Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche before 
developing an account of Ge-stell and standing reserve. In total, chapters One and 
Two provide a reading of the critical aspect of Heidegger’s critique of technology. 
As I have indicated earlier, Chapters One through Five (inclusive) can be read 
hermeneutically: this reflects Heidegger’s own thinking, where one’s exploration 
of such can just as readily begin with alētheia, Ereignis, or Being and Time. In 
light of the hermeneutic possibilities of Heidegger’s thinking (and my account of 
such), the scope of the present chapter is intentionally narrow. The scope of this 
chapter is limited in order that my account of Heidegger’s thinking also acts as an 
introduction to a number of key concepts that I will develop beyond Heidegger’s 
writings throughout the second half of the thesis.    
 
Nietzsche 
Delivered during the late 1930s and containing “treatises which originated in the 
years 1940 to 1946” (Heidegger 1991a, xxxix), the four volumes of Nietzsche 
address the five essential phenomena of modernity. What is peculiar to the 
treatment of the phenomena in this work is Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
development of the modern subject into the übermensch, the Overman2 (1991c, 
216; 1991d, 96-138). Heidegger grounds much of his reading of Nietzsche’s work 
on two key interpretations: the will-to-power as an ontotheological description of 
Being, and the eternal recurrence of the same as the totality of beings (1991c, 161-
183). Heidegger defines Nietzsche’s metaphysics as “a metaphysics of the 
absolute subjectivity of will to power” (1991d, 147). Heidegger attempts to 
demonstrate an essential link between Descartes’ and Nietzsche’s positions by 
interpreting the Protagorean3 notion that ‘man is the measure of all things’ as a 
value judgment as well as nihilistic metaphysical observation. Heidegger 																																																								
2 I intentionally use the gendered English translation “Overman” here following David Farell 
Krell’s translation in the four volumes of the Nietzsche lectures. Although mensch refers to 
humankind more broadly, the gendered term is appropriate to the material I cover in the second 
half of the thesis, and the Heideggerian notion that language reveals the relation of human being to 
itself and its world.  
3 Heidegger interprets the Protagorean claim that “Man is the measure of all things, of things that 
are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not” (Heidegger 1991d, 91) as an 
anthropocentric epistemologically violent perspective. Of this claim, Heidegger states “[o]ne might 
suppose that it is Descartes who is speaking here” (91) in order to stress the essential continuity 
between forms of subjectivity that come from (or develop and entrench) an anthropocentric 
perspective. 
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concludes that Descartes’ subject and Nietzsche’s Overman are both founded in 
subject-centric hubris. For Heidegger, the metaphysical-epistemological primacy 
of the Overman strips the object of its capacity to ‘stand over against’ 
(Gegenstand) human being. When man is the measure of all things, the mystery of 
the unknowable object is lost, thus stripping the object of any meaning or value 
beyond its representable, objective, calculable, and instrumental properties. 
 
One of Nietzsche’s central aims was to instigate a “revaluation of all values” 
(Heidegger 1991c, 202).4 Nietzsche’s revaluation throws the entrenched values of 
the Western tradition, including those stemming from antiquity, Christianity, and 
more contemporary (for Nietzsche) subject-object metaphysics into question. Yet 
as Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche makes evident, this revaluation commenced 
from the position of the Overman. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s “completion of 
metaphysics” (1991d, 216) and adoption of the Overman ideal also instigated an 
age of “anthropomorphism … anthropologism” (ibid), where the will to power 
manifests through the anthropocentric subjectivity of the Overman that 
unequivocally and “absolutely empowers the essence of power for dominion over 
the earth” (230). Heidegger’s interpretation of the Overman as the consummate 
metaphysical subject is key to understanding the five essential phenomena of 
modernity as the early articulation of his critique of technology. This 
interpretation begins with linking the metaphysical and epistemological alienation 
of the Cartesian5 subject from its world with a revaluation of values that is driven 																																																								
4 Nietzsche’s later works, beginning with Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and including (in chronological 
order) Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morality, Twilight of the Idols, The anti-
Christ, and the posthumously published The Will to Power all contain elements of Nietzsche’s 
revaluation. Each of these works is critical of Christian morality and how it shapes the modern 
world. In his autobiographical account of his own work, Ecce Homo, Nietzsche makes clear that he 
regarded Thus Spoke Zarathustra as his most important work (2007, 65-76). For Nietzsche, this 
work was an affirmation: “the yes-saying part of my task was solved” (77). However, he regarded 
the following series of works, as listed above, as “the no-saying, no-doing half: the revaluation of 
previous values itself, the great war” (ibid). Nietzsche refers to Beyond Good and Evil as 
essentially a “critique of modernity” (ibid), in that while the yes-saying of Zarathustra is a poetic 
and frequently ambiguous narrative, the no-saying of the later works often appears in the form of 
direct and explicit polemic against specific targets. For example, “[t]he industrious races find 
leisure very hard to endure: it was a masterpiece of English instinct to make Sunday so extremely 
holy and boring that the English unconsciously long again for their week- and working-days” 
(2003, 112).  
5 It is interesting to note that the influence of Descartes can be found regardless of whether it is 
Kant or Nietzsche that forms the central target of Heidegger’s thinking. In the late 1920s and early 
1930s, in texts such as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, ‘What is Metaphysics’, and Kant 
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by the will to power of the Overman. As such, in its most extreme state, subject-
object metaphysics results in the nihilistic Nietzschean assumption that there is no 
inherent meaning or value in the world other than the will-to-power of the 
Overman (82-83).6 From this, a peculiar kind of anthropocentrism emerges: one 
that is fostered and exacerbated by machination and the gigantic. The connection 
between the will to power and machination and the gigantic is significant. Just as 
the gigantic qualitatively valorises quantity, the will to power is defined by its 
self-sustaining nature; it is only for its own sake, there is no telos other than the 
continuation of the will to power.  
 
Will to power is not simply the way in which and the means by which valuation takes 
place; will to power … is the one basic value according to which anything that is 
supposed to have value, or that can make no claim to value, is appraised … What loses 
the struggle is—because it has lost—untrue and in the wrong. What emerges victorious 
is—because it has won—true and in the right. What is being contested, if we want to think 
of it as a specific substantive goal, is always of less significance (Heidegger 1991d, 82). 
 
In this passage, Heidegger draws out the notion that the will to power wants only 
to be; he characterises it elsewhere as the “will-to-will” (Heidegger 1991c, 196). 
Heidegger interprets the will to power as a hubristic, anthropocentric force that 
regards itself as the yardstick for value, the only qualitative measure. Judgments 
are made, values valorised or dismissed in terms of their capacity to further 
enhance or express the will to power. What is categorised as “untrue and in the 																																																																																																																																																								
and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger emphasises that subject-object metaphysics lacks the 
phenomenological-ontological insight to encounter the problem of Being. In refining this 
observation and developing the mature critique of technology, however, the oblivion of Being 
became the horizon for Heidegger’s thinking, rather than the single, explicit concern. Instead, 
Heidegger’s response to subject-object metaphysics explored the implications of the oblivion of 
Being, with a focus on the distinction between the metaphysics of the subject and the ontology of 
Dasein. Heidegger’s critique of the subject focused largely on the thought of Descartes and 
Nietzsche. Heidegger’s treatment of the Western tradition is perhaps as taxonomical as it is 
genealogical. It is trite and erroneous to write off early metaphysical thinkers as identical, but 
(from a Heideggerian perspective) the distinctions between them still reveal an essential similarity; 
where to locate the similarity and where the difference—order, family, genus, or species, for 
example—is another question. 
6 In The Will to Power Nietzsche states “In so far as the word ‘knowledge’ has any meaning, the 
world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless 
meanings … It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every 
drive is a kind of lust to rule” (1968, 267). While the “[p]erspectivism” (ibid) that Nietzsche posits 
here shares much with Heidegger’s thinking of alētheia, Nietzsche still relegates the stuff of the 
word to a passive role, it is the will to power manifest in human being that Nietzsche believes 
endows meaning to the world.  
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wrong” or “true and in the right”—and it is important to note that a value 
judgment is attached to the notion of truth here—depends on how successfully the 
will to power has manifested in the notion, rather than on its achieving any 
tangible end or goal. As stated in the passage above, the “what” plays no role here, 
the context or substantive content of the matter are of no importance, only that the 
will to power has manifested. Immediately following this passage, Heidegger 
states “[i]f one can speak of aim here at all, then the ‘aim’ is the aimlessness of 
man’s absolute dominance over the earth” (82).  
 
Yet there is a connection here that is not immediately obvious. Just as machination 
reveals beings in their makeabililty, “the age of consummate meaninglessness” 
(Heidegger 1991c, 174)—the age of the Overman and the will to power—reveals 
beings exclusively in their “malleability … [their] perfectly accessible 
disposability” (ibid, my insertion). From Heidegger’s perspective, the acceptance 
of Nietzsche’s nihilism is the impetus for the scientific method: without a God 
there is no value or meaning in the world that is not manufactured by humans, and 
each person is an individuated subject with her own personal preferences, 
opinions, and bias. Therefore, on the one hand, the metaphysical and 
epistemological assumptions of subject-object metaphysics have reduced the 
external world to a series of objects that can only be reliably known through 
objective, calculable, and instrumental representation, and on the other, the 
external world has no value or meaning in itself, all value stems from the will to 
power of the Overman. From Heidegger’s position, there is a perfect harmony 
between the nihilism of the Overman and the perceived necessity of adopting the 
scientific method in order to generate objective truths. In turn, the gigantic acts as 
a horizon for this confluence of ideas. As such, the notion that only scientifically 
generated objective truth has any real truth (and therefore any real meaning) 
becomes more than an accepted academic or epistemological position on the limits 
of ontic inquiry. In modernity, the notion is, in itself, a value judgement. For 
Heidegger, the scientism of modernity discussed in Chapter One emerges 
precisely because the perceived necessity of objective truth is also a value 
judgement rather than simply an observation on the limits of ontic inquiry. Any 
apparent tension between Nietzsche’s nihilism and the perceived necessity for 
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scientifically derived objective truth is superficial at best: each supports the other. 
For Heidegger, modernity is an age where meaninglessness has become 
meaningful. Heidegger’s position holds that rather than abandon its need for 
certainty and guidance, the West has heeded Nietzsche’s proclamation of the 
death of God, but not the warning that such a proclamation carries. The need for a 
God has not been overcome; this need cannot be overcome within an 
ontotheological subject-object metaphysics that requires a first cause of some sort. 
But no void was left by the death of God, for it was (what Heidegger would come 
to call) technology that committed the deicide, and it is technology that occupies 
that position to this day. 
 
The Critique of Technology: Introduction 
By the mid 1940s, the components of Heidegger’s critique of technology had 
already been constructed, but not yet pieced together.7 Central to Heidegger’s 
critique of technology is his interpretation of poiēsis, physis, and technē.8 As with 
the notion of alētheia discussed briefly in Chapter One, Heidegger’s attempt at an 
historical interpretation of these concepts provides significant insight into the 
critical and constructive aspects of his thought in this period.9 For Heidegger, 
poiēsis is “bringing-forth (Her-vor-bringen)” (2008e, 317).10 This interpretation of 																																																								
7 Between the thinking of the mid-late 1930s and the 1949 Bremen lecture series, Heidegger spent 
much of his time exploring the non-critical or what I have above called the constructive aspect of 
the critique of technology, to be discussed in chapters Four and Five. As briefly discussed in the 
introduction of the present chapter, the constructive aspect of Heidegger’s thinking in this period is 
not separate or distinct from the critical, but is a unitary whole. Having spent most of the 1930s 
outlining the critical aspect, it is telling that he did not present a sustained and suitably articulated 
critique of technology until he had also spent the best part of a decade thinking through the 
constructive aspect. The most explicit example of the shared source of both the constructive and 
critical aspects of his thinking can be found in the lecture series from 1933, Hölderlin’s Hymns 
“Germania” and “The Rhine”. 
8 Having considered various renderings of Greek words, I have followed the same convention as 
David Farrell Krell, translator of the Nietzsche volumes as well as ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’ and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (both published in Basic Writings), in my 
Romanised spelling of Greek terms.  
9 As with his reading of other thinkers such as Kant and Nietzsche, whether or not Heidegger 
offers an accurately historical insight into these Greek terms is arguably less important than what 
he does with the reading itself. 
10 “Bringing-forth” is the translation given to the Greek term poiēsis by both David Farrell Krell 
and Julian Young, from Heidegger’s original German “Her-vor-bringen” (2008c, 317). This is a 
seemingly typical Heideggerian extrapolation of a Greek concept, one that Mahon O’Brien 
describes as “somewhat ‘innovative’…” (2011, 97), implying that Heidegger’s interpretations 
contain a significant amount of his own projection. Regardless, it is clear that poiēsis, even 
understood simply as “poetry”, is not merely a linguistic or artistic process, but refers to, in 
O’Brien’s more conventional (than Heidegger’s) rendering of the relevant section of Plato’s 
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poiēsis indicates the significance of Heidegger’s encounter with Hölderlin,11 and 
demonstrates why Heidegger considers a reduction of art to aesthetics 
problematic. As bringing-forth, poiēsis is alethic. Each bringing-forth is also a 
revealing of something as something, and each revealing is also a concealing. As 
such, the context or circumstance in which a phenomenon is encountered, as well 
as the nature or characteristics of the phenomenon, is implicated. Again, think of 
the manner in which a tree has a decisive say in whether or not it is suitable to be 
made into a canoe using traditional hand tools.  
 
According to Heidegger, poiēsis manifests in one of two forms. The first form of 
poiēsis is physis. Despite the conventional, or, for Heidegger, deprived rendering 
of physis as natura or nature, Heidegger argues that an originary understanding of 
physis is as a spontaneous self-emerging: “[p]hysis is poiēsis in the highest sense. 
For what presences by means of physis has the irruption belonging to bringing-
forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself” (2008e, 317).12 This 
interpretation of physis offers a way to think Being in an originary sense, as a 
primordial coming-in-to-existence, devoid of causal or reified metaphysical 
notions. As Heidegger understands it, physis is unable to be properly conceived 
from within the calculable cause and effect thinking of subject-object 
metaphysics.13 Heidegger’s interpretation of physis confounds subject-object 																																																																																																																																																								
Symposium, “any action which is the cause of a thing emerging from non-existence into existence” 
(97). For Heidegger, this conventional rendering is problematic as it falls back to a kind of cause-
effect thinking; it is a historiological, rather than historical, reading of the concept. 
11 Heidegger’s encounter with Hölderlin, and the significance of poetry as a kind of privileged 
speaking, Sagen (Heidegger 2014, 28-30), is revisited in depth in Chapter Five. 
12 As further examples of Anglophone descriptions of physis, Julian Young describes the notion as 
an “unaided” (2002, 41) bringing-forth in order to distinguish it from technē, while Mark Wrathall 
speaks of a “self-arising nature” (2011, 182) and “the self-disclosing welling-up of being” (223).  
13 In attempting to avoid causal representational thinking and to instigate an originary thinking of 
physis, Heidegger’s argument frames subject-object metaphysics, and the Western tradition more 
broadly, as sublating or conflating the ‘why’ and the ‘how’. In ‘The Onto-Theo-Logical 
Constitution of Metaphysics’, Heidegger argues that in order to reconcile the theological ‘why’, 
the theological notion of a God becomes merely the Aristotelian prime mover; the ‘why’ is really 
still just a ‘how’, with God as the first cause. Western metaphysics is ontotheological in that it 
seeks the first cause, and due to this very seeking must eventuate in the adoption of a kind of 
theological ‘why’. Stepping beyond or outside causal thinking is a key aspect of originary 
thinking, and also reinvigorates the possibility of existential, ethical, and spiritual meaning beyond 
humanism or theism. However, Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle also influences his development 
of physis and technē. As with Nietzsche, Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle is frequently 
critical, but often with a sense of reverence or profound respect. For examples of Heidegger’s 
engagement with Aristotle, see The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (32-37), Introduction to 
Metaphysics, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 
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metaphysics in the sense that cause-effect relationships are objective and 
calculable, and yet physis is a spontaneous bringing forth, the cause of which may 
well be incalculable, objectively unknowable. This characterisation of physis asks 
each thinker to attempt to think outside the familiar subject-object metaphysical 
perspective. This originary perspective is indicative of Heidegger’s thinking of 
Being in terms of Ereignis and the es gibt, discussed in Chapter Four. Through the 
notion of physis the originary sense of Being can be developed. Perhaps the best 
way to clarify physis, and the ongoing importance of the originary sense of Being 
that it evokes, is to contrast it with the second form of poiēsis: technē. 
 
For Heidegger “technē is the name not only for the activities and skills of the 
craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts” (2008e, 318). The 
distinction between physis and technē is that technē involves human activity while 
remaining a bringing-forth (poiēsis) that is sensitive to physis. Rather than the 
spontaneous irruption of a thing coming into being (physis), technē is a bringing-
forth from human endeavour, where the human endeavour is guided by an 
originary sense of Being, a comportment towards physis as the guide or standard 
to which the artist or craftworker must adhere: “technē belongs … to poiēsis; it is 
something poetic” (318). Not just any human activity or human directed mode of 
production is technē. In the context of Heidegger’s thinking, technē reflects the 
phenomenological assumption that Dasein is in and of the world and thus must 
consider the world and its surroundings in its activities. In contrast, the 
subject/Overman’s relation to the external world and modes of production is 
guided by little other than the will to power and deference to the objective, 
calculable properties of things in their makeability. To return to the example of the 
tree, the tree becomes itself (as a stage of its enduring presence from seed to aged 
timber) through physis. The characteristics and properties of the tree itself 
determine and contain the many possibilities of the tree. When guided by technē, 
the tree has a decisive say in how Dasein interacts with the tree (in terms of how 
the tree is revealed: the truth of the tree does not just stem from the human 
endeavour or will), and only if the tree is suitable can a canoe, table, guitar, and so 
on be brought-forth. 
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Heidegger’s critique of technology rests on the distinction between bringing-forth 
and “challenging (Her-ausfordern)” (2008e, 320): “[t]he revealing that holds sway 
throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense 
of poiēsis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging” 
(ibid).14 As opposed to the cor-responding nature of technē where the tree is 
revealed as itself in its multiple properties and possibilities, challenging-forth is a 
“setting-upon that challenges the energies of nature … It expedites in that it 
unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the 
beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the 
maximum yield at the minimum expense” (321). Through challenging-forth, the 
tree is revealed solely in its instrumentality. Where the human involvement of 
technē is guided by an originary sense of physis, challenging-forth is directed 
solely by human will and is oblivious to any originary sense of Being. As is the 
case with bringing-forth, challenging-forth is alethic. Challenging-forth is an 
anthropocentric disclosure of the world that valorises human activity and reveals 
beings in their makeability: extant objects with calculable properties and 
instrumental worth. Comparing the hand tools and specific skills of a traditional 
cabinet maker,15 including choosing the right wood, perhaps even selecting an 
individual tree based on its specific characteristics, with machine technology that 
clear-fell harvests an entire forest coup to turn to woodchip and then mass 
manufacture plywood cabinets gives an indication of the distinction between 
bringing-forth and challenging-forth. From Heidegger’s position, challenging-
forth is the prevailing attitude of modernity. It reveals the world as essentially 
other to human being, as something from which the subject/Overman is alienated, 
as something that is only representable through objective, calculable methods of 
inquiry: the world is revealed as exploitable. Where bringing-forth is characterised 
by the human cor-respondence to Being, challenging-forth is anthropocentric 																																																								
14 In order to emphasise the contrast between challenging and bringing forth, and to develop an 
account of this integral aspect of Heidegger’s critique of technology, I will refer to the concept of 
“challenging” as “challenging-forth” where the context is more suitable. 
15 In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger uses the example of a cabinet maker to demonstrate that 
what is most significant in the distinction between a craft as technē and the challenging of modern 
technology is “relatedness to wood” (2004, 14). Regardless of the specific craft or activity, and 
regardless of the tools or machines used in such an activity (and Heidegger includes poetry and 
thinking as such activities), it is the ‘relatedness’ or the human relation-to that is the distinguishing 
feature between technē and challenging-forth: “Our age is not a technological age because it is the 
age of the machine; it is an age of the machine because it is the technological age” (24). 
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violence. 
 
Julian Young points out that “one can be just as violent with a spade as with a 
bulldozer—it just takes longer and occurs, therefore, on a reduced scale” (2006, 
38), but this sentiment does not quite capture the autonomous and alethic nature of 
machine technology and challenging-forth.  One can be violent and challenging 
with a spade, certainly, but unless the person wielding the spade is the equivalent 
of a high-torque, well-oiled diesel engine, the earth in general is not revealed in its 
instrumental malleability-makeability in the same way as it is by the bulldozer. 
The sheer effortless capacity of the bulldozer, as compared to the hand tool, is the 
manifestation of the revealed truth of the earth as exploitable; something to be 
manipulated quickly and efficiently in order to satisfy human will. However, what 
Young’s sentiment captures is the notion that the reduction of the earth to 
something of merely instrumental value pre-exists the bulldozer, that it is not 
simply the existence of the bulldozer or the intention to wield the bulldozer in 
certain ways that distinguishes challenging-forth from technē, but a certain 
combination of these factors. The inherently violent and exploitative 
underpinnings of challenging-forth both sustains and is sustained by the reduction 
of objects and things to calculable, instrumental subject-object relations. The 
violence of challenging-forth stems from the hubris and anthropocentrism of the 
subject/Overman, and is oblivious to the possibility of an originary sense of 
Being. 
 
The distinction that Heidegger makes between bringing-forth and challenging-
forth is integral to understanding Heidegger’s broader project. The distinction 
between technē and challenging-forth has two important implications. First, in 
challenging-forth, human activity is no longer sensitive to the harmonious cor-
respondence of bringing-forth as technē, and is instead a violent imposition; the 
forceful act of a dominating will. Second, challenging-forth is a phenomenon that 
is built on subject-object metaphysical assumptions and is thus incongruous with 
Heidegger’s attempt to articulate the cor-respondence of human being and Being. 
Modern technology is characterised by challenging-forth, a revealing of the world 
in its instrumental makeability.  
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Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology … 
Technology is a way of revealing … [T]he essence of technology … is the realm of 
revealing, i.e., of truth … From earliest times until Plato the word technē is linked with 
the word epistēmē. Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense. (2008b, 318). 
 
In this passage Heidegger claims that the essence of technology is a mode of 
revealing, a way of disclosing truth. Although he claims that the link between 
technē and epistēmē is lost in the modern conception of technology, the link is 
vital to Heidegger’s critique of technology. The way we know the modern world 
is evident in our technological relation to the world. Technology, then, reveals our 
knowing of the world. Technology is an alethic phenomenon. However, the 
revealing of technology is not a neutral or benign revealing of one possibility 
among many, despite the foundations of such a revealing attempting to overcome 
the subjective bias of the individual. As has been discussed, the truth revealed by 
modern technology is objective, and objective truth is qualitatively valued at the 
expense of other possible truths. All revealing is also a concealing: the horizon 
withdraws when one focuses on the foreground. Yet the concealing of modern 
technology is more pernicious than this. In the subtle shift from science as a mode 
of ontic inquiry to the invisible prejudice of scientism, the shift from machines to 
machination, and the rise of the gigantic, the incalculable ontological and 
existential truths of the world are not just alethically concealed, they are devalued, 
reduced and cheapened to subjective conjecture, not real or true by the modern 
technological yardstick.  
 
Technology, then, is a mode of disclosure through which the scientistic version of 
objective truth—a truth that is valorised at the cost of other possible revealings—
reveals the world as exploitable. The truth of beings in modernity is that they exist 
as instrumental, malleable, and makeable. This is the completion of metaphysics 
that Heidegger finds in Nietzsche: the subject-object distinction taken to its 
extreme, where the subject has become the Overman, and the inherent 
meaninglessness of the cosmos is celebrated in order that man may measure 
himself and his accomplishments through the shared mechanism of the gigantic 
and the will to power. All value now stems from this shared mechanism: that 
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which operates for its own sake with no end in sight, the point where the 
quantitative becomes qualitative, where, from the position of the subject, treating 
all things as merely instrumental is not simply permissible, but entirely logical. 
 
The Critique of Technology: Standing Reserve and Ge-stell 
Framed within the position of absolute instrumentality, the concept of exploitation 
becomes merely descriptive and has no pejorative sense—an important 
implication that I return to below. Disclosed solely in its instrumentality, the 
world and its contents become  
 
 standing reserve (Bestand). The word expresses here something more, and something
 more essential, than mere ‘stock’. The word ‘standing-reserve’ assumes the rank of an
 inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which every-thing presences
 that is wrought upon by the revealing that challenges (2008e, 322).  
 
In Heidegger’s use of the concept, standing reserve is the ultimate reduction of 
things to their sheer exploitability. It is the outcome of a process of literal 
objectification, but with more insidious implications that even mask the ‘object’ 
as object. Where Heidegger interprets Kant’s work as maintaining a sense of the 
phenomenological importance of the object in the subject-object distinction, in 
modernity, the combination of scientistic prejudice and the anthropocentric 
nihilism of the Overman reduced the status of the object altogether. Just as 
individual pieces of equipment withdraw into the equipmental whole, objects 
withdraw into the standing reserve; as a class of metaphysical entities, the object 
is stripped of its ability to stand against the subject and is consumed by the 
instrumental, exploitable mass. Heidegger describes an airplane16 resting on a 
runway. While the airplane is an object in the metaphysical sense, this 
characterisation “conceals itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on 
the taxi strip only as standing-reserve” (ibid). As part of the standing reserve, the 
object can no longer counter the subject in any meaningful way. Even when 
broken, conspicuous, or unready-to-hand, the object remains part of the 																																																								
16 The airplane and radio-communications remained specific targets of concern for Heidegger, as 
they manifest the reduced notions of time and space to co-ordinates, losing the existential sense of 
temporality and nearness/distance (Heidegger 1996, 39-48). Instead, “[e]verything washes together 
into the uniformly distanceless” (Heidegger 2012a, 4). 
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equipmental whole. Standing reserve and equipmentality contain many parallels, 
but where the latter acts as a pedagogical demonstration of fundamental 
ontology,17 the former is both a phenomenological description and a value 
judgement. While both concepts demonstrate that Dasein never encounters the 
merely present-at-hand, the former implies that the readiness-to-hand of 
equipment is a sinister reflection of the technological worlding of modernity, 
rather than a universal ontological fact of Dasein. As standing reserve, the world 
loses its capacity to “stand over against us” (ibid), to interrupt, counter, or resist 
us. A large part of  “the danger” (Heidegger 2012a, 51) of the modern 
technological world is that nothing is left to counter the hubris and 
anthropocentrism of modernity, nothing to interrupt or irrupt our exploitation of 
the standing reserve.  
 
The central concept of Heidegger’s critique of technology is “Ge-stell” (2008e, 
324).18 Ge-stell names the dominant mode of revealing in the modern 
technological world. Where Heidegger previously referred to machination as the 
distorted essence of Being, this notion is solidified from the 1949 lectures onward 
as Ge-stell. Ge-stell names the ‘happening’ of scientistic prejudice and the active 
devalorisation of other possible truths as the worlding of the world. From Ge-stell, 
the world becomes standing reserve. As a foundational metaphysical framework 
that forms the horizon for the everyday comings and goings of people in 
developed Western countries, Ge-stell is the culmination of machination, the 
gigantic, the essential phenomena of modernity, Nietzsche’s nihilism, and the 
oblivion of Being. Ge-stell is one of the most important concepts in understanding 
Heidegger’s broader project in that it facilitates an understanding of the event of 
appropriation, Ereignis (discussed in Chapter Four). Further, understanding how 
Heidegger conceives Ge-stell provides a context for understanding his project as a 
whole. As the culmination of the five essential phenomena and the confrontation 
with Nietzsche, the concept of Ge-stell makes sense of Heidegger’s sweeping 																																																								
17 As in Chapter One, I am in concert with Haar (1993, 79) and Swer’s (2008, 103) claims that 
much of Being and Time is a phenomenological account of the specifically technological world, 
whether Heidegger was aware of it or not. 
18 I have followed Andrew J. Mitchell’s in using the hyphenated form of the word Ge-stell in order 
to emphasise the etymological characteristics of the concept as discussed in the body of this 
chapter. 
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reduction of the entire Western tradition before him to subject-object metaphysics, 
regardless of the differences between thinkers within the tradition. Ge-stell frames 
the human understanding-of and relation-to the self, others, and the cosmos. The 
way a question is framed determines both the appropriate method of enquiry and 
the acceptable domain in which its answer must fall. Ge-stell frames human being 
in such a sense. As such, Ge-stell can be thought of in terms of framing, 
enframing, positioning and positionality (in an abstracted sense such as cultural 
norms, or a literal sense such as a privileged perspective that follows from one’s 
socio-economic position within the world) in a variety of senses. It is not an extant 
thing that has any kind of presence-at-hand and thus resists ontic analysis. This 
point is particularly important.  
 
While Ge-stell evades any kind of objective measurement, its results—in terms of 
its affects and effects—do not. I return to this point in the second half of my 
thesis. For example, a psychological investigation into the correlation between 
media consumption and eating disorders in young women is carried out as ontic 
inquiry; it is based on a subject-object metaphysical foundation.  As such, the 
initial framing of the phenomenon—as a correlation between autonomous subjects 
and the external world—is unable to account for a more fundamental 
phenomenological ontological analysis of such. In this kind of example, the 
framing of Ge-stell already pre-determines the type of analysis, the limits of the 
analysis, and what results will be considered legitimate. As the ontic analysis itself 
is oblivious to Ge-stell—this is discussed further below—it is simultaneously 
unable to account for certain populations of people who are positioned by Ge-stell 
in certain ways. For example, children are subject to any number of often 
unconscious, often unintentional cultural expectations based on race, gender, and 
socio-economic status. While these factors may be controlled as variables within 
an ontic study, the significance of these factors as an aspect of the framing or 
positioning of Ge-stell remains uninterrogated. I will discuss the implications of 
this kind of example further in Chapters Six and Seven, but for now it is important 
to note that, as an ontological alethic revealing of the world in which Dasein is in, 
Ge-stell remains outside the purview of ontic inquiry, although the results of such 
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a revealing are prevalent throughout the modern Western world. 
 
While I do not translate the term, it is important to note, as in the discussion 
above, that Ge-stell can be described in a number of ways due to the many and 
varied affects and effects that manifest from such a phenomenon. It is important to 
note that Ge-stell frames the world and positions each person in such a way that it 
largely remains invisible due to its pervasive nature: Dasein’s Being-in-the-world 
is a fundamental ontological structure, and while the world is Ge-stell, one does 
not simply just come and go within such framing and positioning as one pleases. 
As the essence of technology, the worlding of the modern technological world is 
“the challenging that sets upon man to order the actual as standing-reserve … 
[C]hallenging gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man upon 
ordering the actual as standing-reserve” (Heidegger 2008e, 324). As the horizon of 
intelligibility, Ge-stell is the disclosive framing of the world that reveals the truth 
of beings as standing reserve. This point takes on a new relevance when 
considering that human being is itself positioned according to race, gender, and 
class (to be discussed later in the thesis). In this sense, Ge-stell is the distorted 
essence of Being: while it is a mode of revealing, and thus retains what is essential 
to Being, it does not facilitate a properly alethic revealing in that it remains closed 
off to itself as a mode of disclosure. Again, this does not set Ge-stell into a binary 
relationship with Being, but creates a tension between the two concepts, given 
that, at an essential level, they share the same mechanism. This clarification is 
important.  
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of alētheia demonstrates that there are multiple 
possible truths that can become revealed through certain circumstances and 
interactions between Dasein and objects or other phenomena. In this sense, how is 
it that a mode of disclosure such as Ge-stell is distorted, or not “properly” alethic? 
The significance of this question will be discussed in depth below. Ge-stell is 
distorted in the sense that it reveals beings primarily in their standing reserve and 
to the exclusion of other possible unconcealings, rather than as a self-reflexive 
aspect of the interplay between concealment and unconcealment. The worlding of 
Ge-stell recognises and perpetuates objective truth; truth that remains oblivious to 
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the notion of worlding as a function of Being and thus legitimates calculable and 
objective facts. This point becomes increasingly significant for understanding the 
functioning of Ge-stell and my later use of the concept. A key alethic 
characteristic of Being is its inherent withdrawal or invisibility in the presence of 
extant phenomena. This, for Heidegger, led to the simple mistake of the Western 
tradition: privileging the ontic qualities of an extant phenomenon over the fact that 
it exists at all, thus missing the significance of Being as that to which human being 
cor-responds, with which human logos is concerned. Similarly, when holding that 
only calculable and objective truth is legitimate, by its own measure, Ge-stell does 
not exist. In this sense, Ge-stell is doubly concealed: first as a mode of disclosure 
that withdraws as it reveals beings in their presence, and, again as a revealing that 
does not recognise, and actively devalues and seeks to overcome, the multiple 
possibilities of alētheia. The characteristic double concealing of Ge-stell remains 
significant throughout this thesis. The double concealing of Ge-stell defines 
modernity as the culminating era of the age of Western metaphysics.19  
 
Although the everyday meaning of Ge-stell refers to “some kind of apparatus, e.g., 
a bookrack” (Heidegger 2008e, 325), Heidegger employs the word in a manner 
“thoroughly unfamiliar up to now” (ibid). Despite the unfamiliarity of its use, by 
the time Heidegger employs this word he had already devoted much thinking to 
the disclosive nature of language and the significance of the human immersion in 
language as logos, giving a clear context for his introduction of the concept. The 
prefix ‘Ge-’ serves to gather or ‘group-together’ the referent; linguistically it 
transforms a noun into a collective noun. Heidegger provides an example of this 
gathering; “[t]hat which primordially unfolds the mountains into mountain ranges 
and pervades them in their folded contiguity is the gathering that we call Gebirg” 
(324). Bearing in mind the gathering that the prefix intends, Stellen means “to set” 
(326), as in ‘to set in place’, to ‘order’ something or ‘position’ it. It is from this 																																																								
19 This notion was already captured by Heidegger in 1938’s ‘The Age of the World Picture’ in the 
epigraph from Chapter One of the present thesis: “Metaphysics [Ge-stell] grounds [frames] an age 
in that, through a particular interpretation of beings [as standing reserve] and through a particular 
comprehension of truth [as specifically objective and derived through scientific, calculable, 
measurable means], it provides that age with the grounds of its essential shape [it frames the age 
scientistically, technologically]. This ground comprehensively governs all decisions distinctive of 
the age” (2002a, 57, my insertions). 
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sense of ordering that Mitchell, in his introduction to the Bremen lectures, tells the 
reader that Ge-stell “is the gathering of all Stellen, of all positioning, placing, 
putting” (Heidegger 2012a, xi). Richard Rojcewicz states that  
 
 the word often bears the connotation of forceful putting. Most colloquially, stellen means
 to ‘corner’ or ‘buttonhole’ someone, i.e., to press upon or importune. In hunting, it means
 ‘to bring to bay.’ It can also mean ‘to set upon’ someone, in the sense of ‘having at’
 someone, attacking, besieging (2006, 76).  
 
The framing and positioning of Ge-stell must always be understood as forceful 
and violent. The double concealing of Ge-stell, including the scientistic prejudice I 
have already spoken of, is precisely what makes Ge-stell “distorted” and violent.  
 
 The essential violence of technology does not first of all lie in the effect of high-
 frequency machines, but rather in that technology, proximally and for the most part, only
 presents itself to human representation technologically. The essence of technology,
 positionality, conducts its own disguising  (Heidegger 2012a, 57). 
 
The essence of technology, the violent challenging-revealing of the world as 
standing reserve, disguises itself as objective truth. The violence is not the 
physical ripping, mining, and felling of machine technology, but the human 
comportment to the cosmos that facilitates such activity. While it is itself alethic, 
Ge-stell resists and attempts to overcome alētheia. With the various etymological 
roots of the word in mind, it is evident that the concept of Ge-stell brings together 
at least two decades of Heidegger’s thinking. Most obviously, machination and the 
gigantic are subsumed in this concept, and the notion of standing reserve 
expresses the inevitable outcome of a scientistic prejudice that is bound up with a 
nihilistic, anthropocentric perspective of the world. Phenomenologically, the 
subject-object distinction of the Western tradition can be characterised as 
symbiotic: in Heideggerian terminology one might say that the subject and object 
distinction, thought charitably, raises each into their respective essence. However, 
instead of a constitutive subject-object relationship, the subject-standing reserve, 
or subject-instrument (in that standing reserve reduces all things to their sheer 
instrumentality) distinction, is not symbiotic in the same manner. If the subject-
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instrument relationship was analogous to the subject-object relation, then the 
relation would be considered inherently violent: parasitic rather than symbiotic. 
The purely instrumental standing reserve is not raised into its essence by the 
subject, but is beaten into this shape by Ge-stell and the Overman: a process that is 
essentially the same as the former, but that has a different sensibility.20 Ge-stell, 
the essence of technology, is the disclosure of calculable, instrumental truth that 
either devalues or conceals other possible truths. What is disclosed by Ge-stell is 
disclosed to, and manifested by, the will of the subject/Overman: “[t]he moments 
of Stellen—representing (Vorstellen), producing (Herstellen), ordering (Bestellen), 
exposing (Ausstellen), distorting (Verstellen), etc.—reveal a comportment of self-
assertive willing, and collectively they define the essence of modern technological 
revealing/concealing” (Davis 2007, 176).21 
 
Origins and Implications: Jurisdictions 
For Heidegger, technē is a human mode of bringing-forth. Each bringing-forth is 
also alethic. As such, modern technology—where the logos represents the 
gathering together and revealing of a world, the cor-respondence between human 
being and Being, discussed at length in Chapter Eight—is a mode of revealing and 
defining truth. The modern deference to objective truth itself is an alethic 
revealing of the human relation to its self, the world, and Being. Heidegger’s 
thinking tends to valorise the process of unconcealment, where the unhindered 
process itself is at least as important as what is revealed. As I discuss in Chapter 
Four, and later again in the thesis, Heidegger valorises alētheia in so far as the 
human understanding of truth as unconcealment is a step outside subject-object 																																																								
20 The importance of a hermeneutic reading of Heidegger’s thinking, particularly as I am 
developing it in this thesis, is as follows: the standing reserve is “raised into its essence” by the 
subject (or Overman) in precisely the same manner as the (charitably interpreted) symbiotic 
relationship of subject and object. Yet, the pejorative “parasitic” allusion and the reference to a 
violent ‘beating into shape’ attempts to express the idea that the essence of standing reserve is not 
merely of academic or descriptive importance, but is a symptom of the existential, ethical, and 
spiritual alienation and degradation of human being in the modern technological world. It is 
impossible to develop a full account of Ge-stell without an account of Ereignis—this is the purpose 
of Chapter Four. Again, it is important not to think of these two concepts as binaries or opposites, 
but as essentially the same, existing in tension with one another. 
21 Stellen is not just a ‘setting-in-place’, but is specifically the expression of the will-to-power of a 
subject. From the position of this willing subject, that which is not the subject becomes object, and 
from object to mere standing reserve. In this case, Stellen itself is already understood as aligned 
with challenging-forth, in that the ‘setting in place’ is itself an act of will, an attitude of 
instrumental domination. 
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metaphysics, a de-centring of human being (in an epistemological and 
metaphysical sense), and a recovery of an originary sense of Being. For 
Heidegger, recognising the interplay of concealment and unconcealment can act as 
a counter to the hubristic anthropocentrism of modernity. Heidegger’s critique of 
modern technology is a value judgement precisely because the technological 
relation to the world actively devalues, restricts, and doubly conceals an originary 
sense of Being. Alētheia and the forms of poiēsis discussed above are 
characteristic of an originary sense of Being, of a non-scientistic mode of truth, of 
understanding the world, our selves, and one another in multiple ways. 
Developing an originary sense of Being is the aim of the motif found throughout 
Heidegger’s thinking, where the becoming (or making) visible of a phenomenon 
such as equipmentality, Dasein (rather than the subject), or Ge-stell places an 
obligation on each person to respond to this insight. In Chapter Three I define and 
outline how the notion of authenticity22 is the yardstick by which one’s response 
to the originary sense of Being is measured. Chapter Four then explores Ereignis 
as the counter to Ge-stell, the undistorted essence of Being. 
 
From Heidegger’s position, Ge-stell and standing reserve are the culmination of 
two millennia of subject-object metaphysics taken to its logical extreme. The 
modern technological world creates a peculiar tension and dissonance for the 
subject, however. It is a dissonance that perhaps goes some way to justify my 
earlier claim that technology has filled the void of the death of God. For the 
modern technological subject, only objective truth is properly true. On the one 
hand, this means that personal opinion and experience is merely subjective, 
untrustworthy, and biased, and on the other hand, we are free to create and 
celebrate our own meaning and value; all the while conscious that such meaning 
and value, no matter how much it is celebrated, is still not really ‘properly’ true. 
This dissonance is overcome by celebrating our freedom in a particular manner: 
elevating objective truth beyond its functional and pragmatic utility as an aspect of 																																																								
22 Although authenticity is the focus of Chapter Three, it can be briefly summarised here as a mode 
of human being that reflects and manifests the self as Dasein, constitutively in and of the world, 
rather than as the violent and anthropocentric being of the scientistic subject-overman. Following 
the discussion of bringing-forth and challenging-forth, technē is an authentic mode of production 
in that it is sensitive to the de-centring of human being, and of the significance and inherent value 
of the things of the world in their mystery and multiple possible meanings. 
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ontic inquiry to become a qualitatively meaningful, perhaps definitive, aspect of 
human being. In its own way, this is an ingenious, if existentially dishonest, 
response to the tensions that arise in modernity. However, as I discuss in Chapter 
Three, it is not an authentic response when considering the ontological 
constitution of human being as Dasein.  
 
Pre-empting Chapters Three, Six, and Seven, the scientism of modernity 
characterises an inauthentic23 response to ongoing political and ethical issues in 
that it posits an ontic response to ontological problems. An aspect of the critique 
of technology that I have only briefly touched on in Chapter One—and which 
reflects the ontic-ontological distinction—is Heidegger’s distinction between truth 
and correctness. This distinction resonates throughout all of Heidegger’s work 
from at least 1933 onwards. In this distinction, truth is the process of 
unconcealment, alētheia, while correctness refers to a specific and singular 
moment of correspondence between the conditions that frame a particular problem 
or question and the extent to which the response to the problem or question 
satisfies these conditions. Truth, in this sense, is existential-phenomenological in 
that it refers to something that is lived but not necessarily objectively calculable, 
while correctness always has precise measures. While something may be correct, 
such correctness relates specifically to the framing of the question alone in terms 
of a local and specific horizon, rather than a broader horizon on which the 
questioning itself takes place. This distinction echoes Heidegger’s positioning of 
fundamental ontology as the broader horizon that makes ontic inquiry or 
metaphysical ontology possible. Correctness is a specific and localised 
characteristic of a broader ontological happening of alethic truth.  
 
For example, it is correct to state that in contemporary Australian society, victims 
of domestic violence are often male. However, the framing of this statement—the 
unspoken premises that make it correct—does not capture the broader truth of 
domestic violence in contemporary Australia, or even of the statement itself.  																																																								
23 See previous footnote; inauthenticity is a mode of human being that is not reflective of human 
being as Dasein, but is instead a violent closing off of the self from the world, synonymous with 
the alienation of the scientistic subject-overman and the reduction of the cosmos to standing 
reserve. 
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Discounting the debate around the suitability of the word “victim”, the disclosive 
power of the statement “men are often victims of domestic violence” relies on a 
context of heteronormative assumptions that suggest that the statement is actually 
saying, “men are often victims of domestic violence at the hands of women”.24 In 
truth, and in no way discounting the importance of the issue of violence against 
men, domestic violence in Australia is currently a major problem that is 
overwhelmingly committed by men against current or ex partners (mainly of the 
opposite sex), or other family members.25 Further, considering the qualitative 
difference between verbal emasculation, economic oppression, and physical 
assault to the point of homicidal violence—and in the case of the latter it is almost 
exclusively male violence towards women—for the statement “men are often 
victims of domestic violence” to be true (rather than correct), one must overlook 
these qualitative differences. More than simple pedantry, the distinction between 
correctness and truth demonstrates how an issue is framed, what is taken for 
granted in such framing, and the ways that such framing exploits or manipulates 
everyday understandings of issues within the scientistic perspective of modernity. 
In this distinction, the concept of correctness relies on either very specific or very 
vague conditions, whereas truth attempts to understand the way in which what is 
correct has been alethically revealed. 
 
Despite this seeming valorisation of truth over correctness, what is correct and 
what is true can often be the same thing. It would be equally inauthentic, equally 
violent in its own way to simply reject the technological revealing of the world. 
What Ge-stell reveals is one possible truth, but not the only truth. Delivered as a 
public speech in 1955, at the peak of his writing and thinking on both the critical 
and constructive aspects of his critique of technology, and published in 1959 as 																																																								
24 I use this example to pre-empt issues that I discuss in Chapter Seven: the inherently gendered 
aspects of Ge-stell and how they play out. In searching for men’s rights on the Internet, almost any 
random search result will provide you with an example of the kind of phrasing that I have used 
above. Men’s rights groups often perceive feminism in general as a struggle for feminine 
supremacy rather than a political movement to make the systemic bias against women within the 
West visible (although framing the enormously varied umbrella term of ‘feminism’ as simply one 
or the other of these two descriptions is also reductionist and misleading). See Gilmore  (2015) for 
a discussion of how the ‘1 in 3’ statistic of male victims of domestic violence took root in the 
media and minds of men’s groups throughout Australia from a Government report released in 
2013. 
25 See Jac Brown and Kerrie James (2014) for an analysis of domestic violence and its relation to 
gender in Australia. 
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‘Memorial Address’, Heidegger uses the terms “calculative thinking and 
meditative thinking” (1969, 46). It is important not to lose sight of the importance 
and pragmatic utility of objective, scientific, calculative thinking. It is far too easy 
to assume that Heidegger’s critique of technology is a sweeping rejection of 
calculative thinking, but this is not the case. As stated above, a simple outright 
rejection of science, or all thinking that is founded on subject-object metaphysics, 
is an inauthentic response in so far as it is a response that is still determined by 
metaphysics. It is in this sense that Heidegger states “opposition … is servitude” 
(2010b, 33): in answering a question, one accepts the premise of the question, yet 
it is Heidegger’s intention to formulate an entirely different question altogether. 
This is why we are told, in the ‘Memorial Address’, that one must be able to say 
both yes and no to technology (1969, 54). One must not simply reject or dismiss 
what is revealed by the technological world, but at the same time one must remain 
aware of the double concealing of Ge-stell, and of the alethic nature of truth that is 
sacrificed in order to achieve correctness. Again, the motif of interruption, insight, 
and response appears: the ability to say yes or no to technology is dependent on 
the visibility of the essence of technology in the first place. More on this in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
 
Where appropriate, throughout the remainder of the thesis I refer to instrumental-
calculative and existential-meditative thinking. I expand on Heidegger’s original 
terms in order that the concepts more accurately reflect my reading of Heidegger 
and how I later put this reading to use. Predictably, instrumental-calculative 
thinking refers to the domain of thinking concerned with the calculable, 
quantifiable ontic properties of a phenomenon. When assessing the efficacy of a 
hand tool, computer program, or theory, instrumental-calculative thinking 
compares the actual outcome or end result with the original telos or intention of 
the phenomenon in question in a clearly delineated fashion: in this sense, 
instrumental-calculative thinking is concerned with correctness. What I 
characterise as the legitimate jurisdiction of instrumental-calculative thinking 
includes certain aspects of the sciences and associated realms that rely on the 
sciences (health/medicine, engineering and computing, for example), but also the 
everyday problem solving that we are required to perform: why won’t the car 
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start? How long should I cook these noodles? There is nothing inherently 
problematic about instrumental-calculative thinking within its legitimate 
jurisdiction. However, Heidegger’s critique of technology demonstrates that due 
to particular confluence of historical events that rest on a foundation of over two 
millennia of subject-object metaphysics, instrumental-calculative thinking always 
carries the risk of over-reaching itself, of attempting to think outside its legitimate 
jurisdiction. This risk is countered by existential-meditative thinking. 
 
Existential-meditative thinking is concerned with qualitative judgments that fall 
outside the scope of instrumental-calculative thinking, and, as the name suggests, 
with more general reflections on existence itself. This type of thinking is mindful 
of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek concepts considered above. Where 
instrumental-calculative thinking is concerned with correctness, existential-
meditative thinking is concerned with alethic truth. Attempting to offer a strict 
definition of existential-meditative thinking is difficult. This is due to the fact that 
the legitimate application of instrumental-calculative thinking and the 
extrapolation of its results to one’s broader way of being are pre-empted or guided 
in advance—and consequently reflected on—with existential-meditative thinking. 
In this sense, the latter has a broader scope than the former. Existential-meditative 
thinking contains—or, in Heidegger’s terminology, shelters—instrumental-
calculative thinking, never the other way around. Existential-meditative thinking 
is characterised by its reflection on what I have so far referred to as an originary 
sense of Being. Once taking into account the material covered in Chapters Three, 
Four, and Five, I attempt to put my account of Heidegger’s critique to work. I do 
this based on the following assumption: rather than mutually exclusive or 
independent domains, existential-meditative thinking should—in a prescriptive, 
ethical sense—be considered a necessary condition for instrumental-calculative 
thinking. I will argue that the way to facilitate this is through Heidegger’s own 
motif: in making the framing of Ge-stell visible, one is placed into an obligation to 
respond. While the critical aspect of Heidegger’s critique of technology describes 
the danger, the constructive aspect—covered extensively in Chapters Four, Five, 
and Six—outlines how to make the danger visible, and develops the basis for an 
authentic response. 
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Moving Forward 
I have claimed that Heidegger’s critique of technology can be divided into critical 
and constructive aspects, and that neither should be thought without the other. 
Treating the critical aspect of Heidegger’s critique of technology as an 
autonomous piece of his thinking makes the critique susceptible to caricature as a 
rejection of technology or of a sentimental, quasi-Kantian environmental ethics. 
Of course, one can take Heidegger’s concern regarding the scientism of modernity 
and draw one’s own conclusions based on this characteristic of modernity alone. 
One can also think about the distinction between bringing-forth and challenging-
forth with regards to capitalism and consider how machine technology drives the 
West in an economic, rather than existential, sense. From Heidegger’s critique, 
one can crudely piece together a position that is inherently suspicious of modern 
technology altogether—a position that only “says no”—and instead direct one’s 
attention to living more simply in terms of the modern Western engagement with 
the environment. I touch on all of these ideas throughout the remainder of the 
thesis. However, in understanding the critical aspect of the critique more fully, it 
is important to understand the constructive aspect also. Just as technē helps make 
sense of challenging forth, understanding Ereignis provides further insight into 
Ge-stell and its many affects and effects. In Chapter Four I explore Ereignis in 
depth, demonstrating how Ge-stell functions through the appropriating-giving of 
the es gibt and thus making sense of the invisibility and ongoing framing of Ge-
stell. Understanding Heidegger’s concept of Ereignis is crucial in understanding 
how Ge-stell is considered the distorted essence of Being. Again, it becomes 
evident that the critique of technology is central to the recovery of Being, central 
to Heidegger’s thinking as a whole. 
 
Before moving forward with the critique of technology, I now turn my focus to the 
matter of authenticity. In exploring the under-pinnings of Heidegger’s critique of 
technology, it is clear that human being, as the subject, Overman, or Dasein, is 
always implicated in the problem of Being. As discussed in Chapter One, 
Heidegger’s preliminary investigation into the recovery of Being, Being and Time, 
deliberately began with an analysis of human being. In Chapter Three I explore 
the importance of authentic human being to Heidegger’s project, and specifically 
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how authenticity motivates Heidegger’s thinking throughout many of his works. 
In relation to Chapters One and Two, and in terms of moving forward, Chapter 
Three will provide the grounds to interpret Heidegger’s critique of technology as a 
matter of authenticity in so far as it is a matter of existential, ethical, and spiritual 
importance. The constructive aspect of Heidegger’s critique is based on an 
inherently ethical undertaking to recognise and realise authentic human being. As 
such, Chapter Three traces the development of authenticity throughout 
Heidegger’s thought, while Chapter Four’s discussion of Ereignis also clarifies the 
distinction between Ge-stell and Ereignis (and between notions such as bringing 
forth and challenging forth, for example) as one of authenticity and inauthenticity 
in regards to the human relation to Being. 
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Chapter Three — Authenticity 
 
The critical aspect of Heidegger’s critique of technology revolves around two core 
concepts: standing reserve and Ge-stell. Ge-stell is the essence of technology in 
that it discloses the world as calculable, instrumental, and exploitable: it reveals 
the standing reserve. One of the most important phenomenological features of 
Dasein is its Being-in-the-world. Dasein’s understanding of the world as standing 
reserve, and its self as a metaphysically and epistemologically individuated 
subject, stems from Ge-stell. For Heidegger, subject-object metaphysics has 
focused on presence at the cost of Being. With his critique of technology, 
Heidegger demonstrates that the forgetting of Being has significant ethical 
implications. The “ethical dimension” (Nancy 2002, 65) of Heidegger’s thought is 
not an ethics in the conventional sense. As with his discussion of physis as natura, 
Heidegger claims that the modern use of the word, and understanding of, “ethics” 
had lost the originary sense of ēthos (2008d, 255-256). While it is possible to 
characterise the ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thought as a “meta-ethics” 
(Hodge 2001, 2),1 a ground for ethics in the same way that fundamental ontology 
is the grounds for ontic inquiry, Heidegger’s critique of technology is something 
more than this. As I discuss in the Introduction and again in Chapters Six and 
Eight, Heidegger’s thinking is existentially, ethically, and spiritually significant. 
In order to draw out the ethical significance of Heidegger’s critique of technology, 
I turn to Heidegger’s motif that phenomenological-ontological insight creates an 
obligation to respond: when the world is somehow interrupted and becomes 
visible as world, each person must decide how to respond to the implications of 
such visibility. Heidegger’s critique of technology is exemplary of this motif. In 
the Bremen Lectures, and again in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, 
Heidegger turns to Hölderlin to articulate the motif: “But where danger is, grows 																																																								
1 The notion of meta-ethics pertains to a field of study concerned with the possibilities and 
properties of ethical judgments (Sayre-McCord, accessed 3rd Feb. 2016). As such, Heidegger’s 
discussion of authenticity in Being and Time can easily be categorised as including a fundamental 
ontological meta-ethical element. However, Heidegger’s later formulations of authenticity, 
discussed in the second half of this chapter, are not as easily categorised as meta-ethics. While still 
not ‘an’ ethics, the ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thought leading up to and including the 
critique of technology is something more specific, more prescriptive than the analytic that 
demonstrates the possibility of authenticity from Being and Time. 
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the saving power also” (2008c, 340). When the double concealing of Ge-stell—the 
danger—is made visible, one can say both yes and no to technology. The saving 
power is rooted in Dasein’s capacity to respond authentically to Ge-stell. But what 
is an authentic response? 
 
In this chapter I trace the development of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. 
Corollary to this, I demonstrate that the matter of authenticity is the specifically 
ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thought, central to his critique of technology and 
the recovery of Being. As with Chapters One and Two, tracing the development of 
authenticity throughout Heidegger’s work helps demonstrate the depth and 
richness of the concept as it appears in his later thinking. Further, while 
authenticity appears to undergo a significant metamorphosis from Being and Time 
through to the 1940s and beyond, I aim to demonstrate that authenticity serves as 
an example of the continuity of Heidegger’s thinking. Finally, this chapter will 
demonstrate that the critical and constructive aspects of Heidegger’s critique of 
technology rest on a distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity as a mode 
of human being. By understanding authentic Dasein in its cor-respondence to 
Being, and in light of my discussion of Ereignis in Chapter Four, Heidegger’s 
critique of technology will reveal itself as central to his entire project, 
demonstrating the ethical—later, spiritual—significance of Heidegger’s thinking. 
 
The Foundations of Authenticity 
As an ontological possibility of Dasein, authenticity, for Heidegger, is a matter of 
self-understanding and self-reflection. In the modern technological world, this is 
not as straightforward as it sounds. When describing Heidegger’s early notion of 
authenticity, and particularly when extrapolating the same notion to his later work, 
one must place Being and Time in context: as an important but preliminary work.2 																																																								
2 Bernasconi states that “not only the first division of the first part of Being and Time, the 
‘Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein,’ but the whole of the first part of Being and Time, 
had it been completed, would have to have been understood as only provisional, awaiting the 
destructuring that was set to take place in the book's second part” (1994, 123). I contend that while 
the projected whole of Being and Time remains formally incomplete as Heidegger introduced it in 
1927, thinking Heidegger’s works as a hermeneutic whole is sufficient for understanding the 
published Being and Time as provisional. While Sheehan’s attempt to push Heidegger scholarship 
towards a new paradigm is often at odds with my account of Heidegger’s thinking, I agree with 
Sheehan’s claim that “Heidegger did finish “being and time”—not the book by that name but the 
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Being and Time was the formal introduction to the greater recovery of Being, its 
examples working as such, rather than as the final word on the issues contained 
therein. As with equipmentality and Ge-stell/standing reserve, there is a clear 
connection between the early and later consideration of authenticity. While a shift 
in authorial opinion may be apparent between Heidegger’s earlier and later works 
to some degree (and a stylistic shift is taken for granted), a shift in the intention 
and thus context of the works themselves is more significant for tracing the 
continuity of Heidegger’s thinking. Where Being and Time is a declaration of the 
possibility of a new beginning, Heidegger’s later work explores this possibility, 
hermeneutically turning back on itself, re-discovering the beginning as revealed in 
a new light over and again.3 As discussed in Chapter Five, the resonance of a 
beginning or origin is always present in any phenomena. As I demonstrate via my 
reading of authenticity, it is a mistake to focus only on the specific, literal, and 
historical content of Being and Time as an autonomous (from his later thinking) 
representation of Heidegger’s recovery of the problem of Being. Despite this 
caveat, the early notion of authenticity is problematic due to its seemingly 
subjective and relativist overtones. Before coming to terms with the ways that 
Being-in-the-world can be authentic, inauthentic, or undifferentiated (Heidegger 
2008a, 78), it is important to understand how the self—in terms of one’s self-
recognition of the I, of one’s sense of identity as an I—is configured from the 
fundamental-ontological approach. If authenticity relates to self-understanding 
and self-reflection, what, or who, is the self? 
 
Readiness-to-hand is the ontological description of equipment. Ontological 
descriptions do not pertain to the ontic properties of an extant object. Heidegger 																																																																																																																																																								
project that he set for himself” (2015b, 259). 	
3 While I stress the significance of interpreting Heidegger’s thinking as essentially continuous from 
his early to later works, there is little doubt that William Richardson’s distinction between 
“Heidegger I [and] Heidegger II” (2003, xxv, my insertion) is useful for contemplating 
Heidegger’s stylistic and methodological (if not thematic) shift between 1927 and the early 1930s. 
Originally published in 1963, Richardson’s work is one of the earliest, most exhaustive, and 
influential contributions to Anglo Heidegger scholarship. In his preface to this work, Heidegger 
himself remarks “The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the 
condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does 
one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I 
becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II” (2003, xxii). The strength of this claim 
becomes evident in my exploration of technology and authenticity in this thesis.	
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approaches the matter of the self from this same ontological position, claiming the 
experience of self stems from Jemeinigkeit. Rendered in the English translations 
of Being and Time as “in each case mineness” (Heidegger 2008a, 68) by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson and “always-being-my-own-being” (Heidegger 
2010a, 42) by Joan Stambaugh, this ontological characteristic of Dasein 
necessitates the “use [of] a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you 
are’” (Heidegger 2008a, 68). Through the ontological description of mineness, 
Heidegger demonstrates that “I-hood [“Icheit”]” (152) is a phenomenon that 
occurs in-the-world. For Heidegger, the self is not a pre-existing extant entity in 
the same way that the subject is posited in Chapter One, but is always Being-in-
the-world, cor-responding with the world. The ontic distinction between the 
external world and the central nervous system gives a causal insight into the 
mechanics of homo sapiens, but does not capture the ontology of human being. In 
this sense, rather than envision the subject as the centre of experience and the 
origin of meaning and value, ‘mineness’ is Heidegger’s attempt to articulate the 
conspicuous sense of subjectivity (for lack of a better term) that is characteristic of 
human being. From Heidegger’s position, while one’s mineness gives rise to 
subjectivity, the phenomenological fundamental ontological position must ensure 
that mineness is not misconstrued as the basis for the metaphysically and 
epistemologically alienated subject of subject-object metaphysics (and the 
implications of such). This is an important point. Where one can speak of Dasein’s 
subjectivity, this must always be thought in terms of a sense of mineness, in terms 
of the fact that I use the pronoun “I” by necessity to describe my self and my 
concern over the fact that I exist. However, for Heidegger, to collapse this sense of 
subjectivity into the subject-object distinction carries the risks discussed in 
Chapters One and Two. As such, where I refer to subjectivity, I am referring to 
mineness, where I refer to the subject I am referring to the valorised and alienated 
solipsistic self of subject-object metaphysics. For Heidegger, understanding the 
self as the experience of one’s in-the-world ontological-phenomenological 
mineness—rather than as the privileged origin of experience, meaning, and 
value—is essential for authenticity. 
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Authenticity requires mineness in order that a cohesive sense of identity (in the 
form of an I or self) can understand its self in terms of its “potentiality-for-Being-
a-whole” (2008a, 365). However, mineness is itself founded on the more 
primordial ontological structure of Sorge, care (84). Care is the foundational 
ontological being of Dasein. Where Dasein is distinguished as the being for whom 
it’s being is an issue for it (67), the distinguishing feature is care. In some senses, 
care can be thought of as a fundamental-ontological description of sentience. 
Dasein is not just in-the-world in an ontological structural sense, but—and this is 
my description, not Heidegger’s—as a sensing-feeling-emotional being that 
experiences (Erfahrung) itself and its place in the world as more than simply 
present-at-hand.4 Care is the ontological structure that grounds all possibilities to 
flourish, to suffer, to love, and for an originary sense of Being to matter. Each 
Dasein is always already, through no choice or design of its own, invested in its 
own existence. Care is more fundamental than the ontological structures of 
attunement or fundamental moods that reveal the world in certain ways.5 In a 
structural-hierarchical sense, care is what makes attunement, moods, and mineness 
possible. The ontic-metaphysical configuration of sentience as the ability to 
flourish or suffer and/or as the capacity for self-awareness is founded on a basic 
ontological investedness in the world from which a cohesive I or sense of self may 
or may not emerge. “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [“vor”] 
every factical ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein and it does so existentially a 
priori” (238). Where subject-object metaphysics begins with the subject and 
works outwards, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology first reveals the self as a 																																																								
4 Heidegger did not turn his attention to the embodied aspect of Dasein for the simple reason that 
he did not want to conflate ontological and ontic inquiry. However, this does not change the fact 
that the ontological structure of care is, in this model, the ground for the self as a sensing-feeling-
emotional being. As I will discuss later in the chapter, authenticity is one of the most important 
aspects of Heidegger’s thought, as although it refers to ontological structures, these structures only 
ever make sense in terms of their factical-ontic manifestation. For a further discussion of the 
significance of Dasein’s embodiment, see Chapter Six and Kevin Aho’s Heidegger’s Neglect of the 
Body. 
5 Attunement is Stambaugh’s translation of Befindlichkeit, rendered as state-of-mind by 
Macquarrie and Robinson. Fundamental moods, Grundstimmung, and attunement both contribute 
to the context and circumstance in which we understand phenomena and are related to the alethic 
disclosure of the world. Heidegger provides the example of bad moods (2008a, 175), fear (179), 
and the exemplary notion of anxiety (227) as disclosive of the world and of our selves as Dasein, 
responsible for its own potential and possibilities. Note that this does not reduce alētheia to a 
subjective revealing of what is true ‘for me’, but is an aspect of human being in it’s cor-
respondence. 
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meaningfully invested phenomenon in-the-world: the foundational ontological 
being of human being as care. From the confluence of care and Dasein’s Being-in-
the-world, one’s self-aware mineness emerges.6  
 
The Early Notion of Authenticity: Inauthenticity 
In Being and Time, Heidegger defines authenticity following an extensive 
exploration of the self in its everyday inauthenticity. Sartre7 also followed this 
pattern for the same reason: both thinkers assumed that the prevailing mode of 
human being in Western modernity is inauthentic. As a description of a possible 																																																								
6 Problems such as who does and does not have Dasein as their way of being—think of humans 
born with varying degrees of cognitive or neurological damage or impairment, for example—or at 
what age we could say that an individual’s way of being meets the description of Dasein, are not 
part of Heidegger’s fundamental ontological analysis. These questions are perhaps important for 
lending credence to some of Heidegger’s claims, or if one looks to these descriptions of human 
being in order to extrapolate or apply them to already existing fields of study into specifically 
human being. That is, only if they are to be taken as distinct and isolated claims in and of 
themselves, rather than as a demonstration of the fundamental ontological methodology that 
Heidegger developed to overcome the ontic tendencies of subject-object metaphysics, can these 
questions or issues be treated independently. This kind of problem is also played out in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, where the relation of world and animals is discussed, with 
the contentious, perhaps unsatisfactory, conclusion that “The animal has a sphere of potential 
transposability and yet it does not have what we call world…The animal both has something and 
does not have something, i.e., it is deprived of something. We express this by saying that the 
animal is poor in world and that it is fundamentally deprived of world” (1995, 211). While I have 
little problem with the characterisation that Heidegger gives to animals in this sense, it does 
demonstrate that the notion of Dasein, indeed all of Heidegger’s thinking takes certain human 
cognitive faculties for granted, thus limiting the scope of the content-based insights, if not the 
broader phenomenological methodological insights. 
7 Heidegger heavily influenced Sartre. Sartre’s major work, Being and Nothingness, presented a 
reconfiguration of Heidegger’s notion of authenticity/inauthenticity from Being and Time in the 
form of bad faith. Sartre argued that bad faith was the result of a for-itself (the name Sartre gives 
the subject) acting as though it were an in-itself (an object). In this formulation, a for-itself is a 
human being with full cognitive capacities and equipped with free will. However, for Sartre, free 
will is an expression of the consciousness, which is grounded more fundamentally in freedom 
itself. For Sartre, freedom “is not a quality added on or a property of my nature. It is very exactly 
the stuff of my being…man is free” (2003, 461). Because of this freedom, each person is able to 
choose his or her-self in terms of one’s everyday ontic manifestations. This kind of freedom is 
what characterises the human as a for-itself. A for-itself is conspicuously conscious of itself, and of 
itself as an Other for other for-itselfs. Thus, bad faith emerges from a free human being, a for-
itself, acting as an in-itself, or in any way denying herself as an in-itself: “If I were sad or cowardly 
in the way in which this inkwell is an inkwell, the possibility of bad faith could not even be 
conceived” (89). Thus we act in bad faith, are inauthentic, when we deny our freedom to choose 
our self in a certain manner. Unlike Heidegger, Sartre attempts to untangle the psychological 
tension of a person who is in some sense lying to herself, but in a manner that is essentially 
different from lying to others (70-75). This discussion is an important aspect of reconciling one’s 
freedom with one’s everyday entrenchment in the They, and is perhaps a failing of Heidegger if we 
are to understand his project as existential in the same sense as Sartre. However, Heidegger’s 
existentialism is always a phenomenologically grounded fundamental ontology that is guided by 
the recovery of the problem of Being. As I discuss in Chapters Six and Eight, and drawing on 
Chapter Two, authentic human being is not just choosing one’s ontic manifestation of a self, but is 
always guided by an originary sense of Being. 
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mode of human being, authenticity is not a fixed state. Rather, one is always 
authentic, inauthentic, or “modally undifferentiated” (Heidegger, 2008a, 78). This 
ambiguous state between authenticity and inauthenticity is not an extended mode 
in itself, but is the moment between either state; it is the flux that occurs when the 
possibility of authenticity or inauthenticity arises. It cannot itself be an extended 
state as, following the motif that I have mentioned in the previous chapters, when 
faced with a moment of decision, indefinitely remaining in indecision (perhaps in 
an attempt to sustain one’s undifferentiated state, or at least to postpone one’s 
inauthenticity) is itself inauthentic. While one chooses authenticity in a certain 
sense (described below), in light of the discussion of modernity and Ge-stell in 
Chapters One and Two it becomes evident that one’s inauthenticity is often a 
function of one’s unthinking, non-deliberative coherence with the everyday 
comings and goings of the modern technological world. While Heidegger had not 
yet articulated the worlding of the world as Ge-stell in Being and Time, Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world always means being in a world of pre-existing discourses, 
norms, and values. The concept of das Man, the They (2008a, 164), is used to 
describe the unexamined values and meanings that constitute one’s everyday 
comings and goings. Although Dasein is in and of the world, this does not mean 
that each person is simply a product of their environment and nothing more. Care, 
the foundational ontological characteristic of human being, implies a sense of 
investedness as a self, which in turn implies cognition, reflection, and so forth. 
However, the manner in which Dasein’s mineness ontically manifests is always 
influenced by its initially inauthentic immersion in, and emergence from, the 
They. 
 
Heidegger’s discussion of the They is a clear forerunner of his critique of 
modernity, and can be rightfully considered elitist and exclusive in certain senses. 
Heidegger’s formulation of, and response to, the They demonstrates an intellectual 
elitism (and ignorance of the masculine bias that such a notion contains—
discussed in Chapter Six) by remaining oblivious to variables such as education, 
race, gender, and class; variables that, as I discuss throughout the second half of 
the thesis, often frame and order human being into inauthenticity. However, as I 
discuss in Chapters Six and Seven, the fact that many people are unwillingly 
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framed into an inauthentic existence is an indictment of the ubiquitous systemic 
oppression of Ge-stell (and the They), rather any incapacity or failing of 
individuals or particular groups of people. Serving as an underpinning for the later 
critique of modernity, and reminiscent of Heidegger’s railing against mediocrity in 
Introduction to Metaphysics (2000a, 47), the They characterises the faceless mass 
of public opinion that forms the horizon of uncritical, unreflective everyday 
distractions and gossip. Gossip is “idle talk” (2008a, 211), where the disclosive 
power of language is lost to uncritical and unreflective communication and thus 
allows ill informed popular opinion to become entrenched as truth; the unspoken, 
non-deliberative basis of how one should see the world. Through the power of 
popular opinion “[t]he ‘they’ prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what 
and how one ‘sees’” (213). The They is not a single entity, but is itself an 
ontological characteristic of Dasein that also describes tangible ontic phenomena 
such as the sway of popular mainstream media. As one of our many possible ways 
of being, withdrawing into the They, surrendering one’s self to the uncritical, 
unreflective mass of prevailing public opinion, is characteristic of an inauthentic 
mode of human being, characteristic of Dasein’s “falling” (219).  
 
Despite the connotations of the term “falling”, Heidegger claims that this defining 
characteristic of inauthenticity is not to be thought of as falling from “a purer and 
higher” (Heidegger 2008a, 220) status.8 In the description of falling as an 
ontological characteristic of Dasein, Heidegger claims that he is not making any 
kind of value judgement and that he is still concerned with demonstrating his 
fundamental ontological methodology in terms of human being. The claim is 
double edged. It is correct—and I use this term directly in reference to the 
discussion of correctness and truth from the preceding chapter—in so far as the 																																																								
8 “It follows that our existential-ontological Interpretation makes no ontical assertion about ‘the 
corruption of human Nature’, not because the necessary evidence is lacking, but because the 
problematic of this Interpretation is prior to any assertion about corruption or incorruption … But 
in so far as any faith or ‘world view’, makes any such assertions, and if it asserts anything about 
Dasein as Being-in-the-world, it must come back to the existential structures which we have set 
forth, provided that its assertions are to make a claim to conceptual understanding” (Heidegger 
2008a, 224). In this passage, Heidegger claims that he is not actively making normative assertions, 
but neither is he ruling out the possibility of drawing ethical assertions from this understanding of 
human being within its context. I draw this possibility out further in the body of the chapter below, 
specifically by connecting Heidegger’s ontological structures of falling, the They, and the 
possibility of inauthenticity as Dasein’s primary way of being to his critique of modernity. 
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reflection on falling, inauthenticity, and his specific goal in Being and Time, is to 
demonstrate the phenomenological ontological recovery of the problem of Being, 
rather than the development of any kind of ethics. If, against my own 
recommendation, Being and Time is read as autonomous from Heidegger’s later 
work, as a self-contained analytic of Dasein (rather than as a preliminary 
demonstration of the recovery of Being), then Heidegger’s claim that falling is 
neutral and descriptive is sound. Within its own context, Being and Time is a 
demonstration of phenomenological fundamental ontology. However, I have 
already claimed that a more productive reading of Being and Time places this text 
in the context of Heidegger’s broader project. As such, where Being and Time 
presents a descriptive phenomenological account of Dasein as thrown into the 
world and fallen into the They, and as Heidegger’s recovery of Being progressed 
up to and beyond his critique of technology, these same descriptive accounts 
reveal their existential, ethical, and spiritual significance once the They and the 
world are understood within the epoch of Ge-stell. This is why Heidegger’s claim 
is double edged: it is correct, as far as it goes, in the context of Being and Time 
alone, but Being and Time itself also exists as the preliminary work of a greater 
project.  
 
As an ontological mode of human being, falling into the They is inauthentic due to 
the lack of critical and reflective thinking directed toward one’s self, the world, 
and one’s Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, “[t]he supposition of the ‘they’ that 
one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’, brings Dasein a tranquility” 
(Heidegger 2008a, 222). The tranquility of inauthentic existence is not a spiritual 
or especially pleasant state, but is one of constant distraction, of “uninhibited 
‘hustle’” (222).9 Tranquility, for Heidegger, is actually a numbness that is 
characteristic of an inauthentic life. Inauthenticity is not just a possibility like any 
other, instead it absorbs and distracts Dasein, actively concealing or devaluing 
possibilities that lie outside the They: the same ontological alethic mechanism of 
the double concealing of Ge-stell. Falling and the They are ontological 																																																								
9 This passage is translated by Stambaugh as “uninhibited ‘busyness’” (2010a, 171). Either 
translation is suitable in conveying the sense that everyday life in Western modernity is ‘full’. 
Modern life is full of activity, full of distraction, full of work in order that moments of respite 
away from work can be cherished opportunities to revitalise one’s self for work.  
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characteristics of Dasein that blind Dasein to other possibilities in the same way 
that the worlding of Ge-stell reveals the instrumental-calculative truth of beings 
while concealing and devaluing other possibilities. From this concealing, 
Heidegger concludes that inauthenticity, as Dasein’s primary way of everyday 
being, alienates Dasein from its authentic self. Dasein’s alienation from itself is 
the subject’s obliviousness of its constitutive Being-in-the-world; oblivious to the 
ontological insight of what it means to be. Dasein’s alienation from itself is the 
key characteristic of inauthentic human being. The motif of insight and 
obligation—that understanding the world as world requires a response, 
understanding Ge-stell as Ge-stell offers the possibility to step outside its 
framing—also underpins authentic human being. Understanding oneself as Dasein 
rather than as the subject (and the ontological implications that comes with such) 
offers the possibility of authentically reflecting on and responding to this insight, 
to reject and ignore it, or to indefinitely postpone a response (which amounts to 
the latter). As such, if the ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thought stems from 
the notion of authenticity, and authenticity is a response to understanding oneself 
as Dasein, how is this understanding to come about? What is authentic human 
being? 
 
The Early Notion of Authenticity: The Clearing 
An ethical consideration of inauthenticity “becomes all the more urgent … when 
we remember that proximally and for the most part Dasein is absorbed in the 
‘they’ and mastered by it” (Heidegger 2008a, 210). The urgency that Heidegger 
refers to here indicates the ethical and spiritual significance of authenticity in his 
thought. As fallen into the They, inauthenticity is already Dasein’s primary mode 
of being. Compounding Dasein’s fall is the tranquilising effect of inauthenticity, 
an effect that sustains this mode of being. As inauthentic, Dasein is alienated from 
its authentic self. Throughout the Stambaugh (2010) and Macquarrie-Robinson 
(2008a) translations of Being and Time, authenticity is the English translation of 
Eigentlichkeit. In a footnote, Macquarrie and Robinson remind the reader that by 
translating Eigentlichkeit into authenticity “[t]he connection between ‘eigentlich’ 
(‘authentic’, ‘real’) and ‘eigen’ (‘own’) is lost in translation” (68). Eigentlichkeit 
contains the sense of owned-ness, or a property that properly belongs to an entity, 
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thing, or being, including human being. Authentic human being, then, is a mode of 
being in which Dasein factically-ontically manifests what is authentic or proper to 
it: its ontological cor-respondence to Being, rather than its ontic immersion in a 
particular set of norms and values. However, as I have suggested above and 
discuss further below, there is no neat distinction between one’s ontological 
Being-in-the-world and one’s actual embodied being in a world of norms and 
values. As such, how can authenticity be anything more than an abstract concept 
about Dasein’s ontological structures?  
 
Ontologically speaking, authentic human being is an abstract concept that always 
refers to an ontic manifestation of some sort. It is relatively easy to provide ontic 
examples of inauthenticity as characterised in Being and Time. Heidegger would 
give his own examples in Introduction to Metaphysics: idolising sporting 
celebrities, becoming distracted by the television, taking the potential significance 
of distance for granted due to modern forms of transport and communication. 
Consider the way in which the contemporary West busies itself with television 
series and movies, celebrity life magazines, the dedication to staring aimlessly at a 
smart phone in the down time of commuting or waiting in a queue, and the 
uncritical and unreflective consumption of mainstream media news and current 
affairs. Providing similarly specific (yet legitimately generalisable) examples of 
authenticity is difficult for two reasons. First, the ontic manifestation of 
authenticity is unique for each person in a way that certain of the specific 
generalities above are not. For example, as part of the They, dedication to a 
Australian Football League team can cut across social and economic categories in 
Australia, while manifestations of authentic being can still take radically different 
forms even within a smaller homogenous sub-population. Second, authenticity is 
related to what I have so far called an originary sense of Being. Authenticity is not 
an outright rejection of the life in which one finds oneself, but is “a modified way 
in which such everydayness is seized upon” (Heidegger 2008a, 224). Modified in 
what sense? While the ontic manifestation of this modification is always unique, 
the modification itself is the same: it is the overcoming of one’s alienation from 
oneself. But, again, how is the alienation from one’s self to be understood? 
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Dasein’s authenticity is grounded in it’s understanding of itself as Dasein. What I 
have earlier referred to as self-reflection or an understanding of the self is not a 
reference to the kind of self-reflection that one might find in a self-help book, but 
a reflection on the self as outlined above: a self-reflexive experience of I-hood 
conscious of its grounding in care as the foundational state of Being-in-the-world. 
Reflection on the self as Dasein entails reflection on the world that one is in. In 
this sense, the possibility of authenticity is offered in moments of interruption—
irruption—where a breakdown in the referential network of the world makes the 
world, and Dasein’s Being-in, conspicuous. Where the world becomes visible as 
world, one’s self as Dasein (in-the-world) is revealed. Further, the alethic nature 
of the They, the world, and the norms and values in which one has simultaneously 
been thrown and fallen into are revealed. Authenticity requires that one face this 
revelation head on. Further, authentic human being is marked by the kind of self-
reflection and reflection on the world that seeks to re-create or instigate such an 
interruption. In Chapter Six, I refer to this as an en-counter and claim that the role 
of the fourfold in Heidegger’s thinking is to transform everyday encounters into 
en-counters. In making Dasein visible and understanding one’s self in terms of 
multiple ontic possibilities, one’s relation to one’s sense of I-hood is thought 
afresh, offering the possibility of an authentic modification of one’s activities and 
past times. This same interruption is the “saving power” of Ge-stell: in revealing 
Ge-stell qua Ge-stell, Dasein is afforded the opportunity to exist outside the 
framing of the world, to see things (and one’s self) in a state of potentiality 
beyond the standing reserve. But having cursorily touched on Dasein’s Being-in-
the-world in Chapter One, what does reflecting on the self as Dasein mean? 
Further, what does such reflection entail? In short, what is Dasein beyond the 
foundational structure of care? 
 
Heidegger’s account of Dasein in Being and Time establishes authenticity as the 
deliberative reconciliation and subsequent manifestation of the self as Dasein. 
This reconciliation is the modification of one’s everyday activities, recovering 
oneself from the tranquility of inauthenticity. This model of authenticity continues 
on throughout Heidegger’s thinking and is central to the constructive aspect of the 
critique of technology. What shifts between Being and Time and the later works is 
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how authentic Dasein is understood in relation to itself and the world, particularly 
as Being and Time does not examine the ontic aspects of the world in terms of 
modernity, or the ontological structure of the world in terms of Ge-stell. Yet what 
remains largely consistent throughout Heidegger’s thinking is Dasein as die 
Lichtung, the clearing (Heidegger 2008a, 171). Dasein qua the clearing is 
discussed in several key passages throughout Chapter Five of Being and Time 
with the intention of emphasising the Da or “here/there” of Dasein from 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontological perspective (171-178; 182-188; 203-224). 
Heidegger’s emphasis on human being as always being-(t)here demonstrates the 
way in which care (Sorge) is grounded in temporality, bringing together being and 
time (274-280; 364-382). Further exploration of the latter is tangential and 
ultimately unnecessary for the present discussion. However, it is important to note 
that the discussion of the clearing in Being and Time is significant in terms of 
authenticity in both the aforementioned text, and in Heidegger’s terminological 
shift from Dasein to Da-sein post-Being and Time. As I discuss below, this shift 
emphasises a distinction between the way ‘Dasein’ can be used to refer to the 
being of everyday factical-ontic human being—largely inauthentic, absorbed in 
the trivialities of life—as compared to the fundamental ontological clearing of the 
there as Da-sein.10 
 
‘The clearing’ is a figurative reference to a cleared space in a forest, a space that 
allows light to penetrate, as well as highlighting the role of the still-dark forest in 
shaping the horizon (Heidegger 2008a, 171-172; 214; 401-402; 460). Heidegger 
introduces the clearing briefly after a fleeting reference to the “lumen naturale” 
(171), a notion employed by Descartes to describe the human capacity for 
cognition and understanding; the light of reason that places the subject at the 
centre of experience, value, and meaning (Bunnin and Yu 2004). However, by 
interpreting this characteristic of human being from a fundamental-ontological 																																																								
10 Throughout The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1995), Heidegger draws a clear 
distinction between the hyphenated Da-sein as our intrinsic ontological essence, and Dasein as our 
factical, embodied, in the world thereness. Already implicit throughout this entire text is the notion 
that authenticity is Dasein’s recognition, acceptance, and manifestation of its own Da-sein; to be 
the possibility that it is. “To understand Dasein means understanding how to go about being-there, 
Da-sein; it means being able to be-there. Understanding ourselves from out of this most extreme 
possibility of Dasein means acting in the sense of being exposed to the most extreme possibility” 
(1995, 294). 
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perspective, the natural light of reason and cognition can be understood as a 
structural ontological characteristic of Dasein’s there-ness, a reminder that the self 
is always also the Da of Dasein. In regards to the metaphysical problems of 
sentience that I alluded to briefly above, in Being and Time Heidegger states that 
if any being “lacks its ‘there’, it is not factically the entity which is essentially 
Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness” (Heidegger 
2008a, 171). The clearing, then, is the always-temporal there of Dasein always 
characterised by care: by virtue of being-(t)here, Dasein is invested. From care, it 
is possible to extrapolate out the many and varied (and incompletely rendered by 
Heidegger) ontological structures that form the unitary whole of Being-in-the-
world. Authenticity, then, is a way of being that honours one’s Da-sein, rather 
than avoiding or hiding it. The They is inauthentic as it does not reflect on how 
and why one thinks what one thinks. Dasein allows idle talk to become accepted 
as fact; swayed by public opinion, it is uncritical and unreflective of the fact that, 
as a clearing, there is an ongoing interplay between the clearing, the light, the 
horizon of the forest, the darkness that lies hidden behind the horizon, and, finally, 
what is revealed in the clearing. In this figurative language, the alethic nature of 
truth, and the function of the horizon or world in framing such a truth, already pre-
exists the critique of technology. But what does it mean to honour one’s Dasein? 
What is it that “constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self?” (443). The 
most explicit form of authenticity in Being and Time is anticipatory resoluteness. 
 
The Early Notion of Authenticity: Anticipatory Resoluteness 
The temporal nature of Dasein, situated in a present defined by the past and 
projecting itself forward (Heidegger 2008a, 4; 184-187), is a fundamental aspect 
of Being-in-the-world. Human being is never static or fixed, but is always a 
temporally situated activity or way of being-in-the-world. Overlooking the 
framing of Ge-stell in the following example, temporality manifests itself in 
equipmentality as the teleological toward-which and in-order-to that motivate 
human being in some form or another. More than this, Dasein’s attunement and/or 
fundamental moods are also temporal in the sense that they are transient, but also 
affected by Dasein’s temporality. Anxiety, as the exemplary form of attunement in 
Being and Time, demonstrates Dasein’s temporality in that it is not a direct fear of 
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this or that, but a primordial dread of nothing and everything; the tension of a 
being caught between the projected possibilities of the future and the present as 
defined by the past (225-234). As mentioned above, attunement and fundamental 
moods are disclosive in an alethic sense, yet what is disclosed does not necessarily 
interrupt Dasein or facilitate authenticity. An interruption or breakdown of the 
otherwise invisible referential network in which Dasein is embedded must occur 
in order that Dasein as Dasein, and the world as world, are made visible. Anxiety 
is such an interruption. But once the world announces itself, and once Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world as Dasein is made visible, what then? How does Dasein “exist 
authentically as a whole?” (277). 
 
From Heidegger’s perspective, each person must come to terms with her finitude, 
her mortality: “Being-towards-death” (2008a, 278). In authentic Being-towards-
death, Dasein takes its first steps towards seriously considering itself in terms of 
its possibilities, i.e. that it is more than a member of a faceless mass and can 
choose itself in a certain number of ways. However, in first considering itself in 
terms of its possibilities, Dasein is not necessarily revealed to itself as Dasein due 
to its immersion in the They to begin with. As such, the potential insights and 
possibilities offered by Being-towards-death are clouded by the prevailing 
conjecture within the They which “aggravates the temptation to cover up from 
oneself one’s ownmost Being-towards-death” (297) in the first place. Once fallen 
into tranquil, self-sustaining inauthenticity, “[t]he ‘they’ does not permit us the 
courage for anxiety in the face of death” (297-298), does not valorise or support 
individual Dasein in holding on to the interruption of the everyday referential 
network in order to live authentically. This response, what Heidegger calls “falling 
Being-towards-death” (299), is inauthentic. In order to authentically achieve 
Being-towards-death, each person must face her mortality11 and embrace death as 																																																								
11 I use the term ‘mortality’ here intentionally as it resonates with the content of Chapter Five, 
where I discuss Heidegger’s Fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals. It is important to note this 
consistent thread from 1927s Being and Time through to the Bremen Lectures of 1949—where 
Heidegger distinguishes between the “perishing [Verenden]” (2008a, 284) of any biological entity 
and death as an ontological phenomenon for Dasein—to understand the continuity of this essential 
aspect of authentic human being. Death is an ontological phenomenon in so far as it represents the 
absolute finitude and ‘belonging’ (a term explored in Chapter Four) of human being to Being (as 
ek-sistence). This is part of what I come to term Heidegger’s de-centring of human being in the 
face of modern technological hubris. 
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an inevitable possibility. Heidegger named the ontological structure of facing and 
embracing this possibility “anticipation” (306). In anticipation, Dasein is pulled 
from the They and brought back to itself; Being-towards-death in this sense is 
always Being-towards one’s own death, not merely the concept of mortality in 
general. Anticipation, then, is one of the necessary conditions of authenticity as 
characterised in Being and Time. 
The second necessary condition of authenticity in Being and Time is 
Entschlossenheit, resoluteness. Of Entschlossenheit, Stambaugh notes that 
“Heidegger’s primary meaning is ‘unlockedness’, the emphasis being on freed and 
open for something” (Heidegger 2010a, 260), in order to emphasise Heidegger’s 
intentional etymological connection of resoluteness to disclosedness, 
Erschlossenheit. The disclosedness of Dasein relates to truth in the sense that 
Dasein, as the clearing, is always already embedded in a network of meaning and 
value: “truth and untruth with equal primordiality” (Heidegger 2008a, 345); truth 
as a matter of intelligibility, the way in which things are revealed (or framed) by a 
particular horizon. As Da-sein, the world and the unitary whole of Being-in-the-
world is implicated in terms of truth as meaning and value. Resoluteness is 
essential to authenticity as it is a comportment of one’s I-hood towards the self-as-
clearing. With this comportment, the associated structures and implications of the 
self-as-clearing become manifest and a matter of consideration for Dasein. 
Resoluteness is “authentic Being-one’s-self” (344) in the sense of holding on to 
what was phrased above as the sustained courage for anxiety. Resoluteness is that 
property that prevents Dasein from turning away from the reality of Being-
towards-death, stops Dasein from falling back into the tranquil inauthenticity of 
the They. Resoluteness “signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one’s 
lostness” (345). Where inauthenticity is characterised by an alienation from the 
self, authentic human being is the mode of being of the self in its un-framed form. 
This does not mean that all or any framing or revealing of the self in any ontic 
manner is inauthentic, but that losing sight of Da-sein as the clearing risks 
alienation of the self from the self, a necessary and sufficient condition of 
inauthenticity. 
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Given that “authentic Being-towards-death is anticipation…[and] authentic 
potentiality-for-Being has been exhibited, and…Interpreted, as resoluteness” 
(Heidegger 2008a, 349), anticipatory resoluteness is the defining characteristic of 
authenticity in Being and Time. Anticipatory resoluteness is the state in which 
Dasein maintains a deliberate preparedness to understand itself in terms of its own 
possibilities. Further, Dasein must embrace these possibilities as properly 
belonging to it. Retreating from or avoiding these possibilities, or distorting or 
ignoring what it means to be Dasein in terms of one’s in-the-worldness and 
inherent being-with is an inauthentic mode of human being.12 While I have 
developed an account of Heidegger’s early thinking of authenticity as anticipatory 
resoluteness at the cost of skimming over many of the underpinnings of 
“anticipation” and “resoluteness”—notions such as Guilt and Conscience in 
particular (Heidegger 2008a, 325-348)—the discussion above is sufficient to 
demonstrate a rudimentary distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity as 
modes of being within Being and Time. I now draw out some of the implications 
of this early notion of authenticity in order (a) to demonstrate the manner in which 
exploring these implications constitutes much of Heidegger’s later work, 
including the critique of technology, and (b) to outline the manner in which point 
(a) resonates through the remainder of the present thesis. The implications that I 
draw from my exploration so far are introduced as follows: configuring 
authenticity as an ouroboros that connects the ontic and the ontological, authentic 
human being as releasement, and, finally, the ethical dimension of authenticity. 
Through respective discussions of these implications, I will demonstrate how the 
shift from Dasein to Da-sein is the decisive moment that bridges authenticity as 
presented by the early and later Heidegger.  
 
Authenticity as Ouroboros 
As a mode of being, authenticity bridges the ontic and the ontological in an 
affective sense. While the phenomenological observations of Dasein’s Being-in-
the-world afford the opportunity to radically re-consider one’s immersion in an 
invisible referential network of meaning and value, an authentic response to this 
consideration demands an assessment of this being. Understanding authenticity as 																																																								
12 Heidegger’s influence on Sartre and the latter’s notion of bad faith is evident here. 
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an affective bridge between the ontic and the ontological hinges on understanding 
that “[r]esoluteness ‘exists’ only as a resolution” (Heidegger 2008a, 345). This is 
not a tautological claim that Dasein’s resoluteness comes from being resolute, but 
rather that “resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of 
what is factically possible at the time” (345). Dasein’s resoluteness, thus Dasein’s 
authenticity, always begins with each Dasein’s factical-ontical “Situation” (346). 
This places Dasein not just in the specific, local context of the They, but in one’s 
own personal entanglements, one’s own peculiar circumstances. Resoluteness is 
always a sustained openness and willingness towards my factical possibilities as 
potentiality-for-Being, my resolution, not just in the sense that only I can own it in 
the same way I own my authentic Being-towards-death, but in the specific 
entanglements of my situation. The factical-ontical situation of each Dasein is 
always implicated when honouring one’s ontological Da-sein. 
 
While the ontological structures revealed by Heidegger are “factically 
‘dependent’” (2008a, 444) and therefore implicate the ontic, authenticity is 
peculiar in that it is a mode of human being, rather than a constitutive ontological 
structure of Dasein. The historical nature of Dasein, and of “world-historical” 
(440) entities also reveals this specific entanglement, in that the truth of a 
situation—a commercial mining site or a place of spiritual significance to 
aboriginal Australians, for example—is specific to that situation and dependent on 
the anticipatory resoluteness of Dasein in remaining open to the historical, rather 
than simply historiological, truth. Heidegger claims that authenticity is a kind of 
modification, thus a mode, of one’s ontic entanglements, referring specifically to 
the historical notion of heritage throughout Division Two (442). Authentic 
historicality is remaining open to one’s heritage in a personal and, presumably, 
cultural manner, so as to understand one’s situation in terms of the breakdown I 
have already given: self, clearing, what is revealed in the clearing, the horizon that 
frames the clearing, and the possibilities hidden by the horizon. In claiming that 
authenticity is the ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thought, the ontic-ontological 
ouroboros is an important factor to consider. 
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Authenticity Beyond the Clearing 
Although Heidegger was less explicit in his references to authenticity beyond 
Being and Time, the notion remained central to his recovery of the problem of 
Being. Just as readiness-to-hand and equipmentality were early observations of the 
framing of Ge-stell, authenticity shifted from the notion of anticipatory 
resoluteness to Da-sein as an openness that lets phenomena unfold from itself (in 
the same sense that technē is sensitive to physis). While the former has an 
emphasis on the factical-ontical manifestation of authenticity in an active sense, 
the latter augments the former by expressing a reverence for the ontological cor-
respondence of Da-sein and Being. The shift towards lassen, letting or letting-be, 
is a shift in emphasis rather than a total reconfiguration of authenticity: 
anticipatory resoluteness was, from the first, a sustained openness to the 
possibilties of one’s situation. In making a decision, in becoming resolute, or in 
the resolution of the situation, one’s anticipatory resoluteness does not just 
disappear as if the matter is settled once and for all. For authentic Being-as-a-
whole, authentic potentiality-for-Being, and indeed authentic Being-in-the-world 
more broadly, anticipatory (Being-towards-death as one’s own-most possibility) 
resoluteness (founded in the temporality of care as the founding state of all 
potentials and possibilities) is constantly renewed or reinvigorated. This is why 
the question of authentic human being is intrinsically part of the recovery of the 
problem of Being. We are bound up in the question, but this does not place us at 
the centre of the question. 
 
In 1929’s ‘What is Metaphysics’ Heidegger continues his discussion of science as 
a field of inquiry that places the human subject at the centre of the problem. In the 
pursuit of science “nothing less transpires than the irruption by one being called 
‘man’ into the whole of beings, indeed in such a way that in and through this 
irruption beings break open and show what they are and how they are” (Heidegger 
2008b, 95). As discussed in Chapters One and Two, for Heidegger, the subject-
object metaphysical underpinnings of scientific inquiry risks collapsing into 
anthropocentric hubris. The irruption of the human in the passage above is the 
essential movement of the scientism of modernity: the movement that valorises 
the human as a yardstick or origin of meaning and value. From this perspective, 
Chapter Three — Authenticity 	 104 
beings show themselves as what they are solely from the framing of human 
inquiry. In response to the human domination of beings, this same essay also 
outlines Dasein’s potential to more fully, more authentically recognise itself as the 
hyphenated Da-sein. Heidegger’s use of the hyphenated term further distances his 
thinking of a self as a subject, or as Dasein as an emergent property of a 
conscious, sentient, present-at-hand entity.  
 
Beyond the clearing, the essential no-thingness of human being facilitates a 
further shift in understanding the ontological constitution of the self.  
 
In the altogether unsettling experience of this hovering [human existence] where there is 
nothing to hold on to [no fixed, objective value or meaning], pure Da-sein is all that is 
there … This requires that we actively complete the transformation of the man into the 
Da-sein that every instance of anxiety occasions in us, in order to get a grip on the nothing 
announced there as it makes itself known (Heidegger 2008b, 95-96, my insertions).  
 
The factical-historical emphasis of anticipatory resoluteness in Division Two of 
Being and Time seems to suggest that the ontic manifestation of authenticity, 
rooted in one’s situation, was perhaps the major aspect of authenticity. My 
emphasis on the ouroboros corroborates and strengthens such an idea. However, 
as Heidegger developed the notion of authenticity, his thinking took the ouroboros 
and the situation of each Dasein for granted while he continued to emphasise the 
return to understanding the self as the there, as the clearing, as in the passage 
above. Being and Time was a demonstration and introduction to fundamental 
ontology as a phenomenological alternative to subject-object metaphysics and thus 
its content continued to demonstrate this existential analytic by describing various 
facets of human being. But in the wake of this project, as with the above excerpt 
from ‘What is Metaphysics’, Heidegger more concretely demonstrates that the 
matter of authentic human being is directly concerned with the human belonging 
to the problem of Being itself. Thus, the active transformation of the human being 
into Da-sein is not just a step away from subject-object metaphysics, but is also a 
call to fundamentally recognise our selves, not simply as phenomenologially 
embedded in a referential network of a world, but as Da-sein. Understanding 
authentic human being as Da-sein is important for facilitating a shift towards an 
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originary sense of Being in one’s factical-ontical situation. It is this originary 
sense of Being that Heidegger already refers to in this same essay with the 
otherwise mysterious sentiment that Da-sein is “in secret alliance with the 
cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing” (2008b, 106). This creative 
longing already gestures towards the possibilities that Heidegger later finds in the 
notion of authenticity as a poetic appropriation, a belonging-together, of the 
human and Being. 
 
In 1929’s ‘On the Essence of Ground’ and 1939’s ‘On the Essence of Truth’, 
Heidegger articulates the epistemological problems that feed into his critique of 
the scientism of modernity, and, ultimately, Ge-stell. As the open space of the 
clearing, it is not Dasein’s proper place to understand the world as relative only to 
its needs; this, as seen in Chapters One and Two, is the role assumed by the 
subject. In ‘On the Essence of Ground’ Heidegger states “Freedom alone can let a 
world prevail and let it world for Dasein. World never is, but worlds … Letting 
world prevail in projectively casting over us is freedom” (2009a, 126-127). For 
Heidegger, human freedom is not derived from free will or from a fundamental 
metaphysical freedom that makes radical self-construction permissible. Instead, 
Dasein’s freedom is the freedom of an empty clearing (Da-sein), the freedom of 
nothing, that makes it possible for authentic human being to experience itself as 
belonging to Being by resisting the imposition of subject-object metaphysics and 
simply “letting beings be” (2009b, 144). Where freedom for Sartre or Nietzsche 
implies a willful self-construction in the absence of a God or other ontotheological 
determination, freedom for Heidegger indicates a letting-oneself-come to-be. 
“Letting world prevail” is an early formulation of Ereignis, and does not mean 
surrendering to Ge-stell as world, but instead refers to Dasein’s capacity to “let” 
as an expression of one’s freedom as the ontological clearing.  
 
Letting a world prevail is the opposite of the anthropocentric reduction of the 
world to standing reserve in two senses. First, in terms of the internal logic of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological fundamental ontology, Da-sein is free in that it 
structurally-ontologically (devoid of will or of ontic connotation) “lets” the world 
be; Da-sein is the name of human being within a system of thought that has 
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radically de-centred human being from its privileged position in subject-object 
metaphysics. Due to its metaphysical construction, the subject does not—can 
not— “let” in the same way as Dasein. Only by equivocating the term ‘let’, 
shifting from structural ontological feature, to willful permitting, can one say that 
the subject lets being be. Second, Dasein’s “letting a world prevail” always 
recognises that the extant stuff of the world contains its own possibilities and 
potentialities aside from the anthropocentric and instrumental possibilities 
projected by the subject. Authentic human being is thus derived from the nothing 
that Dasein is held into, but also and equally from the world in which Dasein 
always already is.  
 
In ‘On the Essence of Truth’ Heidegger states, “all comportment is distinguished 
by the fact that, standing in the open region, it in each case adheres to something 
opened up as such” (2009b, 141). Here, Heidegger is concerned with the open 
region that adheres to—perhaps better understood as coheres-with, in the sense 
that it comes together to from a unified whole, discussed more in Chapters Four 
and Five—that which gives presence itself. As freedom, one’s letting is a 
“[c]omportment [that] stands open to beings” (ibid, my insertion) in the same 
manner that resoluteness demands that we remain open to possibilities. This 
comportment is “grounded in freedom” (142) and, subsequently, “[f]reedom now 
reveals itself as letting beings be” (144). A maxim found in Being and Time’s 
definition of phenomenology,13 “letting beings be” is here revealed in terms of a 
broader understanding of authentic Da-sein as the open region in coherence with 
Being. This structural, ontological letting, neither properly passive nor active and 
devoid of a willing subject, is, as early as 1930, characteristic of authentic human 
being in Heidegger’s thinking. 
 
Of course, Da-sein, in comportment and freedom, remains open to untruth, to Ge-
stell, and to the valorisation of ontic presence as subject-object metaphysics. 
However, in recovering an originary sense of the open region, authentic human 																																																								
13 For Heidegger, phenomenology is best understood as “to let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (2008a, 58). As such, lassen, letting 
or letting-be, and thus relinquishing the subject-centred notions of subjectivity/objectivity are an 
integral part of Heidegger’s thought since at least Being and Time. 
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being can regain the sense that “being attuned (attunement) can never be 
understood as ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’, because it is thereby simply deprived of 
its essence” (147).14 The essence lost in the positing of a subject within the 
subject-object metaphysical framework is the unveiling of the open region itself. 
The danger of “experience” or “feeling” is that it conceptually—
epistemologically, metaphysically—emphasises the subject rather than Da-sein. In 
this sense, authenticity reflects the critique of modernity and technology in that 
authenticity always implicates the factical-ontic manifestation of an originary 
sense of Being that understands the cor-respondence of Da-sein and Being.  
 
Letting the non-anthropocentric Being of beings announce its multiple 
possibilities also lets authentic human being manifest. We should not view our 
selves as the sole active contributors to the establishment of truth or meaning, so 
much as invested participants simultaneously constituted and appropriated by the 
open space. The phenomenological fundamental ontological method reveals 
authentic human being and the originary sense of Being as a valuable counter to 
the violence of Ge-stell. 
 
Philosophical thinking is gentle releasement that does not renounce the concealment of 
beings as a whole. Philosophical thinking is especially the stern and resolute openness 
that does not disrupt the concealing but entreats its unbroken essence into the open region 
of understanding and thus into its own truth (2009b, 152).  
 
In this passage, “releasement”, a concept explored further below, is a letting that 
recognises and is mindful of the notion that each revealing is a concealing. 
Releasement does not renounce the invisibility of the world (beings as a whole), 
as this invisibility is a necessary function of alētheia. The “stern and resolute 
openness” is a familiar sentiment from Being and Time, where an earnest and 
stern tone can be found throughout much of Heidegger’s writing in Division Two, 
but here it describes a comportment that lets concealing be understood for what it 
is. Releasement makes the invisibility of concealing conspicuous. Releasement is 
a notion that recognises the importance of what remains concealed in the process 																																																								
14 Again, “experience” here refers to the distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung. 
Chapter Three — Authenticity 	 108 
of unconcealed-concealed by letting presence and absence, visibility and 
invisibility, be. The notions of letting/letting-be and releasement are as important 
to defining authentic human being for Heidegger’s later work as anticipatory 
resoluteness is for Being and Time. 
 
Gelassenheit—Releasement 
The human capacity for letting is significant throughout Heidegger’s thinking. In 
order that one might authentically “let that which shows itself be seen from itself 
in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (2008a, 58), one must first be 
aware of one’s own imposition on the phenomenon in question. Second, one must 
come to understand how this or any other imposition is a product of a prevailing 
mode of disclosure, a result of the predominant narratives and values derived from 
the worlding of Dasein’s world. In coming to understand the prevailing mode of 
disclosure as the horizon of intelligibility that frames the truth of a phenomenon, 
the phenomenon itself is able to show itself more freely. By understanding how 
the horizon reveals the phenomenon, the excess (of meaning and value) of the 
phenomenon itself can be recognised, even where it remains mysterious or 
unknown. In modernity, this means recovering objects and things from the 
standing reserve, to encounter them on their own terms. Recognising the excess of 
a thing is a function of letting-be; it is not the same as granting or giving, both of 
which assume the subject as arbiter of meaning and value. In letting, the will of 
the subject withdraws, and in this withdrawal the imposition of Ge-stell fades. 
 
Throughout ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger signals the importance of 
letting-be as a shift away from the subject-object/subject-instrument mind-set. The 
disclosure of Ge-stell “does not lay hold of the thing as it is in its own being, but 
makes an assault on it. Can such an assault perhaps be avoided—and how?” 
(2008c, 151). The assault of illegitimate instrumental-calculative thinking must be 
curbed, resisted, and countered. However, the difficulty of this task was not yet 
fully apparent to Heidegger in the mid 1930s. Approaching the matter of letting-be 
requires a shift beyond subject-object metaphysical thinking altogether. Consider 
the way Heidegger frames the problem of letting below: 
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What seems easier than to let a thing be just the being that it is? Or does this turn out to be 
the most difficult of all tasks, particularly if such an intention—to let a being be as it is—
represents the opposite of the indifference that simply turns its back upon the being itself 
in favour of the unexamined concept of Being? We ought to turn toward the being, think 
about it in regard to its Being, but by means of this thinking at the same time let it rest 
upon itself in its very essence (Heidegger 2008c, 157). 
 
The kind of letting-be that Heidegger articulates in this passage is based, again, on 
the recovery of the problem of Being. An originary sense of Being lets the 
incalculable meanings of a phenomenon come to presence, lets a phenomenon 
“rest upon itself”. From an instrumental-calculative focus on the ontic properties 
of a thing, the incalculable properties remain concealed, their possibilities 
devalued. Thus, letting-be is synonymous with releasement; a kind of withdrawing 
or countering of instrumental-calculative thinking that is grounded in existential-
meditative thinking. Existential-meditative thinking is still an active practice; it is 
something one “ought” do as part of one’s “turn toward the being”.15 Yet 
contained in such a turn is the attempt to understand the context or horizon that 
frames the being, entity, or phenomenon in one’s everyday encounter with it. 
Releasement is not an esoteric or mystical process, but is the reflection on how 
and why certain values are held and is thus a reflection on the prevailing mode of 
disclosure. Again, from ‘What is Metaphysics’, releasement is “in secret alliance 
with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing” (2008b, 106). 
 
Heidegger delivered the lecture ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in 1935, thus his 
encounter with Hölderlin had already affected his thinking. The importance of 
poiēsis as a possible form of resistance to machination, as a way to regain 
authentic human being from the ubiquity of inauthenticity, was already 
established. However, the notion of Gelassenheit,16 releasement proper, was not 																																																								
15 See Mahon O’Brien’s extended discussion of the possible connection between Entschlossenheit 
and Gelassenheit in Chapter Three of Heidegger and Authenticity: From Resoluteness to 
Releasement. 
16 As with most of Heidegger’s lexicon there is a heavily modified and technical use to the term he 
employs, while always leaving the everyday meaning lingering in the mix, thus granting a rich 
complexity to the term; allowing language to truly speak itself. This is not to say that the resultant 
ambiguity is not often problematic. In the case of Gelassenheit, this everyday meaning is a 
profound one for the question at hand. In literal, etymological terms, Gelassenheit is related to a 
sense of stillness and tranquility, it is the “nominal form of the perfect participle of lassen, ‘to 
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fully developed—if one can claim that it ever was—until 1944-45.17 Although 
published posthumously, Country Path Conversations is a series of exploratory 
writings, akin to Contributions, that explore Heidegger’s thinking through this 
period. A small section of this exploratory writing, compiled with a lecture from 
1957 titled ‘Memorial Address’ first appeared in German in 1959’s 
Gelassenheit,18 and remains the only explicit and sustained exploration of 
releasement—the English translation of Gelassenheit—beyond the various notions 
of letting that have under-pinned this aspect of Heidegger’s thought since at least 
Being and Time.  
 
Releasement “lies … beyond the distinction between activity and passivity … 
because releasement does not belong to the domain of the will” (1969, 61). 
Releasement is existential-meditative thinking par excellence: it is an originary 
comportment, both towards things, the horizon or mode of disclosure, and to 
Being itself.19 In this sense, releasement, as the acceptance of the self as Da-sein, 
and of the coherence of this open region with the meaningful presence of things 
and that which grounds or gives this meaningful presence (Being), is exemplary of 																																																																																																																																																								
let’…” (Davis 2007, xxv) and is usually rendered either as releasement or as “letting-be” (Caputo 
1990, xviii). In The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, John D. Caputo also uses the terms 
“composure” (25) and “serenity” (179) as roughly synonymous with Gelassenheit in order to flesh 
out his comparison of the structural elements of Meister Eckhart and Heidegger. From the outset, 
Caputo assures the reader that “Heidegger is not a mystic” (1990, xxi). Rather, the focus of 
Caputo’s study is merely the ‘element’ that Heidegger shares with Eckhart, who Heidegger 
vaguely credits with the term in Country Path Conversations (2010b, 70). Eckhart originally 
introduced the term gelāzenheit (Davis 2007, 70, fn 42) and Heidegger resurrects the term with 
modern German spelling with every intention of retaining the nuance—including aspects of its 
original meaning—that the word contains. For Eckhart, Gelassenheit is a matter of emptying the 
self of the “moral or ethical defects” (Caputo 1990, 175) that come with ego-centric willing in 
order to allow the divine will of God to take its place. It is clear that for Heidegger, the will is a 
problem of the subject, not of the originary sensibility towards Being that is held by Da-sein in 
releasement. 
17 Although published several years later, it is important to note that the development of 
releasement occurred through the middle 1940s, in that it also affects how we are to understand 
Heidegger’s thinking throughout the Bremen lectures, and specifically the manifestation of 
authenticity in light of said lectures. Country Path Conversations is the full 2010 translation of the 
posthumously published GA 77 by Bret Davis. Written across 1944/45, this text had previously 
been abbreviated to what Davis describes as “approximately one-fourth of the entire conversation” 
(x) and published as Gelassenheit as a section of GA 13. This latter is available in English and 
appears alongside the essay ‘Memorial Address’ from 1955, titled Discourse on Thinking, 
translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. 
18 Anderson and Freund’s Discourse on Thinking is the English translation of Gelassenheit, see 
above footnote.  
19 It becomes increasingly difficult to expound the notion of authenticity without referring to 
Ereignis, but in the interest of clarity, and of making obvious the links between each of the 
concepts under investigation, I have left the extended treatment of Ereignis until Chapter Four. 
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authentic human being. While perhaps lacking the more active prescriptive 
connotations of resoluteness, releasement shares the sustained openness towards 
Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being. Again, the shift here is one of emphasis. The 
ouroboros is implicated in releasement, but rather than focus on the modification 
of one’s historical situation, the emphasis is on resisting the over-reaching of 
instrumental-calculative thought and the framing of Ge-stell. In contrast to the 
subject-instrument relation of Ge-stell, the authentic relation between human 
being and Being—or between human being and extant objects—is not one of 
imposition, or of violence, or of challenging forth in any sense. Instead, letting-be 
is an acknowledgment of the proper cor-respondence or belonging-together of 
human being and Being (and other beings), and that this belonging-together 
matters. I am already pre-empting Chapter Four with the phrase ‘belonging-
together’, Zusammengehörenkeit, but this is unavoidable and highly significant. In 
considering the relation between human being and Being in terms of releasement, 
Heidegger writes “the relation between that-which-regions and releasement, if it 
can still be considered a relation, can be thought of neither as ontic or ontological 
… but only as regioning” (76). Releasement, then, is an integral aspect of our 
possibility-for-Being; it is the originary sense of Being that allows us to 
understand the self as Da-sein as given over to Being as an invested participant. 
Through authentic human being as releasement, we are privy to the “regioning” in 
which the ontic-ontological distinction is replaced by the ouroboros, leaving only 
the possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence. 
 
Releasement is an integral aspect of existential-meditative thinking and is a direct 
counter to the over-reaching tendencies of instrumental-calculative thinking. As 
such, releasement and existential-meditative thinking more broadly are essential if 
one is to achieve authenticity in the age of Ge-stell. Throughout the ‘Memorial 
Address’, authenticity, in conjunction with releasement, also appears in the form 
of Bodenstandigkeit, translated variously as “rootedness or autochthony 
depending on a literal or more a figurative connotation” (Heidegger 1969, 49, 
translator’s note). This notion of autochthony or rootedness echoes many of the 
themes that Heidegger develops from his reading of Hölderlin—discussed in 
detail in Chapter Five—and is related to dwelling. The rootedness of Da-sein is its 
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authentic belonging-to Being. As part of the ouroboros, our rootedness is 
inevitably bound to our historical-factical-ontical situation, our physical 
environment, and our friends and family. Our autochthony is an aspect of our 
belonging-to Being; we are historically and factically located, but our ontic 
situation alone does not define us or how we manifest our authentic human being 
beyond providing the basis of the modification. For Heidegger, losing one’s roots 
may have ontic implications, but what we feel as home-sickness or alienation from 
our own culture (for example) is grounded by a loss of our originary sense of 
Being, of losing our belonging to Being. The result of this ontological loss is a life 
of inauthenticity, of falling and immersion in the They, perhaps grasping for 
narratives of self-discovery that re-inforce the subject and often unwittingly 
reduce the cosmos to standing reserve. Releasement is a way to reflect on the 
regioning that facilitates Da-sein’s belonging to Being as an essential feature of 
authentic human being. It also serves as a kind of attunement, in the language of 
Being and Time, which characterises dwelling, the most complete of Heidegger’s 
notion of authentic human being and the height of the constructive aspect of the 
critique of technology (discussed in Chapters Five and Six). 
 
Authenticity and Ethics 
While Heidegger’s thinking does not generate an ethics in the sense of a structured 
series of theoretical principles, in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy, “[o]nly those who 
have read Heidegger blindly, or not at all, have been able to think of him as a 
stranger to ethical preoccupations” (2002, 65).20 The value judgements that 
emerge from Heidegger’s systematic and rigorous thinking demonstrate that the 
thinking itself is ethical, despite not being “an” ethics. In the ‘Letter on 
Humanism’, Heidegger states that ēthos “means abode, dwelling place. The word 
names the open region in which man dwells” (2008d, 256). Rather than refer to a 
structured series of prescriptive principles, for Heidegger, ēthos refers to the way 
in which human being manifests itself as authentic Da-sein in cor-respondence 
with Being; how human being belongs to the regioning of the open region—this 																																																								
20 The translator’s note to Nancy’s essay states that Nancy tends to emphasise a translation of 
Eigentlichkeit as “propre” (85), clearly more related to “proper” rather than “authentic”, whereas I 
continue with the latter to emphasise that there is always also a judgement being made, rather than 
a neutral description of a property. 
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notion will be developed further in my discussion of Ereignis in Chapter Four. In 
the meantime, it is important to note that although authenticity is presented as a 
neutral descriptive mode of human being in Being and Time, as it relates to Da-
sein and an originary sense of Being, authenticity is always of existential, ethical, 
and spiritual significance to Heidegger’s thinking as a whole. Heidegger’s critique 
of technology clearly demonstrates an ethical distinction between bringing-forth 
and challenging. The distinction between the two is the originary sense of Being 
characteristic of Da-sein. The ethical measure in Heidegger’s thought is always 
concerned with authenticity: what is proper to the phenomenon. This property is 
thought in the sense of physis instead of a causal biological understanding of 
nature, Da-sein rather than the subject, and technē rather than technology. 
Authenticity, then, is existentially significant in that it pertains to human being, 
ethically significant in that—founded on care—things matter to human being, and 
spiritually significant (discussed in more depth in Chapter Eight) in that what 
matters to human being resonates with each individual beyond an intellectual or 
theoretical sense.21 
 
In his description of the role of authenticity in Being and Time, O’Brien (2011)22 																																																								
21 See Reiner Schürman’s discussion of the “practical a priori” (1987, 236-245) in Heidegger’s 
thinking: these matters are spiritual (as I have introduced the term in the Introduction) rather than 
merely intellectual or philosophical observations. 
22 There is some contention over the nature of Heidegger’s development of authenticity from the 
period between Being and Time, the Rectorial address and, subsequently, the lectures that 
constitute Introduction to Metaphysics. O’Brien (2011) is critical of both Michael Zimmerman’s 
(1986) and Brett Davis’ (2007) readings of this period of Heidegger’s work, particularly as these 
readings pertain to the groundwork laid out in Being and Time. O’Brien states that Zimmerman 
“misses the basic trajectory” (2011, 80) of the development of authenticity through this period, due 
to what O’Brien perceives as Zimmerman’s excessive emphasis on a transition in Heidegger’s 
thought from voluntarism to quietude. “Zimmerman insists that Introduction to Metaphysics 
represents the zenith of Heidegger’s ‘self’-dominated voluntarism … Heidegger had not yet come 
to realise the subjectivist bent of his appeal to authenticity” (O’Brien 2011, 80). By comparison to 
Zimmerman, O’Brien’s analysis of authenticity in Heidegger’s work pays scant attention to the 
ramifications of Heidegger’s theological background on the recovery of Being. In this sense, the 
development of authenticity from Being and Time to the critique of technology is able to withstand 
numerous readings. I am largely in concert with O’Brien’s contention that “it is important to take 
on board Heidegger’s repeated claims that the project in Being and Time is ‘on the way’, that it is a 
‘path’, and though a necessary one, not a completed one … it is only when we begin to look on 
Heidegger’s project as involving some basic elements of structural and thematic continuity (though 
admittedly not a seamless continuity) that we begin to extricate his philosophical project from the 
interpretive nets of conflict and confusion” (90). This is not to say that a reader of Heidegger 
should take Heidegger’s appeals at face value, but aside from stylistic changes in his writing 
(which again really only supplement what Heidegger had originally pointed to in terms of the 
awkward use of language in Being and Time), finding a radical shift or turn in Heidegger from 
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states that it “can be taken as merely descriptive or as normative and in many 
ways it seems undeniable that it melds elements of both … For now we might say 
that though inauthenticity is not per se a pejorative notion for Heidegger, the idea 
of a life characterised irredeemably by inauthenticity is problematic” (25).23 
However, as I have stated above, the purely descriptive aspect of authenticity 
presented in Being and Time is due to the role this work plays as an introduction 
and demonstration of fundamental ontology, rather than as the final word on 
Dasein or the recovery of Being. Placed in the context of Heidegger’s thought as a 
whole, Being and Time—and the description of authenticity contained within—is 
a preliminary work that establishes and demonstrates a beginning point for a 
phenomenologically derived fundamental ontology. That concepts such as 
authenticity and the They were first employed in a descriptive manner has little 
bearing on the fact that these ideas are of ethical significance in terms of later 
Heidegger’s critical, rather than descriptive, account. In what might at first seem 
like a rejection of interpreting authenticity as ethically significant, Heidegger 
wrote: 
 
Beyng-toward-death is to be grasped as a determination of Da-sein and only as such a 
determination … Yet how pathetic and cheap it is to latch onto the term “being-toward-
death” and explain it as a crude “worldview”, one which is then laid to charge in Being 
and Time … Not everyone, however, needs to carry out this beyng-toward-death and to 
take over the self of Da-sein in this authenticity. Rather, to carry that out is necessary only 
in the sphere of the task of laying the ground for the question of being … The carrying out 
of being-toward-death is a duty incumbent only on thinkers of the other beginning, though 
every essential human being, among the future creative ones, can know it. (2012b, 223-
224). 
 
																																																																																																																																																								
Being and Time onwards requires that the two introductions of the aforementioned work be taken 
less lightly than they were seemingly intended. 
23 For Julian Young “[i]nauthentic life has a certain downside to it. There is, Heidegger suggests, a 
certain sense of something being amiss, a dim sense of self-betrayal” (2010, 113). Thus while the 
ontological notion of authenticity remains normatively neutral (as we are Dasein, regardless of 
how we view our selves), it is difficult to accept that inauthentic being-towards-death, for example, 
has no normative implication, especially in light of the fact that these kinds of constitutive 
ontological structures can—must—only be understood in terms of their specific, concrete 
manifestations. Michael Zimmerman states that “[c]omplete insight into authentic Being-towards-
death…can follow only from an individual’s own experience. Compared to such direct insight, all 
explanations are second hand” (1986, 69). 
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In this passage Heidegger first dismisses the possibility of authenticity as an ethics 
in the shape of a crude worldview24 before concluding that authentic being-
towards-death is so significant, so fundamentally important that only an “essential 
human being” can manifest it. I draw attention to the elitism in this passage to 
highlight the idea that an originary sense of Being matters for Heidegger’s thought 
in an ethical, but also a spiritual, sense. The “incumbent duty” is an obligation to 
recognise and realise authentic human being, an existential matter that is ethically 
significant and carries spiritual implications. Again, while Heidegger is not 
suggesting that developing an originary sense of Being must follow certain 
prescriptive guidelines in the sense of a more structured series of ethical 
principles, his thought contains an existential, ethical, and spiritual impetus. 
Joanna Hodge states that Heidegger’s thinking is always “in advance of the ethical 
concerns of individuals and the political concerns of communities” (2001, 4)25 in 
that both of these distinct notions emerge from a shared fundamental grounding 
such as Heidegger’s thinking of human being as care (see the Introduction and 
Chapter Eight for my discussion of the connection of care to spirituality). For 
Hodge, as for Nancy (2002), Heidegger’s overall project can be considered an 
“originary ethics” (Hodge 2001, 202), an originary ethics founded on Dasein’s 
existential investedness and pertaining to an impassioned spirituality. In her 
conclusion, Hodge lists six reasons why she believes Heidegger scholarship more 
broadly fails to understand Heidegger’s project as ethical. Some of these issues 
overlap with the discussion in this and previous chapters, most obviously that 
Heidegger’s rejection of “ethics” was simply part of his rejection of distinct 
categories of thought that are delimited by their grounding in subject-object 
metaphysics and reduced from the Greek to Latinate form. Further, Heidegger’s 
ethics begin with an authentic relation to the self as Da-sein, a relation that 
highlights what I am referring to as spirituality. 
 																																																								
24 Bearing in mind that Contributions was written throughout the same period as Heidegger’s 
engagement with Nietzsche and the publication of 1938’s ‘The Age of the World Picture’, the 
dismissal of a crude worldview takes on specific significance in that the subject is alienated from 
its self and the world and this alienation is compounded by the will to power of the Overman to 
create a hubristic anthropomorphism that ultimately reduces the cosmos to standing reserve. 
25 Both Frederick Olafsson (1998) and Michael Lewis (2006) draw on the importance of Dasein’s 
Being-with as foundational for Heidegger’s ethical thinking. 
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Given the ethical significance of authenticity in Heidegger’s thinking, it is 
reasonable to claim that Heidegger’s project as a whole was the issuing forth of an 
urgent call to think outside the violence of Ge-stell. Joanna Hodge states that 
Heidegger “performs a reduction of ethics and reveals our ethical need” (2001, 
11).26 It is the ethical need that Heidegger responds to, not with an ethics as such, 
but with a thinking that demonstrates the possibility of de-centring human being, 
and offers the possibility of addressing many of the ethical and political problems 
that emerge from the framing of Ge-stell. Rather than attempt to draw out a 
specific ethics or further substantiate how Heidegger’s thinking, especially the 
analytic of Being and Time, can be understood as an ontological meta-ethics, I 
will, for the moment, continue my exploration of Heidegger’s thinking, mindful 
that an ethical dimension, a reflection of an ethical need (which, in turn, reflects a 
spiritual deficit), is apparent in Heidegger’s project as a whole. In Chapter Eight I 
will demonstrate that this ethical need stems from care, and that the ethical 
dimension of Heidegger’s work is also properly a spiritual dimension. 
 
Moving Forward 
In this chapter I have traced the development of authenticity in Heidegger’s 
thought. I have demonstrated that authenticity is an integral aspect of Heidegger’s 
thinking, and that the recovery of Being itself has ethical significance. Having 
traced the development of Heidegger’s critique of technology in Chapters One and 
Two, the exploration of authenticity in this chapter helps to build a sense of the 
importance of the connection between Ge-stell and Ereignis, the focus of Chapter 
Four. From the first three chapters of the thesis, it is apparent that Ge-stell frames 
human being in such a way that the modern technological age is characterised by 
inauthenticity. Given Da-sein’s ontological Being-in-the-world, human being 
necessarily entails an inauthentic mode of being given the double concealing of 																																																								
26 Hodge states that “[e]thical enquiry unlike metaphysical enquiry puts in question the humanity at 
the site at which philosophy emerges. Thus Heidegger’s enquiries are for me ethical in the sense 
that they put this humanity in question. They are meta-ethical in revealing this difference between 
the ethical and the metaphysical modes of enquiry” (23). This notion reflects Heidegger’s own 
thinking in the sense that while he was hesitant to use the term ethics due to its metaphysical 
connotations, from the introduction of care as the foundational being of Dasein through to the 
releasement of Da-sein, Heidegger’s methodology and insights demonstrated that things matter to 
human being, and that there is something existentially significant, something profound, about the 
idea that Dasein is able to escape the tranquility of the They by understanding this tranquility as 
the violent and oppressive framing of Ge-stell.  
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Ge-stell. Yet in making Ge-stell visible, indeed in any moment of interruption—
whether deliberate in the sense of existential-meditative reflection or an 
unintentional breakdown of a referential network—one is afforded the possibility 
of authenticity. While the ethical significance of this possibility is apparent in 
Heidegger’s critique of technology, I expand on Heidegger’s notion of Ge-stell in 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight to discuss aspects of the framing-positioning of Ge-
stell that Heidegger did not specifically account for.  
 
In order that the connection between the ethical (and, later, spiritual) significance 
of authenticity and Heidegger’s critique of technology is more fully developed, 
Chapters Four and Five will complete my account of the critique of technology by 
exploring what I have termed the constructive aspect of the critique. In Chapter 
Four I explore the notion of Ereignis, giving an account of what Heidegger 
understood as the cor-respondence of human being and Being. As with Chapters 
One and Two, Chapters Three and Four can be read hermeneutically in that 
Heidegger’s notions of Da-sein and Ereignis each shed light on the other. As 
stated above, Heidegger understood ēthos as referring to dwelling. Dwelling is 
explored in more depth in Chapter Six, as it is a term that Heidegger uses to 
encapsulate the constructive aspect of his critique of technology. There is no doubt 
that dwelling has great ethical and spiritual significance for Heidegger given that 
he used the term to describe the human belonging to Being, and how each Dasein 
can live in the sway of an originary sense of Being. The tension that this thesis 
seeks to highlight stems from Heidegger’s own thought: if Ge-stell frames and 
positions human being into inauthenticity in ways that Heidegger had not 
considered, is the notion of dwelling actually capable of countering such framing? 
Is dwelling really possible in the modern technological world? 
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Chapter Four — Ereignis 
 
[T]he terms ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’, which are used in a provisional fashion, do 
not imply a moral-existentiell or an ‘anthropological’ distinction, but rather a relation 
which, because it has been hitherto concealed from philosophy, has yet to be thought for 
the first time, an ‘ecstatic’ relation of the essence of man to the truth of Being (Heidegger 
2008d, 236). 
 
Tracing the genealogy of Ereignis is, in some ways, a more formidable task than 
for Ge-stell. First, Ereignis names an important aspect of Heidegger’s thought as 
far back as 1919.1 Second, as with authenticity, Ereignis is arguably more readily 
definable as that which it is not: in this case, Ge-stell. In 1962 Heidegger delivered 
a lecture titled ‘Time and Being’, the printed summary of which contains an 
explicit outline of where, at the time of publishing, Heidegger felt that he had 
most clearly articulated the concept of Ereignis, both explicitly and through key 
concepts. It is here that my investigation begins. However, in the wake of 
posthumously published works including Contributions, Mindfulness, and Country 
Path Conversations, contemporary readers now have access to a number of 
resources that demonstrate the development of Ereignis and its intrinsic bond to 
Ge-stell, authenticity, and dwelling. 
 
The passage above lays out a series of thoughts that unfold throughout the present 
chapter. As discussed in Chapter Three, authenticity is a mode of being which 
results from Da-sein’s choosing itself. However, this choice is the result of a 
deliberate reflection on itself as Da-sein, rather than the subject. This distinction is 
important and will be discussed further below. Here, Heidegger rejects the moral-
existentiell2 metaphysical framing of authenticity in the same way that he also 																																																								
1 See Towards the Definition of Philosophy (58, 60) for Heidegger’s early references to Ereignis. 
2 “Existentiell” is a term from Being and Time that refers to the specific factical-ontical choices of 
a specific individual. Height, weight, and hair colour are ontic features of an individual, and 
whether or not they prefer vanilla or chocolate is an existentiell concern for them. Rarely used by 
Heidegger beyond Being and Time, I have not used the word “existentiell” throughout this thesis 
due to its superfluity to my content and for Heidegger’s thinking as a whole. The use of the word 
(and associated concept) in Being and Time is a matter of completeness for the analytic, but is 
abandoned in Heidegger’s later thinking, and is absent from the critique of technology altogether. 
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rejects “logic” and “values” as metaphysically enframed (2008d, 249-252). As 
with Heidegger’s distinction between ēthos and conventional ethics as a branch of 
subject-object metaphysical thinking, Heidegger’s rejection of logic and values 
must be understood in an equivocal sense: he rejected “logic” as a formal, 
structured aspect of subject-object metaphysics, but he did not reject logical, 
critical thinking. His equivocation stems from a distinction between his pejorative 
use of “ethics” and “logic” as nouns, and their conventional use as adjectives. As 
nouns, the concepts attached to these terms are framed by, and perpetuate the 
framing of, Ge-stell. Heidegger’s rejection of logic, values, and ethics/morality is 
never a rejection of the content or even motivation of such, but of the framing 
inherent to subject-object metaphysics. Throughout this chapter, I re-examine 
threads from Chapter Three to further demonstrate that while authenticity is not a 
matter of ethics or morals in any metaphysical sense, the “ecstatic relation of the 
essence of man to the truth of Being”—as in the passage above—thought as 
Ereignis, describes authentic human being. As such, the concept of Ereignis lays 
the groundwork for a clearer understanding of the ethical and spiritual significance 
of Heidegger’s thinking. As with previous chapters, I track the development of 
Ereignis throughout Heidegger’s thought as part of a broader hermeneutic. As 
stated above, my exploration initially takes its cue from the summary notes 
provided in the published version of the 1962 lecture ‘Time and Being’. While not 
offering a strict, single definition of the concept, I will demonstrate that a rich 
understanding of Ereignis can emerge from a hermeneutic reading of the concept. 
As such, the first section of this chapter is limited to a discussion of Ereignis in 
terms of its development and broad definition, while subsequent sections focus on 
the continuity of Heidegger’s thought by unpacking the intrinsic connection of 
Ereignis, Ge-stell and authenticity. 
 
Thinking Ereignis from Da-sein 
The summary of ‘Time and Being’ points towards 1947’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ 
as the first major work (available at the time) where “[a]ppropriation is already 
spoken of, but still with a conscious ambiguity” (Heidegger 2002c, 36). In ‘Letter 																																																																																																																																																								
What I have previously called, and continue to call, the factical-ontical situation, manifestation, or 
features of a person takes for granted that each individual also has their own specific ontic 
preferences, aspirations, and concerns. 
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on Humanism’, Heidegger re-iterates much of what was laid out with Being and 
Time, in order to ensure that no trace of subject-object metaphysics remains when 
thinking of the essence of human being as “ek-sistence” (2008d, 228).3 Ek-
sistence describes the essence of human being in so much as there is no original 
grounding, purpose, or yardstick for our way of being, other than the fact that we 
are at all. In Division Two of Being and Time Heidegger introduces “ecstases” 
(2008e, 377) in order to explicate the temporality of Dasein in the authentic 
“moment of vision” (366), or Augenblick. Playing on the twin notion of ek-
sistence as both “standing outside” (ibid, translators’ note) and “existence”, it is 
articulated in ‘What is Metaphysics’ thus: “Da-sein means: being held out into the 
nothing” (2008b, 103), the nothing in the sense of the ab-grund, or abyss. Da-sein 
is literally ek-static in that it stands-out-from, indicating Dasein’s conspicuous 
relationship to its own being. This fundamental ontological insight is further 
evidence that, for Heidegger, any attempt to invert, subvert, or otherwise 
overcome metaphysics is already pre-determined in one shape or another by 
metaphysics; only by stepping outside the framing of metaphysics can the essence 
of human being be properly thought. As such, Heidegger warns that the existential 
notion that “existence precedes essence” should not be thought in the same 
language of metaphysics at all.4  
 
In ‘On the Essence of Truth’ Heidegger states “[i]n Da-sein the essential ground, 
long ungrounded, on the basis of which human beings are able to ek-sist, is 
preserved for them … Ek-sistence, rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the 
disclosedness of beings as such” (2009b, 145). However, the relation of truth and 
freedom from this passage must be thought in conjunction with ‘On the Essence of 
Ground’ where Heidegger states that “freedom as origin itself becomes ‘ground’. 
Freedom is the ground of ground” (2009a, 134). If this is the case, then many of 																																																								
3 Ek-sistence is a significant concept in the development of authenticity in that it shifts the thinking 
of Dasein to Da-sein. 
4 ‘Letter on Humanism’ was composed in large part to distance Heidegger from Sartre. Sartre’s 
‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ is one of the prime targets of Heidegger’s ‘Humanism’ essay. 
Sartre’s formulation of “existence precedes essence” (2007, 20) is imbued with Nietzschean will-
to-power, where the subject is the centre of self-construction: I exist, I am free, and therefore I can 
determine my essence by defining my self. For Heidegger, the formulation “existence precedes 
essence” is purely ontological and relates to the grounds of Da-sein rather than any metaphysical 
essence such as the subject.  
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the ontological concepts first introduced in Being and Time—Dasein as the 
clearing, as constitutively Being-in-the-world—are a suitable starting point to 
understand Ereignis. Rather than observations on human being or a 
reconfiguration of the subject, they are notions that attempt to destabilise the 
privileged role of the subject as the arbiter of meaning and knowledge and to 
recover an originary sense of Being. ‘Letter on Humanism’ stresses this point. 
However, the open space of the clearing, the emptiness of the nothing into which 
Da-sein is held, is never actually empty; the emptiness of Da-sein is an emptiness 
that is always thrown-into and full-of the worlding of the world, Ge-stell. Dasein’s 
ek-sistence is ontological and facilitates each individual’s ontic existence in the 
world. When stressing the metaphysical properties of the human and arriving at 
humanism, as in Sartre’s case, Heidegger argued that the highest dignity, what it 
essentially means to be human, has been missed.  
 
In describing the always-full emptiness of Da-sein, ‘Letter on Humanism’ presents 
Heidegger scholarship with a number of well-known, and deeply problematic, 
phrases. However, these phrases are readily interpreted in light of the material I 
have covered in Chapters One, Two, and Three. Where Heidegger 
anthropomorphises Being in the phrase “Being is still waiting for the time when it 
will become thought-provoking for man” (2008d, 227), he is re-stating his 
position on the oblivion or forgetting of Being and the plight of modernity (the 
lack of a sense of plight). Of course, Being is not an entity that is literally waiting 
for human thought to engage with it, but instead Heidegger seems to state that 
while the oblivion of Being reigns, Ge-stell continues to frame the human relation 
to Being in such a way that the relation itself remains invisible, at best taken for 
granted. This claim can also be interpreted as an ethical implication, i.e. that Being 
(prescriptively) should or ought to become thought provoking, rather than remain 
concealed by subject-object metaphysics. Similarly, where Heidegger states 
“language is the house of Being”5 (236), one is reminded of the importance of 																																																								
5 While I return to this phrase later in the chapter, it is worth noting already that this oft-quoted 
phrase is the key to reconciling Heidegger’s problematic take on “world-poor” animals, and helps 
to make sense of the otherwise seemingly anthropocentric (even when attempting to think in 
Heideggerian terms) claims around the special bond of humans and Being. While it is outside the 
scope of this thesis, the issue can briefly be covered by understanding that by ‘language’, 
Heidegger was referring to the various forms of grammatical systems that both shape and are 
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language in shaping our understanding of existence: that metaphysical subject-
instrument thinking is sustained by the disclosive power of language, the logos of 
technology, where the truth of beings is their presence as standing reserve. 
However, phrases such as “Man is the shepherd of Being” (234), and “Man is the 
neighbour of Being” (245) are ostensibly more problematic than the previous 
examples.6 The central problem of these phrases is the linguistic necessity of the 
separation or distinction of Being from Da-sein.7 No matter the lengths one goes 
to describe the “relation between” Being and Da-sein, the emphasis remains on the 
implication that two separate or distinct entities or processes are at play. The 
language of preserving, shepherding, and guarding, for example, always gestures 
towards a kind of mediating effect on the “‘ecstatic’ relation of the essence of man 
to the truth of Being” (236). In later writings, Heidegger would attempt to 
overcome this linguistic separation with the notion of Ereignis.  
 
Thinking Ereignis from Ge-stell 
Following ‘Letter on Humanism’, the 1949 Bremen lecture series Insight Into 
That Which Is and 1953’s ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ are indicated as 
sources in which Ereignis is “spoken of more unequivocally” (2002c, 36). As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the essence of technology is a mode of disclosure of 
the world that perpetuates and is sustained by instrumental-calculative thinking. 
The double concealing of Ge-stell reveals the truth of beings as eminently ready-																																																																																																																																																								
shaped by the world. While a mountain range beckons to Dasein and, for purely pragmatic terms, 
Dasein must refer to it, name it, for functional purposes (navigation, for example), the shift from 
mere communication to language is the shift that Heidegger exploits in regards to the difference 
between humans and animals. As ‘Letter on Humanism’ makes clear, human beings are perhaps 
closest to the animals in metaphysical terms, but Sorge, the care of Da-sein, one’s investedness 
beyond sentience in terms of the capability for an existential crisis of the philosophical sort—or 
even just of the mid-life sort—is what places human being in a privileged relation to Being. This is 
discussed further below, as the discussion of Ereignis becomes more detailed. See Chapter One, 
footnotes 12 and 24 for a discussion of my use of the term hubris, and the difficulty that can arise 
from emphasising the importance of Heidegger’s earlier Dasein analytic when attempting to 
interpret his later work. 
6 These are the types of phrases that Sheehan (2015a), for instance, is often critical of, arguing that 
they lend themselves to a metaphysical understanding of a reified ‘big-B’ Being as well as evoking 
images of concepts or ‘things’ that are somehow able to be separated out, or thought of in distinct 
ways. Certainly, this latter concern is justified, and, as is discussed in some depth below, much of 
his later writings on Ereignis attempted to address this issue. Additionally, this kind of phrasing is 
readily understood in the light Heidegger’s engagement with Hölderlin; an engagement that had 
already spanned two full series of lectures by the time ‘Letter on Humanism’ appeared.  
7 This is the central problem that continues to plague those who write under the influence of 
Heidegger—even those speaking German and Greek: how to authentically speak Being in an 
otherwise metaphysical language. 
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to-hand, reduced from objects to standing reserve. Understanding Ge-stell as a 
mode of disclosure is valuable in understanding Ereignis, the latter referred to in 
the Bremen lectures as the “worlding” (2012a, 18) of the world. In Being and 
Time the world became conspicuous through a kind of breakdown or rupture, 
including from the attunement of anxiety, where the world showed up as a totality 
of beings. Gaining insight into the worlding of the world, both in terms of the 
process itself (as the alethic horizon of beings, the limits of the clearing) and the 
specifics of what is revealed (the distinction between bringing-forth and 
challenging-forth, for example), reveals something significant about one’s self, 
one’s world, and the happening of Being itself.  
 
Ge-stell did not just spontaneously spring to dominance.8 Rather, as I have 
demonstrated in Chapters One and Two, Heidegger argues that Ge-stell is the 
culmination of subject-object metaphysics: the inevitable result of the oblivion of 
Being. There is no singular cause for Ge-stell’s dominance, despite the possibility 
of pinpointing certain decisive moments in the Western tradition such as the work 
of Plato, Descartes, and Nietzsche, for example. Importantly, Ge-stell gains its 
own traction, and had become autonomous even before the industrial revolution 
and the increasing prevalence of machine technology. As outlined in Chapter 
Two, Ge-stell is the framing of the world that underpins machine technology, and 
which facilitates the widespread autonomy of the latter due in part to the 
pragmatic utility of instrumental-calculative thinking and in part to the 
valorisation of the scientism. A mode of disclosure—worlding—thus appropriates 
human being in that the ontic structures and discourses of the world into which 
one is thrown are shaped by, and in turn shape, the language and concepts that one 
uses to make sense of the world (and one’s own existence). Dasein is appropriated 
by Ge-stell in the sense that the meaning and value of the world (as revealed by 
Ge-stell) both pre-exists and constitutes Dasein. As the always-full clearing, the 
being-there of Dasein is thrown into the narrative of subject-object metaphysics. 
As such, one’s experience of self is readily explained by autonomous subjectivity. 
Further, the subject-object distinction grants the possibility of an objective and 																																																								
8 At what point can we say that an epoch has shifted? Is there a “moment”, and, if so, can it only be 
recognised historiologically? These questions will become significant when I develop an account 
of the relationship between patriarchy and Ge-stell in Chapter Six. 
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neutral position in regards to the extant stuff of the world; a possibility that 
simultaneously reduces the extant stuff of the world to standing reserve. The 
modern objective conception of truth is the appropriation of human being both 
into and by Ge-stell. 
 
The worlding of the world is neither explicable by nor grounded upon anything other than 
itself … The inexplicability and ungroundability of the worlding of the world lies much 
more in the fact that things like causes and grounds remain unsuitable for the worlding of 
the world. As soon as human knowing reaches an explanation here, it does not somehow 
step over the essence of the world, but rather collapses beneath the essence of world. The 
human will to explain does not at all reach into what is simplistic of the single fold of 
worlding (2012a, 18). 
 
The “will to explain” is an issue for Heidegger here in that, as I alluded to in 
Chapter One and will discuss further in Chapter Five, he designates a particular 
kind of instrumental-calculative violence to the term “explanation”, rather than 
using it in a neutral, descriptive sense. Whatever is beyond the legitimate 
jurisdiction of instrumental-calculative thinking must be considered from an 
existential-meditative perspective, just as ontic measures become invalid when 
applied to the ontological. For Heidegger, in attempting to explain the worlding of 
the world, the phenomenon loses its mysterious essence (and the human reverence 
for such) and is reduced to a series of causal, calculable, ontic events. The 
“ungroundability” of worlding is itself the reason that Heidegger is haunted by the 
problem of Being. Why beings and not, instead, nothing? How can we understand 
Being in a way that does not simply reduce it to a first cause in the tradition of 
subject-object metaphysics? The worlding of the world, and the appropriation of 
Da-sein as the there of the clearing remain impossible to explain in terms of cause 
and effect without essentially altering what Heidegger is trying to articulate. 
 
Thus we now characterize the world in respect to being. So conceived, world is 
subordinate to being, while in truth the essence of being essences from out of the 
concealed worlding of world. World is not one way of being and deferential to this. Being 
has to own its essence from the worlding of world. This points out that the worlding of 
world is an appropriating (das Ereignen) in a still-unexperienced sense of this word. 
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When world first properly takes place, then being, and along with it the nothing, vanish 
into worlding. (Heidegger 2012a, 46).9 
 
As Da-sein, we are in the world, we are of the world, and we properly belong to it. 
As Heidegger stated in the above passage, world as world exists only in so far as 
the essence of Being is an appropriating-giving, the worlding of the world, which 
remains invisible: “vanishing into worlding”. The worlding of the world is the 
appropriation of Da-sein and the world: Ereignis. The essence of Being is manifest 
or expressed in worlding. World is not “subordinate” to Being in a hierarchical 
sense, and the essence of Being has nothing to do with what is substantively 
revealed in the worlding of the world—beings as standing reserve, beings as holy 
relics—but rather worlding belongs to the world in that the former is ontologically 
constitutive of the latter. In a phenomenological sense, Dasein is always already in 
a world full of meaning, Dasein does not encounter abstract shapes and sounds, 
but beings, and the totality of beings as the world. Yet as the world worlds, that it 
worlds remains unseen. Due to Dasein’s very in-the-worldness—compounded by 
the notion that by revealing meaningful extant entities, alētheia itself remains 
invisible—Dasein remains oblivious to Being until a moment of interruption 
makes worlding and the world (and, subsequently, the appropriation of Dasein by 
the world) visible. Further, the essence of Being, the appropriating-giving that is 
the worlding of world, not only naturally withdraws from visibility (in the alethic 
sense that each revealing is also a concealing), but in this case such invisibility is 
compounded by two and a half millennia of Western subject-object metaphysics; 
the double concealing of Ge-stell. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, the 
modern revealing of the world actively closes off the question of Being in favour 
of the calculable presence of beings. Ge-stell is a peculiar mode of disclosure in 
that it is doubly withdrawn; once as a mode of disclosure, and again due to the 
content and nature of what it discloses. Heidegger frames the double concealing of 
Ge-stell thus: 
 
																																																								
9 Mitchell does not capitalise being to Being in his translation of the Bremen lectures. In the 
interest of consistency throughout my thesis it is important to note that Mitchell’s lack of 
conventional Anglophone emphasis here does not alter the meaning of the passages.  
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World and positionality [Ge-stell] are the same. They are differently the essence of Being. 
World is the guardian of the essence of being. Positionality is the complete forgetting of 
the truth of being … [The] essential danger [of Ge-stell is that] … world and positionality 
as the respective differentiation of what essences of beyng displaces itself after itself in 
setting after itself (Heidegger 2012a, 50-51, my insertions). 
 
In this sense, Ereignis—as the worlding of world, the pure essence of 
Being/Beyng—can now be understood as what facilitates Ge-stell, in the sense 
that Ge-stell is Ereignis. But where Ereignis is the worlding of the world, Ge-stell 
is the worlding of a specifically technological world. It is in this sense that Ge-
stell is considered distorted: it is not the functional opposite of Ereignis in a binary 
sense, it is Ereignis, but in an incomplete, “distorted” sense. “The essence of 
being” is disclosive, it appropriates Da-sein and reveals beings. The world is “the 
guardian of the essence of being” in that the worlding of the world makes the truth 
of beings (their meaning or value) evident to Dasein. Ge-stell and Ereignis are 
both the essence of Being as an appropriating-giving, yet the former actively, thus 
doubly, conceals its alethic nature.10 The “essential danger” is that in the specific 
concretion of the technological world, Ge-stell devalues and delegitimises that 
which falls outside the jurisdiction of instrumental-calculative thinking, including 
the notion of worlding, or Being as an appropriating-giving. As such, Ge-stell 
“displaces itself” in any attempt to reflect on itself. This is the key to 
understanding Heidegger’s critique of technology and to extrapolate his thinking 																																																								
10 The distinction—and connection—between Ge-stell and Ereignis is important to understand 
either concept. This connection is neglected in Dana S. Belu and Andrew Feenberg’s ‘Heidegger’s 
Aporetic Ontology of Technology’ from 2010. In this article, Belu and Feenberg deliver a reading 
of Ge-stell as either completely totalizing and therefore unable to be examined or eluded, or as 
only “partial” (6) which then diminishes the concept of enframing. They conclude that as 
Heidegger can examine and discuss Ge-stell, it is not a complete, totalizing enframing, and is 
therefore only a partially enframing force at best, thus the efficacy of the concept is compromised. 
Aside from the fact that, as stated by Lorraine Markotic, one’s being entrenched in a system does 
not preclude one from being able to examine and question it (2016, 133), Belu and Feenberg base 
their interpretation of Ge-stell solely on the Bremen Lectures from 1949, and the subsequent 
(1951) essay ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. As I demonstrate in Chapters One to Six, 
Ge-stell, and Heidegger’s critique of technology overall (with its component constructive and 
critical aspects) is not distinct from his broader project of the recovery of Being. The attempt to 
establish an interpretation of Ge-stell as either total or partial on these two texts alone  fails to take 
account of the essential aspect of Ge-stell: that it is also Ereignis (as discussed in the present 
chapter). Contra Belu and Feenberg, if Ge-stell is the technological distortion of Ereignis, then 
understanding it in terms of ‘partial’ or ‘total’ is to fundamentally miss both the ouroboros of the 
ontic and the ontological (discussed in Chapter Three) and how this ouroboros is the key to 
authentic human being (discussed in Chapters Three, Six, and Eight); the key to stepping outside 
the framing of Ge-stell. 
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beyond the ontic examples that he covered in his own writings. It is also the key to 
understanding the “relation” between human being and Being. 
 
Momentarily jumping forward, 1969’s ‘Seminar in Le Thor’ states that “[a]n 
excellent way of approaching enowning [Ereignis] would be to look into the 
essence of positionality [Ge-stell] in so far as it is a passage from metaphysics to 
another thinking … for positionality is essentially ambiguous” (Heidegger 2012c, 
60). However, Heidegger does himself a disservice here. As I have demonstrated 
in Chapters One and Two, from the instrumentality of readiness-to-hand to the 
writings on machination and the gigantic, and subsequently through to the Bremen 
lectures and beyond, Ge-stell is anything but ambiguous. What perhaps remained 
ambiguous for Heidegger and his audience at the time of this statement is the 
relation of Ereignis and Ge-stell, or, more specifically, how Ge-stell hides itself in 
the double sense described above. In order to address this ambiguity, the Bremen 
lectures offer a number of valuable insights, not least of which is the 
straightforward statement, found in Heidegger’s own footnote to the main text, 
that “positionality is the event of appropriation” (2012a, 50). How should this 
claim be understood? Simply put, Ge-stell—as the “distorted essence of Being”—
is to inauthentic existence what Ereignis is to authentic ek-sistence: they are the 
same, but with important differences. In a sense, Ge-stell is an inauthentic mode 
of Ereignis; it does not “give” and “let”, but instead imposes an artificial layer of 
instrumental-calculable equivalence over all things (a peculiar type of giving and 
letting). The way in which Ge-stell “Ge-stells” is identical to the way Ereignis 
“Ereignises”, although the former is always a violent framing of a particular 
world, where the latter names the more primordial worlding inherent to any world. 
That the two share the same ontological mechanism leads to unfortunate 
tautologies: the world worlds, positionality positions, appropriation appropriates, 
enframing enframes, and so on.  
 
Importantly, Heidegger did not attempt to use Ereignis to describe a causal 
mechanism to ground any kind of realist metaphysics. It is inconsistent with 
Heidegger’s thought to ponder the metaphysical existence of beings in the absence 
of human being; this was not the intention of Heidegger’s project. The 
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metaphysical premise of this kind of question frames Heidegger’s thought as 
either pertaining to the existence of beings independent of Dasein, or as reducible 
to an anthropocentric position that places Dasein in a world of meaningful things 
in place of the subject. Certainly, in the absence of human being, Ge-stell and 
Ereignis would fail to manifest, but does this mean that Heidegger’s project is 
reducible to an understanding of how human subjects invest meaning in the 
world? Yes and no. Ereignis and Ge-stell are modes of disclosure, and ek-sistent 
Da-sein is the appropriated open region in which the disclosure unfolds. Pre-
empting a discussion of the es gibt, below, in the absence of human being one 
might say that the giving-aspect of Ereignis continues to give, but can it be 
properly grammatically or conceptually characterised as giving, or as a gift, if 
there is no reciprocal giftee? This is neither a metaphysical claim that Being is or 
is not in the absence of human being, or an epistemological claim that meaning, 
value, and what can be known by human being ultimately stems only from human 
being. Again, to frame Heidegger’s thinking in this manner is to ask that his 
thinking meet metaphysical requirements. The implications of Heidegger’s 
thought are not metaphysical, however, and, as I have claimed in Chapter Three 
and will argue throughout the remainder of the thesis, in reading Heidegger in a 
literal and superficial sense, one misses the ethical and spiritual significance of the 
recovery of Being. Heidegger urges us to develop an originary sense of Being. 
The significance of Heidegger’s work in de-centring human being from its 
valorised position in subject-object metaphysics opens up a variety of new ways to 
think old problems, but there is nothing more certain to close down these new 
possibilities than to continue to frame old problems under subject-object 
metaphysical conditions. By adopting Heidegger’s approach, it is the very frame 
that shifts and reveals old problems in a new light. In the age of Ge-stell, shifting 
the frame is an ethical imperative and authenticity a spiritual obligation. 
 
If forced into an explanation of Heidegger’s metaphysics, one might argue that 
from Heidegger’s perspective, objects are extant in their brute presence regardless 
of human being; but this does not mean that all meaning and value is 
anthropocentric. Neither does it mean—as it logically could not—that what is 
meaningful and valuable for human being properly exists in the absence of human 
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being. In their extant state, objects contain all the properties and possibilities that 
contribute to the meanings and values that the objects hold when Dasein 
encounters them. Although each revealed truth of an entity or phenomenon is 
revealed through (and to) Dasein, this is not to say that the meaning and value of 
such stems solely from Dasein. Instead, a revealed truth always relates specifically 
to the inherent properties of the extant entity itself. In the absence of Dasein, the 
tree retains the properties and characteristics that would either make it suitable to 
bring-forth or even challenge-forth a canoe, but these properties cannot be 
characterised as such in the absence of Dasein (which does not negate their status 
as extant). In contrast, human being, as the open region, cannot exist without 
Ereignis. As the there that is always in-the-world, Dasein is always already 
appropriated, and appropriated anew in the case of an interruption that makes the 
world visible. This position does not privilege Sein or Da-sein, but, instead, is 
concerned with how each comes fully into its own through a mutual 
appropriation.11 This does not reduce Being and Ereignis to anthropocentric 
constructs, or merely conceptual counterparts to human experience, but instead 
restores the constitutively phenomenological significance of Being and the world 
to human being. Further, as I have already demonstrated, Ge-stell is Ereignis in so 
much as it is a mis-appropriated happening of Ereignis as subject-object 
metaphysics. Indeed, “positionality (the gathering unity of all ways of positing 
[Weisen des stellens]) is the completion and consummation of metaphysics” 
(2012c, 60) in that it is the mode of revealing that dominates and subjugates ek-
sistence into subject-instrument metaphysics. That same sentence continues, “and 
at the same time [Ge-stell is] the disclosive preparation of enowning” (60, my 
insertion), indicating that as Ge-stell is revealed as the historical-metaphysical 
logos—the essence of technology—the mode and manner of this historically 
situated revealing of Being allows a glimpse of the a-historical Ereignis.  
 																																																								
11 Thought metaphysically, this argument can be collapsed into an anthropocentric position. Such a 
collapse is correct in a manner of speaking, and is the reason that human being is always 
implicated in the problem of Being. However, it comes perilously close to re-instating the human 
as the solipsistic creator, the yardstick of all knowability and meaning, and in a very basic sense, 
this is precisely what distinguishes Heidegger’s phenomenology from Husserl’s as discussed 
briefly in Chapter One. Being is regardless of human being, but Ereignis is the coming together, or, 
as I discuss shortly, the belonging together of Da-sein and Sein. There is no world without Da-sein, 
and Ereignis is the worlding of the world. 
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Thinking Ereignis from Ereignis: Later Thinking and Exploratory Writing 
In ‘The Principle of Identity’, Heidegger makes an important distinction between 
the twin concepts of “belonging together … [and] belonging together” (2002b, 29, 
my insertion); an important shift of emphasis that I discuss below. The phrase 
“belonging together” is the English translation of Zusammengehörenkeit. The 
emphasis that Heidegger makes is not on the “sameness” of zusammen, where one 
might say that things belong together in a categorical sense, but on gehören, 
belonging. As with Ge-stell, the prefix ge indicates a gathering-together, while 
hören refers to hearing. In this sense, gehören as “belonging” carries mutually 
appropriative connotations in that the process of hearing requires both sound and 
listener in the same way that giving requires a giftee. In its everyday sense, the 
belonging of gehören also has connotations of owning in a non-proprietary sense: 
I belong to you and you are mine; I grew up near these mountains, I feel that I 
belong here. Belonging together is an emphasis on sameness in a categorical 
sense: two hammers have this kind of categorical sameness. However, a hammer 
and a nail belong together, not in a categorical identical sense, but in a constitutive 
phenomenological-ontological sense. The hammer and nail each come into their 
own in their belonging to one another. However, this example is not ideal in that, 
thought from within Being and Time, or from the perspective of Ge-stell, the 
hammer and the nail, and the work bench and the shed, collapse into categorical 
sameness as das Zeug, equipment. Instead, the belonging together of Da-sein and 
Ereignis is expressed in Being and Time in the basic formulation of Being-in-the-
world. World and Da-sein properly, appropriatively belong together, distinct, yet 
forming a unitary whole.12  
 
By holding to the earlier notion that world is the essence of Being (as is Ge-
stell/Ereignis, but in a different sense) and that Dasein is, in the most profound 
sense, in-the-world, we are in a position to catch sight of Ereignis as the belonging 
together of human being and Being. 
																																																								
12 Having introduced the concept of belonging together, throughout the remainder of the thesis I 
will express the concept without italicisation or as a specifically technical term. Instead, depending 
on the grammatical context in which the concept appears, I will simply refer to “belonging” or to 
the idea that Da-sein and Sein “belong” in order that the concept can be retained without the need 
for especially Heideggerian terminology. 
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Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this … For it is 
man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence. Such becoming present 
needs the openness of a clearing, and by this need remains appropriated to human being. 
This does not at all mean that Being is posited first and only by man. On the contrary, the 
following becomes clear: Man and Being are appropriated together. They belong to each 
other … We stubbornly misunderstand this prevailing belonging together of man and 
Being as long as we represent everything only in categories and mediations … [t]hen we 
always find only connections that are established either in terms of Being or in terms of 
man, and that present the belonging together of man and Being as an intertwining. 
(Heidegger 2002b, 31-32). 
 
This passage is essential for understanding how Heidegger arrives at the notion of 
Ereignis, and is exemplary of the de-centring of human being that is so important 
to his thinking. Here, Heidegger explicitly addresses the problem of approaching 
the essence of Being in terms of distinct categories (that are mediated 
representations to the subject), rather than as a primordial unitary whole with 
multiple components. This passage contains the seemingly problematic phrase 
“lets Being arrive as presence”, yet the importance of letting has been discussed at 
length in Chapter Three. The arrival of Being as presence is a reference to the 
notion that Being has the double aspect of both the appropriating-giving of the 
worlding of world, as well as referring to what is made present in both an extant 
and meaningful sense by this process. As such, human being, ek-sistence, Da-sein, 
and the clearing, all name the essential phenomenon of human being as the there 
that is always already “responding to Being”; human being as cor-respondence. 
Dasein always already phenomenologically encounters what is present as 
something in particular, and in this sense Being as presence needs Dasein. Yet one 
must be careful not to assume that this is a metaphysical claim that there is no 
Being without humans. As outlined above, Being is, regardless of humans, but the 
mutual appropriation of Being and Da-sein in their belonging together must occur 
in order for Being to make present specific things such as canoes and hammers. 
From this understanding of appropriation, the perpetual risk of collapsing these 
notions back to an emphasis on the human as the centre of all phenomena remains. 
Indeed, in The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics, Heidegger spoke of the 
human as world-forming and warned that:  
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surely this means that world is nothing in itself but rather something formed by man, 
something subjective. That would be one possible interpretation of what we have hitherto 
said concerning the problem of world and the concept of world—one possible 
interpretation, but one which nevertheless precisely fails to grasp the decisive problem 
here (1995, 285). 
 
In reducing the cor-respondence or belonging of Ereignis to an anthropocentric 
metaphysical position, one fails to understand the ethical significance of both 
authentic Da-sein and Ge-stell’s framing of (inauthentic) human being. Despite his 
insistence in the above passage that a subjective interpretation of world-formation 
is incorrect, throughout The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
goes on to claim that humans are world-forming due to their ontological 
characteristic of projection (1995, 362-366). However, he warns against assuming 
that projection is any kind of subjective representation of the world where all 
meaning and value stem from the human, or that the world only comes to be 
through the human conception of a totality of beings through a fundamental 
attunement (anxiety in Being and Time, boredom in The Fundamental Concept of 
Metaphysics). Da-sein’s projection in The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics is 
not a subjective outpouring of meaning and value onto otherwise passive and 
uninvolved objects and phenomena, but is, rather, an ontological aspect of the 
there of Da-sein that is always already appropriated in its belonging to Being. In 
familiar methodological manner, Heidegger introduces the notion of projection, 
retaining its familiar and everyday use and granting it a “terminological status” 
(362), before distinguishing (in the sense that the ontic-ontological difference is a 
type of distinction that can refer to the same entity) between the more familiar 
usage and “the originary projection…namely that occurrence which 
fundamentally makes possible all familiar projection in our everyday 
comportment” (ibid). Thus, any Dasein-centric interpretation of the world (or of 
Being, of Heidegger’s project more broadly based on this text) that Dasein is in 
and of, fails to take into account that “[w]orld prevails in and for a letting-prevail 
that has the character of projecting” (ibid). Projecting, then, is a technical term 
relating to the letting of the there, the Da, of Da-sein, that is later characterised as 
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a “making possible” (364) of possibilities that exist in pre-Dasein, pre-world 
phenomena. 
 
Understanding Ereignis as the mutual appropriation, belonging, or cor-
respondence of Da-sein and Sein makes Heidegger’s intentions with difficult 
phrases from the ‘Letter on Humanism’ and, later, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ 
evident. The notion that “man” is the neighbour or shepherd of Being, or that 
Dasein should preserve or shelter Being, becomes a matter of ethical and spiritual 
significance in the sense that authentic human being is the ontic manifestation of 
ek-sistent Da-sein, always mutually appropriated-with/belonging-to Being. Rather 
than remain oblivious to the giving of Being, the task is to recognise and realise 
Da-sein as that which is given over to Being. Da-sein preserves Being in Ereignis, 
while the modern subject erases Being within Ge-stell. Da-sein shelters and lets 
Being, while the modern subject imposes and exploits the standing reserve. Before 
addressing ‘Time and Being’, the text that has largely guided my exploration of 
Ereignis so far, I now turn to the posthumously published writings of the late 
1930s. These writings, as I have previously discussed, are exploratory; they 
demonstrate Heidegger’s sustained attempt to articulate Ereignis at least a decade 
before his descriptions of Da-sein in the ‘Letter on Humanism’ and the notion of 
Ge-stell from the Bremen lectures. While one cannot grant the final word on 
Ereignis to one text or another, the development of the notion so far can be 
enriched with this step back.  
 
Ereignis shares the root Eigen as found in the previous chapter’s central theme, 
Eigentlichkeit.13 The purpose and intention of the word Ereignis, including its 
inability to be adequately translated, lies in its etymological richness.14 In The 
Event, Heidegger spends time teasing out the ramifications and implications of 
Ereignis. Richard Rojcewicz presents the following passage in a format that 
																																																								
13 This shared etymological root makes sense of Emad and Maly’s translation of Ereignis as “en-
owning” (2008g, 11).  
14 This coming from the perspective that there is “a decline and impoverishment of language itself, 
which is entirely obvious if one compares the neediness of spoken language today with the riches 
of language still recorded by the brothers Grimm in the previous century” (Heidegger 2012c, 51). 
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presumably attempts to represent and replicate the hand-written original; I have 
attempted to re-create this format. 
 
Literal meaning.  
To show [Er-eigen]: to bring into view [Er-eugen], —to catch sight  
of [Eräugen] —ostendere, monstrare,  
to catch the eye, come into view,  
seize the gaze, to appear 
to manifest itself, carry to, give forth.  
—to show  —exhibit—clear up.   
 
To eventuate (same as the above) eu [i.e. ereugen] became ei [i.e.,  
ereigen] —   
and also confusion with the unrelated “own”  
[“eigen”], proprium,  
i.e., with “adopt” [“an-eignen”], “arrogate”  
[“zu-eignen”] 
Already thus at the start of the seventeenth century.  
 
To eventuate = to strike the eye [er-aigen] —by way of clearing—to  
show 
To eventuate  —to incorporate into the clearing  
to arrogate to it protection and  
preservation— 
to human beings and to their care. 
To eventuate = to come into its own of the self appearing and at the same  
time self-concealing self. (Heidegger 2013, 156-157). 
 
Given his commitment to the significance of the alethic nature of language, it is 
reasonable to assume that Heidegger intends all of these connotations and origins 
to resonate in the concept of Ereignis. In this passage, Heidegger demonstrates 
that Ereignis is essentially disclosive: it brings into view, it gives forth, and that 
through an etymological twist (at least, according to this passage) this kind of 
eventuation incorporates the notion of coming into its own. The final section 
shows Heidegger’s consummation of the earlier meanings and terms, the 
eventuation of an event where a thing appears as a thing but the evental happening 
itself remains invisible in its self-concealing. Additionally, it becomes clear that 
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this concept applies specifically to the “relation”, now thought of as cor-
respondence, mutual appropriation, or belonging together of human being and 
Being.  
 
Mindfulness is a series of writings composed around the same time as, and only 
barely more structured than, Contributions and The Event. In their introduction to 
this work, translators Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary claim that Mindfulness 
“elaborates” (Heidegger 2008g, xiii) on the project laid out in Contributions. In 
regards to Ereignis, Heidegger presents the notion that “Being is En-owning”15 
(83).  
 
In en-owning, 
be-ing holds sway as freedom 
be-ing holds sway as ab-ground 
be-ing holds sway as refusal 
be-ing holds sway as truth (time-space)16 
Every word here says en-owning and what it says holds sway in en-owning. No alien and 
no familiar concept from metaphysics can be thought unto these words. (2008g, 83-84). 
 
While brief, this passage elucidates the continuity of Heidegger’s thinking of 
Ereignis, and the constitutive appropriation or cor-respondence that it names. As 
discussed above, and in the previous chapter, the essays ‘On the Essence of Truth’ 
and ‘On the Essence of Ground’ make clear that freedom and the ab-grund are 
inextricably connected in the sense of a constitutive and alethic appropriation. The 
“refusal” refers to the self-concealing nature of alētheia; that Ereignis 
“Ereignises” and, as a result, Dasein encounters beings as presence, while 
remaining oblivious of the appropriating-giving of Being. Again, at the end of this 
passage, Heidegger reminds the reader that she cannot simply attempt to re-think 
old problems without first changing the entire frame, and that this means turning 																																																								
15 Mindfulness uses a number of translations that I do not adopt unless quoting directly, i.e. en-
owning for Ereignis, ab-ground for ab-grund, and be-ing for Seyn. 
16 The reference to time-space here is developed further by Heidegger in the sections of 
Mindfulness that immediately follow this passage (2008g, 84-86). He speaks against the 
metaphysical thinking of time and space as calculable properties, instead relating temporal-
spatiality to the ab-grund. The concepts are synonymous with an emptiness-that-allows, just as the 
clearing of Da-sein is always ontologically empty in order to be factically-ontically replete with 
content. 
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away from subject-object metaphysics to fundamental ontology. 
 
Turning to ‘Time and Being’, Ereignis is thought in terms of “that which gives”, 
as es gibt, the “It” that “gives” in the sense that we can say “there is” (Heidegger 
2002c, 5-10). Throughout this lecture/essay, Heidegger claims that the history of 
Being in the Western tradition has been defined by the manner in which the es gibt 
was understood. As a result of the dominance of subject-object metaphysics, the 
epoch of Ge-stell is the culmination of the manner in which “epochs overlap each 
other in their sequence so that the original sending of Being as presence is more 
and more obscured in different ways” (9). However, “[e]poch does not mean here 
a span of time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental characteristic of sending, 
the actual holding-back of itself in favour of the discernability of the gift” (ibid). 
The epoch of Ge-stell is not just the age or era defined by Ge-stell, but rather 
refers to the worlding of the world as the double concealing of Ge-stell. Ereignis, 
then, is not simply another word for Being, but is part of an attempt to move 
beyond the word Being altogether. The word Being arguably remains susceptible 
to metaphysical causal thinking, while Ereignis, with its multiplicity of meanings 
and connotations, speaks of the cor-respondence of Da-sein and Being, and thus 
de-centres the role of human being and a strictly instrumental-calculative 
interpretation of extant entities in their unconcealment. Naming Ereignis also 
reminds us that there is nothing static or fixed about Being. The infinitive “to be”, 
in Heideggerian terms, simply implies that “there is”, i.e. that existence is, rather 
than nothing. Ereignis is poiēsis in so much as there is always a bringing-forth, 
and what is brought-forth, what is given, obscures and hides the giving. Further, 
Ereignis, as I have maintained in regards to the problem of Being, always 
implicates human being. 
 
Ereignis and Authenticity 
Ereignis relates to authentic human being in that it names the mutual 
appropriation, belonging, or cor-respondence of Da-sein and Being. However, the 
more one attempts to categorise the various ontological structures of Da-sein, as in 
Being and Time, the more anthropocentric Heidegger’s thinking appears. This is 
reflected in the absence of any sustained exegesis on the structures and 
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characteristics of Da-sein in order to make sense of the giving of Being and the 
event of appropriation in the later Heidegger.17 Not only does such a treatment 
risk re-centring human being, thus reducing Heidegger’s project to a new way of 
describing the subject, it fails to emphasise the ethical and spiritual implications 
that follow from the belonging together of human being and Being. On one hand, 
it makes little sense to speak of Ereignis without emphasising the role of Da-sein; 
clearly Da-sein is integral to Ereignis, and each Da-sein is simultaneously a 
factical-ontic, embodied individual for whom being is a matter of care and 
concern. On the other hand, (over-)emphasising the role of Dasein in granting 
meaning and value risks conflating phenomenological in-the-worldness with 
humanist anthropology. Worse, it fails to acknowledge the limits and counters of 
human meaning and value: the earth and the gods, discussed at length in Chapter 
Five. In a certain sense, speaking of “meaning and value” is absurd in the absence 
of human being. Despite such absurdity, it does not follow that meaning and value 
is anthropocentric. An originary sense of Being recognises that authentic human 
being is a cor-respondence and is sensitive to the distinction between technē and 
challenging-forth, for example.  
 
It is correct, in the sense discussed in Chapter Two, to say that meaning and 
value—of a discourse, of an extant entity, of an ecosystem—only comes into 
being with Dasein (in the same sense that a gift requires a giver and giftee), but it 
does not follow from this that meaning and value is contingent on Dasein alone. 
Rather, Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is always a Being-with: the things of the 
earth call to human being in certain ways, interactions with other people drive 
Dasein in certain directions. Again, turning one’s attention to a tree already 
presupposes the tree and its inherent properties and characteristics; the tree always 
already has a decisive say in the matter. While it is correct that the cultural-
mythological, economic, and instrumental meaning and value that we attach to the 
tree exists only because of human activity, the truth of the tree is that it is already, 
in and of itself, an excess of meaning and value—it is all these things and more. 
Dasein can only invest meaning and value in the tree because of its appropriated 																																																								
17 The closest that the later Heidegger comes to a further exegesis on Dasein is the role of the 
mortal in the fourfold (2001, 148-149; 154-155; 176-180), discussed at length in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
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belonging together with the tree as tree. To emphasise the “human origin” of 
meaning and value risks a return to subject-object or subject-instrument 
metaphysics. 
 
Authentic human being entails the recognition of ek-sistent Da-sein as belonging 
to Being. This belonging, or cor-respondence, is Ereignis. Authentic human being 
is also an originary sense of Being; the sense of one’s belonging. Ereignis is the 
basis for the factical-ontic manifestation of authentic human being that Heidegger 
eventually calls poetic—in the sense of poiēsis—dwelling (a sustained discussion 
of dwelling can be found in Chapter Six). Poetic dwelling recognises that meaning 
and value is not contingent on human needs and desires, but reflects Da-sein’s 
belonging. While the everyday Dasein of Being and Time is always in-the-world, 
ek-sistent Da-sein is the always-full open region that, in authentic factical-ontic 
manifestation, reflects the belonging or cor-respondence of a finite mortal, on the 
earth, under the sky, before the gods. The fourfold, das Geviert,18 of gods, earth, 
sky, and mortals—discussed at length in Chapter Five—features strongly in 
Heidegger’s thought following the Bremen lecture period. The fourfold appear in 
the first of the 1949 Bremen Lectures titled ‘The Thing’ (published autonomously 
with the same title in 1950), and again most extensively in 1954’s ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’. I introduce the fourfold briefly here in order to make the 
significance and connection of Ereignis, Ge-stell, and authenticity clear, and to 
introduce the trajectory of the second half of the thesis.  
 
The fourfold can be interpreted as an attempt to articulate the component aspects 
of Ereignis, while simultaneously laying the groundwork for the existential-
ethical-spiritual matter of dwelling. Rather than an anthropological or Dasein-
centric reading of Being-in-the-world, the mortal of the fourfold is factically-
ontically here and now on the earth in the multiple senses of the actual 
environment and the ontological structures that shelter and counter the world. 
There is no world without Dasein, but, equally, there is no world without earth.19 																																																								
18 “Fourfold” is the English translation of das Geviert, which more literally means something like 
“the four-ing”. 
19 The relationship that Heidegger posits between earth and world is discussed at length in Chapter 
Five. 
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Similarly, Ereignis is a concept that makes the otherwise hidden “giving” of Being 
visible. In this process of making visible, Dasein is placed in a position of 
possibility, where the obligation to respond to what is made visible determines 
Dasein’s mode of being as authentic or inauthentic. For the mortal of the fourfold, 
the fifth essential phenomenon of modernity, the flight of the gods, becomes 
conspicuous. As such, Dasein is able to again place itself before the gods by 
“letting” the gods return. Discussed at length in Chapters Five and Six, Ereignis is 
more than the belonging of Da-sein to Being, but names the mutual 
appropriation—the mirroring—of the fourfold into a unitary whole, where the 
roles of the earth and the gods serve to remind us that regardless of the many and 
varied ontological structures of Da-sein, human being is never the sole arbiter, 
never the centre of Being. Authentic human being recognises the appropriation of 
human being, and the manner in which this appropriation limits and counters as 
well as constitutes and announces the human. 
 
As “the photographic negative” (Heidegger 2012c, 60) of Ereignis—a problematic 
characterisation in that it posits the two as binary opposites, rather than emphasise 
that the metaphor works only in specific relation to the (in)conspicuous alethic 
features of the two—Ge-stell is an ethical problem for Heidegger. Ge-stell first 
annihilates, and then prevents the emergence of, an originary sense of Being. Ge-
stell is a double concealing that makes itself invisible and restricts the possibility 
of a rupture in one’s everyday immersion in the tranquil inauthenticity of 
modernity. Characteristic of Ge-stell is the alienation of the human from the 
cosmos; reduced from constitutively in-the-world, to being in the world only in a 
physical, mediated sense. The danger and the plight of modernity refer to the 
double concealing of Ge-stell. Authentic human being counters and resists the 
danger, but this only happens in first recognising the danger for what it is. This 
recognition is characterised by thinking Ereignis, by adopting a comportment of 
letting through the fundamental attunement of releasement, and thereby sustaining 
an originary sense of Being. In sustaining this originary sense, we are able to 
engage in technē rather than exploitative challenging-forth where matters of 
production—of tangible things as well as art and language—are concerned. 
Dwelling is sensitive to the giving of Ereignis and manifests this sensibility by 
Chapter Four — Ereignis 	 140 
letting and facilitating poiēsis in general, rather than concealing or erasing Being 
through the violent narratives of Ge-stell. 
 
Dasein’s investedness, care (Sorge) and the ontological structures of Da-sein such 
as Being-in-the-world only make sense in terms of Da-sein’s mutually 
appropriative belonging to Being; the phenomenological distinction between an 
acoustic wave of energy and the sound of a bird in flight stem from such cor-
respondence. The sounds that one encounters are always already the barking of a 
dog, the crashing of waves, and so on, with an important exception. The exception 
is, again, the interruption or breakdown of the referential network—an 
unidentifiable “bump in the night”, for example. The interruption is the moment 
that Being irrupts into our everyday experience as dread20 (or fear, anxiety, 
boredom, or any fundamental attunement that announces the totality of beings, 
announces the world, makes Da-sein conspicuous). However, it is important to 
note that Ereignis names the belonging that is proper to ek-sistent Da-sein as the 
always-full open-region: appropriated and appropriating. One of the most 
significant insights of Heidegger’s thinking is not the question of whether or not 
Being presences via the human constitution of the clearing, or the reverse of this, 
but the notion that it is equally both of these things. 
 
 																																																								
20 As part of the Dasein analytic in Being and Time, Heidegger makes a number of distinctions 
between the various types of attunements that Dasein has as part of it’s phenomenological Being-
in-the-world. In his discussion of fear, Heidegger states “if…that which threatens has the character 
of something altogether unfamiliar, then fear becomes dread [Grauen]” (2008a, 182). The 
distinction here is that a bump in the night that is recognisable as the sound of a door closing or a 
cat knocking a garbage bin, while still able to elicit fear in certain ways, is different to an 
unidentifiable bump; a sound that is recognised as a bump that one cannot account for. While 
Heidegger makes important distinctions between fear and anxiety (2008a, 179-182, 228-235) and 
boredom (1995, 59-175), these modes of attunement share two important features for Heidegger’s 
broader project. First, they support the notion of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and thus demonstrate 
the significance of Heidegger’s ontic-ontological distinction by thinking human being beyond the 
ontic Western metaphysical tradition. Second, as constitutively in-the-world, these modes of 
attunement—in the language of the later Heidegger—demonstrate the manner in which human 
being is given over to Being, as ek-sistent Da-sein, as the mortal of the Fourfold. In conjunction 
with the notion of authenticity—that Being must somehow become conspicuous for each Dasein in 
order that ek-sistent Da-sein can recognise itself—articulating these modes of attunement makes 
Dasein visible. Heidegger states that attunement “not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and 
its submission to that world which is already disclosed with its own Being; it is itself the existential 
kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the ‘world’ and lets the ‘world’ 
‘matter’ to it…Phenomenological Interpretation must make it possible for Dasein to disclose 
things primordially; it must, as it were, let Dasein interpret itself” (2008a, 178-179). 
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Moving Forward 
In following the path offered in ‘Time and Being’, this chapter has tracked the 
development and articulation of Ereignis in relation to Da-sein, Ge-stell, and, 
finally the later writings on Ereignis itself. In following this path, a number of 
consistencies and important connections become clear. First, in light of Chapter 
Three, the discussion of Ereignis from Da-sein demonstrates that the notion of 
authenticity and the concept of Ereignis are structurally interwoven in Heidegger’s 
thought. While I emphasised ek-sistent Da-sein in the present chapter, and Da-sein 
as the always-full emptiness of the clearing in Chapter Three, the two are 
identical. As Heidegger’s thought developed towards the articulation of the giving 
of Being, what makes presence as such possible, his thinking of Dasein from 
Being and Time remained central to his thinking, essentially unchanged save for 
the emphasis. In the later writings, the multiple structures of Dasein were no 
longer a pedagogical demonstration of the fundamental ontological method, 
instead the basic structure of Da-sein as the clearing, implicating the emptiness, 
the uncleared horizon, the light that the clearing lets in, and what is lit up in the 
clearing, became the focus. From Being and Time on, authenticity, for Heidegger, 
is a mode of one’s being that is always concerned with understanding human 
being. Understanding human being requires an understanding of being in an ontic 
and ontological sense, and of Being more broadly as that which gives presence. 
Specifically, authentic human being is a mode of being that entails a deliberate, 
reflective factical-ontic manifestation of our ontological self as the clearing, 
appropriated by Being, letting beings be, and sustaining an originary sense of 
Being. An originary sense of Being is what distinguishes technē from challenging-
forth. It is mindful of truth as alētheia, and thus is aware of the distinction 
between correctness and truth: that an adequate correspondence between utterance 
and factical-ontic reality is revealed by a horizon, and that this horizon acts as a 
mode of disclosure that may either make itself conspicuous as a mode of 
disclosure or may further conceal its inherent self-concealing. 
 
Ge-stell is doubly self-concealing. First, it conceals itself naturally as with all 
alethic modes of disclosure: in the presence of the gift, the giving of the gift is 
taken for granted and remains unseen. However, as the culmination of two and a 
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half millennia of subject-object metaphysics, Ge-stell has framed modernity in 
such a way that anything that appears outside the jurisdiction of instrumental-
calculative is systemically devalued; considered not properly real or true. The 
pragmatic utility of this thinking—and due in no small part to the inherently 
masculinist and patriarchal foundations of the Western tradition, discussed in 
Chapter Six—facilitated the emergence of the scientistic prejudice in modernity. 
From this perspective, the metaphysical notion of Being and extant entities must 
be representable in terms of observable, measurable cause and effect. Further, 
from this metaphysical perspective, the basic formula of authentic human being 
remains the same as it does for Heidegger: a factical-ontical manifestation of 
human freedom. However, the metaphysical perspective is oblivious to the 
phenomenological-ontological shift from the willing subject to Da-sein. As such, 
Heidegger’s notion of a factical-ontic manifestation of the self as an open clearing, 
appropriated by Being, is distorted into a narrative of subjective self-construction, 
of willing the self to be. From this metaphysical position, the absence of any 
meaningful, objective yardstick means that there can be no properly ethical 
distinction between technē and challenging-forth, no recognition of the alethic 
possibilities of poetry, art, and language. As such, these ways of understanding the 
human belonging to Being are reduced to, and dismissed as, mere aesthetics.  
 
The notion of authenticity thus becomes re-framed—re-framed in the sense that 
Nietzsche’s Overman had already trod this ground; later traversed by Sartre—as 
merely a matter of willing the self to be whatever one chooses. Ostensibly the 
formula remains the same across Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Sartre: we reflect on 
our self and our situation, and in such reflection we come to realise we are free to 
choose, and with this realisation comes the obligation to choose (and it is largely 
the obligation that makes authenticity a matter of ethical and spiritual 
consideration, as I suggest in Chapter Three). Yet there is a world of difference 
between Heidegger’s notion of authenticity and that of Nietzsche and Sartre. 
While there are significant differences between the ways in which Nietzsche and 
Sartre develop, arrive at, and characterise the formula of authenticity, they remain 
broadly within the same framing of subject-object metaphysics. The central 
difference between the latter two thinkers and Heidegger’s conception of 
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authenticity is that Da-sein is only free in an ontological sense. Yet in order to 
even get this far, Dasein and the world must be made conspicuous to the 
individual somehow. Embodied, factical Dasein is always in-the-world, and the 
double concealing of Ge-stell presents freedom only as a matter of the will of the 
subject. In itself, as I will discuss further in Chapter Six, this concept does not 
account for gender, race, and other forms of systemic oppression that position 
human being within Ge-stell. While the subject, and, in particular, the will-to-
power driven Overman as subject par excellence, is free to choose, to will to step 
beyond social norms and to construct the self however he sees fit, Da-sein’s 
freedom is constitutively different. Da-sein is always ek-sistent, but always in cor-
respondence. 
 
Da-sein’s freedom is ek-sistence, but ek-sistence as freedom is always finite: it is 
a particular set of possibilities that offer the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, rather 
than the seemingly open slather of freedom available to the subject. This is not 
simply due to the fact the Da-sein is factically-ontically always in the world, 
always in its respective situation, with its own heritage and specific, local 
historicality, but, more significantly, Da-sein qua phenomenological Da-sein is 
not the centre and sole arbiter of meaning and value. As such, Da-sein does not 
just express its will to power, but is situated within a greater cor-respondence. 
While beings in their meaningful presence only come into meaningful presence 
through the clearing of Da-sein, this is a process of mutual appropriation. There is 
not first Da-sein, then the abstract stuff of the world that Da-sein evaluates and 
judges. How and what the stuff of the world is matters: there is no world without 
Dasein, but the world is always also sheltered by earth, not simply constructed by 
the subject. In the instrumental-calculative relation to the world, the willing 
subject can cut down an entire forest of trees, turn it into woodchip and then 
fabricate as many plywood canoes as he wants with no metaphysical or ethical 
implications. The truth of the world for the willing subject is standing reserve. In 
contrast, the truth of the world for Da-sein is always constituted by the 
appropriation of Ereignis in which the earth counters and limits the possibilities of 
human being. For Da-sein it is not simply that the tree itself has a decisive say as 
to whether it can be made into a canoe for the ontic reasons of its species, its 
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location, the shape of its trunk and so on, but that in the recognition of Da-sein as 
mutually appropriated with Being in Ereignis, that the tree is there (in the ontic-
ontological sense of earth and world) and has qualities of its own at all is of 
existential, ethical, and spiritual significance. As such, the factical-ontic 
manifestation of one’s Da-sein entails a shift in the role that the stuff of the world 
plays in constituting one’s factical-ontical self. The stuff of the world matters to 
human being as Da-sein in a way that it does not for the subject, and in reflecting 
on this each person is faced with a choice: to own one’s self as Da-sein or to 
withdraw into the narrative of the subject, to ironically lose our authentic self in 
gaining total metaphysical subjectivity, as fallen into the They. 
 
As authentic, one’s factical-ontic manifestation of ontological human being must 
honour Da-sein’s cor-respondence. Technē is an ethical mode of human bringing-
forth because it is a factical-ontic manifestation of the recognition that the stuff of 
the world constitutively matters to the mutually appropriated Da-sein within 
Ereignis. As I discuss in the next two chapters, the fourfold is designed to 
facilitate this recognition. As a referential network that recovers objects from the 
standing reserve, and restores their “thingly” status as things (discussed in Chapter 
Six), the fourfold is a configuration of the cor-respondence of human being. 
Ereignis names both a sustained happening in that it is the worlding of the world, 
but it also names the moments of interruption where Dasein is offered the 
possibility of seeing the world, of seeing a totality of beings as having been 
“given” or framed in a certain way. Ereignis is the functioning of Ge-stell, making 
sense of the claim that Ge-stell is the distorted essence of Being. Ereignis is the 
saving power of Ge-stell: as Ge-stell is made visible, so, too, Ereignis. 
 
Developing an account of Ereignis is significant for understanding the ethical and 
spiritual dimension in Heidegger’s thinking. It is not enough to beg the question 
and claim that Ge-stell’s violent and exploitative framing of the world as standing 
reserve is unethical due to its violence and exploitation. Instead, the ethical 
yardstick at play in Heidegger’s thinking is the notion of authenticity; what is 
proper to the cor-respondence of human being and Being. For Heidegger, poiēsis 
(including technē and physis), alētheia, and logos all refer back to the ethical-
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spiritual imperative that each person ought develop and sustain an originary sense 
of Being. The framing of Ge-stell stems from and perpetuates an inauthentic 
configuration of human being, a mis-appropriation of Da-sein’s Being-in-the-
world as a subject-object relation in which the primacy of the subject is valorised. 
Within subject-object metaphysics, human being never truly interrogates itself 
beyond the ontic, i.e. in terms of its belonging to the world and to Being itself. 
Instead, the internal logic of subject-object metaphysics facilitates anthropocentric 
hubris, where the stuff of the world—and, as I discuss further in Chapter Six, 
certain groups of people—is reduced to its instrumental-calculable value. From 
this position, other people and the environment are either important to me, or are 
important because they are like me: the subject can never truly overcome the 
problem of whether or not a thing can be inherently valuable or have intrinsic 
worth. Authentic Da-sein, however, must recognise the constitutive significance 
of things; not just for their factical-ontical utility, but also for the very fact that 
they exist at all. From the understanding of authentic human being that I have 
developed so far, Chapters Five and Six finalise and take stock of my account of 
Heidegger’s project. In the process of taking stock I refer to what I consider one of 
the most significant implications of Heidegger’s critique of technology and the 
lacuna in Heidegger’s thinking: the inherently gendered aspect of Ge-stell. While 
the application of Heidegger’s thinking to obvious examples such as the West’s 
seemingly inextricable immersion in machine technology, understanding the 
gendered nature of Ge-stell reveals the potential of Heidegger’s thinking to be far 
broader than the consideration of trees and canoes. Indeed, in the same way that 
modern forestry and agricultural machinery reveals the environment as standing 
reserve, the Internet, and everyday discourses that underpin political institutions, 
reveal the patriarchal framing of femininity.  
 
Chapter Five — the Gods 	
	
146 
Chapter Five — The Gods 
 
To repeat a poem or even to be able to recite it by heart does not yet mean being able to 
follow poetically the telling of the poetry (Heidegger 2014, 41). 
 
In Chapters Three and Four, I claimed that Heidegger’s critique of technology 
relates to authentic human being, and, as such, is of existential, ethical, and 
spiritual significance. Tracing the development of authenticity from anticipatory 
resoluteness through to releasement mirrors the development of Ereignis in 
Heidegger’s thinking. The link between Ereignis and authenticity, discussed in 
Chapter Four, contributes significantly to Heidegger’s de-centring of human 
being. The critical aspect of the critique of technology explores the ramifications 
of subject-object metaphysics taken to its extreme. The subject extends its domain 
over all things and reduces the stuff of the cosmos to standing reserve. Scientism 
pervades modern notions of truth, the quantitative becomes qualitative—corollary 
to Nietzsche’s will to power as its own self-contained yardstick—and human 
being becomes further alienated from its essence, its self, others, and the 
environment. The ethical-spiritual dimension of Heidegger’s thought, including 
the de-centring of human being, attempts to counter the framing of Ge-stell. From 
a de-centred position one is able to re-frame old problems in new ways, allowing 
the cor-respondence of human being and Being to reveal the cosmos (and our 
place within it) in a new light. But how is such a de-centring to be thought or 
achieved? 
 
In the present chapter I develop an account of the underpinnings of the fourfold of 
gods, mortals, earth and sky. In particular, I pay special attention to the earth and 
the gods. For Heidegger, the gods are integral to de-centring human being, and the 
fourfold offers a way to think Ereignis, and to understand authentic human being 
as dwelling: the focus of Chapter Six. Tracing the development of the gods 
throughout Heidegger’s thinking gives greater insight into the gods of the fourfold 
and, again, contributes to a hermeneutic reading of the thesis overall. Relying only 
on Heidegger’s thinking from 1949-1955 to develop an understanding of his 
thinking of the gods runs the risk of developing an incomplete, or unnecessarily 
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ambiguous account—a direct result of Heidegger’s own poetic ambiguity in 
discussing the gods in the later works. Heidegger first outlined many of the 
notions that are central to the gods of the fourfold in his 1933 lecture course 
published as Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” and later in 
Contributions. The gods of the fourfold, as with all four elements of the fourfold 
and Ereignis itself, represent a culmination of at least two decades of thinking. 
Interpreting the fourfold, and subsequently deploying the fourfold as a concept, 
from Insight into That Which Is, and its resultant essays including ‘The Thing’, 
‘The Question Concerning Technology’ and ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ thus 
requires understanding the origins and context of the fourfold, rather than 
attempting to understand the nuance of its final form from the aforementioned 
writings.  
 
Tracing the development of the earth is less difficult than the gods. However, the 
role of the earth is refined across Heidegger’s thinking, from its earlier role in 
‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ to its appearance in the fourfold. The earth and 
the gods share a similar function in the fourfold, and they both actively contribute 
to the de-centring of human being in Heidegger’s thinking. As forces that limit 
and counter human being, the gods and the earth are phenomenological-
ontological features that resist anthropocentric hubris. Throughout the remainder 
of the thesis I will demonstrate that, ultimately, the fourfold and the associated 
concept of dwelling, can act as a concept to interrupt one’s inauthentic tranquility. 
The fourfold, then, represents Heidegger’s most complete attempt to articulate 
how an originary sense of Being might be realised. In this sense, the fourfold is 
essential to understanding the ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thought. 
 
Hölderlin in the Mid 1930s: A Beginning Point 
Many of the notions expressed in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ stem directly 
from Heidegger’s earlier encounter with Hölderlin. For Heidegger, an encounter 
with poetry requires that one adopt a comportment of releasement: 
“[u]nderstanding the enigma, therefore, is not equivalent to solving it, but means 
precisely holding fast to that which is inexplicable and thus attaining a matter of 
authentic knowing” (2014, 225). In this brief passage Heidegger articulates a 
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significant distinction between “understanding” as a kind of letting (and thus an 
“authentic knowing”), and explanation as a kind of imposition; I introduced this 
idea briefly in the previous chapter. In the sense intended by Heidegger, 
“explanation” is a form of conceptual violence in that it does not let a 
phenomenon remain wholly what it is, but attempts to reduce it to familiar, 
definable terms. The distinction that Heidegger is trying to draw between 
understanding and explaining is akin to the difference between technē and 
challenging-forth. The implication here is that rather than allow for the alethic 
nature of interpretation—such as the relation between translation and 
interpretation in Being and Time, for example (2008a, 55)—explanation is 
considered to be an example of instrumental-calculative thinking operating outside 
its jurisdiction. For Heidegger, explanation loses its alethic quality in that it 
explains in an unequivocal sense. By contrast, Heidegger conveys the sense that 
understanding—especially understanding something that is outside the jurisdiction 
of instrumental-calculative thinking—allows something mysterious to retain its 
mystery. For Heidegger, one must understand and respect the unknowable as 
unknowable. This distinction may seem tenuous, but it is an important beginning 
point for interpreting the role of the gods in Heidegger’s thought, especially in 
relation to de-centring human being: not everything can, or should, be explained 
and reduced into anthropocentric instrumental-calculative terms. Indeed, resisting 
such a reduction is ethically and spiritually important. In terms of poetry—a form 
of bringing-forth, poiēsis—one must resist the anthropocentric, instrumental-
reduction of a poem, of all art, to something present-at-hand, as merely words on a 
page suitable only for aesthetic critique (where art as aesthetics is characteristic of 
modernity—see Chapter One). Instead, by understanding, Heidegger believes that 
one can allow (rather than impose upon) the poem to speak; one gives oneself 
over to the poem in a certain sense. How to make sense of such a nebulous 
concept? 
 
The thinking that underpins the fourfold is an explicit attempt to think outside the 
frame of subject-object metaphysics. As such, Heidegger grounds his thought on 
the self as ek-sistent Da-sein: the self as belonging to, in cor-respondence with, 
Being. What makes this particular era of Heidegger’s thought contentious is that 
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he offers a specific outline of what such cor-respondence might, or should, look 
like based on his own historical-factical situation. Despite this historical-factical 
specificity, the structural or phenomenological-ontological notions that he 
develops apply to Da-sein, human being, not just the Da-sein of twentieth century 
Germans. As such, “giving oneself over” to the poem means abandoning the 
assumption that poetry is merely a form of subjective expression and instead 
allowing the alethic nature of language to resonate with one’s Da-sein. For 
Heidegger, authentic human being must be realised in order that we might “yet 
stand in that domain in which poetry unfolds its power” (Heidegger 2014, 23). 
Note that this is not an empty valorisation of poetry, but a reference to an 
originary sense of Being: the domain that one must stand in. Through an originary 
sense of Being—recognising the self as Da-sein, the alethic nature of language 
and truth, aware of the distinction between technē and technology— poetry, and 
particularly Hölderlin’s poetry,1 can reveal the world in meaningful, non-
instrumental ways. In this sense, Heidegger’s encounter with Hölderlin was 
already influenced by his own response to subject-object metaphysics: while the 
subject imposes meaning and value, Da-sein is always phenomenologically in-the-
world, where the world is constituted by the stuff of the cosmos as much as it is 
human discourse. Da-sein qua Da-sein encounters the poem (or artwork) from a 
position of letting, thus—in the sense of poiēsis—the poem is always disclosive. 
An encounter with poetry requires that one recognise one’s authentic self as Da-
sein. The encounter requires that one factically-ontically manifest one’s 
ontological Da-sein in such a way as to facilitate the disclosive appropriation of 
the poem. As such, it is evident that Heidegger’s engagement with Hölderlin is 
intrinsically connected to authenticity, Ereignis, and the critique of technology in 
the sense that the third essential phenomenon of modernity, art as aesthetics, is a 
direct reference to this poetic engagement. 
 																																																								
1 The matter of Heidegger’s consideration of Hölderlin as the poet of poets, and of the specific 
relation of the German people to poetry and so forth is beyond the scope of this thesis. What 
Heidegger reveals through the writings of this period, and in the notion of dwelling in particular, is 
applicable beyond the specific historical Dasein of the German people. A close reading of these 
texts tells us as much in his own words. The fact that he used his historical position and the 
political turmoil of Germany at the time as exemplary for articulating his thinking through this 
period does not specifically restrict the deployment of this thinking to conservative, right-wing, 
fascist politics. 
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Prior to his development of the gods and the fourfold, Heidegger’s first 
exploration of Hölderlin’s poetry demonstrates the groundwork for establishing an 
originary sense of Being. Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, and his subsequent 
resurrection/recalling of the gods in the fourfold, is thus situated in an originary 
space where everyday Dasein must understand itself in terms of authentic Da-sein. 
This is an integral point for Heidegger’s thinking as a whole, and particularly in 
understanding his engagement with poetry. 
 
[I]t is not at all the fault of the poem that we no longer experience any power in it, but has 
something to do with us, with the fact that we have forfeited our ability to experience, and 
with the fact that our Dasein is entangled in everydayness that keeps it expelled from 
every domain in which art unfolds its power (Heidegger 2014, 22). 
 
Phenomenologically, the poem retains its disclosive power; it is the 
worlding/double concealing of Ge-stell that does not permit the poem to “unfold 
its power”. The tranquil inauthenticity of the technologically framed They blinds 
human being to its authentic Da-sein and prevents an originary sense of Being 
from emerging. This keeps Da-sein “expelled from every domain” except Ge-stell. 
By understanding the self as subject, and framing the world into an instrumental-
calculative subject-object metaphysical distinction, we have “forfeited our ability 
to experience” our cor-respondence with Being, our openness to alētheia. Only 
through the deliberate factical-ontic manifestation of one’s ontological self as Da-
sein, i.e. only by becoming authentic, can this be overcome. However, returning to 
Chapter Three, certain conditions are required in order to manifest authentic 
human being. Heidegger will come to suggest that the interruption of the everyday 
that facilitates authentic human being in Being and Time can be found in art also.  
 
The disclosive power of poetry is important to Heidegger’s development of the 
fourfold. The interruptive and alethic power of poetry is a foundation on which 
Heidegger’s thinking of the gods and the earth are developed. For Heidegger, 
“[p]oetry is a telling in the manner of a making manifest that points” (2014, 29). 
Despite the fact that a poem might be literal and explicit, Heidegger’s reading of 
Hölderlin leads him to conclude that the power of poetry is its capacity for 
allusion and intimation, conspicuously alethic modes of disclosure. The poem is 
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always connotative, containing a value judgment, or requiring an emotional—
more properly, spiritual—response. Again, for Heidegger, the significance of the 
poem is that it intimates or alludes rather than explicitly states. However, the 
“pointing” of the poem is only revealed to Da-sein, accessible only from an 
existential-meditative perspective. Importantly, the pointing is not simply an 
allusive gesture to be subjectively interpreted by each person, but is a pointing-
towards; while the intimation or allusion itself is always somewhat ambiguous, 
what is intimated or alluded to is always something specific in the sense of a finite 
number of possibilities. This pointing is what Heidegger would come to call the 
language of the gods. 
 
The poet harnesses the lightning flashes of the God, compelling them into the word, and 
places this lightning-charged word in the language of his people. The poet does not 
process the lived experiences of his psyche, but stands “under God’s thunderstorms” … 
When Hölderlin speaks of the “poet’s soul,” this does not refer to some rummaging 
around in the lived experience of one’s own psyche … Thunderstorms and lightning are 
the language of the gods, and the poet is the one who has to endure this language without 
shirking, to take hold of it (Heidegger 2014, 30). 
 
Just as some poems are explicitly literal rather than allusive in the sense described 
above, not everyone who composes a poem is an authentic poet.2 For Heidegger, 
the distinction lies in whether or not the poetry (or art in any form) reflects Da-
sein’s belonging to Being; but this in a particular manner. The figure of the poet is 
important to the development of the fourfold in that the poet is a figure 
characterised by releasement, rather than by the willing imposition of 
anthropocentric hubris. The poet does not express her mediated, subjective 																																																								
2 As with the work of Kant, the pre-Socratics, Nietzsche and so on, Heidegger’s encounter with 
poetry serves as a sounding board for his own thinking. In the same way that he does not have ‘an’ 
ethics Heidegger, does not have a theory of art or poetry as such. Rather, he appropriates various 
thinkers and concepts to demonstrate his recovery of the problem of Being. However, it is 
important to draw out the significant aspects of Heidegger’s reading of poetry without being 
seduced into an unnecessarily exclusive position over who is, and who is not, a poet. In exploring 
Heidegger’s thinking from the 1930s and early 1940s, Theodore Adorno’s warnings from The 
Jargon of Authenticity must be given a fair hearing. One must be careful to avoid the trap of 
powerful and emotive Heideggerian rhetoric when attempting to draw out the many ethically 
significant aspects of Heidegger’s thinking.  However, what Adorno condemns as a “diminished 
theological resonance” (1973, 5) in Heidegger must not be immediately dismissed as religious 
zealotry without a full and fair exploration of what such thinking can reveal. See Chapter Six for a 
discussion of the masculinist bias in Heidegger’s work that can lead to a mis-appropriation of 
authenticity as an exclusive or elitist model of human being. 
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experiences (in the sense of Erlebnis), but is a conduit that channels and brings-
forth the intimating-allusive language of the gods into a historical-factical 
manifestation. The lightning-charged words of the poet are intended to evoke an 
existential-meditative response, the poet reveals the world in a fashion that is 
unable to be understood by, or reduced to, an instrumental-calculative perspective. 
The bombastic imagery of the thunderstorm and the image of the lightning flash3 
refer to the Augenblick, the moment of insight, or a glimpse of the pointing of the 
gods. This is why the poet must stand “under God’s thunderstorms”; the poet must 
endure the maelstrom in much the same way that authentic Dasein in Being and 
Time must endure its own mortality and finitude. Indeed, the two concepts express 
essentially the same idea in that authentic Being-toward-death requires the same 
grim determination—and later a more gentle letting-be—to maintain a non-
subjective openness as the poet.4 Whether or not Heidegger considered himself a 
poet, it is clear that he considered the power of poetry to be its capacity to speak in 
an existential-meditative sense, evoking an impassioned existential, ethical, and 
spiritual urgency to counter the hubris of the subject.  
 
The intimating-alluding-pointing aspects of poetry, the thunderstorm and 
lightning, are further described by Heidegger as “beckonings … The gods simply 
beckon, however, in so far as they are” (Heidegger 2014, 31). Rather than 
interpret the pointing or telling of poetry as a simple corollary to the limiting of 
possibilities, beckoning summons each person to action, it calls to us in a way that 
is actively appropriating. In so far as the gods beckon, Heidegger declares that we 																																																								
3 Despite the political connotations associated with this era of Heidegger’s thought—and clearly 
these connotations are enough for many readers to dismiss or avoid Heidegger’s thinking in 
general—the German romantic connotations of the sturm und drang and the language of the gods 
also resonates with the timbre of Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling (2005) in which 
Abraham’s dilemma and the tension between the tragic hero and the knight of faith is explored, or 
The Sickness Unto Death where despair reveals the self as “the conscious synthesis of infinitude 
and finitude that relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself” (1983, 29). John D. Caputo 
contends that Kierkegaard’s influence on Heidegger, particularly Being and Time-era Heidegger, is 
significant (1987, 12; 1993a, 12, 17, 45, 47-48). Caputo himself writes in an impassioned timbre, 
as in Against Ethics, for example. To contextualise Heidegger’s thinking of this period exclusively 
through National Socialist politics is an erroneous reduction of the thinking itself, mistaking its 
potential for its contextual failings. 
4 See the section of Chapter Three titled “Gelassenheit” for a discussion concerning releasement, 
and footnote 15 in particular for a reference to Meister Eckhart’s notion of emptying one’s self for 
God. These notions apply to the poet and are potentially early formulations of releasement in 
Heidegger’s thinking. 
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must understand poetry, in the sense of alethic poiēsis, as “that which sustains 
from the ground up the configuration of the being of human being as a historical 
Dasein in the midst of beings as a whole” (34). For the historical Dasein of 
modernity, the existential-meditative possibilities of our cor-respondence with 
Being are lost, and “beings as a whole” are instrumentally-calculably reduced to 
standing reserve. As a manifestation of the beckoning of the gods, the human 
understanding of poetry reveals the worlding of the world. The gods, then, play an 
integral role in Ereignis (appropriation), and particularly the poetic-linguistic 
manner in which this occurs.5 As discussed in Chapters One and Two, modernity 
is characterised by the flight or withdrawal of the gods. As such, the flight or 
withdrawal of the gods is an integral part of the critique of technology; only in the 
absence of the gods can Ge-stell hold sway.  
 
Heidegger establishes his approach to poetry and the gods largely throughout Part 
One of Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”. His approach, often 
couched in familiar terms and thoughts from Being and Time, includes the attempt 
to awaken the fundamental attunement of “holy mourning” (2014, 79). Holy 
mourning  
 
places us at once before the fleeing, the remaining absent, and the arriving of the gods … 
Insofar as the gods thoroughly govern historical Dasein and beings as a whole, however, 
the attunement at the same time … transports us specifically into those relations that have 
evolved toward the Earth, the countryside, and the homeland (123).  
 
For Heidegger, holy mourning, as with anxiety, boredom, and releasement, makes 
the human relation to “beings as a whole” conspicuous. Such conspicuity, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, is a necessary condition for authentic human being. In 																																																								
5 While I do not extensively address Heidegger’s analysis of language in this thesis, many aspects 
of this thinking are covered due to the singular continuity of Heidegger’s thought. Throughout 
Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”, his reflections on language are developed and 
remain consistent throughout the remainder of his published work. Here, he equates language and 
“world” (2014, 58) building further on notions that he had explored in The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics. Further, in the former text, Heidegger declares that humans do not have language, 
but rather the reverse (2014, 24), stating that “[w]e are a dialogue…We are an event of language” 
(63). Heidegger’s engagement with poetry is ultimately concerned with his development of 
Ereignis and authenticity as the counter to Ge-stell, and this engagement necessarily includes the 
idea that poetising, as an essentially linguistic endeavour, shapes our historical relation to Being. 
Poetising is an essential aspect of existential-meditative thinking. 
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the modern technological age, the gods “govern” in that they are withdrawn. As 
such, holy mourning makes Dasein’s connection to earth, countryside,6 and 
homeland visible. The homeland is not an explicitly historical-ontic geographical 
reference—although it does contain this element for each factical-ontic Dasein—
but is an ontological reference to “the power of the Earth” (Heidegger 2014, 80). 
The homeland is where one feels a sense of belonging, where one knows one’s 
self as Da-sein: while this may happen in a specific geographical location, the 
sense of belonging is not actually to the location, but to Being itself, the location 
becomes important by association. “In the Earth’s becoming homeland, it opens 
itself to the power of the gods” (96), yet this “becoming homeland” is 
characterised by “nurturing” (95). Only through nurturing—and here I paraphrase 
to demonstrate the continuity of Heidegger’s thought and to develop my own 
argument—as a kind of letting akin to releasement, and through holy mourning as 
a kind of existential-meditative thinking, can one preserve earth7 and the sense of 
belonging that is proper to a homeland. The originary sense of Being that a 
homeland can facilitate counters the instrumental-calculative understanding of 
such as “a mere place of residence … which accordingly goes hand in hand with 
the advent of godlessness” (95). The earth, synonymous throughout this lecture 
series with the earth of the artwork, is the grounds of de-centred human being, but, 
equally, is an “abyss” (96) of human being. The earth, “the holy one, who is 
Mother of all” (96) is not of the gods, it does not beckon, but simply is in a brute 
sense. A brief turn to the artwork essay will assist me here. 
 
Earth and World as Ereignis  
In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, the earth re-appears in Heidegger’s thinking. 
While it is no longer described with Hölderlin’s language—as holy and 
maternal—it essentially retains these same functions with some minor shifts. The 																																																								
6 While Heidegger discusses the earth and the homeland in detail, the notion of the countryside 
from this passage does not receive an extended treatment. The term appears to be reserved largely 
for specific ontic markers (such as rivers), given that Earth and homeland are ontological in nature. 
Despite the contextual political connotations of ‘the homeland’, its use here is unavoidable. See 
Chapter Eight for a discussion of the importance of understanding the home and homeland outside 
a masculinist and political setting. 
7 While Earth is capitalised throughout Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”, this 
convention is not followed in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, nor later where the earth appears as 
part of the fourfold. I will continue to use a lower case ‘e’ with the exception of direct quotes or in 
stressing a point. 
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role of the earth in the artwork essay, touched on in Chapter Four, demonstrates 
how Heidegger was able to frame the earth as grounds and abyss, a counterpart to 
the gods in the fourfold. The world is the horizon of intelligibility, the set of social 
practices, meanings, values, and so on that each of us is thrown into. The worlding 
of world is the giving, the unconcealing that is brought forth from the 
appropriation of Ereignis. Similarly, the world is the prevailing historical human 
relationship to Being, demonstrated most clearly in language, the logos of an age. 
The worlding of the contemporary world is Ge-stell, the logos of technology. The 
entanglement of Da-sein and the world is always also founded on the earth. 
 
The earth has multiple meanings in Heidegger’s thinking, both factical-ontical and 
ontological. However, the multivalence of the earth itself constitutes a specific 
function.8 As the ontic material stuff of the cosmos, the earth becomes both 
grounds and abyss in an ontological sense. The manner in which the tree has a 
decisive say in whether or not it is suitable to produce a canoe is the grounding of 
the earth. That the tree has properties and characteristics that predetermine its 
possibilities for Da-sein is the ontological happening of the earth: the earthing of 
the earth. Heidegger states that the word earth “is not to be associated with the 
idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical 
idea of a planet” (2008c, 168), yet in terms of de-centring the human, these ontic 
notions of the earth are always implicated. The material things of the earth contain 
a finite number of possibilities and meanings. This finitude is both a ground in the 
sense that it facilitates a number of specific possibilities, and an abyss in the sense 
that by carrying multiple possibilities it is still not any kind of single, objective, 
and universal truth. The earth is ontological—as the world worlds, the earth 
earths—yet it always simultaneously implicates a factical-ontic phenomenon;9 this 																																																								
8 See Michel Haar’s The Song of the Earth for a possible interpretation of the many meanings and 
implications of the earth in Heidegger’s thinking. Haar’s characterisation is consistent with, 
although broader and more detailed than, my own and further demonstrates Heidegger’s poetic 
thinking of the earth as connected to the maternal homeland—specifically in contrast to the 
paternal fatherland (Haar 1993, 142)—as well as a way to understand the factical-ontic properties 
and implications of a specific environment. Haar’s discussion of dwelling and the implications of 
Heidegger’s sustained encounter with Hölderlin also provides further evidence to support the 
notion that this period of Heidegger’s thinking contains far more potential for ethical and political 
thinking than the conservative right-wing implications that became bound up in it. 
9 In his ‘Race and Earth in Heidegger’s Thinking During the Late 1930s’, Robert Bernasconi, 
drawing from Michel Haar’s The Song of the Earth, also gestures towards the multiple aspects of 
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is no different from the ontic-ontological ourobros that Heidegger’s thinking 
reveals, where resoluteness is only found in a resolution, authenticity is only 
possible as an actual factical-ontic manifestation, and so on. 
 
As grounds and abyss, the earth “occurs essentially as the sheltering agent” 
(Heidegger 2008c, 168). In the spontaneous self emerging of physis, the earth is 
that which shelters and preserves the spontaneous self-emerging and that which 
comes into and out of being, through its waxing and waning. Again, this can be 
thought in terms of its ontological function and its factical-ontic manifestation; the 
earth is both the seed that grows into the tree that then ages and dies, as well as the 
properties and possibilities that the seed contains within itself. Earth is 
“irreducibly spontaneous, is effortless and untiring” (171-172) in that it is an 
aspect of Ereignis that acts as an origin of sorts, be it ground or abyss. The origin, 
as stated in Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “the Rhine”, is that which 
precedes a commencement, in its springing-forth. Whatever remains-in-having-
sprung-forth is always in some way faithful to its origin (Heidegger 2014, 3-5). As 
with the gods, the ontological earthing of the earth is beyond calculation yet 
provides a finite number of possibilities. While limiting possibilities is a kind of 
pointing, the earth does not point, beckon or intimate the possibilities that it 
contains in the same way that the gods do; rather, earth simply earths in its 
impassivity. The following passage from ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ conveys 
this idea: 
  
Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it … destruction may herald itself under the 
appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of technical-scientific objectivation of 
nature … The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and 
preserved as that which is essentially undisclosable (Heidegger 2008c, 172). 
 																																																																																																																																																								
the earth in Heidegger’s thinking, supporting the notion that it plays an ontological role that cannot 
be thought as somehow abstracted or in isolation from either the history of a people, or of their 
ontological homeland. As I shall discuss further in the body of the present chapter, while the earth 
alone does not define any kind of essence—race, for example—in terms of blood and soil, the 
notions of blood and soil are an aspect of the earth in terms of finitude; ontic aspects of ontological 
historicity. As shall become clear, attempting to define the earth in isolation from the fourfold is a 
slippery endeavour. In the same manner that Ge-stell and Ereignis make sense of one another in 
their essential sameness, the earth must come to be understood within the mirroring of the fourfold 
once the earlier and more primordial discussion of the strife with the world has been explored.  
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Opening this passage, and setting the tone for this discussion of the earth, 
Heidegger makes clear that in its ontological aspect, the earth resists instrumental-
calculative thinking. Reducing the earth only to materiality as a kind of 
instrumental-calculable present-at-hand material object—“the appearance of 
mastery”—is an act of violence that misses what is essential to the earth. The earth 
is thus concealed and reveals itself only as undisclosability, as that which is an 
origin, a grounds or an abyss, but that itself remains hidden. With regards to the 
distinction discussed above, we can existentially-meditatively “understand” the 
earth in its undisclosability, but we cannot “explain” it in instrumental-calculative 
terms. In explaining the earth we risk losing its essence and seeing only material 
stuff.  
 
 All things of earth, and the earth itself as a whole, flow together into a reciprocal 
 Accord … Here there flows the bordering stream, restful within itself, which delimits
 everything present in its presencing. (Heidegger 2008c, 172). 
 
In “reciprocal accord” the unitary phenomenon of earth can again be understood 
as the ground—the limits and possibilities—upon which the world is founded. The 
unitary phenomenon of the earth is not isolated from other ontological 
phenomena, but is an aspect of Ereignis. The “bordering stream” here is possibly a 
reference back to Hölderlin to demonstrate the ontic-ontological happening of 
earth. A major river such as the Rhine, as I discuss below, defines a locale in 
terms of gathering the surrounding landscape and the human relation to the 
landscape, giving the locale a particular sense of place rather than mere co-
ordinates on a map. The river is of the earth in the ontic sense, yet also 
ontologically acts as an origin that continues to shelter that which springs forth: 
the two sides of the bank are sustained in their “bankness” or their 
“Eastness/Westness” through the grounding of the river. 
 
Heidegger’s account of the earth is more specific in ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’ than in his writings on Hölderlin in one important sense: it exists in tension, 
in “strife” (Heidegger 2008c, 174) with the already-familiar notion of world. “The 
world grounds itself on earth, and earth juts through the world” (174). As an 
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origin, as the grounds and abyss of world, including in the ontic sense—i.e. that a 
specific mountain range (or a river) takes on a series of meanings within the 
world—the ontic-ontological earth remains the phenomenological grounds and 
origin as well as limits (abyss) of said meanings. Earth juts through world in that it 
resists and counters the attempts to know it—to exploit or oppress it—in an 
instrumental-calculative sense. Ge-stell frames the human relation to being in an 
instrumental-calculative manner, but where this relation is interrupted, or where 
instrumental-calculative thinking fails to achieve its goal due to the inadequacy of 
machine or calculation, the earth is earthing. The gods limit meaning and value 
through pointing and beckoning, where the earth limits tangible possibilities. As 
will be discussed below, it is impossible to completely separate out the gods from 
earth, but where a tree resists being made into a canoe due to its shape, its species, 
its accessibility, this is the limiting of the earth. Where the tree is physically 
suitable to be made into a canoe but doing so would have other implications 
(perhaps the tree is important for shade, or as a prolific seed tree, for example), the 
gods are beckoning. The strife of earth and world is an early twofold formulation 
of Ereignis and an important forerunner of the fourfold. 
 
The strife of earth and world is also described as “counterplay” (Heidegger 2008c, 
181); a gentler, less aggressive characterisation of this twofold, and one that 
gestures towards the “cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing” (2008b, 
106) with which the fourfold is described. The counterplay of earth and world is 
Ereignis in the sense of alētheia, unconcealment: truth.10 Thus, as sheltering and 
																																																								
10 See Chapter One, footnote 52 for a discussion of Thomas Sheehan’s insistence that Heidegger 
should never have attempted to re-define the notion of ‘truth’ in terms of unconcealment. To 
expand on the former note, Sheehan claims that Heidegger was concerned with the unconcealment 
of meaningful presence, and that to apply this notion to truth is ambiguous and unproductive. 
However, were one to remove truth from Heidegger’s thinking of unconcealment, much of 
Heidegger’s emphasis on the importance of language for world and for Dasein would be lessened. 
This is particularly significant when taking into account how language defines our historical 
relationship to Being and thus to the world and one another. Understanding truth as a kind of 
context-specific (in terms of earth and world) revealing is integral in identifying systemic bias and 
oppression. The way in which “meaningful presence” plays out in the average everyday is as truth 
in a definitional and existential sense. For example, the denial of racism, misogyny or homophobia 
from a person using derogatory racial or gendered terms in their everyday vocabulary is based on 
their lack of awareness of the claim that language has on human being; that language defines our 
relations and reveals truths. I may not identify myself as committing a biased or hateful act by 
jokingly using an offensive term for a homosexual man, but in doing so I linguistically reinforce 
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preserving in terms of an origin (grounds/abyss), the inherently limiting and 
countering aspect of earth always determines, at some level, both how world 
worlds, and what is unconcealed in such a worlding. “In essential strife … the 
opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their essential nature” (174); 
earth and world are thus an early expression of Ereignis, and represent a twofold 
thinking that articulates the mechanisms of appropriation. The essential strife or 
counterplay is later described as mirroring or ring-play (Gering) and is “essential” 
in that it is the processual happening of the earth-world twofold that constitutes 
the existence of these structures. Echoing the multiple but unitary structures of 
Dasein from Being and Time, this transitional and exploratory writing 
demonstrates the continuity in Heidegger’s thinking in terms of the happening of 
Being and the manner in which there is a constant tension or counterplay of the 
ontic-ontological distinction manifest in the ouoboros of authenticity. As I have 
demonstrated, an account of Ge-stell is enriched through an understanding of the 
five essential phenomena of modernity, and the same holds true in terms of 
developing a genealogical account of Ereignis, dwelling and the fourfold. 
 
Hölderlin in the Mid 1930s: Mortals, Demigods, Gods 
The earth of the artwork essay is Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s earth. 
Hölderlin’s earth is holy, outside instrumental-calculative reduction. The earth is 
not holy in a formal, religious sense, but is properly an object of reverence due to 
its laying outside instrumental-calculative reduction. The thunderstorm is the 
language of the gods, but is also of the earth. The gods and the earth remain 
hidden, and yet the poet must endure the thunderstorm to bring this language into 
the realm of humans. The gods intimate, they beckon:11 this beckoning is not 
merely establishing meaning and value, but is a calling of sorts, a call to an 
																																																																																																																																																								
hetero-normative masculinity at a broader, systemic level, despite how I, as a supposedly sovereign 
subject, identify my motivations. 
11 Mitchell describes the gods as “messengerial” (2015, 171). Mitchell’s account further 
demonstrates the belonging-together of the fourfold  (as Ereignis) by providing an example similar 
to my own gift-giver-giftee analogy in Chapter Four: “[t]he message … cannot be given without 
maintaining a relation to the donor, it cannot be received without establishing one with the 
recipient. Neither can fully ‘own’ the message” (186), the gods point and beckon to meaning in a 
way that demonstrates that meaning does not stem solely from human being.  
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originary sensibility.12 The earth, however, does not beckon. The earth shelters 
and preserves that which has sprung forth. The earth is an origin, and, as an origin, 
earth is one aspect, one fold of physis, of the giving of Being. It is holy in the 
sense that it is properly beyond instrumental-calculative thinking, beyond the 
average everyday of human kenning. In reducing the earth to its technological 
instrumental-calculability, one remains oblivious to its essential undisclosability, 
thus losing grasp of its essential nature as grounds and abyss.  
 
Part Two of Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” builds on the 
preparatory aspect of Part One. Having established the significance of poetry in 
terms of the human relationship to Being through holy mourning, Heidegger 
attempts to further untangle how we can understand the “special mission” (2014, 
18) of letting the gods emerge. Here Heidegger works towards another early 
thinking of the fourfold through the distinction of gods, demigods, and mortals. As 
with the earth and the world of the artwork, the distinctions between these three 
serves to demonstrate their “originary belonging together” (168); as different and 
distinct they each raise the others into their respective essence. Heidegger 
interprets demigods as an aspect of the limiting and countering of phenomena, but 
also as containing an element of the pointing-intimating of the gods. “[D]estiny is 
the beyng of the demigods” (159) in so far as destiny is not a pre-determined fate 
or inexorable cause-and-effect, but “an apportioning and determining that sets 
limits” (158). Ontologically, a demigod is more than human, but less than a god, 
yet the destiny that is the demigod speaks to both gods and humans and 
corresponds to their essence. The being of demigods  
 
is in itself an intimating directedness towards the gods themselves; yet at the same time, 
in the direction of the human being, they are the incitement of human beyng, an 
incitement in which and through which human beyng is first awakened to its impassioned 
character and placed into the possibilities that provide a measure (Heidegger 2014, 165-
166). 
																																																								
12 While beyond the scope of the present thesis, I would argue that the ontological function of the 
calling of the gods can be traced back to the call of conscience and the importance of guilt as an 
ontological structure of Dasein in Being and Time. Certainly Caputo finds a link between the early 
and later Heidegger’s thinking in terms of the influence of Kierkegaard on the German thinker. 
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As the being of demigods, destiny stands between, and calls to both, humans and 
gods. Destiny directs Dasein to realise an originary sensibility as a call to 
authenticity—where one’s “impassioned character”, one’s spirituality, is the 
recognition of Dasein’s foundational ontological structure of care and 
investedness in one’s own being; the recognition that things matter—but to 
become sensitive to the beckoning of the gods from within such a sensibility. A 
river, then, can be a demigod in that it  
 
creates paths and limits on the originally pathless Earth. Since the flight of the gods, the 
Earth has been pathless. The human being cannot find the way, nor do the gods point the 
way directly. Yet in the rushing, self-assured course of the river a destiny fulfills itself, 
land and Earth are given limits and shape, and the homeland comes into being for humans 
(Heidegger 2014, 204). 
 
The limits set by the river create a sense of locale, an ontic-ontological homeland. 
Calculable co-ordinates in space are revealed as a vibrant, meaningful place; a 
place that speaks to Dasein that unfolds one’s own historical Da-sein to one’s self. 
But further, the meaning and value of such a homeland, and the limits of the 
demigod (as destiny, not simply the brute limit as of the earth), also unfold a 
meaning of the homeland and Da-sein that “beckons”, that calls Dasein to an 
originary sensibility beyond the average everyday entrenchment in instrumental-
calculative thinking. 
 
Earth, demigods, and gods share the characteristic of limiting, resisting, or 
countering, each in their own way. The earth is hidden and secluded, yet is an 
origin that shelters and preserves the world. The be-ing/beyng of demigods is 
destiny, a concept tied to origin in that the commencement that comes from the 
origin is guided by destiny. Finally, the gods rage in the thunderstorm; intimating, 
directing, beckoning, acting as a kind of counter or limit to anthropocentric hubris. 
The notions of limit and counter, particularly in relation to the gods, are spoken of 
further in the posthumously published exploratory writings of Contributions and 
The Event. Limits and counters to human being, primarily in the form of gods and 
earth, are central to my account of Heidegger’s work and how it can be put to 
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work. I will return to limits and counters in the discussion below. The functional 
role of the demigods is essential to Heidegger’s development of the fourfold a 
description of Ereignis: “[i]n this poetizing of the beyng of the demigods—that is, 
of the middle of beyng, between gods and humans—beyng as a whole must unveil 
itself to us” (Heidegger 2014, 216).  The “middle of beyng” is definitive of the 
problem of Being for Heidegger as it is the ground from which “beings as a 
whole—gods, humans, Earth—are to open themselves up anew” (167). The 
middle of beyng reveals the essence of gods and humans in the manner that the 
beyng of demigods itself plays out: where there is simply a mass of spatial co-
ordinates for instrumental-calculative thinking, the springing-forth of the river, the 
demigod, brings the power of the earth to humans as a homeland and sustains 
itself in the now existentially particular place that it is. The springing forth, 
essentially synonymous with Being, with physis and so forth, is of particular 
importance. Part Two of Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” 
partially concludes with an exploration of springing forth via the notion of an 
extant entity that remains present in its having sprung forth. It is here that the 
notions of gods and earth begin to transform into what will later be thought of as 
the fourfold of Ereignis. 
 
The Fourfold of Springing Forth 
Perhaps the most obvious13 prototype of the fourfold of Ereignis is Heidegger’s 
attempt to articulate the mechanisms that underpin the occurrence of a 
phenomenon or event. A phenomenon has two specific characteristics: (a) 
springing-forth and (b) “the manner in which its having sprung forth remains” 
(Heidegger 2014, 222). These two characteristics are in constant tension and echo 
the relationship of earth and world, yet they are not in themselves part of the 
fourfold structure. Rather, (a) and (b) are each separately underpinned by a dual or 
twofold structure of their own. As such, in understanding a phenomenon in terms 
of these two characteristics, a fourfold emerges.  
																																																								
13 Graham Harman claims that a forerunner of the fourfold is present in Heidegger’s tool analysis 
of Being and Time, and that, in fact, Heidegger’s most effective analysis of a fourfold (akin to 
Harman’s project of object oriented ontology) is found in the 1919 Freiburg Lecture course 
(Harman 2002, 7-9; Harman 2011, 36). I contrast my account of the fourfold with Harman’s in 
Chapter Six. 
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The pure origin is not that which simply releases something other from itself and 
abandons it to itself, but [is] rather that commencement whose power constantly leaps 
over what has sprung forth, outlasts it in leaping ahead of it, and is thus present in the 
grounding of that which remains … in other words, is authentically the destination 
(Heidegger 2014, 219). 
 
The origin and commencement, then, “constitutes the unity of beyng” (219) in as 
much as the tension between characteristics (a) and (b) of a phenomenon also 
sustains the phenomenon in its having sprung forth at all. As stated above, each of 
the two characteristics are underpinned by their own twofold structure. The 
ontological structures of origin and commencement form the “pure origin” that is 
constitutive of characteristic (a), springing-forth. The twofold structure that 
underpins the pure origin are “birth” (which later becomes simply earth) and “ray 
of light” (the forerunner of gods). The connection between earth and birth is a 
clear reference to holy “Mother Earth” (220). The earth is the grounds and abyss 
that facilitate the brute springing forth of a phenomenon, while it (the earth) 
remains concealed; the earth is “the enveloping closure of the womb” (ibid). Yet 
the pure origin is more than just birth. Springing-forth is always the springing-
forth of something. The gods determine the specific nature of this ‘something’: in 
the pure origin the earth (birth) is always accompanied by “the Thunderer (Zeus)” 
(219). In the transformation from Hölderlin’s poem to Heidegger’s proto-fourfold, 
the Thunderer becomes the more generic “ray of light” (220).  
 
The ray of light refers to both the lightning flashes of the storm—the language of 
the gods—but also the more obvious metaphor of the clearing, of something lit up 
as something.  
 
In the ray of light, that which springs forth receives the possibility of the illuminating look 
— that is, of that look into the essence in which the excessive fullness of a great willing 
presses toward the emergence of figure. Figure, however, is both inner delimitation 
bringing itself to a stand and entry into the dark, into which it closes itself off … what is 
dark, by contrast, itself does not lose its unfettered character in the configuring light of 
delimitation, but lets it become conspicuous (220-221). 
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The pure origin, as the unity of origin and commencement, contains the earth as 
birth (brute coming into being), and the gods as coming into being as something in 
particular, something delimited and differentiated. The “entry into the dark” is the 
notion that the figure contains itself as figure, but that such containing-itself is 
also a function of its excess remaining in the undisclosed darkness. As with 
famous images from Gestalt psychology—such as the white vase on the black 
background, or two black faces in profile on a white background—it is the 
background, the horizon that remains “the dark”. While the twofold of birth and 
ray of light underpins characteristic (a), the springing-forth of a phenomenon or 
happening of an event, “need and discipline” (222) form the ontological twofold 
that underpin characteristic (b), remaining-in-having-sprung-forth. 
 
Rather than thinking of need and discipline (or birth and ray of light) as causal 
mechanisms in a metaphysical sense, these twofold structures are appropriative. 
This ontological appropriation has ramifications for existential-meditative 
thinking, and in reconfiguring how we, as humans, relate to ourselves, and to 
existence in general. “Need”, therefore, refers to an ongoing moment of 
(in)decision; each phenomenon is sustained in its need, which is in turn driven 
by—and therefore perpetually in tension with—the twofold of the pure origin of 
springing-forth. Need contains “compulsion, constraint, impossibility of escape, 
and constriction” (ibid), which are inherent in the remaining-in-having-sprung-
forth and in the remaining-in-having-spring forth. Need calls for a response from 
the phenomenon. Need represents the inexorable fidelity that a phenomenon in its 
remaining-in-having-sprung-forth must demonstrate to its pure origin in 
springing-forth. The fidelity, however, does not mean simple coherence, but rather 
an ongoing response to the origin.  
 
The second ontological feature of point (b), remaining-in-having-sprung-forth, 
and the counterpart to need is “discipline”. Discipline is the happening of a 
phenomenon responding to its need, and thus remaining in tension—whether in 
coherence or resistance—with the origin. Discipline is articulated as “an inner 
harnessing and binding” (ibid), and exists in the twin sense that “we comprehend 
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need as outer discipline, and discipline as inner need, where ‘outer’ refers to that 
which is without freedom and untethered, and ‘inner’ to that which is free and 
proves binding” (ibid). Discipline as inner need represents the resolute decision to 
remain faithful to the forces of the pure origin in remaining-in-having-sprung-
forth. Remaining faithful to these forces means responding to them in some way 
whether rejection, acceptance, or modification. While underpinning the fourfold, 
this kind of thinking is familiar in that it echoes Heidegger’s discussion of 
anticipatory resoluteness and the manner in which each Dasein must respond to its 
own historical-factical-ontic situation. 
 
Each four of these forces—birth, ray of light, need, and discipline—interact in the 
middle of beyng as a unity, each with its own peculiar harmonious tension with 
the others. However, there remain a number of ambiguities and problems with this 
model of the fourfold, indeed with Heidegger’s thinking in this particular text 
overall. Chiefly, there is the problem of causality and effect, two concepts that 
remain at play throughout Heidegger’s exploration of Hölderlin’s poetry, yet are 
an aspect of metaphysical thinking that Heidegger generally attempts to avoid. It 
is perhaps reasonable to claim that through this version of the fourfold, Heidegger 
was more intent on reading and extrapolating Hölderlin rather than refining and 
sculpting his own thinking. Based on the textual analysis above, as well as the 
themes covered in Heidegger’s posthumously published exploratory writings, it 
seems difficult—perhaps unnecessary—to attempt to delimit where Heidegger’s 
reading of Hölderlin ends and his own thinking begins. What is evident in 
Heidegger’s thinking of the middle of beyng, the demigod, gods, and humans 
throughout Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” is that the cor-
respondence of Da-sein and Being demonstrates a phenomenological de-centring 
human being. Once Being-in-the-world is understood in a constitutive sense, and 
measured against the yardstick of authentic ek-sistence and an originary sense of 
Being, the technological and anthropocentric hubris characteristic of modernity 
can be countered. In such countering, the possibility of dwelling is realised. 
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The Countering 
In the above discussion I have provided examples from Hölderlin’s Hymns 
“Germania” and “The Rhine” and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in order to 
demonstrate Heidegger’s characterisation of the phenomenological-ontological 
beckoning, limiting, and countering of the gods and the earth. Such limiting and 
countering is essential to interpreting the ethical-spiritual significance of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological de-centring of human being. The ethical 
significance of this shift has already been gestured towards: “the holy” is 
characteristic of that which lies outside instrumental-calculative thinking and is 
thus worthy of reverence. Reverence for that which limits and counters human 
being, and thus de-centres human being will become increasingly important in the 
remaining chapters of the thesis, where terms such as ‘reverence’ and ‘spirituality’ 
will be used more extensively in relation to the ethical dimension of Heidegger’s 
thought. Moving beyond the first Hölderlin lecture series, Heidegger’s notion of 
countering appears extensively throughout exploratory writings such as 
Contributions, Mindfulness, The Event and Conversations on a Country Path. In 
Contributions in particular, the gods receive an extended treatment, with a 
particular emphasis on the “Last God” (Heidegger 2012b, 319).14 
 
The gods are properly beyond instrumental-calculative thinking. In this sense, the 
gods and their beckonings remain undecidable in that they are beyond a fixed and 
singular interpretation. The gods represent a moment of indecision between the 
																																																								
14 Richard Polt points out that the gods in Contributions are “even more cryptic than the rest of the 
book” (2006, 203). Polt attempts to make sense of the gods “not as a present-indicative theory of 
the divine but as a future-subjunctive evocation of an event” (204). Polt attributes “existential 
possibilities” (208) to the gods, supporting my contention that the gods are a kind of limit or 
counter to human being in the same sense that the earth in the artwork essay represents a limit of 
the world. Sheltering is also a countering, in a non-causal sense; that which shelters and makes 
space, also only makes “so much” space. The sheltering and the countering are the same process. 
This claim holds true throughout Heidegger’s thought. Think, for example, of the notion that 
human being as Da-sein is the shepherd of being. Contained within this thought is the recognition 
that the shepherd both shelters and provides conditions for the flock, but also determines how the 
flock congregates, travels, rests and so forth. To shelter is also to counter, to “raise each other into 
the self-assertion of their essential natures” (Heidegger 2008c, 174). Heidegger explicitly lays this 
thought out in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ where he says “A boundary is not that at which 
something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins 
its presencing” (2001, 152). 
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certainty (and violence) of instrumental-calculative thinking and the acceptance of 
mystery characteristic of existential-meditative thinking.15  
 
To speak of the “gods” does of course not mean that a decision has been made here 
affirming the existence of many gods instead of one; rather, it is meant to indicate the 
undecidability of the being of gods, whether one or many. This undecidability carries 
within it the question of whether something like being can be attributed to gods at all 
without destroying everything divine. (Heidegger 2012b, 345). 
 
From undecidability, the obligation to choose emerges, this is the familiar 
obligation from the motif in Heidegger’s thought that is the condition for authentic 
or inauthentic human being: as new insights are gained one is obliged to respond, 
to make a choice. In making that choice, or in deliberately putting off making the 
choice, our mode of being is determined in its (in)authenticity. However, a 
decision on the existence of the gods themselves risks losing the essence of gods, 
and reducing them to some kind of causal force as in the ontotheology of subject-
object metaphysics. For the gods to remain—in order that we do not “destroy 
everything divine”—any decision concerning them must remain beyond the 
instrumental-calculative capacity of human being. The authentic response to the 
gods is itself a kind of undecidability, but only in so much as we can attempt to 
understand the beckoning of the gods, if not to comprehend the gods themselves. 
In such a response, one has made a decision, letting the gods remain mysterious 
and undecidable rather than calculating the gods either into or out of being, thus 
destroying the divine. In accepting undecidability qua undecidability, Dasein 
makes an authentic choice in the sense that one recognises the gods in their being 
just as one recognises Da-sein as one’s own: 
 
Da-sein is only in the en-ownment of man to the guardianship of the truth of be-
ing…Only when a man learns to have an inkling that it is not for him to decide on 																																																								
15 The indecision that is related to the gods here could be the sublation of “need and discipline” 
from the earlier fourfold of springing-forth, in that the gods are unknown but they beckon in a 
manner that situates them differently to the earth. Need and discipline relate to the way a 
phenomenon is in tension with its pure origin and is forced into a decision, bound to its origin in 
either affirmation or denial. Although this is tangential to my central reading of the gods in 
Heidegger’s work, it is reasonable to speculate that need and discipline, which do not easily figure 
as the sky or the mortals in the mature concept of the fourfold, are brought under the auspice of the 
in-decision and undecidability of the gods. 
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godlessness but that godlessness is the highest loss for the gods themselves, only then 
does he enter the path of mindfulness which shows him how godding as retro-attainment 
of godhood enowns itself solely out of be-ing (Heidegger 2008g, 211). 
 
The godding of the gods is outside instrumental-calculative thinking, and is 
inaccessible through that kind of ontic inquiry. In reducing a god to a 
philosophical first cause, the god no longer beckons or speaks in the thunderstorm, 
but is understood simply as part of a greater ontic calculation. In order that a god 
remain holy or divine, humans must remain incapable of coming to a definite 
decision on the gods, to declare them as this or that. Rather, in their divinity, the 
gods are authentically encountered by finite Dasein (in its self-understanding as 
Da-sein); open to the beckonings, understanding the mystery as mystery. To 
interpret the gods otherwise, or to resolutely hold to Nietzsche’s death of god as 
the absolute absence of anything holy or divine is possible only for “those who 
relate to and treat their God in the same way as a pocket-knife. When a 
pocketknife is lost, it is indeed gone. But to lose God means something else” 
(Heidegger 2014, 86). “Losing” the gods is corollary to the inauthentic, 
illegitimate omnipotence of instrumental-calculative thinking in the modern age. 
Divinity and holiness cannot be objectively measured, thus, under Ge-stell, they 
are merely subjective notions, not true or real as such. 
The godding of the gods, then, is a beckoning or pointing that remains concealed 
in some way. The beckoning of the gods is also a limiting, a countering, as it is the 
call to something specific. While the earth is also a kind of limit (as grounds and 
abyss), it is the combination of earth and gods in the early fourfold of springing-
forth that forms the pure origin, that generates finite possibilities with specific 
beckonings. This kind of pure origin is re-thought and re-configured in 
Heidegger’s exploratory writings, and appears in the form of the last god. Thought 
at the same time that the Nietzsche lectures were developed, Heidegger’s trope of 
origin/commencement also plays out in the notions of ending, completion, or 
fulfillment. As discussed above, an origin is not yet a beginning as such: “what is 
last … is the most profound beginning” (Heidegger 2012b, 321).16 Attempting a 
																																																								
16 This is the same sentiment that Heidegger applied to Nietzsche: in completing Western 
metaphysics by taking the subject/object distinction to its extreme in terms of nihilism, the will to 
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definition of the last god is problematic in that Heidegger is both allusive and 
elusive with the concept. It is clear that, generally speaking, the gods—and thus 
the godhead, the divinities (‘god-like’ ones), and the last god17—represent 
something that is “wholly other” (319)18 to anything that is representable or 
calculable. The last god, then, is a name for that which inspires the inceptual 
thinking of the other beginning: the commencement of an epoch of Ereignis, 
arguably the primary concern of Contributions. The last god takes on a pivotal 
symbolic status, as the god that can interrupt and forcefully tear everyday Dasein 
from its entrenched inauthenticity, placing each person in the moment of 
obligation. Yet, as suggested above, the sense of the “last” god is not necessarily 
that of the numerically or chronologically final god. 
 
In The Event, Heidegger states “[t]he last god first grounds the essential 
occurrence of that which, badly calculated, is called eternity” (2013, 197). This is 
echoed in Mindfulness where “‘Eternal’ gods are no gods” (2008g, 223), if eternal 
is to be thought of in a quantitative sense. The last god, then, is an announcement, 
a forceful, rapturous, beckoning or counter that wakes everyday Dasein to its self 
as Da-sein. While eternity is not to be considered a mathematically accountable 
incalculability, the back-handed gesture that Heidegger makes to eternity here is 
in order to evoke the connotation of time-less temporality: qualitative eternity. If 
time-space is the orderable notion of the ontic universe, then the last god is 
beyond such reckoning. Instead, the last god represents the existential divinity of 
Being as a resonance of the pure origin. 																																																																																																																																																								
power, and the overman, Nietzsche represents the moment of thinking where one is forced to take 
a position on the meaning, or lack thereof, of one’s own existence. 
17 In the texts that explicitly refer to the fourfold, “divinities” is the most common translation of die 
Gottlichen which can be rendered literally as “the God-like” ones.  Having traced the concept 
through Hölderlin and the later exploratory writings, I continue to use “gods” throughout this 
chapter, as the concepts of the divinities (‘Building Dwelling Thinking’), the gods (Hölderlin’s 
Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”), the last god (Contributions), and the angels (discussed in 
the next section of the chapter) are all doing the same structural-functional type of work for 
Heidegger. While there are slightly different connotations for each, when speaking broadly of the 
fourfold and its underpinnings, all of these names are appropriate. I continue to use gods in the 
interest of brevity.  
18 This phrase comes from the introduction to chapter seven of Contributions, The Last God, and 
refers to a short passage that reads “[t]he god wholly other than past ones and especially other than 
the Christian one” (2012b, 319). This should be understood as a complete rejection of the 
ontotheological (either atheistic or theistic) understanding of gods as representable or causal 
forces. 
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The last god is not an end. The last god is the oscillation of the beginning in itself … what 
is inceptual eludes every attempt to grasp onto it and essentially occurs only in protruding 
beyond all things that, as futural, are already in-corporated into it and delivered over to its 
determining power (2012b, 329). 
 
This futurality is entirely different from any kind of “eschatological” attitude, that is, from 
an attitude that is not attuned to grounding and aims at awaiting an “end of time” which 
awaiting pre-supposes already a complete forgottenness of being (2008g, 217). 
 
These passages demonstrate that the last god is only in so far as the passing by is 
felt, and the call to authenticity is heard as “the oscillation of the beginning”. For 
Heidegger, the last god represents the moment where the plight of modernity, the 
invisibility of Ge-stell, announces itself and is recognised as such. The last god 
awakens an originary sensibility that conspicuously reveals the technological 
framing of Ge-stell. If what is last is always a beginning, it should not be thought 
of in strictly causal terms, but rather as shaping or limiting an exhaustive but finite 
series of possibilities. The passing by of the last god is the moment of decision, 
the moment that contains both authentic and inauthentic possibilities.  
 
Towards the Fourfold 
I have given an account of the gods from Heidegger’s early reading of Hölderlin, 
and demonstrated some of the influence that this thinking of gods has had on his 
exploratory writings. Throughout this period, Heidegger also engaged with a 
number of Hölderlin’s poems in a series of short lectures/essays, and gave the poet 
two other sustained treatments in ‘Remembrance’, published in Elucidations of 
Hölderlin’s Poetry, and Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”. Characteristic of 
Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, and key to my argument, is the notion that the 
homeland is to be understood within the context of authenticity and Ereignis. 
One’s homeland consists of “friendly openness … and everything there that is 
brightened up, and glows and gleams, and casts forth its light” (Heidegger 2000b, 
33). It is the recognition of the giving of Being, of Da-sein and an originary sense 
of such. 
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What is most inviting in the homeland, and what comes to meet him half-way, is called 
“full of joy”, the joyful … What it composes, the joyful, is gaiety … we have to use this 
word in a strict sense: what has been cleared and brightened up. What has been cleared in 
this way has had a space freely made for it, illuminated and put in order (2000b, 34-35). 
 
Here, Heidegger uses gaiety to refer to the phenomenologically meaningful 
presence of beings. In the homeland of Being, what is “illuminated and put in 
order”, i.e. the world qua world, presents itself to Da-sein. The joyful meets Da-
sein half way, in that Being and Da-sein are mutually appropriated in Ereignis. In 
mutual appropriation, the phenomenological properties and characteristics of 
beings themselves play a significant role in determining the meaning and value 
they hold for Da-sein, and Being is the giving of presence at all. The notion of 
meeting half way emphasises Ereignis as appropriation, rather than privileging 
either Being or Dasein in any sense. 
 
This pure opening which first “imparts”, that is “grants”, the open to every space and to 
every temporal “space”, we call gaiety [die Heitere] according to an old word of our 
mother tongue. At one and the same time, it is the clarity (claritas) in whose brightness 
everything clear rests, and the grandeur (serenitas) in whose strength everything high 
stands, and the merriment (hilaritas) in whose play everything liberated sways. Gaiety 
preserves and holds everything within what is safe and sound. Gaiety heals 
fundamentally. It is the holy (2000b, 37, translator’s insertion). 
 
Not only is gaiety here a clear reference to Ereignis in that it is the pure opening 
that appropriates in order that the stuff of the world is revealed as it is—
“liberated” from the darkness of unconcealment—but it is also “holy”. The holy is 
the pre-condition for gods and divinity, and, as such, is the grounds for humans—
as those who are countered by the gods—to come into their own essence, to be 
“fundamentally healed”.19 The development of gaiety from that which is cleared 
and brightened to that which heals and preserves and, finally, to the holy, rests 
upon the development and understanding of the gods and their role in Ereignis. 
Just as Being and Time focuses on Dasein as the being that is closest to us in order 
to tackle the broader question of Being, so, too, the development of the holy in 
																																																								
19 This notion of healing is clearly a value judgement of the ‘sickness’ of inauthenticity. 
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‘Homecoming/To Kindred Ones’ rests on the gods. This claim is played out in the 
following passage:  
 
In “The Journey”, the angels of the house and of the year, are called  “gods” … In the 
later version, then, have the gods been reduced to mere angels? Or have angels also been 
introduced along with the gods? Neither—but now with the name “angels” the being of 
those who were previously called “gods” is said more purely. For the gods are the 
brightening ones, whose brightening offers the greeting sent by gaiety. Gaiety is the 
essential ground of the greeting, that is, of the angelic, in which the very being of the gods 
consists. By using the word “gods” sparingly, and hesitating to say the name, the poet has 
brought to light the proper element of the gods, that they are the greeting ones through 
whom gaiety extends its offering (2000b, 38-39).  
 
The angels of the house and the angels of the year are mentioned earlier in this 
same passage (35-36), and refer, again, to the interplay of clearing and 
appropriating. They are “brightening” in so far as the beckoning is something 
more specific than finite possibilities. The “house” is the site of ek-sistent Da-sein, 
where the homeland as the power of the earth is experienced, and the “angel”, i.e. 
the god of the house is the earth; “[t]he earth brightens up ‘the house’” (35). The 
“year” is thought of as the temporal space that allows, in Heideggerian terms, the 
“seasons to season”. The seasons are contrasted by “fiery brightness and frosty 
darkness” (36), another obvious allusion to un-concealment, to the necessary 
contrasts that exist throughout Heidegger’s thought as a whole.  
 
From the fourfold of springing-forth, and thinking the relation of human being to 
Being, gods, the earth, and demigods, a version of dwelling begins to appear. In 
Contributions, a much clearer fourfold is sketched out, where humans and gods 
are contrasted with earth and world (Heidegger 2012b, 246). This later version of 
a fourfold is more refined than the fourfold of springing-forth. The earth and 
world interplay is retained from ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, but now humans 
and gods are incorporated. The strife of earth and world is now understood in 
terms of Da-sein, to whom the strife is revealed, “Da-sein is the enduring of the 
essential occurrence of the truth of beyng” (246).  
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Thus Da-sein is the between: between humans (as grounding of history) and the gods (in 
their history). The “between”: not one that simply results from the relation of the gods to 
humans; rather, one that first grounds the time-space for such a relation, in the sense that 
it itself springs from the essential occurrence of beyng as event and in the sense that, as 
self-opening centre, it makes the gods and humans decidable for one another (2012b, 
247). 
 
The “grounding of history” here is the determination of the relationship of humans 
to Being, whether in its divinity or oblivion. Da-sein is the “between” in the sense 
that the meaning produced by the interplay of earth and world is understood in 
terms of the absence/presence/beckoning of the gods; Ereignis appropriates human 
being. Without the existential awareness and investment of care as the 
fundamental ontological structure of Da-sein, the giving of Being becomes simply 
a metaphysical pondering. As a phenomenological understanding of how human 
being is in the world, and how we, as humans, can and perhaps should understand 
our selves as cor-respondent, the fourfold sketches out the belonging-together of 
human being and Being in Ereignis. 
 
The Mature Concept of the Fourfold: Earth, Sky, Mortals, Gods 
The central and most frequently referenced texts in which the fourfold appear are 
the Bremen Lectures and the resultant essays ‘The Thing’ from 1950 and 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ from 1954. However, it is clear that Heidegger’s 
exploration and development of the gods—both in isolation and in conjunction 
with the interplay of un-concealment—played an integral role in Heidegger’s 
thinking from the mid 1930s onwards. Where Heidegger introduces the fourfold in 
‘The Thing’, which was available as an autonomous essay in English before the 
full Bremen Lectures, the conceptual depth it contains—the result of almost two 
decades of thinking—could easily be missed when encountering the essay for the 
first time. The central concern of ‘The Thing’ is restoring the ‘thingly’ existential 
character to objects (which first requires retrieving objects from the standing 
reserve). The fourfold is a way to develop an originary sense of Being, to 
overcome the alienation between subject and object that leads to the technological 
reduction of the material world to standing reserve. Just as art has the capacity to 
disclose a world while making the earth conspicuous in its sheltering and 
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preserving, a thing is no longer an object to be exploited, but something that we 
feel near to us, that we understand as having existential significance. In the 
“thinging of the thing” (2001, 175), the earth, sky, mortals, and gods are gathered 
“into a single Fourfold” (171). 
 
In ‘The Thing’, as in all of the texts that discuss the fourfold, the definition of 
each of the four is brief and allusive, and comes with the reminder that in thinking 
of any one of the concepts, all four of the concepts must be thought in their 
essential unity.  The four belong-together, they cor-respond, and, as a whole, are 
synonymous with Ereignis: “The fouring, the unity of the four, presences as the 
appropriating mirror-play of the betrothed, each to the other in a simple oneness. 
The fouring presences as the worlding of the world” (Heidegger 2001, 178). 
Developing an account of the fourfold relies on this essential unity. However, 
given that each fold plays a different supplementary role to the others and thus has 
particular ontic manifestations, it is possible to consider each fold individually. 
Yet it is always the unity of the fourfold that is of chief importance to the concept. 
 
I have already discussed the earth in some detail throughout this chapter.20 In the 
fourfold, the earth is “the building bearer, nourishing with its fruits, tending water 
and rock, plant and animal” (Heidegger 2001, 176). This is the actual tangible 
earth that forms the basis of a locale, is found in the river, is the banks of the river, 
but is also the ontological process that I have outlined above in so far as it shelters 																																																								
20 Both Julian Young (2002) and Jeff Malpas (2008) draw a distinction between the earth of the 
artwork and the earth of the Fourfold. Young claims that the earth of the artwork is “the mystery of 
the unconcealed…[but in the fourfold] the mystery is, as it were, distributed equally between its 
four elements” (2006, 93, my insertion), while Malpas states that the fourfold is “quite distinct” 
(232) from the earth-world pairing of the artwork. While the earth of the mature fourfold can 
superficially be read as something different to the earlier references to the earth, tracing the 
genealogy of the fourfold back through to the birth/ray-of-light/need/discipline of springing-forth, 
and the humans/gods/earth/world pairings of the event demonstrates an obvious continuity. While 
there is a distinction—a shift—of sorts, emphasising the distinction over the continuity does little 
for making productive sense of the fourfold; a task that is integral to my thesis. In The Fourfold, 
Mitchell delivers a sustained treatments of the earth in Heidegger’s thought. While not as 
exhaustive as Haar’s Song of the Earth, Mitchell’s work is particularly significant for my thesis in 
that it is an in-depth analysis of the underpinnings of the fourfold. In regards to the continuity of 
the earth, Mitchell contends that while the fourfold is not yet present in ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’, “the role that the earth plays there prepares it for eventual inclusion in the fourfold” (2015, 
71). Mitchell contends that the earth should be considered as “phenomenality as such” (79); that 
aspect of meaningful presence in which the extant stuff of the cosmos itself has a say in how 
Dasein understands and relates to it.  
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and counters the world. The earth is always also Hölderlin’s holy mother earth, the 
dark, withdrawn abyssal ground of springing-forth. As with all aspects of the 
fourfold, it pertains to dwelling as authentic human being, and, as authentic, 
always refers to the ontic-ontological ouroboros. Despite the “infuriatingly literal” 
(Wrathall 2011, 204) discussion of the earth within the mature concept of the 
fourfold, holding fast to the development and the role of the earth, particularly its 
embodiment of actual earthly things in the phenomenological sense, gives insight 
into its ontic-ontological characteristics as ground and abyss. 
 
Of the four, the role of the sky initially seems to be the most ambiguous. 
However, by once again tracing the development of the fourfold through the 
encounter with Hölderlin and framing Heidegger’s thinking as primarily a 
response to Ge-stell, the concept becomes clear. If Heidegger’s thinking both up 
to and throughout this period is understood as largely an exercise in articulating 
authentic human being—as ek-sistent Da-sein, belonging-together in Ereignis—
and should one pay sufficient attention to Heidegger’s encounter with Hölderlin, 
then the references to the sky of the fourfold contain a sufficient number of 
allusions and explicit statements to reveal itself.  
 
The sky is the sun’s path, the course of the moon, the glitter of the stars, the year’s 
seasons, the light and dusk of the day, the gloom and the glow of the night, the clemency 
and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether (Heidegger 
2001, 176). 
 
First, and most obviously, the interplay and constant flux of un-concealment is the 
central trope here. From light to dusk, to gloom and then glow, from the dark of 
the year, the hidden winter, to the bright, revealed summer, the sky is alethic in 
nature, revealing the world in various ways. Not only this, the sky here is referred 
to explicitly in one of Hölderlin’s own favoured terms: aether. In ‘Remembrance’, 
Heidegger states: 
 
The northeast is the wind (in Swabian dialect, der Luft [the air]) which in the poet’s 
homeland brightens up ‘the air’ (the aether) and extends gaiety into the distance. The 
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northeast wind clears the sky. It gives a free, cool path to the rays and light of the sun (the 
heavenly fire) (Heidegger 2000b, 109, translator’s insertion). 
 
Gaiety is the holy; that which is the necessary ground for gods and mortals and is 
recognised and named by demigods. The aether, here, is the more primordial 
grounds for gaiety: the aether is the space in which the wind blows away that 
which conceals (clouds) and allows the light of the sun to brighten up, to 
highlight, to unconceal that which presences. The sky of the fourfold is 
connotative of the worlding of the world in certain specific ways. It is sheltered 
and countered by the earth, it is always changing, revealing and disclosing being 
in different ways, both in the mundane and the extraordinary. Further, in ‘Building 
Dwelling Thinking’, the sky also reveals the ethical dimension in Heidegger’s 
thinking. Bearing in mind that the fourfold is part of Heidegger’s response to Ge-
stell, “Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky. They leave to the sun and 
moon their journey…they do not turn night into day nor day into harassed unrest” 
(2001, 148). In dwelling, humans accept the changing of the seasons and the shift 
in meanings and unconcealed truths that come with it. Through an originary 
sensibility with an emphasis on releasement, Dasein allows things to be what they 
are, without imposing human will or attempting to dominate and force things to go 
against their own essence. The sky is a reminder of constant change, but also of 
how Dasein authentically responds to such. 
 
The mortals of the fourfold is a relatively uncontested and simple concept; it is the 
name of finite human being, “capable of death as death. Only man dies. The 
animal perishes” (2001, 176). The notion of mortality remains largely unchanged 
throughout Heidegger’s thinking. We are finite, not just temporally but in multiple 
senses: we are specifically human, bipedal land-dwelling mammals with certain 
nutritional and psychological-emotional needs. Our historical situatedness as a 
being invested in its own being throws us into a world of existential possibilities 
where we are faced with the decision of our own authenticity, to accept our Being-
towards-death. Reflecting the grammatical shift from everyday Dasein to ek-
sistent Da-sein, the mortals of the fourfold refer to authentic human being, those 
who dwell. The mortals, as authentic human being, are perhaps the most obvious 
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reminder that the fourfold is thought of as a unity—the a-temporal features of our 
finitude such as requiring oxygen to breathe, for example, can be understood as 
indications of our earthliness, as the influence of the earth as a counter or limit to 
our being as mortal—and incorporates both the ontic and the ontological. As only 
one element of the four, the mortals represent Heidegger’s decisive de-centring of 
human being, both phenomenologically and ethically. 
 
Finally, the fourfold is completed by the divinities/gods.21 The present chapter has 
exhaustively covered the origins and development of the gods of the fourfold, yet 
without this genealogy, the gods of the fourfold are a difficult and ambiguous 
concept.  
 
The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the hidden sway of 
the divinities the god emerges as what he is, which removes him from any comparison 
with beings that are present (Heidegger 2001, 176). 
 
The “beckoning messengers” are understood as the undecidable, incalculable 
gestures that invest certain kinds of meaning and values into the world. 
Importantly, these gestures can only be discovered through existential-meditative 
thinking, free of the epistemological impositions of Ge-stell. The godhead—der 
Gottheit—is not a specific god, but is arguably comparable with the last god of 
Contributions in the sense that the divinities gesture towards, or pave the way for 
the emergence of a new originary sense of human being in Ereignis. The “hidden 
sway” is equally the undecidability of an incalculable ontological happening, as 
well as the conditions that are named by the demigods, in order that the god (in 
however it happens to express itself, remembering that this is not a monotheistic 
nor pantheistic character) can become what it is. The gods in their godding are that 
which stands outside all calculation, and are properly beyond comparison with any 
extant entity. It is important, however, to take seriously the repeated caveat that 
Heidegger presents with the fourfold: none can be thought of in isolation from the 
others. The constitutive components of the fourfold properly belong-together in 
the “appropriating mirror-play” as “expropriative appropriating” (Heidegger 2001, 																																																								
21 See footnote 17 above. 
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177). The four are “[n]estling, malleable, pliant, compliant, nimble” (178); to 
think of one in isolation from the others becomes an exercise in artificially 
delimiting the concept from its poiētic basis.  
 
Moving Forward 
Throughout this chapter I have traced the origins of the fourfold. The fourfold 
plays an important role in what I have termed the constructive aspect of the 
critique of technology. By developing a reading of Heidegger’s critique of 
technology, including an understanding of Ereignis and the fourfold, the concept 
of dwelling is already revealed. In the next chapter I will explicitly discuss the 
concept of dwelling by drawing on the material that the thesis has covered so far. 
However, the remaining chapters of the thesis mark an important shift. While I 
have been developing a charitable reading of Heidegger so far, my discussion of 
dwelling will form the basis for a critical interpretation of certain aspects of his 
work. In particular, I will introduce a number of issues from an existing body of 
work that is critical of Heidegger’s obliviousness to the significance of sex and 
gender in the modern technological world. However, rather than focus on the 
lacuna in Heidegger’s thinking, I will argue that Heidegger’s thinking, when freed 
from a strict adherence to his own factical-historical situation and thus a 
masculinist bias, continues to offer important insights into how sex and gender is 
framed by Ge-stell. I do not intend to defend Heidegger from feminist critique, or 
to claim that his thinking as a whole is broad enough to encompass whatever he 
remained oblivious to as a person. Instead, I will demonstrate that dwelling 
continues to be of the utmost significance in the modern technological world, but 
with some important caveats and perhaps unforeseen implications.
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Chapter Six — The Impossibility of Dwelling 
 
In Chapters One and Two I traced the development of the critical aspect of 
Heidegger’s critique of technology. As the technological, instrumental-calculative 
worlding of the modern world, Ge-stell frames, orders, and positions each Dasein 
in specific ways. As the clearing, Da-sein is always Being-in-the-world. However, 
Dasein is not simply given over to technology. As discussed in Chapter Three, as 
an entity characterised by self-aware investedness in its own being, Dasein always 
has the potential for authentic or inauthentic being. Authentic human being is the 
historical-factical-ontic manifestation of one’s ontological ek-sistent Da-sein. In 
Chapter Four I outlined Heidegger’s thinking of Ereignis, and suggested that a 
hermeneutic interpretation of Ge-stell and Ereignis can reveal the yardstick that 
Heidegger uses to distinguish authenticity from inauthenticity. As such, Ereignis 
is one of the key features of the constructive aspect of Heidegger’s critique of 
technology. While the historical-factical-ontic manifestation of authenticity is 
always particular to an individual, what characterises one’s being as authentic is 
not simply subjective or contingent on the will of the individual. Instead, the 
distinction between technē and challenging-forth, between Ge-stell and Ereignis, 
between the hubris and will of the subject and the releasement of Da-sein, reflects 
the distinction between authentic and inauthentic being. However, due to Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world, the possibility of an ontic manifestation of one’s ontological 
Da-sein requires an interruption or breakdown of one’s average everydayness. The 
tranquility of the They must be disrupted; the affects and effects of Ge-stell must 
somehow become conspicuous for one to formulate an authentic response to such. 
Following on from my introduction of the fourfold in Chapter Five, the present 
chapter will consider how the fourfold can facilitate an interruption to one’s 
everydayness, thus creating a necessary condition for authentic human being.  
 
The constructive element of Heidegger’s critique of technology is characterised by 
its emphasis on dwelling. As authentic human being, dwelling involves technē. As 
a reflection of dwelling, human activities such as agriculture, art, and construction 
are characterised by letting, rather than forceful domination. This sentiment is 
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expressed in the essays ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ and ‘…Poetically Man 
Dwells…’. In saying both yes and no, dwelling is not a rejection of science or 
technology. Rather, dwelling is a reconciliation of instrumental-calculative 
thinking with its grounding in existential-meditative thinking. However, dwelling 
is not a panacea for the last two centuries of technological—and, equally, political 
and cultural—colonisation. Industrially developed countries cannot simply undo 
the damage that has occurred from the framing of the world as standing reserve. 
Similarly, one cannot simply re-frame or de-frame the prevailing metaphysical 
understanding of what it means to be in the broadest sense: as I discuss below, the 
ordering, framing, and positioning of Ge-stell—the saying of the logos of 
technology—is more than a prevailing outlook towards tools or the environment. 
The logos of technology speaks and gathers the relation of human being to 
existence itself. From this, two points arise. First, each person can say both yes 
and no to technology in some meaningful way in their own lives. Each of us can 
establish an originary sense of the essence of human being and learn to dwell in 
the modern world, even if only temporarily and in some small way. Second, and 
more perniciously, while the ontological positioning and framing of human being 
is equivalent from Dasein to Dasein in an abstract sense, the historical-factical-
ontic situation of each individual, and even of groups or classes of people, can be 
radically different. While some are framed or ordered into positions of relative 
privilege, others are framed and ordered by systemic oppression. As such, the 
capacity to dwell, and indeed the very notion of dwelling—as Heidegger presents 
the concept—may be compromised. The remaining chapters of the thesis are 
dedicated to exploring the implications of this second point.  
 
In this chapter I consider the idea that gender is a significant aspect of the framing 
and ordering of human being. I do not argue that the notion of gender is itself an 
inherently metaphysical framing of human being—this possibility is briefly 
considered, but is ultimately tangential to my own argument—rather that Ge-stell 
itself is gendered in that it valorises the masculine at the expense of the 
unmasculine. In order to support this claim I engage with a variety of theorists 
whose work augments the reading of Ge-stell that I have developed so far. I argue 
that while Heidegger was oblivious of the masculine bias of the Western 
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philosophical tradition, his critique of technology offers valuable insights into how 
patriarchal and masculine norms invisibly frame the modern technological world. 
Further, I argue that the masculine bias in Heidegger’s own work—a bias that 
becomes evident through an exploration of dwelling—serves to highlight the 
extent of such framing. In order to work towards what might be called an ethics of 
dwelling, this chapter begins with a broader discussion of the fourfold. From this 
chapter forward, my thesis is concerned with demonstrating that the logos—the 
gathering-saying—of technology applies to far more than the human relation to 
machine technology or the environment, and that dwelling forms the basis for a 
kind of originary ethics that can counter the framing of Ge-stell. 
 
Dwelling is the closest that Heidegger comes to positing a prescriptive vision of 
authentic human being. The concept brings together the major aspects of his 
thinking up to that point: beings/Being, concealment/unconcealment, 
authenticity/inauthenticity, Ereignis/Ge-stell, calculation/meditation. As discussed 
in the Introduction, and touched on in Chapter Three, the fundamental grounding 
of ethics in Heidegger’s thought is a kind of meta-ethical concern. Extrapolating 
from the notion that human being is founded on care, Heidegger’s thinking 
demonstrates that humans are existentially invested. Further, this investedness is 
both a predisposition towards, and the foundation of, ethical thinking (as well as 
the basis for spirituality discussed further in Chapter Eight). Things matter to 
human beings. Joanna Hodge states that Heidegger’s thinking is always “in 
advance of the ethical concerns of individuals and the political concerns of 
communities” (2001, 4) in that both of these distinct notions can emerge only 
from a shared fundamental grounding such as Heidegger’s thinking of human 
being as care. For Hodge, as for Nancy (2002), Heidegger’s overall project is 
inherently ethical, an “originary ethics” (Hodge 2001, 202).1 Hodge claims that 
Heidegger scholarship more broadly fails to understand Heidegger’s project as 
ethical by misinterpreting Heidegger’s rejection of the reduction of ethos into a 
formal discipline of ethics (where the latter is thought from within subject-object 																																																								
1 Both Nancy and Hodge focus on ‘The Letter on Humanism’ to demonstrate their arguments. The 
importance of this essay to understanding Heidegger as an ethical thinker also demonstrates the 
inherently ethical thinking of authentic human being as ek-sistent Da-sein, appropriated in 
Ereignis. 
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metaphysics and has thus lost an originary sense of Being) and a rejection of 
ethics as a matter of thinking. In a certain sense, the phrase ‘ethics of dwelling’ is 
simply a tautology: as I discuss in Chapter Eight, dwelling is something more than 
ethics, but it is also always properly ethical. Regardless, I will refer to an ethics of 
dwelling where the context is suitable, in order to emphasise the systematic 
underpinnings and quasi-deontological nature of the concept, discussed further 
below. 
 
The fourfold is a mechanistic description of Ereignis. As the appropriation of 
human being and Being (component parts that should not be thought as 
metaphysically distinct), Ereignis is both alethic and poiētic. Poiēsis is a bringing-
forth, and the act of bringing-forth is alethic in that it reveals something as 
something. Alethic revealing also conceals other possibilities and potential 
meanings of a thing: there is no single objective truth, despite the possibility of 
ontic correctness. Further, technē, as a human activity, is already related to modes 
of knowing, epistēmē, and all knowing is a phenomenological knowing of 
something as something. In this sense, all knowing and bringing-forth is alethic. 
Where Heidegger cites Hölderlin’s phrase, “poetically man dwells” (2001, 211), it 
is precisely the alethic nature of knowing and bringing-forth that he has in mind. 
In one’s everyday comings and goings, one’s in-the-worldness reflects the 
worlding of the world. In everydayness, one responds automatically or pre-
cognitively to the worlding of the world. In doing so, one coheres with Ge-stell. 
Alternatively one’s ontic manifestation of ek-sistent Da-sein can deliberate on, 
and reflect, one’s inherently poiētic nature. Ereignis attempts to describe the 
ontological happening of Being while always referring to the factical-ontical here 
and now of a phenomenon. The fourfold demonstrates that Da-sein is always a 
part of the question of Being, but is never the centre of the question. Corollary to 
this, the question of Being is not a question of the possibility of the existence of 
the cosmos in the absence of human being, but neither is it a question that is 
reducible solely to a metaphysical subject.  
 
Through the fourfold, the worlding of the world as Ereignis becomes visible. 
Dwelling begins with an interruption of one’s everyday inauthentic being. Each 
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interruption is alethic, the trick is to recognise it as such. In the epoch of Ge-stell, 
dwelling is made possible only through interruption, through moments in which 
the concealed is revealed or where concealment itself becomes conspicuous. In 
dwelling, the role of the fourfold is to transform the day-to-day encounters of 
Dasein into en-counters that interrupt and counter Dasein (in the sense of the earth 
and the gods) in a manner that reveals Da-sein. The everydayness of Dasein must 
be countered; one’s will, reflections, or pre-reflective activities must be countered, 
interrupted, and in some way limited in an unexpected or unusual fashion that one 
can recognise as beyond one’s subjective will. The fourfold offers a way to 
practice releasement in order to remain properly open to the en-counter that lies at 
the heart of Heidegger’s project: existence itself, the problem of Being. In 
transforming the encounter into en-counter, each moment of one’s life, each 
decision one makes, affords the possibility of authenticity. In order to dwell, one 
must be open to the en-counter, willing to be en-countered at every turn. How 
does such an abstract notion actually play out in the modern technological world? 
How does one transform the encounter into an en-counter through the fourfold? 
Once en-countered, what then?  
 
Heidegger, Harman: Unfolding the En-counter from the Fourfold 
In contrast to my account of the fourfold, Graham Harman2 develops a form of the 
fourfold that supports his object-oriented ontology. Harman’s object-oriented 
ontology is not of concern to my argument, but the critique that Harman gives of 
Heidegger’s fourfold affords me the chance to demonstrate how the concept can 
be employed. Harman is not concerned with dwelling as such. Instead, he reads 
																																																								
2 My extended engagement with Graham Harman is driven by two significant points: first, Harman 
takes the fourfold to be as central to Heidegger’s thought as I do. He not only offers penetrating 
insight into its development and weaknesses, but into its possibilities and profundity. While he 
may find many of the troubling ambiguities of the fourfold (such as sky and gods) to be 
superfluous, Harman is prepared to engage with the fourfold as a significant concept in its own 
right, rather than as a faltering, perhaps slightly embarrassing, “poetic” step on the way to Ereignis. 
Second, Harman’s presentation of the fourfold serves as a sounding board for my own 
interpretation of the concept, and allows me to further develop a reading of Heidegger that I 
mobilize throughout the rest of the thesis. As such, my thesis is not explicitly concerned with 
Harman’s work, nor is it intended as a ‘critique’ of such. Rather, Harman provides a solid point of 
reference from which my extrapolation of the fourfold as poetic dwelling into contemporary issues 
of Ge-stell can unfold. In his own reference to Harman, Mitchell’s third footnote in The Fourfold 
describes Harman’s project as “not one of exegesis, but of creative appropriation” (2015, 322); it is 
my intention that this thesis falls somewhere between the two. 
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Heidegger’s project as a bold attempt to re-establish a ground for (what Heidegger 
would call) the ontic, metaphysical properties of objects, from a perspective that is 
interested in the conceptual “overlap” (Harman 2011, 20) of phenomenology and 
realism. While I argue against Harman in the following discussion, my polemic is 
not intended to claim that Harman is “wrong” or that my account of the fourfold is 
definitive. Instead, I use Harman to concretise my account of the fourfold, and to 
demonstrate that the concept is integral to dwelling. 
 
Harman explains the fourfold as the overlapping of two axes: 
concealed/unconcealed, and something-specific/something that is at all (2001, 83-
89).3 This interpretation of the fourfold is consistent with the fourfold of 
springing-forth from Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine”, and, 
Harman claims, Heidegger’s earlier, pre-Being and Time thinking (2011, 36).4 
This interpretation of the fourfold is useful in terms of describing Dasein’s 
phenomenological encounters with things in the world (rather than abstract shapes 
and sounds). However, as I discuss below, where Harman believes that 
Heidegger’s later fourfold fails—the earth as a “relapse … toward a half cooked 
monism” (91), and Heidegger’s unwillingness to “grant any sort of dignity” (92) 
to modern technology, for example—are the exact moments in which the ethical 
dimension of the fourfold, as a constructive aspect of the critique of technology, 
emerges most clearly. Where Harman notes that “[t]he whole of Heidegger’s 
philosophy can be read as a critique of ontotheology” (85), he fails to note that 
Heidegger’s critique is also a response to the ethical and spiritual destitution of the 
modern world. 
 
In his 2009 article, ‘Dwelling with the Fourfold’, Harman claims that the only 
distinction between a jug as a thing (existentially significant) and a Styrofoam cup 																																																								
3 For Harman, Heidegger is a monotonous thinker, thinking and re-thinking the same thought over 
and again (2011, 57-60). For Harman, it is Heidegger’s thinking of a fourfold in 1919 that is of 
importance for object-oriented ontology, more so than the 1949 version that this thesis explores.  
4 In Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Harman states “[w]ith Theodore 
Kisiel, I hold that Heidegger’s life-long subject matter is already perfectly visible as early as 
1919…The fully ripe tool-analysis of the 29-year-old Heidegger  already signals the high-water 
mark of twentieth-century philosophy” (2002, 7). This is a contention that Harman holds on to, 
stating that the Heidegger had already sketched the fourfold in 1919 (9), and that his later version, 
that I hold to and Harman critiques, over-complicates the earlier insights and is thus less useful, 
and perhaps even less correct (199-204). 
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as mere object (or as part of the standing reserve) is “sheer prejudice on 
Heidegger’s part” (294). However, this prejudice is an ethical judgment concerned 
with the way the world is revealed through the production and everyday use (as 
encounter, not en-counter) of the Styrofoam cup. The alethic and poiētic qualities 
of the Styrofoam cup are different to those of the jug, mirroring the distinction 
between Ge-stell and Ereignis. Heidegger’s prejudice here is demonstrated 
through his use of the fourfold to resist and counter the violence of Ge-stell. A 
thing (rather than an object) is not, or is no longer, framed by Ge-stell. The 
fourfold is conspicuous in a thing, whether the thing makes the fourfold 
conspicuous through its use, design, or manufacture (think of the way the artwork 
allows the earth to irrupt into world), or whether one’s en-counter with the thing 
allows the fourfold to presence. Mindfulness towards the fourfold—an openness 
towards the possibility of en-counter—reveals the Styrofoam cup in its everyday 
context as an object of single-use disposability. Certainly the cup can become a 
thing through any number of en-counters: it might take on existential meaning as 
part of a childhood memory, for example. But first and foremost, the Styrofoam 
cup stands—or lies empty among numerous others in the empty stands after a 
sporting event, or forever floating in its undegradability in an urban creek or 
stormwater drain—as an example of the standing reserve. The Styrofoam cup is 
challenged-forth and used; its alethic properties remain invisible in the double 
concealing of Ge-stell, yet one’s pre-cognitive use and abandonment of the cup to 
landfill is a direct result of its revealing. However, by invoking the fourfold and 
making the alethic quality of the Styrofoam cup (and what it reveals) conspicuous, 
one is obliged to respond; a condition for the possibility of authenticity. Consider 
Harman’s commentary on the distinction between thing and object: 
 
The first weakness, of course, is his rather forced distinction between things and objects. 
If Heidegger says that every thing is a mirror-play of the fourfold, he does not concede 
that every entity is a thing. Some entities are merely objects, and it seems that the force of 
the fourfold is suspended in these cases (Harman 2009, 297). 
The distinction between a thing and an object follows the same path of thinking as 
all of Heidegger’s later works. It is the same as the distinction between the 
objective, instrumental-calculative spatial co-ordinates of a particular 
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geographical location and the outpouring of a river into the ocean that has 
existential and spiritual significance to the people who live in the region. The 
former representation is always correct, but is never the whole truth, while the 
latter is an alethic existential-meditative understanding of a place as containing a 
number of meanings and values beyond its ability to be described in terms of co-
ordinates. For Heidegger a thing “gathers” (2001, 151) in essentially the same 
sense as an artwork, a demigod, and the logos. Gathering is the process of a world 
(worldhood, worlding) both coming into itself and becoming conspicuous or 
visible. Gathering is the process of a thing revealing its significance beyond its 
instrumental-calculable properties and thus interrupting the predominance of 
instrumental-calculative thinking. The distinction between thing and object here is 
not yet an explicitly ethical one until considering the inherent tendency of 
instrumental-calculative thinking to violently over-reach its legitimate jurisdiction 
in the double concealing of Ge-stell. For Heidegger, an object is something that 
has been robbed of its thingly qualities, not simply by way of its mode of 
production, or the manner in which it is encountered by human being, but in the 
way its mode of production and the instrumentality of the extant object itself 
reveals the human relation to the world and to Being. The “gathering” that belongs 
to an object is the double concealment of Ge-stell, the making invisible of the 
worlding of the world. Challenging-forth is an unethical mode of production due 
to its violent and singular revealing/ concealing. What is produced from 
challenging-forth exists as an object for inauthentic Dasein to treat with pre-
reflective everyday instrumentality as part of the standing reserve. By invoking 
the fourfold, however, the object can regain the thingly quality of conspicuous or 
multivalent gathering and can thus interrupt the inauthentic tranquility of Dasein. 
By letting the fourfold presence, an object becomes a thing and gathers in the 
sense that it makes the revealing of challenging-forth, Ge-stell, and the standing 
reserve visible. The “force of the fourfold” is thus not suspended in an object, but 
rather is concealed and/or distorted by Ge-stell’s revealing of the world. 
 
Through existential-meditative thinking, one can allow the fourfold to become 
conspicuous in any object or phenomenon. Letting the fourfold come to presence 
in an object-phenomenon shapes the en-counter. In the case of a Styrofoam cup, 
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for example, the earth shows up in a highly processed form, robbed of its 
countering-sheltering. The gods presence in the Styrofoam cup perhaps by 
beckoning one to dispose of it carefully, or perhaps not use it at all, given its 
inherent disposability. The earth and the gods are counters and limits to human 
hubris, but what is the counter of the Styrofoam cup to human will? In its mode of 
production and everyday use, the Styrofoam cup does not counter human being in 
any meaningful sense. While a bridge gathers the banks of a river (Heidegger 
2001, 151), an artwork gathers the rock from which the temple is made and the 
sky that foregrounds the towers of the temple (Heidegger 2008c, 167-168), a river 
gathers an ontic space into an ontological homeland, a Styrofoam cup gathers the 
standing reserve. But the gathering of standing reserve is a double concealing. 
Only by letting the fourfold presence can the otherwise invisible gathering of the 
Styrofoam cup become visible and interrupt Dasein, thus marking the distinction 
between object and thing. Letting the fourfold presence allows one to compare 
what the phenomenon in question reveals to what might ideally have been 
revealed by the fourfold in a similar circumstance (and this ideal might be one of 
many possibilities). Consider the following passage from Harman: 
Imagine the most contemptible possible entity in Heidegger’s eyes: say, a cybernetic 
cooling system for an American boxing match shown by live worldwide television and 
projected via real-time hologram in Singapore and Kuwait. Even this atrocious scenario 
would also have to involve the mirroring four of the fourfold, however shallow and vulgar 
it would seem to Martin Heidegger (Harman 2009, 297).  
And indeed this scenario does involve the mirroring of the fourfold, but only in 
the same distorted sense that Ge-stell is Ereignis. Just as Ge-stell reveals the world 
solely in its instrumentality, even though the functional-structural worlding of the 
world is still Ereignis, the fourfold are present in the phenomenon described in 
this passage, but they are actively concealed and distorted by the revealing/double 
concealing of Ge-stell. Heidegger’s concern with this scenario, as with any 
phenomenon, would be that in its revealing, there is nothing in the phenomenon 
that existentially counters or de-centres human being, nothing that interrupts and 
makes Da-sein and the worlding of the world visible. Harman characterises 
Heidegger’s potential perspective of this phenomenon as “shallow and vulgar”, 
reducing Heidegger’s potential response to little more than an offended sensibility, 
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rather than a deliberative ethical judgement with spiritual implications. While it is 
potentially correct that Heidegger the man would view this scenario in such a way, 
to imply that the thing-object distinction, and the existential, ethical, and spiritual 
significance of such a distinction, rests on this sensibility alone is a caricature of 
Heidegger’s thought. Harman’s scenario reveals the world as a referential network 
of global, imperial, capitalist, masculinist endeavours: this event would be 
sponsored by a number of large corporations with a duty to make profit for their 
shareholders; promoters would make money selling advertising time before, 
during, and after the fight—advertising that would be targeted specifically at a 
mostly male audience of a particular demographic; the technological infrastructure 
needed for such an event would require a number of manual laborers and workers 
of various skill sets from various countries, implicating both race and class issues. 
By their very nature, major boxing events are also masculinist events, both in the 
aggressive nature of the content and the portrayal of women as bikini-wearing 
standing reserve, as ‘ring girls’. In addition to these factors is the questionable 
reduction of this kind of activity to a for-profit, commercially driven spectator 
sport. The fourfold is not an abstracted ontological theory, but is an ethical 
response to Ge-stell. Ge-stell is more than technology: it is the technological 
revealing of the world and human being in general. 
 
De-centring human being—recovering a sense of what it means to be Da-sein and 
to let things matter, rather than simply impose on them the will of the subject—
underpins Heidegger’s thinking as a whole, and the notion of dwelling and the 
fourfold in particular. The scenario above reveals something meaningful about the 
relation of human being to Being in the epoch of Ge-stell. The involvement of 
machine technology and an American boxing match5 in this scenario is not 
sufficient to reveal an unethical (inauthentic) relation of human being to Being; 
this is evidenced in the peripheral activity that such a scenario demands, as 
outlined above. Through this activity, the scenario reveals the worlding of Ge-stell 
																																																								
5 In an extended passage from Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger spoke pejoratively of 
America and lamented the popularity of heavyweight boxer Max Schmeling among the German 
people (2000a, 40). While Heidegger does not name Schmeling in this passage, it is accepted that 
the reference to a “boxer [who] counts as the great man of a people” (ibid), is a reference to 
Schmeling who, according to O’Brien was “glorified by the Nazi propaganda machine” (2011, 78). 
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to everyday inauthentic Dasein, concealing the finitude of Da-sein and the human 
belonging to Being behind the tranquil distraction of the They. Yet Harman’s 
scenario above does not have to conceal these things: letting the fourfold presence 
can transform this encounter into an en-counter, the phenomenon can gain a 
thingly quality by revealing itself as a revealing. Harman fails to acknowledge this 
as his version of the fourfold represents his one-sided interest in its ontic 
metaphysical potential.6 
 Even the most ludicrous and superficial entities are real, and any ontology must do justice
 to all of them. Given its universal vocation, ontology cannot pretend that fast food and
 plastic cups do not exist (Harman 2009, 297). 
 
For the purpose of my polemic, it is not necessary to labour the point: for Harman, 
the fourfold must be a consistent ontological description of the presence and 
presencing of things. However, as I have outlined in Chapter Five, Heidegger’s 
fourfold is not simply a descriptive phenomenological ontology of entities, but is 
an inherently ethical concept that de-centres human being and counters the 
anthropocentric hubris that stems from subject-object metaphysics. Fast food and 
plastic cups are not outside the fourfold, and, while a humorous part of his casual 
writing style, Harman’s continued characterisation of Heidegger’s “prejudice”—
both in the passages above, and again in the passage below—misses the ethical 
and spiritual significance of the fourfold. Rather than pretend that these objects do 
not exist, Heidegger’s thinking of the fourfold allows one to en-counter the 
phenomenon of fast food (and the packaging in which it is delivered) in order that 
the world that such a phenomenon reveals or gathers is made conspicuous. The 
distinction between object and thing is an ethical distinction (founded on 
existential investedness, with spiritual implications) that is concerned with the 
following three points: the mode of production and thus the alethic quality of an 
entity; the specific features of the entity itself, its sensuous qualities, its aesthetic, 
its purpose, its suitability for its purpose, and; everyday Dasein’s encounter, and 																																																								
6 I do not use the term “ontic” here to be dismissive of Harman’s project. Rather, Harman boldly 
claims that “Heidegger studies has often been sidetracked by a serious misunderstanding of the 
term ontic” (2002, 6), and his analysis revolves around reclaiming the interpretation of the ontic in 
order to return to the tools themselves, rather than to “retreat ever deeper into the conditions 
underlying these entities” (6). 
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the possibility of Da-sein’s en-counter, with the entity as a condition for 
authenticity. The ethical distinction between thing and object is bound to all of 
these three points in that an object is a product of challenging-forth. The alethic 
aspect of challenging-forth is the double concealing of Ge-stell, where the world is 
revealed as standing reserve.  
 
A thing is an entity or phenomenon that one en-counters in its gathering. The thing 
makes the worlding of the world visible, whether Ge-stell or Ereignis. The jug 
from ‘The Thing’ is a thing first and foremost as it gathers the fourfold and reveals 
Da-sein’s belonging to Being. A Styrofoam cup is an object first and foremost as 
the manner in which it gathers the fourfold conceals the gathering, conceals the 
very revealing that it is always sustaining. The everyday encounter with a 
Styrofoam cup—using it, throwing it away—reveals the world through the double 
concealment of Ge-stell. In this sense, the Styrofoam cup and the jug are both 
things and objects depending variously on the three points discussed in the 
paragraph above. Yet the nature of the first two points—the mode of production 
and alethic quality of the entity, and the specific features of the entity itself—
always predisposes some extant entities as things, and some as objects due to the 
horizon of the modern technological world. The saving power of Ge-stell is that 
making the framing of Ge-stell visible also makes Ereignis visible. When 
worlding becomes visible to Dasein, one can choose to authentically respond to 
this worlding by reflecting on and ontically manifesting one’s Da-sein as cor-
respondent to the mystery of Being, or one can turn away from the mystery, 
reducing the cosmos to nothing more than its instrumental-calculative features, 
allowing Ge-stell to conceal itself once more. 
 
Harman’s second major critique of the fourfold is the ambiguity with which 
Heidegger describes each of the four as both ontic and ontological, disrupting the 
neat distinction between the two. However, as I have discussed at length in 
Chapter Three with regards to authenticity, Ereignis, and the later Heidegger’s 
thinking more broadly, the ontological always implicates the ontic. 
Phenomenologically there is no ontological realm that does not also have its ontic 
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manifestation. The “ambiguity” of the ontic-ontological earth, for example, is 
dealt with in Chapter Five. Harman criticises Heidegger’s ambiguity thus: 
 
The second problem … is Heidegger’s inability to forget the literal connotations of the 
four terms of his fourfold. For instance, he too often uses metaphors of fertility when 
describing “earth,” even though chloroform, mules, and Teflon must all be earthly beings 
according to his schema … And finally, the moment of “gods” allows Heidegger to inflict 
his peasant Kitsch romanticism on all of us, by implying that rubber plantations, 
junkyards, cellular phones, and slapstick pranks are refused admission to the sphere of the 
divine, even though these preposterous entities are every bit as godlike in Heidegger’s 
fourfold sense as Greek temples and holy codices are (Harman 2009, 297-298). 
 
There are two significant problems with this critique of the fourfold. First, as I 
have indicated above, Harman’s caricature of Heidegger’s position—reducing the 
gods to peasant Kitsch and conflating the sphere of the divine with a descriptive 
function rather than an ethical judgement on the jurisdiction of instrumental-
calculative thinking, discussed below—is a continuation of the straw person that 
Harman develops in order to demonstrate Heidegger’s inconsistency in developing 
an object-oriented ontology. Yet from the reading of Heidegger that I have 
established, this criticism is unfounded, as this was not the sole, or even primary, 
function of the fourfold in Heidegger’s thinking. Harman misrepresents 
Heidegger’s intentions in order to demonstrate the ways in which the latter’s 
thinking of the fourfold misses the mark. From Harman’s appropriation of the 
fourfold as a normatively neutral description of entities in their springing-forth it 
appears ridiculous to claim that the earth (fertile in the sense that it is part of the 
pure origin, the ground and abyss) is any less present in Teflon than in a spring 
bubbling up from the ground. To address this issue, I must raise another problem: 
namely, that Harman equivocates what it means for things to be “of the earth” or 
granted “admission to the sphere of the divine”. 
 
The mirroring of the fourfold indicates that none can be thought in isolation from 
the others. By singling out the gods or the earth (I have omitted similar examples 
of the mortals and the sky from Harman’s passage above) and providing examples 
that challenge Heidegger’s position, Harman is able to demonstrate Heidegger’s 
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inconsistency. However, if we take the claim that none of the four can be thought 
in isolation from the others seriously, then the examples that Heidegger or Harman 
provide serve only to demonstrate an emphasis towards one aspect or another; 
they are pedagogical examples. Of course Teflon is of the earth in the same way 
that a bubbling spring is, yet Teflon reflects a peculiarly modern technological 
approach to meal preparation (and is itself a product of challenging-forth): 
convenient and time-efficient, making mealtime quicker and easier. In turn, this 
reflects the domestic attitude of the modern consumer: rather than as a necessary 
function of human being, a time for friends and family, for conversation, or an 
opportunity to reflect on the origin and significance of the food being served, the 
modern technological world reveals meal preparation as an inconvenience, an 
activity that steals time from more valuable work or leisure activities.7 Teflon 
reveals meal preparation as a kind of challenging-forth for harried and hurried 
inauthentic Dasein. Despite this, through a comportment of releasement and 
existential-meditative reflection on the fourfold, one can say yes and no to Teflon 
and appropriate it in one’s dwelling. While Teflon reveals the world as a place 
where cooking should be made quicker and easier, this is not what Da-sein must 
accept. The revealing of the world through Teflon is indicative of a broader, 
instrumental-calculative attitude that reflects the gigantic, where the quantitative 
becomes qualitative. The earth, however, is not just representative of the 
“concealed-something that exists” pairing that Harman’s dual axes place it on. 
The earth is a counter, a limiting factor. It is fertile in that it is part of the origin, 
therefore it reaches beyond itself to influence the “remaining in having sprung 
forth” of a thing, but not just in the sense of the brute existence of the thing. 
Rather, the earth of the fourfold refers to the fourfold in its unity in terms of the 
ethical valorisation of an unforced, non-violent revealing of Ereignis. Authentic 
human being always refers to an understanding of Da-sein, the cosmos, and Being 
itself: violently framed by Ge-stell, or gleaming8 in their excess and plenitude.  
																																																								
7 In ‘Letter on Humanism’ Heidegger cites the case of Heraclitus in the kitchen: “here too the gods 
come to presence” (2008d, 257). Kevin Aho (2009, 68-69) suggests that Heidegger’s inclusion of 
this example demonstrates the possibility that Heidegger’s thought has the potential to break out of 
its own masculinist-patriarchal frame (discussed further in the body of the chapter). 
8 In his interpretation of the German phrase Das Glänzen, Richard Capobianco suggests that the 
more usual English translation, ‘shining’, is “inadequate … English obliges with a number of 
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What Harman considers “peasant Kitsch romanticism” in the passage above, is the 
beckonings that give existential, ethical, and spiritual import to the phenomenon 
that Dasein’s care cor-responds with. He is correct to say that the rubber 
plantation is “every bit as godlike” as a Greek temple in the same way that it is 
correct to say that Ereignis and Ge-stell are both the essence of Being. What 
Harman dismisses is the inherently ethical and spiritual significance of the 
fourfold as a concept that reveals the inauthentic relationship of human being to 
itself and the cosmos. Phenomena are revealed as significant due to Dasein’s 
earthly finitude and poetic dwelling; as de-centred, human being is not the sole 
measure or arbiter of meaning. Despite the anthropocentrism of Ge-stell, things do 
not just matter to me, in a self-centred sense; things simply matter. Harman’s 
reading of the fourfold dismisses Heidegger’s thing-object distinction by shifting 
the focus to the sheer ‘springing forth’ and sustained existence of an extant 
artifact. In doing so, however, Harman’s account is oblivious to the distinction 
between technē and modern technology, and this distinction forms the context for 
Heidegger’s thinking of the fourfold. The fourfold is the foundation of dwelling. 
Towards an Ethics of Dwelling 
Throughout the thesis (and discussed in the Introduction and again in Chapter 
Eight), I have alluded to the existential, ethical, and spiritual significance of 
Heidegger’s thinking; the three are distinct but should be understood 
hermeneutically. In Heidegger’s terminology, the three are a threefold, where each 
mirrors and shelters the others. Heidegger’s thinking is existentially significant in 
that it pertains to existence itself. Further, the question of Being always implicates 
human being. Any question of ethics is always bound to the idea of human being 
as constitutively existentially invested; the ethical and the existential form a 
hermeneutic twofold, where one might readily argue that the existential is the 
ethical, rather than the grounds for such. As stated previously, while Heidegger 
does not have “an” ethics, I have demonstrated that the matter of authenticity, and 
the distinction between technē and modern technology is a properly ethical one in 
																																																																																																																																																								
alliterative that carry forward both the form of the German word and its distinctive sense: 
gleaming, glistening, glittering, glowing. Nature does not just ‘shine’, it ‘gleams’”  (2014, 29). 
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the sense that it is a systematically derived value judgement, rather than a vague 
poetic sensibility. Finally, as I will discuss in more depth in Chapter Eight, 
Heidegger’s thinking is spiritual in that ethical concerns are bound to Dasein’s 
constitutive existential investedness as care: one’s ontology always manifests in 
one’s historical-factical-ontic embodied self as an impassioned being. An 
originary sense of Being, and of one’s cor-respondence, is an ethical matter, but is 
experienced or lived as something more. Heidegger’s thinking is spiritually 
significant in that it contains a reverence for existence that counters the hubris and 
anthropocentrism of the modern technological world. That things matter at all is 
an existential concern, that there is a value judgement to such matters is an ethical 
concern, that I am thrown into, and identify with such judgements with 
vehemence, reverence, or apathy—that I am assailed by the world into which I am 
thrown, and where I am continually faced with the task of choosing to be what I 
am—is a spiritual concern. The spiritual significance of Heidegger’s thinking 
recognises something divine, something wholly other than human being, in 
existence itself: it is a product of, but not simply reducible to, the twofold of 
existential-ethical significance. However, all three should be thought 
hermeneutically in terms of the ontic-ontological ouroboros, where each ek-sistent 
Da-sein is also always a historically situated factical-ontic embodied person.  
 
From the existential-ethical-spiritual threefold, I now turn my attention towards 
the possibility of an ethics of dwelling—bearing in mind my caveat that this 
phrase is tautological and used specifically to emphasise the systematic, structural, 
and quasi-deontological features of dwelling, discussed below—based on the 
material I have covered in the thesis so far. As authentic human being, dwelling is 
not simply the willing self-construction of a subject resolutely grasping, rejecting, 
or modifying its ontic circumstances based on his or her particular historical-
factical situation. Instead, dwelling is always concerned with the distinction 
between Ge-stell and Ereignis, technē and modern technology, challenging 
imposition and letting-be. As such, an ethics of dwelling is founded on a 
phenomenological-ontological yardstick: the unforced appropriation of Being 
itself. However, as a yardstick that must also apply to the ontic realm in each 
person’s historical-factical situation, the sheer abstraction of “the unforced 
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appropriation of Being itself” is highly problematic. It is at this point that 
dwelling, as Heidegger formulates the idea, begins to falter. The concept of 
dwelling is founded on a rich and complex network of ideas; it is arrived at 
through a rigorous ontological exploration of what it means to be, and how the 
world shapes Dasein in various ways. But for dwelling to have any meaningful 
purchase—which I believe it does—it must be articulable beyond the notion of 
saying both yes and no to technology. For dwelling to overcome its problematic 
nature (discussed further below), it must be something more than an ontological 
description of subjective experience. To put dwelling to the test, one is forced to 
honestly ask the question: does Heidegger’s thinking actually offer anything more 
than a way to re-consider the subject-object relation and the hubristic, self-ish 
comportment of the modern Western subject to the environment and other people?  
 
By de-centring human being, Heidegger overcomes the problem of an ethical 
position that is purely subjective or relative to the individual by demonstrating that 
(what could be characterised as) objective, earthly features of reality such as the 
density of a fluid, the grain of wood, the mineral composition of a rock do in fact 
speak to each of us in the same way.9 Were each person sensitive to nature as 
physis, to language and agriculture and construction as poiētic, as technē, then the 
beckonings of the gods—the ways in which we would meaningfully interpret and 
respond to the ‘speaking’ of the earth—would be interpreted in essentially the 
same way, regardless of meteorological, geographical, and cultural differences. 
For example, an igloo, a mud hut, or a modern house that has been designed to 
reflect and fit in with the topography and prevailing atmospheric conditions of its 
location may all be built from different materials and have different design 
features, but, in Heideggerian terms, what is essential to each of them is the same. 
Similarly, different types of plumbing and sanitation solutions, as well as the 
development and use of agricultural tools reflect differences in cultures, materials, 
and the environment while all performing the same task. In this sense, an ethics of 
dwelling could not be rigidly prescriptive without a necessary level of abstraction. 																																																								
9 The assumption here is that objective reality is only accessible for those whose 
neurophysiological-cognitive functioning is statistically normal. That each system of ethics carries 
a number of fundamental assumptions that automatically include/exclude various entities based on 
their capacity for responsibility or obligation is discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
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However, free of the hubris and egocentrism that underpins Ge-stell, and filled 
with a reverence for the mystery of existence itself, such an ethics would maintain 
that certain ways of being are unequivocally unethical in a deontological sense—
that they fail to follow a rule, or the yardstick of unforced appropriation—and, 
correspondingly, that any number of other possible ways of being would be 
ethical. 
 
Despite this charitable characterisation of an ethics of dwelling as a quasi-
deontological position founded on an originary sense of Being, a problem remains. 
The attempt to overcome the problem of subjective relativism via alethic 
pluralism—in that there are many possible ways that dwelling can manifest 
depending on the historical-factical-ontic situation of each Dasein, regardless of 
the possibility of objectively understanding the countering-sheltering of the earth 
and the beckonings of the gods—remains susceptible to individual bias. It is in 
this sense that Heidegger’s thinking can be interpreted as a subtle shift in the 
relation of human being to itself and the environment, rather than as a grand or 
radical commencement of “the other beginning”. If Heidegger’s thought is a shift 
(no matter how subtle or significant), rather than a radical new beginning, can an 
ethics of dwelling offer anything more than any other ethical system? Can 
dwelling really facilitate the kind of openness and spirituality that overcomes 
hubristic anthropocentrism and egocentrism? Perhaps the saving grace of dwelling 
is Ge-stell itself. In much the same way that Sartre can describe bad faith without 
offering a clear picture of its alternative, Ge-stell offers the beginning point for an 
ethics of dwelling: by diagnosing specific features of the technological world, and 
revealing their ethical and spiritual destitution, an immediate (rather than abstract) 
point of engagement emerges.  
 
However, in order to find more than a meta-ethics or a ground for ethics in the 
concept of dwelling, one must be prepared to more fully explore the implications 
of Ge-stell beyond the intersection of human being and modern technology. Ge-
stell is an instrumental-calculative framing of the world, but the technological 
framing of the world positions people differently according to variables such as 
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class, race, and gender.10 No account of dwelling is complete without an in-depth 
account of the implications of Ge-stell beyond Heidegger’s own examples and 
warnings. Heidegger’s technical term ‘technology’ is easily conflated with the 
everyday understanding and use of the same. Such a conflation does injustice to 
Heidegger’s thinking and the possibilities that it affords. In order to come to terms 
with the existential, ethical, and spiritual significance of Heidegger’s thinking, I 
now explore an aspect of the modern technological world that Heidegger remained 
oblivious to. My exploration is double edged in that while it exposes one of the 
central weaknesses of Heidegger’s account of Ge-stell (and his analysis of the 
Western tradition), it simultaneously demonstrates the robust nature of the 
thinking that underpins this account. As such, the remainder of the thesis aims to 
demonstrate the efficacy of Heidegger’s thinking, despite its limitations. Building 
on the account of Heidegger’s critique of technology that I have developed so far, 
I now introduce the claim that the Western metaphysical tradition is not simply 
anthropocentric, it is also Anglo-centric, Euro-centric, and—the specific focus of 
this thesis—phallocentric.11  
 
The Male Subject and the Patriarchal-Masculinist Framing of Ge-stell 
In this section of the chapter I will establish two central points. First, I will argue 
that due to the inherently masculinist and patriarchal nature of the Western 
philosophical tradition, Ge-stell is an inherently gendered mode of disclosure that 
privileges the masculine to the detriment of other ways of being. Second, I will 
demonstrate that if Heidegger’s response to Ge-stell is oblivious to the colonising, 
racist, classist, and masculinist aspects of Ge-stell, dwelling—as formulated by 
Heidegger, as a response to technology—is severely limited in its applicability 
and scope. However, I shall also argue throughout the remainder of the thesis that 
this is not a reason to abandon Heidegger’s thinking or to lose faith in the 																																																								
10 Class, race, and gender are only three of the many ways that human being is framed by Ge-stell. 
Adding to this list are obvious examples such as sexuality and physical and cognitive capacity, and 
less obvious examples such as religious and ethical persuasions. The remainder of this chapter and 
Chapter Seven both focus on the framing of gender and sexuality, with a brief discussion of the 
similarities between Michel Foucault’s genealogical methodology and Heidegger’s thinking of Ge-
stell to make sense of the claim that Ge-stell’s framing of human being is more than an abstracted 
matter of a metaphysical relation to Being.  
11 I return to the concept of phallocentrism in more detail in Chapter Eight. I use it here only to 
introduce the following discussion.   
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possibility of dwelling. On the contrary, through the following discussion I will 
demonstrate that Heidegger’s analysis of Ge-stell offers a productive way to 
critically interpret the masculinist-patriarchal framing of the modern technological 
world. Further, I will conclude that rather than revealing an irredeemable flaw in 
the concept of dwelling as developed by Heidegger, the failure of the concept 
serves as an en-counter that makes the gendered12 framing of the world 
conspicuous. In other words, as the limitations of the concept are revealed, the 
conditions for these limitations are made conspicuous. Interpreted 
hermeneutically, this kind of revealing is itself an en-counter, a condition for 
authenticity, for dwelling. Through the remainder of this chapter, I problematise 
dwelling by remaining faithful to Heidegger’s thinking while taking the concept 
beyond his original examples. In making dwelling problematic, I aim to 
demonstrate that while the original concept of dwelling fails for certain reasons, 
this failure can be understood as a condition for a more robust interpretation of the 
concept: a more authentic authenticity.  
 
Heidegger claims that Ge-stell is the culmination of the oblivion of Being 
throughout the Western philosophical tradition. In accepting his analysis of Ge-
stell, one must also grant that any other taxonomically consistent features of the 
Western philosophical tradition must also manifest in Ge-stell. Further, if Ge-stell 
is not just a culmination, but also an exacerbation of subject-object metaphysics, 
where the alienation of the subject from the object has reduced the external world 
to standing reserve, then it follows that other significant taxonomic features of the 
tradition are perhaps similarly exacerbated. The exacerbation of subject-object 
metaphysics into the technological framing of Ge-stell places the subject in a 
paradoxical position where the lack of inherent meaning in the universe has 
facilitated a shift in attitude, where the quantitative, instrumental-calculative way 
of knowing the cosmos has become qualitatively valorised. This position is 																																																								
12 As a matter of scope, I have limited my analysis of Ge-stell to the issue of gender privilege and 
oppression while noting that the framing of the modern world also applies to liberal-capitalist 
economics and matters of class, and is clearly relevant to the racism inherent in the traces of 
colonial imperialist attitudes. This last is particularly prevalent in a colonised country such as 
Australia where first nations peoples—particularly those in rural areas—are, as a population, the 
most disadvantaged group of people in the country in terms of infrastructure, health, and economic 
opportunities. 
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paradoxical in that qualitative existential significance itself is unable to be 
quantitatively measured and must therefore be considered merely subjective. Yet 
technologically diagnosing the subjective as somehow less real or true than the 
objective—merely subjective—is also a value judgement, rather than a neutral 
descriptive account. Again, if Ge-stell is an exacerbation of subject-object 
metaphysics, it follows that other central and consistent tendencies within subject-
object metaphysics are exacerbated within Ge-stell as well. What, then, is the 
significance of the fact that predominantly male thinkers from positions of relative 
privilege constitute the Western philosophical tradition, and that the experience of 
the subject is largely a masculine one?13 
 
In The Man of Reason, Genevieve Lloyd claims that the subject was largely 
founded on a metaphysical interpretation of the cosmos where the masculine or 
active element of each binary was valorised: strong/weak, active/passive, 
motion/rest, male/female (1993, 3). Given this cultural association, Lloyd goes on 
to claim that the “male-female distinction itself has operated not as a 
straightforwardly descriptive principle of classification, but as an expression of 
values” (103). Similarly, Luce Irigaray argues that the subject of subject-object 
metaphysics, and thus of the modern technological world, is always masculine. 
The masculine subject is thought of as active, present, symbolically endowed with 
the phallus, while the feminine is denied subjectivity; the feminine object is 
merely the empty reflection of the masculine subject, passive, absent, endowed 
with a sexual abyss rather than a phallus (1985, 133-135).14 According to Judith 
Butler, Irigaray does not claim that the feminine is constructed of whatever is left 
over from the construction of the masculine but that the masculine has solely 
appropriated the means to becoming a subject at all (2002, 15). Discussed further 
in Chapter Eight, the language that ascribes meaning and value to both sex and 																																																								
13 As constitutively in-the-world, where the world consists of the patriarchal masculine framing of 
Ge-stell, each Dasein is exposed to specific cultural gender norms. As I discuss throughout this 
chapter and the next, the less conscious effort that it takes for an individual to cohere with said 
norms, the less likely it is that these norms—and particularly the harmful or oppressive qualities 
associated with these norms—will be conspicuous for this person. Heidegger’s thinking, though 
itself fraught with masculinist assumptions, offers the possibility of making these norms visible 
through the notion of authentic ek-sistent Da-sein, the mortal of the Fourfold. 
14 For a further discussion of the continuity and disparity between Heidegger’s and Irigaray’s 
thinking, see Joanne Faulkner’s ‘Amnesia at the Beginning of Time: Irigaray’s reading of 
Heidegger in The Forgetting of Air’ (2001). 
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gender is always already “phallogocentric” (ibid) and unable to articulate the 
feminine without a masculinist taint. While Irigaray’s characterisation of the male 
subject incorporates elements of psychoanalytic theory, both she and Lloyd 
attempt to demonstrate that obvious gender inequalities—in terms of socio-
economic status and power, for example—are neither arbitrary nor related solely 
to the choices and actions of the individual. Rather, the manner in which the 
masculine and the unmasculine manifest in the modern technological world is 
always framed by a deeply entrenched series of cultural associations and value 
judgements. Kevin Aho writes “[f]eminist critics, for the most part, agree with 
Heidegger’s position that the interpretation and understanding we have of 
ourselves is not determined by essential biological differences but by the 
sociohistorical situation into which we are thrown … the meaningful social roles 
and practices we grow into are uniquely patriarchal” (2009, 58). The implications 
of these claims, and those in the following discussion, will be examined further in 
Chapters Seven and Eight. 
 
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir demonstrates the extent to which the 
subject is a model of peculiarly masculine construction. De Beauvoir (1997) 
argues that the subject of the Western tradition is based on masculine standards 
that devalue the unmasculine. For example, de Beauvoir demonstrates that the 
female role in reproduction is framed in terms of a passive receptivity to the active 
male role, and that such framing is a product of, and perpetuates, a value judgment 
disguised as a neutral description (1997, 39-41). Further, reflecting the double 
concealing of Ge-stell, de Beauvoir highlights the fact that devaluing the feminine 
is not an objective judgment, but instead is 
 
 dependent on a whole context; the ‘weakness’ is revealed as such only in the light of the
 ends man proposes, the instruments he has available, and the laws he establishes. If he
 does not wish to seize the world, then the idea of a grasp on things has no sense; when in
 this seizure the full employment of bodily power is not required, above the available
 minimum, then differences in strength are annulled; wherever violence is contrary to
 custom, muscular force cannot be a basis for domination (de Beauvoir 1993, 67). 
 
For de Beauvoir, not only is the subject an accumulation of masculine traits, such 
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accumulation acts as the context, measure, horizon, or frame that subtly 
transforms each description into a value judgment. The notion of superfluous 
strength in this passage is analogous to Heidegger’s account of the gigantic and 
the will to power. The particular type or quantity of strength that is appropriate for 
a given task is valued less than the notion of strength itself, simply for its own 
sake. The peculiarly masculine subject, stemming from a systemic masculine bias 
within the Western tradition, is also illustrated by the way that gender is 
consciously and unconsciously learned, or, less charitably, imposed and sustained 
through a variety of discourses. In so far as the specifically masculine subject and 
the imposition of gender norms and social roles are always framed within modern 
technological discourses, bell hooks’ notion of “imperialist white supremacist 
capitalist patriarchy” (2016, 2) is readily interpreted as the worlding of Ge-stell. 
Implicating the unitary entanglement of a number of discourses stemming 
specifically from the Western philosophical tradition, hooks’ concept 
demonstrates the multivalence of Ge-stell in the modern technological age.  
 
Although patriarchy is not exclusive to the West, it is a key historical feature of 
the Western philosophical tradition. Not only is the canon almost entirely made up 
of male thinkers, all of these thinkers also lived under (and mostly benefited from) 
patriarchal rule. As such, it is uncontentious to claim that the Western 
philosophical tradition developed on a patriarchal horizon. I understand 
‘patriarchy’ to descriptively and historiologically refer to Western socio-political 
structures, as well as a pervasive, systemic masculine bias stemming from and 
perpetuating masculine models of socio-political and juridical rule or 
governance.15 As Gail Stenstad relates: “[t]he beginning of patriarchal social 
structures is older, by at least two or three thousand years, and is also more 
geographically diverse than the beginning of Western philosophy that is 
Heidegger’s focus” (2001, 346). The extent and nature of the influence of the 
patriarchal horizon on the development of a peculiarly masculinist metaphysics is 
impossible to quantify. While the two concepts are distinct, Ge-stell is always 																																																								
15 Many feminist theorists, including those I engage with in the body of the chapter, continue to 
utilise, rather than radically re-define, the concept of patriarchy in a number of ways. Sylvia 
Walby’s Theorizing Patriarchy (1990) and Gerda Lerner’s The Creation of Patriarchy (1986) 
continue to serve as foundational texts for an exploration of the concept. 
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patriarchal, while the reverse of this—that patriarchy is also always 
technological—does not hold true; this is due to the peculiarly historical nature of 
Ge-stell. In light of the material discussed throughout the thesis so far, it is useful 
to consider patriarchy itself as an alethic revealing of the world. Patriarchy makes 
it possible for certain people to flourish in ways others cannot. A patriarchal 
horizon invests social power and authority in the masculine, making it possible for 
a series of voices to be heard, while simultaneously silencing, or at least 
devaluing, other voices. From the patriarchal Socratic Greeks, to the outright 
misogyny of the Church, the voices of the Western philosophical tradition were 
shaped in meaningful ways by a gendered horizon, a gendered revealing of the 
world. The influence of this phenomenon is apparent in everything from the kind 
of hero myths that continue to be valorised in popular culture, through to the 
intentional and unintentional reinforcement of gender roles in children. 
  
First published in 1982, Carol Gilligan’s In A Different Voice (2003) further 
demonstrates the masculine bias that exists within prevailing (of the time, and 
arguably persistent today) models of human psychological development. As a 
discourse entrenched in the metaphysical foundations of Ge-stell, such a 
masculine bias is, arguably, foundational for the discipline itself. Gilligan 
discusses various theories concerned with the role of gender identity to a child’s 
sense of self, which is, in turn, attached to a series of pre-existing gender norms 
and expectations that valorise the male perspective of the world. Gilligan’s 
analysis began, at least in part, in response to Robert Kohlberg’s assertions around 
the development of morality. Kohlberg’s framing of morality is based in the 
masculinist subject-object metaphysical model of European Enlightenment ethics, 
particularly Kantian deontology with “important strands” (Blum 1988, 473) of a 
utilitarian outlook. This model of morality valorises the masculine subject as 
described above and, for Kohlberg, assumes that the inability to move beyond a 
level of attachment and empathy for others demonstrates a developmental deficit 
(Gilligan 2003, 18). Echoing the contextual framing that de Beauvoir refers to in 
the above passage, Gilligan relates that from the masculinist perspective, “only if 
women enter the traditional arena of male activity will they recognise the 
inadequacy of this moral perspective” (ibid). Attachment and empathy are 
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devalued within the traditional male arena, and only through the realisation of 
such can women “progress like men toward higher stages where relationships are 
subordinated to rules…and rules to universal principles” (ibid). The assumption 
that one should progress beyond relationships towards universal principles is a 
violent epistemological imposition on the alethic conception of truth. Gilligan’s 
work, in concert with Irigaray and de Beauvoir, provides further evidence for the 
notion that there is no feminine or non-masculine subject, only the subject, which 
always already assumes the masculine perspective (as impartial, objective, and 
thus invisible to itself), and valorises this perspective to the detriment of other 
ways of knowing. 
 
Gilligan demonstrates that the social sciences attempt to understand the 
development of personality and identity by assuming that “men’s experience 
stands for all of human experience” (2003, xiii). In revealing this assumption, 
Gilligan’s work, as with that of Lloyd and Irigaray, exposes more than the isolated 
bias of key thinkers of modernity such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Freud. 
Instead, a feminist perspective reveals the modern technological world as the 
culmination of peculiarly masculine subject-object metaphysics and augments 
Heidegger’s critique of the Western tradition. Devaluing traits and characteristics 
that are culturally associated with the feminine is a significant aspect of Ge-stell. 
Recognising this is important for understanding how Ge-stell frames the modern 
technological world and the people who live in it. The rational, autonomous 
subject that stands as the cornerstone of modern Western juridical, political, 
ethical, and medical narratives is the product of an inherently masculine 
metaphysics, and is framed into a position of relative power and privilege by Ge-
stell. While Heidegger may have been oblivious to this gendered aspect of Ge-
stell, his attempt to recover the problem of Being, and to counter instrumental-
calculative thinking with existential-meditative thinking offers important insights 
into how the gendered aspects of Ge-stell manifest. Interpreting the violence of 
imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy as aspects of Ge-stell not only 
sheds new light on the implications and relevance of Heidegger’s thinking, it 
sheds new light on the historical-factical-ontical problems associated with such 
framing. Importantly, considering gendered issues as an aspect of Ge-stell 
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provides a way to en-counter these issues, to either make the invisible visible, or, 
at least, conspicuous in its invisibility. In short, the concept of Ge-stell offers a 
way to interpret the implications of patriarchy that can supplement a political, 
sociological, or historiological explanation of the same. 
 
Butler’s account of gender offers further insight into how masculinist bias 
systemically frames the modern technological world. Butler’s analysis of gender 
demonstrates that the framing of Ge-stell, as I have presented it, is not just 
masculinist, but inherently heteronormative. In her revised preface (from 1999) in 
Gender Trouble (2002), Butler states that any form of gender theorising should 
“be careful not to idealize certain expressions of gender that, in turn, produce new 
forms of hierarchy and exclusion” (viii). This warning is sensitive to the 
distinction between a violent, challenging mode of revealing, and an alēthic 
revealing that is sensitive to its own nature. Not only does Ge-stell create 
conditions that give rise to a masculine subject at the direct expense of the 
unmasculine, in ordering human being in this manner, Ge-stell enforces a 
“compulsory heterosexuality” (2002, 24) in a socio-political and metaphysical 
sense. In its current historical form, compulsory heterosexuality is also 
intrinsically masculinist: it devalues effeminate (behaviourally, aesthetically, 
sexually) men, and assumes that even same sex couples will adopt social norms 
that perpetuate the dominance of the masculine over the unmasculine. Butler’s 
analysis of gender demonstrates that many feminist theories, including those that 
attempt to address or account for systemic masculine bias, are also 
heteronormative.16 Heteronormativity is historically masculinist, perpetuating the 
ideal of a feminine homebody and a masculine provider, a pervasive cultural ideal 
that is evidenced in modern capitalist institutions.17  
 																																																								
16 Chapter One of Gender Trouble outlines much of Butler’s concern over the potentially 
oppressive and exclusive nature of identity politics. Butler asks “[t]o what extent does the category 
of woman achieve stability and coherence only in the context of the heterosexual matrix?” (2002, 
9), reflecting the idea that the degree to which each person is able to cohere with Ge-stell is of 
existential, ethical, and spiritual significance in so far as human being is constitutively in-the-
world.  
17 See Nina Power’s One Dimensional Woman (2009, 17-22) and Nancy Fraser’s Fortunes of 
Feminism (2013, 53-82) for a discussion of the masculine bias pervasive in the structure of the 
capitalist workplace.  
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Butler’s account of gender performativity is important for understanding how the 
notion of gender can be interpreted as an ontological characteristic distinct from 
ontic sexual biology. A central point for Butler, but ultimately tangential for my 
own project, is the question of whether or not the concept of gender is itself 
inherently oppressive in a hierarchical or exclusionary sense. This is an important 
question that I do not have the space to address in this thesis.18 However, the 
significance of this question is such that I raise it in the body of the chapter in 
order that the conclusions and considerations of the remainder of the thesis must, 
at least indirectly, be aware of the destabilising nature of such a question. Despite 
the possibility that gender itself is an oppressive framing of human being, Butler’s 
analysis also provides further support for the notion that the framing of Ge-stell is 
inherently masculinist. In the first chapter of Gender Trouble, Butler summarises 
much of what I have previously described as the double concealing of Ge-stell, 
stating that “subjects are invariably produced through certain exclusionary 
practices that do not ‘show’ once the juridical structure of politics has been 
established” (2002, 5). The conditions for subjectivity, in this case culturally and 
normatively valued masculine characteristics, pre-determine the nature of the 
subject, and in this pre-determining they become invisible in their ubiquity. Butler 
continues, “[t]he juridical structures of language and politics constitute the 
contemporary field of power; hence, there is no position outside this field, but 
																																																								
18 In ‘Post-Identity Politics and the Social Weightlessness of Radical Gender Theory’, Paddy 
McQueen (2016) offers a concise summary of the tension between post-Butlerian accounts of 
gender and feminist political models that are regarded as containing some kind of essentialist 
perspective (i.e. that there is a shared or common characteristic that defines the category of 
‘woman’ that is more than a performance). McQueen states that this tension emerges from a 
perceived “social weightlessness” (74)—a lack of political traction or phenomenological-
existential accuracy in regards to the lived experience of many women—of post-identity, post-
gender theorising. Anticipating the difficulty that my own position—one that follows Heidegger’s 
de-centring of human being and of recognising the countering-sheltering of the earth and its 
interplay with the worlding that constitutes Dasein’s Being-in-the-world—would perhaps tend 
towards, McQueen takes the position that “the problem with advocating strategies of incoherence, 
nomadic becoming or imperceptibility is that they can collapse into a social weightlessness that 
renders them irrelevant or insensitive to the material, embodied realities of those individuals that 
they are meant to help. Furthermore, they rest upon models of agency that assign a radical capacity 
for self-transformation to individuals without specifying how such a capacity emerges and is 
sustained” (77). The question of whether gender itself is oppressive is too large for this thesis in so 
far as it takes a step beyond this thesis. While I want to demonstrate that Ge-stell is a gendered 
framing of the world, and to demonstrate both the strength and limitations of Heidegger’s thinking, 
claiming that any concept of gender, or more humbly that a binary concept of gender, is in itself an 
oppressive framing of human being is a different question to my own, and thus requires a different 
approach to the one I have taken. 
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only a critical genealogy of its own legitimating practices” (8). Here, Butler 
reinforces the notion that it is impossible to wholly step outside the framing of Ge-
stell due to the manner in which it manifests in particular social and political 
institutions, and that instead, it becomes necessary to make it visible (via a 
“critical genealogy of legitimating practices”), to understand Ge-stell qua Ge-stell. 
 
Butler states that the “genealogical critique refuses to search for the origins of 
gender … rather, genealogy investigates the political stakes in designating as an 
origin and a cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of 
institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin” 
(xxix). Through this approach, Butler is able to draw out a number of difficulties 
and inconsistencies in re-thinking gender by making  the violent and oppressive 
conditions that create the difficulties and inconsistencies visible in the first place. 
It is possible, and, I believe, important, to consider Ge-stell as an important 
ontological feature of the “institutions, practices, and discourses” that Butler seeks 
to interrogate. The “multiple and diffuse points of origin” that form the gendered 
subject are readily interpreted as the many overlapping and intersecting historical-
factical-ontic manifestations of the technological, imperialist, white supremacist, 
capitalist, patriarchal revealing of the world. Rather than reduce these various 
institutions, practices and discourses of oppression down to one source, 
interpreting these various manifestations of systemic oppression as aspects of Ge-
stell—and in light of Heidegger’s phenomenology—readily demonstrates the 
efficacy of the concept of subjectivation, where Dasein becomes entrenched in a 
situation that keeps Da-sein and the human belonging to Being hidden. In this 
sense, Ge-stell is the disclosive frame from which various “regimes of truth” (viii) 
emerge.  
 
While Butler is often critical of Foucault, the critical genealogy of the latter plays 
an important role in the former’s analysis of gender performativity and the 
problems of identity politics. Butler draws on aspects of Foucault’s thinking to 
consider how a subject is produced from (what I characterise as) its historical-
factical-ontic situation. While Butler and Foucault each take their own trajectory, I 
discuss the two thinkers together here only to suggest that the critical genealogical 
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approach that they employ—each in their own way—augments Heidegger’s 
thinking of Ge-stell, and provides further support for my own. Giorgio Agamben 
considers Heidegger’s thinking of Ge-stell in “proximity” (2009, 12) with 
Foucault’s thinking of an apparatus, in that both refer to “a set of practices, bodies 
of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and 
orient” (ibid). Yet the most obvious difference between Foucault’s genealogical 
account and Heidegger’s concept of Ge-stell is the specificity of the former and 
the breadth of the latter. However, this difference is complimentary in that 
Foucault demonstrates the significance of understanding the notion of a self that is 
constitutively-ontologically in the world, where the world is not simply a neutral 
or benign horizon.19 Timothy Rayner draws three direct continuities between 
Foucault’s reflection on the affect/effect of Biopower and the subject, and 
Heidegger’s thinking of Ge-stell. Rayner names these three continuities  
“substantive … instrumental [and] strategical” (2001, 150, my insertion). In his 
discussion, Rayner is careful to demonstrate that Foucault does not simply 
“recapitulate” (142) Heidegger’s thought, but rather that in certain fundamental 
ways the two “deploy a shared way of thinking” (143). Rayner’s account of 
Foucault and Heidegger also demonstrates that the framing and ordering of Ge-
stell extends beyond the technological, and implicates the way in which the 
subject, and those who are unable to cohere with the standards of (male) 
subjectivity, are framed within Ge-stell via a number of specific ontic discourses 
and institutions. Further, Rayner is clear that Foucault’s account is not simply 
Heideggerian and should not be characterised as such. Alan Milchman and Alan 
Rosenberg, editors of Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, also discuss 
the risk of such a claim. In their introductory essay ‘Toward a Foucault/Heidegger 
Auseinandersetzung’, they conclude that it is a mistake to exaggerate Heidegger’s 
influence on Foucault, where “Foucault emerges as a disciple of Heidegger’s” 
(Milchman and Rosenberg 2003, 5). Foucault’s analysis of biopower is more 
specific than Heidegger’s discussion of Ge-stell in the sense that Foucault 																																																								
19 While I am in no way implying that Foucault or Butler’s projects are subsumed by the broader, 
horizonal thinking of Ge-stell, I am nevertheless suggesting that the basis of their thinking shares a 
kind of methodological assumption about the alethic nature of language and social institutions. In 
turn these three thinkers understand the self as largely a product of language and social institutions, 
as constitutively being-in-the-world. Finally, all three can be characterised as thinkers who assume 
that the mode of revealing prevalent in modernity is largely violent and oppressive. 
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factically-ontically grounds his analysis in historiologically traceable and 
definable social institutions such as the modern prison and the psychiatric 
institution. Despite the different intentions and conclusions of each thinker, much 
of Foucault’s work compliments Heidegger’s thinking of Ge-stell, augmenting 
and correcting his thinking in particular instances (Rayner 2001, 150-154).  
 
The Impossibility of Dwelling 
As the essence of technology, Ge-stell frames, orders, and positions the world and 
its inhabitants in certain ways. The saying of the logos of technology is an 
instrumental-calculative saying, a gathering of the world that revolves around a 
subject and its search for objective truth. In the Western tradition, the subject is 
privileged over the object in that it is the centre of experience, and the origin of 
meaning and value, while the object remains passive. However, the subject of the 
Western tradition is also a historically masculine subject. Not only is this subject 
alienated from the world that it is constitutively in (as Dasein), it is also 
epistemologically-existentially detached from its constitutive network of other 
people as Mitsein, Mitdasein, Being-with. As Gilligan’s work demonstrates, the 
masculine subject learns to detach from nurturing, caring, empathetic interactions 
with others in order to develop the capacity to follow abstract, universal 
principles. The masculine subject must step beyond or outside its world in order to 
achieve autonomy. However, the potential cost of metaphysical autonomy, from 
Heidegger’s position, is the anthropocentric hubris of the willing self-constructing 
subject that reduces the cosmos to standing reserve. Corollary to this reduction, 
the unmasculine is also devalued. Social institutions, cultural norms, and language 
itself come to valorise the masculine experience of the world to the point that the 
masculine experience of the world becomes invisible in its ubiquity. The 
masculine experience of the world is accepted as the correct experience of the 
world. As such, technology, in Heidegger’s sense of the term, is a historically 
masculine revealing of the world. Ge-stell is a masculinist-patriarchal framing of 
the world. This problematises notions of objectivity and impartiality in that—
similar to the double concealing of Ge-stell—the masculine experience of the 
world is already culturally associated with objectivity and impartiality, even when 
it is reflecting the masculine bias of Ge-stell. 
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If objectivity and impartiality require that an individual be aware of her own 
socio-cultural-historical context and how this informs her understanding of the 
world, then such a context must be made conspicuous. Yet the more one’s 
fundamental ways of being cohere with the prevailing mode of disclosure, the less 
conspicuous such disclosure becomes. One cannot objectively or impartially 
analyse an assumption that one is oblivious of. As such, there is an important 
catch here: on the one hand, the historically masculine perspective has been 
valorised for its objectivity, yet, when understood as coherence with the 
masculine-patriarchal worlding of Ge-stell, such objectivity risks losing its 
authentic essence. Objective or impartial reflection is, of course, integral to critical 
thinking and the appropriate application of the scientific method and instrumental-
calculative thinking. However, in considering the double concealing of Ge-stell, 
what is readily assumed to be impartial or objective may reflect the systemic bias 
inherent to Ge-stell, rather than any genuine impartiality or objectivity.20 The 
distinction here is one of authenticity in so far as impartiality requires that each 
person not only understands her position and the assumptions that underpin it, but 
also that she has honestly reconciled this position with her own historical-factical-
ontic circumstances in order to understand how and why she holds such a position 
(and whether or not such a position is really a reflection of the violent, willing 																																																								
20 In her Introduction to Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Heidi Grasswick 
reflects on the idea that impartiality and objectivity may simply reflect a coherence with a 
hegemonic series of assumptions: “Positivist philosophy of science … might have been able to 
explain gender bias … [b]ut it could not explain why it was feminists who seemed to be the ones 
noticing the bias … Whether it be the positivist ideals of value-neutrality dominant in the scientific 
realm, or an ideal of rationality carrying masculinist undertones yet understood to be necessary for 
knowing, or the standard abstract epistemological model of ‘S knows that p’ where ‘S’ could be 
any knower, belying a commitment to the interchangeability of knowers, such frameworks make it 
easier to mask masculine bias as a neutral position. If knowledge is equated with a neutral point of 
view, then those who have the power to claim knowledge can mask (albeit unwittingly) their 
particular perspective as the neutral point of view” (2011, xix). The double concealing of Ge-stell 
can account for this kind of pernicious bias, leading to conditions that Miranda Fricker refers to as 
testimonial and hermeneutic injustice. “[T]estimonial injustice [is] a kind of injustice in which 
someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower” (2007, 20, my insertion) in relation 
to the “credibility excess … or… credibility deficit” (17) of either the speaker or the audience. By 
comparison, “hermeneutical injustice [is] the injustice of having some significant area of one’s 
social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to persistent and wide-ranging 
hermeneutic marginalization” (154, my insertion), where hermeneutic marginalisation refers to 
exclusionary hegemonic social practices that do not account for the life experiences, meanings, and 
values of those who are a minority for some reason beyond their control (race, gender, class, and 
so on). 
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imposition of the subject). To claim one’s position is impartially, objectively true 
is only possible in the instrumental-calculative sense of correctness; nothing 
alethic can be impartially, objectively, universally true. Additionally, deference to 
the instrumental-calculative must be interrogated to ensure its legitimacy. But 
what of those who are unwilling or simply unable to cohere with Ge-stell as 
completely as others?  
 
I have previously claimed that the fourfold is a way to transform an encounter into 
an en-counter. An en-counter is an interruption of the everyday that makes the self 
as Da-sein, the masculine worlding of Ge-stell, and the possibility of dwelling 
visible. Yet despite this formula, not every Dasein’s historical-factical-ontical 
situation is such that it can dwell in any meaningful sense. This is the point at 
which Heidegger’s account of dwelling, as the central feature of his response to 
Ge-stell, falters: for dwelling to have any traction, for the concept to be more than 
a nebulous abstraction of a poetic response to the sheer wonder of existence, it 
must offer something more than a simple saying yes and no to technology. It must 
recognise that there are qualitative and quantitative differences between people’s 
capacities (based on their historical-factical-ontic situation) to resist or respond—
to say no—to Ge-stell. As authentic human being, dwelling always implicates the 
ontic-ontological ouroboros. Further, dwelling is not a willing self-construction, 
but a manifestation of one’s belonging to Being, an ontic manifestation of poiētic 
ek-sistent Da-sein. In the same way that resoluteness is only in so far as there is a 
resolution, poiētic dwelling is only where Da-sein conspicuously (rather than 
simply ontologically) manifests itself poiētically. Dwelling is not subjective, but is 
measurable by the same standard that distinguishes technē from modern 
technology. If dwelling has a yardstick of sorts, then what use the concept for 
those who are positioned by Ge-stell in such a manner that dwelling seems little 
more than an unachievable ideal? Does dwelling deny the possibility of 
authenticity to those unable to cohere with Ge-stell, those who are unable to 
modify their ontic situation in a way that honours both their historicity and their 
ek-sistent Da-sein? While Dasein is ontologically equivalent, the ontic 
manifestation of a being that is constitutively Being-in-the-world—where the 
world is Ge-stell—is disparate from person to person, dependent on the framing of 
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imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy. Speaking in regards to the 
earlier Heidegger’s insistence on the neutrality of Dasein, and thus the universality 
of his fundamental ontology, Kevin Aho writes: 
 
 As a man, Heidegger’s starting point has a specific gender identity based on a particular 
 masculine understanding of being. This understanding is embodied in the everyday social 
 acts and practices of an early twentieth-century German male who also happens to be
 young, educated, middle class, and relatively healthy. Because his existentiell descriptions
 are already shaped by a background of patriarchal social norms, it is obviously not self
 evident to Heidegger that he must announce his own gender identity in Being and Time.
 As Simone de Beauvoir reminds us, as a man he does not have to (2009, 56).  
 
That Heidegger himself was positioned by Ge-stell into relative privilege and 
power is not enough to dismiss his thinking as irredeemably masculinist. It does, 
however, problematise aspects of Heidegger’s thought, and places his 
contemporary readers into a productive tension with these aspects. Here is, in his 
own way, a deeply enframed individual whose thinking laid out a path to make the 
very conditions that define him as enframed visible. That he was unable or 
unwilling to apply this thinking to himself is not a failure of the thought, but of the 
thinker himself. Although I argue that Heidegger’s later critique of technology 
offers a way to interpret the masculinist framing of Ge-stell, Heidegger’s 
formulation of dwelling falters in that it emphasises the ontological neutrality of 
Da-sein at the expense of the gendered, embodied, historically situated Dasein. 
While each person’s ontological ek-sistent Da-sein is equivalent, it does not 
follow that the historical-factical-ontic situation of each Dasein is qualitatively 
equivalent. While Heidegger does not explicitly make this claim, his account of 
dwelling implicitly assumes that each person has an equivalent capacity to 
reconcile and modify her historical-factical-ontic situation in order to reflect one’s 
ek-sistent Da-sein. However, the less one coheres with Ge-stell, the more difficult 
such a reconciliation (and modification) becomes. While this may sound counter-
intuitive at first—that cohering with Ge-stell actually facilitates dwelling—it is 
key to understanding how and why Heidegger’s response to technology falters in a 
way that he did not, perhaps could not, see. By abstracting the notion of dwelling 
beyond gender (or race, or class), it narrows its applicability to those for whom 
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such universal abstraction has any meaningful purchase. In other words, the 
assumption that ontic equivalence (of situation or capacity) follows from 
ontological equivalence, already assumes a masculine horizon.  
 
The possibilities for dwelling that are offered to a child prostitute in Thailand21 are 
qualitatively different to those of a white, male, middle class, university-educated 
office worker. In the patriarchal framing of Ge-stell, those who do not cohere with 
the hegemonic characteristics of Ge-stell are positioned in such a way that they are 
routinely ‘interrupted’. However, this kind of interruption does not result in the 
same meaningful factical-ontic possibilities as it does for those in privileged 
positions. For those unable to cohere with the masculine norms valorised in Ge-
stell, the revealing of the world is perhaps visible and conspicuous more often 
than not. However, rather than act as a condition for authenticity, such visibility 
serves as a horizon of oppression. That the interruption of Ge-stell is not a basis 
for authenticity for those unable to cohere with Ge-stell was already noted by de 
Beauvoir: 
 
 [S]he lacks the technical training that would permit her to dominate matter. As for her, it
 is not matter she comes to grips with, but life; and life cannot be mastered through the
 use of tools: one can only submit to its secret laws. The world does not seem to woman as																																																								
21 I refer to Thailand here, and again later in the thesis, as perhaps the exemplary instance of a 
developing country where prostitution and Western tourism deliberately, rather than coincidentally 
intersect. Elizabeth Bernstein and Elena Shih state “[f]ascination with sex and poverty drives 
Westerners to Thailand; however, once they arrive there, they avoid sustained interactions with sex 
workers—and in particular, with sex workers’ rights organizations—so as to not challenge the 
already-cemented imaginaries of what sexual commerce in Thailand consists of” (2014, 450). 
Alexis Aronowitz (2009) provides an analysis of global human trafficking. This analysis supports 
the notion that Thailand is exemplary for the case I am making, linking Thailand specifically to 
“child sex tourism” (39). Chapter Six of Sheila Jeffreys’ The Industrial Vagina: The Political 
Economy of the Global Sex Trade provides a meta-analysis of previous studies to demonstrate the 
extent to which Westerners treat Thailand as a destination for prostitution. Jeffreys’ states “[t]he 
term ‘sex tourism’ is a euphemism, and a normalizing term, which can conceal the harm done by 
prostitution tourists and represent this form of men’s behaviour as being about mutual fun and 
entertainment. The term ‘prostitution tourism’ is more suited to making the gendered nature of the 
phenomenon and its harms to women visible” (131). While Aronowitz demonstrates that it is not 
just women that are being harmed by prostitution tourism, Nicola Piper (2005), Sarah Meyer et. 
Al. (2014), and Siroj Sorajjakool and Arelis Benitez (2015) demonstrate that sexual slavery, 
human trafficking, and prostitution tourism is generally aimed at women of all ages and young 
boys (still an unmasculine other). Thailand is certainly not the only country that faces these issues, 
but I use the country as a specific reference point. It is important to note that all of the 
aforementioned studies demonstrate the complicity of the West—in the sense that it is largely 
Western men who are using the people who are trafficked or socio-economically coerced—in these 
issues across all the developing and third world countries. 
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 ‘an assemblage of implements’ intermediate between her will and her goals, as Heidegger
 defines it; it is on  the contrary something obstinately resistant, unconquerable (1993,
 609). 
 
Here, de Beauvoir supports the notion that Ge-stell is clearly a masculinist-
patriarchal worlding, and her account of Heidegger reveals (in concert with the 
discussion of equipmentality in Chapter One) that his analysis of equipmentality is 
itself a reflection of the being of those Dasein who remain largely uninterrupted. 
However, the implications of the above passage are that for those unable to cohere 
with the masculine standards imposed by Ge-stell—women, but also “[w]orkers, 
black slaves, colonial natives” (de Beauvoir 1993, 609), implicating all those who 
fall outside the privileged positions of an imperialist white supremacist capitalist 
patriarchy—dwelling lacks traction due to its limited scope and applicability. In 
the constant face of the en-counter, with little hope of any meaningful historical-
factical-ontical manifestation of authenticity, what then?  
 
Gender, race, and class are some of the numerous intersecting22 conditions that 
render dwelling, as Heidegger presents it, either impossible or meaningless. 
Chapters One to Five, and the first half of the present chapter, demonstrate that 
dwelling is not simply poetic hyperbole or rhetoric. Dwelling is an ethical and 
spiritual concern that arises from Dasein’s existential investedness. Given that 
Heidegger’s formulation of dwelling falters—to the point of impossibility in some 
instances—in the face of the masculine-patriarchal bias of Ge-stell (in that his 
response to Ge-stell must now be understood as incomplete, rather than simply 
incorrect), how is one to progress? Rather than abandon the notion of dwelling, I 
contend that what I am, somewhat polemically, naming “the impossibility of 
dwelling” is itself an en-counter that affords the possibility to revisit and revise the 
concept. The impossibility of dwelling is not an indictment of failure, but of 
incompleteness; it is a call to hold fast to the notion, but with a renewed sense of 
purpose, a renewed reverence for Being (and the sense that things matter), and to 
take the existential, ethical, and spiritual significance of Heidegger’s trajectory 																																																								
22 The concept of “intersectionality” was introduced by Kimberley Crenshaw (1986) to articulate 
the multiple oppressions that apply to a given individual in terms of race, class, gender, sexual 
orientation, physical capacities, and so on. 
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seriously. While those who cohere with Ge-stell remain enframed by its double 
concealing, systemic gender oppression of the kind to be discussed in Chapter 
Seven will remain invisible: the systemic element hidden by a masculine-
patriarchal horizon. While Ge-stell remains invisible, mainstream debates around 
gender oppression are destined to occur within enframed spaces, based on 
uninterrogated assumptions that shape the debates in advance. Ge-stell is invisible 
to those who remain uninterrupted by Ge-stell. While each of us faces our own 
unique and individuated existential crises, such crises are not always qualitatively 
analogous to those whose situations are compounded by systemic oppression. 
Systemic oppression, by definition, is the flip side of systemic privilege.  
 
Moving Forward 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the fourfold can act as a heuristic through 
which an everyday encounter can become an en-counter. An en-counter is an 
interruption of one’s everyday activities, a moment in which the worlding of the 
world and the self as Da-sein is made visible. As a motif in Heidegger’s work, 
each en-counter affords the possibility of authentic human being. Further, each of 
us is faced with an obligation to respond to this possibility; this is the necessary 
condition for authenticity. As authentic human being, dwelling is a concept that 
counters and resists the technological framing of Ge-stell. Understood as the 
culmination and exacerbation of the Western philosophical tradition, Ge-stell is 
not simply the result of the oblivion of Being in favour of ontic presence, but also 
reflects a systemic valorisation of masculinity and the devaluation of the 
unmasculine. Dwelling, therefore, cannot simply be a response to the 
technological world in the sense of saying both yes and no to technology. By its 
own measure, dwelling must be a response to the gendered, masculinist-
patriarchal positioning of human being within the modern technological world. In 
Chapter Seven I will explore the mainstream debate around pornography to 
demonstrate the way the debate is framed, before developing an account of 
‘pornification’ and rape culture as aspects of the patriarchal framing of Ge-stell. In 
Chapter Seven I will demonstrate the efficacy of Heidegger’s thinking in relation 
to these phenomena, before I go on to consider how dwelling might be reimagined 
in light of these specific examples in Chapter Eight.  
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Chapter Seven — Misogyny and Technology 
 
We live in the male frame; pinned there (Dworkin 2007, 43). 
 
In the latter half of Chapter Six I claimed that Ge-stell is inherently masculinist 
and patriarchal, valorising the active subject, reducing the passive object to 
standing reserve. I have argued that the subject of subject-object metaphysics is a 
peculiarly masculine subject. From this perspective, the meaningful constitutive 
relation between subject and object—as found in Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Kant and Husserl, discussed in Chapter One—is corrupted by the technological 
reduction of the object to standing reserve. Similarly, the relation between 
masculine and unmasculine is also violently framed by Ge-stell. The object is 
reduced to standing reserve and the subject is valorised as the centre and origin of 
meaning and value, framed into a position of hubristic anthropocentrism, while the 
masculine is valorised at the expense of the unmasculine. The concept of 
misogyny plays an important role in this chapter and the next. The challenging of 
Ge-stell functions at the expense of the poetic letting of Ereignis. The over-
reaching of instrumental-calculative thinking occurs at the expense of existential-
meditative thinking. So, too, the valorisation of the masculine can only sustain 
itself at the expense of the unmasculine.  
 
Etymologically, ‘misogyny’ means hatred of the feminine. Ge-stell is a 
culmination and exacerbation of the masculinist-patriarchal bias of the Western 
tradition. In this sense, misogyny is not just attributable to an individual, but is an 
aspect of the framing of Ge-stell; misogyny is a socio-cultural phenomenon, a 
horizon of sorts. As a horizon, an individual need not feel any conscious, 
deliberate, or explicit hatred while acting or thinking misogynistically (in the same 
way than an individual may not identify himself as acting or thinking in racist or 
homophobic ways despite evidence to the contrary). Just as treating equipment as 
ready-to-hand is not necessarily a reflection of a particular person’s intentional 
technological enframing of an object, an expression of misogyny, sexism, racism, 
or homophobia is not defined solely by the feelings or intentions of the individual, 
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but the horizon on which that performance takes place. As such, the expression of 
hatred articulated by ‘misogyny’ is the devaluing and delegitimising of the 
unmasculine that is inherent to Ge-stell, rather than the conscious, deliberate 
hatred that an individual feels towards a specific object or issue (although it can 
obviously take this form as well). In this chapter I will consider some of the ways 
that the misogynist framing of Ge-stell manifests in the modern technological 
world. First I will analyse how the masculine subject informs the pornography 
debate. As part of this analysis, I will demonstrate that Ge-stell frames the 
pornography debate by shifting the focus of the debate from the possibility of 
authentic human being towards the valorisation of the autonomous individual. As 
such, the ethical and existential significance of pornography is overlooked in 
favour of a political position that contains unexamined metaphysical 
underpinnings. Pornography is a particularly important phenomenon to consider in 
that a critical Heideggerian analysis of it can reveal the significance of the 
intersection of technology and misogyny. In the technological production of 
pornography, and in the perpetuation of various types of sex work in general 
(discussed further in Chapter Eight), standing reserve is revealed. As with a 
Styrofoam cup, or a work of art, pornography is alethic, framing and ordering 
both its participants and its consumers from the intersection of technology and 
misogyny. As with patriarchy and Ge-stell, technology and misogyny cannot be 
collapsed into one and the same phenomenon. However, given the patriarchal 
underpinnings of Ge-stell, the modern technological framing of the world is also 
misogynistic.  
 
Pornography is exemplary of the intersection of technology and misogyny. Aside 
from the obvious utilisation of various technological mediums through which 
pornography is distributed, pornography is the product of an entire industry; it is 
largely a capitalist venture.1 That an exploration of pornography implicates 																																																								
1 Clearly non-commercial pornographic material exists, but for the purpose of this chapter I refer to 
mainstream commercial pornography. Following Gail Dines, if one does an internet search for 
“porn” or “pornography” and randomly clicks on any of the first five or so results that come up, 
one is only three or four button clicks—at most—away from extremely graphic, violent, racist, and 
misogynistic content (Dines and Smith 2012, 19). Although I acknowledge the existence of, and 
possibility of authentic en-counter with, material that might be broadly classed as pornographic, 
the purpose of this chapter is not to make totalising or universal claims, but to demonstrate that 
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capitalist structures is significant, in that the commodification inherent in 
capitalism reflects Ge-stell’s positioning of the subject and standing reserve. The 
capitalist aspect of pornography reflects the challenging-forth of the industry, 
where there is little to counter or interrupt human will. In terms of understanding 
pornography as part of the broader misogynist context of Ge-stell, Andrea 
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon claim that the capitalist venture of 
pornography shares the same violent and patriarchal foundations as everyday acts 
of coercion and oppression, as well as having a direct relation to phenomena such 
as human trafficking (1989, 41-51). While the connection between pornography 
production and consumption and systemic sexual violence may not seem obvious 
at first, as I will demonstrate below, Dworkin and MacKinnon’s claims become 
even more powerful when interpreted through my account of Heidegger’s critique 
of technology. The relation of pornography to the aforementioned phenomena 
does not need to be empirically causal, nor a statistically significant correlation.2 
Rather, the alethic nature of pornography perpetuates the already misogynist 
framing of the modern technological world. It is the frame that perpetuates these 
phenomena. The sex trade in a country like Thailand is sustained specifically by 
the pornographic-misogynist-technological framing of the world. That the 
production and consumption of pornography in a developed country is protected 
by legal rights while the ethical and political worth of prostitutes and victims of 
child sexual abuse in developing countries—or of those from poorer classes in 
developed countries—remains contested is indicative of the alethic significance of 
pornography in the modern technological-misogynist world. Much mainstream 
commercial pornography is also racist and frequently contains incestual and/or 
pedophilic imagery, taglines, and plots (Dines 2010, 121-140, 156-162), 
indicating that the perspective that much mainstream pornography adopts is that of 
the hegemonic, white Anglo, heterosexual male.  
 
The connections between pornography production and consumption and human 																																																																																																																																																								
specific and highly problematic issues of the modern technological world can be reimagined 
through Heidegger’s critique of technology.  
2 See Chapter Six, footnote 20: in developing and non-Anglo countries, the link between human 
trafficking, socio-economic coercion, and prostitution and pornography is well established. The 
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that this link is concealed, or at least convoluted, by Ge-
stell, the same disclosure of the world that perpetuates and sustains the link itself.  
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trafficking, socio-economic coercion, and general misogyny remain contested due 
to a lack of empirical evidence supporting a quantitative cause and effect in 
specific instances (in the developed world). However, interpreting these 
phenomena from the account of Heidegger’s thinking that I have developed 
reveals a connection between pornography and sexualised, violent, and misogynist 
phenomena in terms of the worlding of the modern technological world. I have 
already established that in thinking a mode of disclosure, in thinking the worlding 
of the world, one is already thinking beyond the instrumental-calculative: this is 
an aspect of the double concealing of Ge-stell. As such, it is possible to consider 
the causal (for want of a better term) connection between pornography production 
and consumption and misogyny from the account of Heidegger’s thinking that I 
have developed so far. The connection does not need to be quantitatively causal or 
correlative, while qualitatively indicating something more than a co-incidental 
relationship. For example, while it may be methodologically impossible to 
demonstrate a causal link between sexualised advertising and misogyny, and a 
correlation might be clouded by too many uncontrolled variables, interpreting 
these phenomena as an aspect of Ge-stell offers a way to think the qualitative 
connection. As constitutively in-the-world, Dasein is affected by the world in the 
same way that Butler, de Beauvoir, and Irigaray might argue (in their own distinct 
ways) that the subject is effected. As such, I will suggest that the aspects of Ge-
stell I discuss in this chapter are indeed important causal factors (again, for want 
of a better term) to consider, but only in a sense beyond the empirical-
metaphysical cause and effect relationship. This chapter demonstrates that a clear 
empirical cause-effect relationship is blurred by the many forces at work within a 
white supremacist imperialist capitalist patriarchy in terms of the human 
belonging to the worlding of Ge-stell. 
 
Following my analysis of pornography, I will discuss the notion of “pornification” 
(Long 2012, 111), claiming that such a phenomenon can best be understood as the 
technological-misogynist framing of the modern world. Finally, I will introduce 
the concept of rape culture. The concept of rape culture illuminates the extent of 
the gendered technological violence of Ge-stell. As with Heidegger’s own project, 
my critical exploration of the violence of Ge-stell serves as a point from which an 
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authentic response can be formulated. This chapter, then, aims to demonstrate the 
way in which a phenomenon so ubiquitous that it is invisible—the systemic and 
oppressive gendered bias of Ge-stell—can be en-countered through Heidegger’s 
thinking. While I do not explicitly invoke the fourfold in this chapter as such, the 
prevalence of the subject and of subject-object metaphysics makes the absence of 
the fourfold conspicuous. When considering the two central themes of Chapter 
Six—dwelling and the fourfold, and the masculine bias of Ge-stell—the present 
chapter makes evident the ways in which Heidegger’s configuration of dwelling 
falters and/or fails for those who are unable to cohere with Ge-stell. 
 
The Subject of Pornography 
Nancy Bauer states that “[c]ritiques of pornography … have not changed since the 
1980s” (2015, 1). Despite the qualitative and quantitative changes in pornographic 
content, medium, and accessibility, arguments around pornography typically 
continue to take one of two positions. Although each position contains its nuances 
and can be located on a spectrum (rather than a fixed, unified point), the two 
camps remain categorisable as ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ pornography. I name the former 
‘liberal-libertarian’, and the latter ‘ontological’. The contemporary pornography 
debate has little to do with any kind of community-based definition of morality or 
obscenity—an accusation of moralism implies that the position is clouded by local 
circumstances such as religious demographics or tainted by the implication that its 
proponents are anti-sex, prudish, or extremely conservative—yet both positions 
are founded on ethical (and political) assumptions. The pornography debate is 
important to my thesis for two reasons: the ubiquitous and misogynistic features 
of pornography itself, and the various ways in which subject-object metaphysics 
permeate and frame the debate—the liberal-libertarian position in particular. The 
liberal-libertarian position has two distinct emphases: pro-pornography, and anti-
censorship. The two emphases are flip sides of the same coin in this particular 
debate, but this does not reflect a unified or cohesive perspective.  
 
On the one hand, pornography can be promoted as a healthy and normal aspect of 
consensual human sexuality. However, this position is becoming increasingly 
untenable in academic circles for the reasons I discuss in the body of this chapter. 
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Of greater significance to the liberal-libertarian position is the anti-censorship 
message that it contains, and the manner in which its proponents question the 
right—and cost—of allowing a state or ruling body to impose restrictions on the 
individual. In the pornography debate, this position tends to place the political 
rights and personal liberty of the individual front and centre. The liberal-
libertarian position valorises the subject, and is epistemically indebted to subject-
object metaphysics.3 I will demonstrate that this is the source of the dissonance 
between the two positions; where the liberal-libertarian model takes its subject-
object metaphysical underpinnings for granted, the ontological position strives to 
counter this inherent masculinism by revealing a phenomenological account of 
pornography as an alethic aspect of the modern technological world. The 
ontological position that I outline below builds on elements of existing critiques 
that stem largely from the work of Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon. 
My engagement with the liberal-libertarian position develops a context for the 
distinction between the two positions and demonstrates the extent to which it is 
steeped in subject-object metaphysics. At the end of this section of the chapter I 
will discuss both positions in terms of their alethic properties, including the 
pragmatic and ethical-political importance of the liberal-libertarian position.  
 
The liberal-libertarian position, as presented by thinkers such as Ronald Dworkin 
(1981) and Wendy McElroy (1995), is concerned largely with the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals.4 In particular, Dworkin’s account—largely 																																																								
3 See Chapter Six, footnote 19 for a brief discussion of the problem of traditional Western 
epistemology from the perspective of feminist epistemology. 
4 In their introduction to The Porn Report (2008), Alan McKee, Katherine Albury, and Catharine 
Lumby speak of the disparity between “pornography’s most vocal opponents and the attitudes of a 
largely silent majority” (xii) in terms of the tension between pornography and regulation. Their 
analysis is largely a political one and repeatedly appeals (in either the positive or the negative to 
support their central contentions) to the views “that the majority of the community share” (20). 
One of the difficulties of this perspective is that, in an attempt at neutrality, the authors assume that 
what is just and right stems from a majority opinion. While they raise the issue of patriarchy, it is 
treated as a belief or perspective held by certain theorists, rather than thought through as an all 
pervasive mode of disclosure that, in concert with Ge-stell, devalues whatever falls outside of its 
standards. Similarly, Jeff Sparrow’s Money Shot: A Journey into Porn and Censorship (2012) has, 
as the title suggests, a focus on the political aspect of pornography and its regulation. The approach 
taken by these two books represents the attempt to distance the authors from bias. There is an 
attempt to maintain objectivity despite noting the inherently personal and emotive nature of the 
issue. As with much of the literature around pornography, there are an enormous number of 
foundational metaphysical assumptions left uninterrogated that call both the methodology and 
conclusions of these books, and others, into question. 
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concerned with the issue of censorship and privileging the rights and liberty of the 
individual—was an important counter-point to anti-pornography campaigns in the 
1980s. Dworkin’s position remains compelling and influential: contemporary 
thinkers, such as Rae Langton (2009), continue to formulate direct responses to 
the arguments that Dworkin laid out almost four decades ago. Dworkin’s 
argument remains significant in that he is able to openly accept that pornography 
might be harmful and might lack cultural significance,5 but that these reasons are 
not sufficient for a governing body to breach the public-private distinction and 
impose restrictions on private adult behaviour. For both Dworkin and McElroy, 
the political rights of the individual subject are the crux of the pornography 
debate. Whether considered as the right to freedom of expression, freedom of 
speech, or sexual liberation, in their own ways both the aforementioned thinkers 
are concerned primarily with the slippery slope of censorship and the right of the 
state (or other people) to impose a set of subjective, value-laden standards on the 
political subject. This position valorises the political sovereignty of each person 
and attempts to reconcile the notion that human sexuality is complex and 
heteronomous in its forms of expression and therefore unable to be regulated in a 
political sense beyond legally defined consensual limits. While Dworkin and 
McElroy share many opinions, it is McElroy, rather than Dworkin, that I primarily 
respond to in this chapter. I make this decision based on the fact that McElroy 
identifies specifically as an “individualist feminist” (1995, 6), and is interested 
specifically in a woman’s right to self-governance, rather than the more general 
issue of censorship. McElroy’s emphasis is significant given the claims I have 
made around the misogynist-patriarchal framing of Ge-stell. 
 
Perhaps the main strength of the liberal-libertarian position is the political equality 
it grants to each person. However, as discussed in Chapter Six, this kind of 
abstract equivalence is easily biased towards the masculine as coherent with Ge-
stell. Political equality is an ideal, the ontic manifestation of which is contingent 
on the capacity of the individual and their particular historical-factical situation. 
McElroy marks the liberal-libertarian position as fundamentally different from the 																																																								
5 As part of his introduction, Dworkin states that “the strongest arguments in favor of allowing 
Mein Kampf to be published hardly seem to apply to the novel Whips Incorporated or the film Sex 
Kittens” (1981, 177). 
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ontological position in that she explicitly declares, “the personal is not political” 
(1995, 64).6 From McElroy’s position, the mechanisms behind notions of 
consent—psychology, personal situation and context—are irrelevant. Instead, the 
liberty of the individual to express herself—for the will of the subject to 
manifest—however she sees fit, including through participating in and/or 
consuming pornography, is the central concern. A further assumption here is that 
any person participating in, or consuming, pornography cannot be held 
responsible for any direct or indirect harm that this causes to other people for the 
simple reason that everyone else is also an autonomous, rational, political subject 
and thus responsible for themselves. If one woman willingly participates in and/or 
consumes pornography with a partner, while another lives a loveless life of 
violence and degradation from a partner whose model of masculinity and 
heterosexual intimacy is based on pornography,7 the onus here is on the latter to 
exercise her autonomy and improve her lot. This perspective is a clear 
manifestation of the notion of the metaphysically autonomous subject. As the 
centre of experience and the origin of meaning and value, only the subject can 
know what is right or wrong for her or himself.  																																																								
6 McElroy identifies as an individualist feminist which she defines on the basis of “self-ownership: 
that is, it is a woman’s body, it is a woman’s right” (1995, 6). In using the phrase “the personal is 
not political”, McElroy clearly sets herself in opposition to a wide range of feminist perspectives; 
the phrase “the personal is political” marked a conceptual rallying point around the women’s 
movement in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s and was the title of a paper by Carol Hanisch 
published in 1970. McElroy’s style of individualist feminism, as she notes herself, is susceptible to 
the attack that she has internalised patriarchal norms and is merely working within the misogynist 
political-metaphysical infrastructure rather than attempting to expose or change this framing. 
McElroy’s response to this throughout A Woman’s Right to Pornography is an unconvincing return 
to the position of the solipsistic subject and the assumption that from this position no one subject 
has the political right to judge or impose their views on another; her individualism is simply a 
libertarianism, a political position rooted deeply in the masculinist patriarchal metaphysics of the 
subject. In a retreat to the metaphysics of the subject, and delimiting the inefficacy of such a retreat 
by maintaining that her argument is based on a political position that is separate from “the 
personal”, McElroy’s position is philosophically unsophisticated and based on straw person 
arguments and caricatures of the positions she opposes. All this while failing to meaningfully 
acknowledge that, as condescending as it may sound, not everyone has been granted the equal 
contextual capacities or resources to make informed, deliberative, and authentically consensual 
decisions about their lives.  
7 See, for example, Melinda Tankard Reist’s (2016) discussion of adolescent girls in Australia 
suffering from the effects of pornography. Due to its ready accessibility and increasingly graphic 
nature, pornography is shaping the sexual expectations and behaviours of adolescent males. This is 
a clear example of how pornography, through the prevalence of smart phones, exists at the 
intersection of technology and misogyny, and that this intersection has triggered a qualitative and 
quantitative shift in the content and affects/effects of pornography. Also see Eric Owens et al. 
(2012) for a literature review on the effects of Internet pornography on adolescents in terms of self 
identity, self worth, and social development. 
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As stated above, the strength of the liberal-libertarian position is the political 
equality it grants to each person. Yet the efficacy of political equality is dependant 
on a worlding that is equally shared or neutral for all inhabitants. However, the 
bias of the modern technological world does not frame people equally. McElroy 
offers a “value-neutral definition: Pornography is the explicit artistic depiction of 
men and/or women as sexual beings” (1995, 34); a nebulous definition that 
requires an unquestioned acceptance of the terms “artistic” and “sexual beings”. 
This definition fails to recognise the target demographic and primary use of 
pornography: no matter what else it might be, in the modern technological world, 
pornography is always originally and primarily material for men to masturbate to. 
Despite McElroy’s insistence on the pitfalls and drawbacks of an ontological 
definition of pornography—where she specifically attacks Catharine MacKinnon 
and Andrea Dworkin’s position, discussed below—her account of pornography 
remains oblivious to the disclosive nature of language and the manner in which 
language claims human being. Any attempt at a value-neutral descriptive 
definition of pornography—even the assumption that a value-neutral definition of 
pornography is possible—can only be made from a position that is largely 
coherent with Ge-stell. While McElroy broadly dismisses Marxist analyses of 
class (and thus the political possibility of a collective group known as ‘women’) as 
convenient narratives used by radical feminists to avoid the problem of individual 
choice and responsibility (1995, 49-68), she remains silent on her own deeply 
entrenched, inherently masculinist, metaphysical underpinnings. Returning once 
again to the passage from ‘The Age of the World Picture’ that introduced Chapter 
One of my thesis,  
 
Metaphysics grounds an age in that, through a particular interpretation of beings and 
through a particular comprehension of truth, it provides that age with the grounds of its 
essential shape. This ground comprehensively governs all decisions distinctive of the age 
(Heidegger 2002a, 57). 
 
The modern scientistic “comprehension of truth”—and the historical masculine 
bias inherent in this philosophical position—is characteristic of the liberal-
libertarian position on pornography, censorship, and the liberty of the individual. 
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This position holds that any one person or body is unable to judge or impose 
views on another, as there are simply no grounds for such judgement or 
imposition. This argument shifts the debate away from pornography and into a 
space that assumes the political equivalence—in the sense of capacity, not simply 
worth or value—of each person. Indeed McElroy asks that the reader consider the 
“arrogance” (1995, 64) of those who suggest that the capacity to make informed 
political decisions can be hindered or limited by one’s personal life. By contrast, I 
argue that it is naïve and insulting to assume that gender, education, class, and 
race do not affect one’s political capacity (not worth) in important ways. It is 
naïve in so far as it makes the assumption that people can make informed 
decisions about the world without knowing how they are situated in the broader 
context of the world (they can hold opinions on their lives, certainly, but this is not 
the same as making informed decisions on the world), and it is insulting in that it 
suggests that people in positions of disadvantage or oppression are directly and 
personally responsible for such. Proponents of the liberal-libertarian position are 
aware of the potential dangers and problems associated with pornography, but do 
not acknowledge these problems as stemming from an over-arching systemic bias 
or disclosive horizon. Instead, their position valorises the role of the individual in 
choosing her actions for herself, concerned almost exclusively with the personal 
liberty and political autonomy of the subject.  
 
Ontology and the Challenging Forth of Pornography 
The ontological position on pornography is characterised by the notion that there 
can be no neutral definition of pornography as framed in the modern technological 
world. In acknowledging the disclosive power of language, the ontological 
position defines pornography in relation to its alethic horizon. From the 
ontological position, pornography is not defined in terms of what it is, but what it 
does. My reasoning behind naming this position ‘ontological’ is not simply to 
resonate with the Heideggerian themes of the thesis—although where I refer to 
ontology and phenomenology, it is Heidegger’s thinking that I refer to—but to 
recognise the alethic happening of pornography, that it is not a static or fixed 
phenomena, but an appropriating event of its own kind. From the ontological 
position, McElroy’s inclusion of the phrase “artistic expression” in her definition 
Chapter Seven—Misogyny and Technology 	
	
225 
of pornography rings true in a manner contrary to her intentions. While McElroy 
uses the phrase to indicate that pornography is merely an aesthetic performance 
that can only be judged subjectively and thus has no objectively correct ethical 
significance, pornography is poiētic in so far as it is part of the revealing of the 
modern technological world. The masculine bias of pornography reflects the 
misogyny of the modern technological world. The alethic nature of pornography 
reveals an aspect of misogyny that is more disturbing than salary inequity in the 
workforce, for example. While both are examples of the way women are valued 
less than men,8 there is a qualitative ethical and political difference between the 
attitudes that are fostered—what is revealed—by these two manifestations of 
misogyny. While they are perhaps on the same spectrum, the explicit and brutal 
violence of much mainstream pornography is more than a reflection of antiquated 
values, as one might charitably describe the pay gap. Instead, much mainstream 
pornography is unabashed misogyny, a reduction of the unmasculine to something 
perhaps worse than standing reserve: the deliberate target of degradation, revenge 
and violence. 
 
One of the best known and most controversial of the anti-pornography theorists, 
often working with Catharine MacKinnon, is Andrea Dworkin. A key figure in the 
anti-pornography movement, Dworkin’s written work is unapologetically 
personal. In many ways, Dworkin’s position is exemplary of the radical feminist 
position that McElroy stands in opposition to. McElroy characterises Dworkin’s 
work thus: “[t]he politics of liberation had failed; it was time for a politics of rage” 
(1995, 52). While she may empathise to some degree with the motivations behind 
radical feminism, McElroy places herself in clear opposition to the positions 
found within it, dismissing the movement as privileging ideology over reason. 
Undoubtedly there is an element of ideology associated with much of Dworkin’s 
work, yet interpreting her work as a “politics of rage” provides the context to 																																																								
8 While I do not adopt an essentialist position that masculinity and femininity are inexorably 
connected to biological sex, the position put forward by de Beauvoir, Gilligan, Irigaray, and 
Lloyd—as discussed in Chapter Six—demonstrates that an historical connection between gender 
and sex exists, even if it is learned from oppressive cultural norms. As such, in certain examples, 
such as the pay gap, it makes more grammatical sense to say that women are valued less in the 
workplace, as this disparity occurs despite gender. Even masculine women (in appearance, 
behavior, attitude), while perhaps paid more than their feminine counterparts, are still subject to 
pay inequality. 
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make it more accessible. Openly approaching Dworkin’s work knowing full well 
that she is writing from a position of frustration and anger allows the work to 
reveal its message, as confronting as it may be. In her anger, Dworkin did not 
abandon reason or rationality, yet her position is not always conventionally 
articulated by academic standards. Dworkin’s work does not benefit from a 
logical-grammatical analysis of its often-rhetorical content unless said analysis is 
first sensitive to poiēsis and alētheia. One can criticise Dworkin’s argument solely 
based on its structure and delivery rather than on what its claims attempt to 
articulate, but in doing so, one is responding to structure and form, not the 
argument itself.9  
 
Where opponents of Dworkin can easily mischaracterise her claims in 
Intercourse—often reducing a nuanced position to a simplistic caricature that all 
heterosexual sex is rape10—what is too easily overlooked in Dworkin’s thinking is 
her attempt to reveal (what I have characterised as) the masculinist framing of the 																																																								
9 Of course there are instances where the structure or form of an argument contains fallacies that 
render the argument invalid, implausible, unsound, or untrue, but a poorly presented argument can 
still be charitably interpreted despite its delivery. Not only does dismissing an argument based 
solely on its structure or delivery risk losing a sense of alētheia, but is also potentially classist, 
racist, and—in terms of the association of the masculine with rationality and feminine emotional 
expressivity with irrationality—misogynist. Dworkin’s work is unapologetically emotional and 
biased in a certain way, but, as I will discuss further in Chapter Eight, it perhaps also contains an 
obligation to respond: Dworkin’s ideas must be en-countered by those who will find it hardest to 
agree with them. Insisting that feminist debates must only take place within the accepted sphere of 
the masculinist Western tradition silences the voices of those for whom such a tradition is 
inaccessible. Nancy Bauer struggles with Dworkin for the same reason as McElroy. Bauer 
describes Dworkin’s position on male sexuality as “soul crushing … hyperbolic and empirically 
untestable” (2015, 3-4). Bauer acknowledges the “nub of truth” (4) in Dworkin’s account, but her 
deference to the empirically testable betrays an unwillingness to engage with the alethic 
possibilities of Dworkin’s thought. This is not an entirely fair account of Bauer’s overall position; 
while she is concerned by Dworkin’s extremism, de Beauvoir’s influence on Bauer allows the 
latter to charitably interpret the hyperbolic tendencies of a writer such as Dworkin. As I later note 
in the body of this chapter, Bauer’s position frequently corresponds with my own. Her appeal to 
the “empirically testable” in the instance cited above does not prevent her from later attacking the 
scientism adopted by much contemporary philosophy, and the manner in which such scientism 
prevents philosophy from gaining the kind of meaningful insights into topics such as pornography 
that it is capable of (2015, 116-118). 
10 In the foreword to Intercourse, Ariel Levy addresses perhaps the most infamous extrapolation of 
Dworkin’s work that all heterosexual sex is rape (xi-xxvii). In her own preface to the same work 
Dworkin states that she was advised to include an introduction to the work to clarify and perhaps 
“soften the blow”. She writes “[m]y colleagues, of course, had been right; but their advice 
offended me. I have never written for a cowardly or passive or stupid reader, the precise 
characteristics of most reviewers” (2007, xxix-xxx), and that only for those who have already 
“eroticized a differential in power that allows for force as a natural and inevitable part of 
intercourse” (xxxii) could an erroneously reductive interpretation of Intercourse result in the claim 
that heterosexual sex equals rape. 
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world. Dworkin, as with many radical feminists, takes for granted that, all things 
being equal, women should be treated with the same respect and consideration as 
men. However, while this notion is shared across most, if not all, forms of 
feminism, radical feminism is distinguished by the fact that it recognises that “all 
things being equal” is an abstract hypothetical that has no bearing on the reality of 
the modern misogynistic technological world and the way it frames human being. 
For a radical feminist—bearing in mind that “radical” refers to fundamental or 
inherent roots—it is the framing of the world that must be addressed, not just, or 
only, the behaviours and attitudes of individual human beings.11 From a radical 
feminist perspective, and couched in Heidegger’s terminology, the sense of 
empowerment that comes from modifying one’s behaviours in order to cohere 
with Ge-stell is inauthentic. Coherence with Ge-stell is synonymous with the 
tranquility of everyday inauthenticity—no interruptions, no en-counters: work 
hard, enjoy the latest hit television show, barrack for your football team, consume, 
back to work—the sense of belonging, acknowledgment, approval, and thus 
empowerment that a woman might feel by meeting certain socio-cultural 
expectations is inauthentic where the measure of such empowerment is a sense of 
belonging to the enframed das Man. Where coherence with Ge-stell means 
adopting an oppressively heteronormative ideal of masculinity or femininity 
despite one’s manifold possibilities, then any sense of gratification—
empowerment, tranquility—from such coherence is inauthentic. This is why the 
faltering, or, indeed, the impossibility of dwelling is significant: if cohering with 
Ge-stell is inauthentic, yet affords a sense of empowerment, and perhaps opens up 
socio-economic possibilities that might otherwise be unobtainable, what 
meaningful choice is there?  
 
Many radical feminists are suspicious of the caveat that women should be treated 
“with the same respect and consideration as men”, in that it is readily interpreted 
as treating women in ways that are considered respectful in a masculinist culture, 
rather than as respecting different considerations and needs specifically for 
women (or the unmasculine in whatever form it may take). Where the framing of 																																																								
11 In this specific sense, the radical feminist perspective shares Heidegger’s notion that an origin 
guides the commencement and ongoing trajectory of a phenomenon, and that rather than try to 
amend what is, another beginning affords the chance of effecting real change. 
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Ge-stell appears neutral, extending respect and consideration too easily becomes 
an oppressive act that extends heteronormative masculine expectations. For 
Dworkin, as with my extrapolation of Heidegger’s thinking, there is no neutral 
public space or impartial position, and any phenomenon that lays claim to either 
of these characteristics is oblivious to its own inherently misogynistic 
underpinnings, oblivious of its own enframing.  
 
For Dworkin, pornography is an inherently violent and dominating expression of 
masculine power. As with any interaction between human beings in the modern 
technological world, pornography takes place on a masculinist technological 
horizon. However, pornography is doubly problematic in the sense that its 
production blurs the line between fiction and non-fiction, the parameters of 
consent (of viewer and performer), and the perceived separation between the 
representation of an act and the act itself. The mode of production that brings-
forth pornography in Ge-stell dictates that actual violence must take place in order 
to satisfy and perpetuate the demand for the representation of this specific form of 
violence. In other words, in order for someone to watch a violent sexual act—
whether they believe it to be a fictional representation or a consensual act, even if 
their preference is to watch something that is fictionally presented as non-
consensual—a violent sexual act must take place. The commercial aspect of 
pornography is particularly significant to Dworkin and the ontological position 
due to the symbolic and literal power that economic affluence carries with it 
(Dworkin 1989, 20-22). Again, as articulated by bell hooks, it is impossible to 
untangle racism and misogyny from economic inequality and oppression in the 
modern technological world. Dworkin’s position on pornography is readily 
understood from the account of Heidegger’s thinking that I have developed, 
particularly in light of the masculinist-patriarchal underpinnings of the Western 
tradition as discussed in Chapter Six and the horizon of misogyny introduced at 
the beginning of this chapter. Due to the misogynist framing of Ge-stell, 
‘pornography’ does not simply refer to content or a product; it names an alethic 
disclosure of the world. The revealing of the world inherent to pornography begins 
with its mode of production and is sustained through its continued consumption. 
As an origin, the mode of production not only reveals the world, but reaches ahead 
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of a phenomenon to influence its ongoing existence. For Dworkin,  
 
 The word pornography, derived from the ancient Greek pornē and graphos, means
 “writing about whores”. Pornē means “whore”, specifically and exclusively the lowest
 class of whore, which in ancient Greece was the brothel slut available to all male citizens.
 The pornē was the cheapest (in the literal sense), least regarded, least protected of all
 women, including slaves. She was, simply and clearly and absolutely a sexual slave…In
 ancient Greece, not all prostitutes were considered vile: only the porneia. Contemporary
 pornography strictly and literally conforms to the word’s root meaning: the graphic
 description of vile whores, or, in our language, sluts, cows (as in: sexual cattle, sexual
 chattel), cunts. The word has not changed its meaning and the genre is not misnamed
 (1989, 199-200). 
 
Despite the historical-historiological accuracy of this definition,12 the notion that 
pornography is a specific expression of misogyny directed at a person revealed as 
little more than standing reserve is important. This notion is important for 
understanding Dworkin’s position on pornography, but also how the ontological 
position understands pornography as actively disclosive, as effective and affective. 
The “brothel slut”, according to the account above, is not a citizen, not a part of 
the demos; she (or he) has no social power. The implication here is that this lack 
of status, lack of social power, is perpetuated in contemporary mainstream 
pornography (and sex work, discussed more in Chapter Eight). Further, the nature 
of the acts that constitute pornography, and the subsequent function that it fulfills, 
serves to sustain and entrench a power differential in which the unmasculine is 
routinely devalued and degraded. 
 
Dworkin and MacKinnon offer a juridical definition of pornography as part of 
their work with the City of Minneapolis. Working to amend the city’s civil rights 
laws, and published as Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women’s 
Equality, Dworkin and MacKinnon propose a series of terms and definitions to 
demonstrate the impossibility of a neutral definition of pornography: an 
impossibility stemming from the masculine-unmasculine power differential and 																																																								
12 Dworkin does not make it clear whether her reading of pornē is specifically her interpretation of 
the Greek or what her sources are for this definition. At worst, this interpretation of the Greek is no 
less creative than Heidegger’s. 
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implicating Dasein’s Being-in the misogynist-patriarchal enframing of the modern 
technological world. Under their proposal pornography is defined as “the graphic 
sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words” 
(Dworkin and MacKinnon 1989, 36), where such subordination is derived from 
the representation of women stripped of their dignity and subjectivity, and where 
the reduction of women to sexual objects to be treated violently and with disdain 
is represented as inherent to their nature (ibid). Despite its heteronormative 
language,13 what is most significant about this definition is the inclusion of the 
actively performative notion of subordination. Dworkin and MacKinnon’s 
position highlights the necessity of an ontology of pornography that acknowledges 
the power differential inherent to pornography, highlights the way the topic is 
framed by misogyny, and makes the framing of the assumed neutrality of the 
liberal-libertarian position visible.  
 
Langton provides further support for the efficacy of MacKinnon and Dworkin’s 
earlier work by introducing aspects of J. L. Austin’s speech act theory to 
demonstrate the affective/effective nature of pornography. This maneuver is 
intended to classify pornography as a particular type of speech in order to address 
the claims that pornography should be protected from censorship under freedom 
of speech provisions. Langton demonstrates that speech is more than a linguistic 
representation of the world, and her account is mindful of the actively disclosive 
role of language. For Langton, MacKinnon’s account of pornography 
demonstrates the “illocutionary force” (2009, 28) of the phenomenon. 
Illocutionary speech consists of “utterances whose force is something more than 
the semantic content of the sentence uttered…and something other than the effects 
achieved by the utterance—the perlocution” (32-33). The illocutionary force of 
speech relies on a set of socio-culturally accepted conditions or context in which 																																																								
13 I do not wish to cursorily dismiss the heteronormativity of this account, or of much radical 
feminism in general. Butler points out many of the problems of identity politics in her Preface, 
Introduction, and Chapter One of Gender Trouble. In particular, the category or class called 
‘woman’ is bound to exclude certain people. Depending on the kind of political purchase that this 
concept of a political class is intended to have, this exclusion may be relatively benign and 
incidental, or intentionally elitist and malicious. This matter is ultimately tangential to my thesis, 
thus my continued reference to ‘the unmasculine’. However, as I state in the Introduction, this 
thesis has many feminist aspects, yet it is not my intention to provide an overtly feminist reading 
of Heidegger or of the issues in this chapter. 
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the speech occurs. Austin uses the example of a wedding (1962, 5). In the context 
of a wedding ceremony, and spoken in response to the celebrant, the utterance ‘I 
do’ is an illocutionary act due to the socio-cultural context and conditions in 
which it is uttered. In this instance, ‘I do’ is not merely a descriptive or semantic 
phrase, but is “performative” (6) in that it is an act performed with intentional 
consequences. In such performances, one is not simply talking, but doing 
(committing, promising, warning, and so on). This is the “‘performative-
constative’ distinction—the distinction between doing and saying” (47) that 
Austin’s concepts of illocution and perlocution—the effect of the illocutionary 
act—rely on.14 For Langton, pornography is not a fictional representation of 
misogynist violence, it is misogynist violence in that it carries illocutionary force. 
I discuss (what could be characterised as) the perlocutionary effects of 
pornography in the sections on pornification and rape culture, below. However, in 
How To Do Things With Pornography, Bauer challenges Langton’s appropriation 
of Austin’s speech act theory. Bauer claims that it is unclear what the conditions 
and context are that would grant pornography the kind of authority to make it an 
illocutionary act (2015, 62-63). Bauer acknowledges the importance of untangling 
“the ontological status of pornography” (65) that stems from MacKinnon’s work, 
and which Langton supports, but claims that through developing a “candid 
phenomenology” (6) of pornography, the weakness of MacKinnon’s and 
Langton’s accounts are exposed. Bauer states  
 
 it’s very difficult to say what sort of ‘authority’ pornography could possess apart from an
 account of what authority, and especially the kind of authority that’s not ceremonially
 invested in a person or group, is or could be (63). 
 
																																																								
14 Austin distinguishes between “force and meaning” (100) in so far as the latter is a matter of 
semantics, description, and representation, where the former demonstrates an affinity to what 
Heidegger might characterise as the human belonging to the alethic nature of language. However, 
the illocutionary force of a performative speech act is also reflected by its perlocution (or lack of): 
the outcome of the illocutionary act. Austin defines the perlocution as “what we bring about or 
achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading … We must distinguish the 
illocutionary from the perlocutionary act: for example we must distinguish between ‘in saying it I 
was warning him’ from ‘by saying it I convinced him, or surprised him, or got him to stop’” (108-
109). This distinction is important in understanding the disjunction between Langton and Bauer, 
and the reason that I support the former against the latter.  
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Bauer refutes the possibility that pornography possesses illocutionary force, and 
certainly the perlocutionary force, in the way that Langton contends, in that she 
believes it lacks the requisite formal authority. As part of her argument, however, 
Bauer is concerned with raising a challenge to contextual and linguistic authority 
in general, not only to Langton, but also to philosophy itself. Much of what Bauer 
touches on corresponds with the ideas I have developed in Chapter Six and above. 
In particular, Bauer notes that even with a post-Butlerian sensibility towards 
gender, the fact that unmasculine individuals find themselves trapped between the 
masculinity of the subject, the misogyny of Ge-stell, and a literal inability, 
incapacity, or unwillingness to cohere with Ge-stell (in either of the disparate 
senses articulated by de Beauvoir or Irigaray, for example) remains a significant 
problem (2015, 10-11, 15, 19, 39-51). Therefore, as an ontic possibility of Dasein, 
one can performatively subvert gender roles, yet the worlding of the world (which 
assails and appropriates Da-sein) throws Dasein into a context where such 
performativity fails to indefinitely overcome the oppression of systemic 
technological misogyny. As such, it is Ge-stell that provides the requisite 
authority, the context, and the conditions to grant illocutionary and perlocutionary 
force to pornography. While these conditions are not as conspicuous as those of a 
wedding ceremony, my reading of Ge-stell accounts for such invisibility. Bauer 
calls for a “candid phenomenology” of pornography—an existentially honest 
account of the factical-ontical experience of pornography—yet, for Bauer, a 
candid phenomenology of pornography would reveal it as something less 
malicious and destructive than MacKinnon and Dworkin’s definition. This is 
because Bauer’s phenomenology of the everyday understanding and interaction of 
pornography could only hope to describe the inauthentic relation—or encounter, 
rather than en-counter—of Dasein and pornography within Ge-stell.  
 
Bauer’s notion of phenomenology is rooted in a descriptive relationship between 
an intentional subject and an object, more Husserlian than Heideggerian. In the 
context of this chapter, such a subject-centric phenomenology is problematic, in 
that it does not adequately account for the significance of a horizon, logos, or 
over-arching mode of disclosure to the intentionality of the subject. A 15 year old 
boy does not realise that his sexual expectations and aesthetic are being shaped 
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and neurologically-behaviourally rewarded by his habitual engagement with 
pornography; any phenomenology of pornography that cannot capture this alethic 
appropriation of in-the-world Da-sein must surely fail to offer any meaningful 
insight into the ontology of pornography. The ontological position on 
pornography, as I have characterised it, does not assume that pornography is 
phenomenologically encountered in a socio-cultural vacuum devoid of meaningful 
implications. Instead, the masculinst bias of Ge-stell already frames the encounter. 
Further, the ontological position recognises that Ge-stell reveals pornography as a 
normal component of human sexuality, devoid of other connotations or meanings. 
Pornography always occurs on the misogynistic-patriarchal horizon of Ge-stell. 
Given the propensity for misogyny in online spaces,15 and given that the internet 
is undoubtedly the most popular medium for the consumption of pornography, the 
everyday encounter of pornography is multiply framed.  
 
The liberal-libertarian and ontological positions on pornography are inherently 
irreconcilable. The liberal-libertarian position emphasises the danger of censorship 
and holds the personal rights and liberties of the political subject above all else. 
From this perspective, the pornography debate is about personal choice and the 
contested right of a state to make or enforce moral judgements. The obvious 
difficulty with this position is its “all or nothing” approach, where a political 
subject is either autonomous and thus a full bearer of rights who must be 
respected, or not. By contrast, the ontological condition can be critically 
characterised as leaning too heavily on the notion of social construction: that as 
Da-sein each person is merely an empty vessel filled by the worlding of Ge-stell. 
The tension between these two positions is important, however, due to the alethic 
nature of each. Both sides appeal to first-hand accounts from current or former sex 
workers and both sides invoke autobiographical and anecdotal evidence to lend 																																																								
15 See Emma Alice Jane (2014; 2015) for a discussion of the overwhelming misogyny of online 
spaces. Jane’s analysis of online misogyny supports the notion that the intersection of technology 
and misogyny is the reflection, perhaps exacerbation, of the already entrenched misogyny of Ge-
stell. Just as Heidegger stated that “Our age is not a technological age because it is the age of the 
machine; it is an age of the machine because it is the technological age” (2004, 24), indicating that 
technological artifacts reflect and potentially exacerbate an underlying and pervasive attitude, so, 
too, with the misogyny of online spaces. It is not simply the medium that has caused a tide of 
“gendered vitriol” (Jane 2014, 558), but the manner in which the medium facilitates an already 
existing propensity. 
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their arguments credibility. Both sides of the argument deserve consideration. The 
liberal-libertarian position demonstrates the importance of taking first hand 
opinions seriously, particularly the opinions of those who the ontological position 
would characterise as the first casualties of pornography: the people actively 
involved in pornography and sex work. However, in taking these opinions 
seriously, one must be prepared to listen and hear what is being said, to hear what 
is disclosed beyond the self-expression of a subject. Privileging the rights of the 
political subject does not exclude an understanding of the disclosive nature of 
language, or accepting a horizon of masculinity and misogyny, or reconciling the 
political subject as one factical-ontic possibility of Dasein’s being. The idea that 
dwelling may be impossible for some people highlights the fact that while an 
individual’s situation defines her choices, such framing cannot simply be used to 
dismiss her choices out-of hand, even if they bind her to inauthenticity. As I raised 
in Chapter Six, and will discuss again in Chapter Eight, in order that dwelling 
retains its original sense, the concept must be able to respond to both the 
technological and misogynistic framing of Ge-stell. Rather than abandon the 
concept, it must be re-imagined to overcome its limitations, while remaining 
faithful to its original purpose.  
 
The tension between the two positions on pornography further demonstrates the 
ongoing significance of thinking alētheia, Ereignis, and Ge-stell. Problems of 
consent and choice can be re-examined from a fresh perspective when it is the 
horizon, not the isolated ontic-physical act, which defines a sexual act as an act of 
power or subordination. In the hypothetical absence of Ge-stell, it is theoretically 
possible for two or more people to engage in, or watch others engaging in, sexual 
acts that express an act-specific power differential (such as bondage, domination, 
and sado-masochistic acts, or even simple representations of the unmasculine 
figure as submissive), with little social, ethical, or political implications or 
ramifications. What the liberal-libertarian position fails to take into account is that 
pornography indirectly affects others as part of the worlding of the world. If a well 
educated, affluent, white woman chooses to become a sex worker and insists that 
society must respect her political autonomy, she must also consider that her 
choosing to have sex with men for money may be contributing to a broader 
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horizon of masculine privilege and domination that affects other unmasculine 
people in harmful ways. She becomes empowered by cohering with Ge-stell in a 
way that perpetuates Ge-stells framing of others. In the absence of Ge-stell, one 
might consider the choice that the educated, affluent, white woman makes to be 
authentic and ethically permissible as it is not the isolated act itself that is 
problematic. Indeed, due to the misogynistic framing of Ge-stell, the 
empowerment that many women—and others who are in some way systemically 
oppressed by Ge-stell—feel from cohering with Ge-stell in one form or another is 
entirely understandable: the inauthentic tranquility of the They is, after all, a 
comfortable resting place between irruptive en-counters, one can not begrudge 
moments of inauthentic tranquility to those whose lives are marked by 
incoherence with Ge-stell. Not only this, as I will discuss in Chapter Eight, 
striving to cohere with the worlding of one’s world is entirely natural and normal. 
If an essential part of human being is the search for a sense of belonging to Being, 
regardless of whether this is expressed through a nomadic, ascetic, or sexually 
non-conforming lifestyle, then the sense of cohering with these standards will be 
similar. It is important to remember, however, that in the worlding of Ge-stell, the 
decision to cohere with internalised oppressive standards can only be considered 
authentic in a willing self-constructing existential sense, not as an act of dwelling. 
  
That people cohere with Ge-stell to varying degrees further demonstrates the 
importance of the alethic aspects of the pornography debate. Both sides of the 
debate present an important truth, but where the scope of the liberal-libertarian 
position is narrow, the ontological position attempts to paint a picture beyond the 
role of the individual and to investigate the broader disclosive nature of 
pornography. Any discussion of pornography must consider the entanglement of a 
number of discourses—politics, capitalism, racism, sexual expression—that play 
out within the framing of Ge-stell. Augmenting arguments from Langton, 
Dworkin and MacKinnon with my account of Heidegger’s thinking offers 
valuable insights into how the pornography debate is shaped by Ge-stell, and how 
dwelling (including a consideration of the impossibility of dwelling) can be 
understood in light of the misogynist-patriarchal framing of the modern 
technological world. In response to the kind of claims that implicate pornography 
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with imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, McElroy—with the intent 
to demonstrate a kind of prudishness or moralism in her opponents—states that 
“to be consistent [those in the ontological position] have to call out sexually 
incorrect TV, literature, art, and advertising” (65, my insertion). It is precisely out 
of a concern for such consistency that many contemporary thinkers are shaping 
and utilising the concept of pornification. 
 
Pornification 
The intersection of misogyny and technology has led to an increasing prevalence 
of pornography, which, in turn, can explain the increasingly explicit, violent, and 
extreme nature of pornographic material that is readily available. As Gail Dines 
states in Pornland, “images today have now become so extreme that what used to 
be considered hard-core is now mainstream … compared to porn today, the porn 
of yesterday seems almost quaint” (2010, xvii). One could undoubtedly track a 
strong correlation between the increasing prevalence and extremity of 
pornography and the increasing prevalence of sexualised advertising and sexual 
imagery in the mainstream media. In the first chapter of How To Do Things With 
Pornography, titled ‘Pornutopia’, Bauer declares that “Twenty years after the porn 
wars raged at their height, the triumph of pornography is everywhere evident” (6) 
and that “the pornographization of everyday life” (ibid) has taken hold. Dines 
tracks the rise of pornography—from a ‘gentlemen’s culture’ with the pretense of 
erudition in magazines such as Playboy in the 1960s to instantly available 
hardcore internet porn—into its now normalised position. The word ‘porn’ itself 
has become a colloquial adjective to describe a fetishistic fascination with 
something, guitar porn, for example. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the 
vast majority of pornography is also a commercial, capitalist exercise. It is 
impossible to untangle pornography and the pornification of mainstream culture 
from a simultaneous immersion within a capitalist framework. Again, bell hooks’ 
notion of imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy articulates the many 
interwoven aspects of the Western tradition that culminate in the framing of Ge-
stell. 
 
An in-depth analysis of the ways that capitalism and marketing normalise the 
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reduction of (particularly) women and girls to sexual objects is unnecessary here. 
As Bauer notes, regarding the objectification of women as unethical in and of 
itself tends to rest on a number of Kantian assumptions concerned with restricting 
someone’s capacity to achieve subjectivity (2015, 31). This perspective often 
leaves the possibility of a masculinist horizon that devalues the unmasculine 
unexamined. Rather than attempt to demonstrate the psychological effects of 
sexualised marketing, or the reasons why reducing a person to an object is 
unethical, what I wish to highlight is how the concept of pornification can be 
understood as an aspect of Ge-stell. While Ge-stell is patriarchal, patriarchy is not 
necessarily technological. Pornification is an expression of Ge-stell’s misogynist-
patriarchal aspect. In this regard, pornification is also technological. The sheer 
ubiquity of sexualised images, the prevalence and easy accessibility to what would 
have been considered hard-core pornography less than two decades ago, and the 
assumed neutrality and normality of sexual experiences being shaped by 
mainstream norms (depilation, the pressure to perform acts that replicate scenes 
from pornography, issues around body shape) are all at least partly affected by 
pornification, and all shape the modern world in various ways.16 As Being-in-the-
world, Dasein is inexorably affected by pornification. Pornification names the 
unfolding of the alethic revealing of pornography: an over-arching aesthetic of 
what it means to have a body worthy of desire, the feminine—regardless of 
biological sex, although predominantly women—as passive, the masculine as 
dominant. Further, pornification is an extension of the kind of masculinist sexual 
aggression characteristic of much mainstream pornography into popular culture 
and everyday existence. 
 
Women are pornified into hairless, slim, young, and sexually eager objects, in no 
need of a personality, face, or meaningful identity. Men are also framed, 
positioned into “toxic masculinity” (Kupers 2005, 713) by this same process of 																																																								
16 Julia Long (2012), Gail Dines (2010), and Nancy Bauer (2015) all discuss the various ways that 
pornification is shaping the formative sexual experiences of young people. Given the qualitative 
shift in pornography, the pressure, particularly on young women, to replicate scenes of submission 
and degradation that cannot imaginably be fun or comfortable for anyone’s early sexual 
encounters, place young women in a social predicament that has no comparable male equivalent. 
While young men are being framed and ordered into a position that is degrading in so far as it robs 
them of their humanity, they are, none the less, largely framed into the position of power in 
heteronormative settings.  
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pornification. The masculinist horizon consists of a different set of pressures, 
often placing men into positions of relative power, while making such positioning 
invisible. Such positioning also contains its own unique heteronormative 
oppression and violence in the absence of an alternative or less-damaging model 
of masculinity.17 Because of this dual framing, damaging for both the masculine 
and the unmasculine in different ways, the pornification of Ge-stell must be made 
visible to those positioned into relative privilege. Ge-stell makes us—the 
coherents, the masculine—less than human, by hiding the possibility of authentic 
human being behind the tranquility of the everyday: the very same tranquility that 
de Beauvoir demonstrates is impossible for the unmasculine. The impossibility of 
dwelling for some thus heightens the obligation of dwelling for others, even 
though such obligation remains invisible—this obligation is discussed further in 
Chapter Eight. To interrupt the tranquility of everyday inauthenticity, the 
pornification of the world, and the misogyny of Ge-stell, must be en-countered as 
rape culture. 
 
Rape Culture 
Defined by the editors of Transforming a Rape Culture as “a complex of beliefs 
that encourage male sexual aggression and supports violence against women” 
(Buchwald, Fletcher and Roth 2005, xi), the concept of rape culture has developed 
within (largely) feminist scholarship since the mid 1970s. Rape culture is an 
umbrella term used to describe the culminative social norms and conditions in 
which rape is considered an act of violence, control, and power, rather than an 
expression of desire or sexuality (xiv). Susan Brownmiller’s Against Our Will: 
Men, Women, and Rape (1993) is dedicated to dismissing the notion that rape is 
an exceptional act committed by a criminal fringe, and instead is part of a larger 
economy of power and authority. Brownmiller’s analysis points to aspects of the 
prison system as exemplary of this economy of power, where rape acts to establish 																																																								
17 In his paper ‘Toxic Masculinity as a Barrier to Mental Health Treatment in Prison’, Terry 
Kupers states that “[t]he term toxic masculinity is useful in discussions about gender and forms of 
masculinity because it delineates those aspects of hegemonic masculinity that are socially 
destructive, such as misogyny, homophobia, greed, and violent domination” (716).  The concept is 
also prevalent in many online editorials and blogs and is used in such a manner that supports the 
contention that toxic masculinity is a result of men being framed and positioned by Ge-stell in 
ways that are damaging to all genders. 
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hierarchy and dominance (256-267).18 I propose that rape culture can be 
productively understood in light of the account of Ge-stell that I have developed. 
In particular, while remaining sensitive to the problems of essentialism and 
compulsory heteronormativity, it is important to note that rape culture implicates a 
specifically misogynist horizon. Both figuratively and literally, rape is 
predominantly a masculine (gendered, rather than sexed) act of domination. 
Again, I do not propose any kind of essentialism by using the gendered term, but 
instead refer to the prevalent Western association of masculinity with activity, 
strength, power, and so on. In this sense, rape culture is a misogynist framing of 
the world that valorises and legitimises the masculine over the unmasculine. As a 
broader horizon or framing, rape culture problematises the ontic-legal definition of 
rape and complicates matters of consent by demonstrating that rape is often 
connected to a broader socio-cultural context. This context, I argue, is most 
effectively interpreted as Ge-stell, the misogynist framing of the technological 
world in which each Dasein finds itself. Whether consenting to sex as a socio-
economic transaction, such as in prison or prostitution, or by submitting to 
adolescent peer pressure (and this kind of pressure implicates pornification and the 
intersection of technology and misogyny), rape culture is a concept that highlights 
the context in which consent is granted. As such, rape culture is more effectively 
interpreted with Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology than the metaphysical 
model of the autonomous, willing subject. 
 																																																								
18 In The Myth of Prison Rape: Sexual Culture in American Prisons (2009), Mark S. Fleisher and 
Jessie L. Krienert (2009) suggest that the prevalence of non-consensual homosexual sex in the 
prison system is far less than mainstream media and popular culture represent. Fleisher and 
Krienert state that “a study of the culture of prison rape is a study of the concepts of sexuality, 
personal identity, and institutional social roles forged to a study of actual or purported violence” 
(xiii), implying that, beyond its legal definition, the concept of rape is connected to the context in 
which it takes place. While Fleisher and Krienert make the tenuous claim that there is less risk of 
rape in prison than there is in college (3), in making this claim they equivocate the meaning of rape 
and inadvertently—and, ultimately, contrary to their intentions—demonstrate that rape culture (in 
which sexual activity is a part of an economy of power) is inextricably bound to a broader context 
or horizon which distorts the distinction between authentic consent and (social, cultural, economic) 
coercion, and is, thus, alive and well in the American prison system. Fleisher and Krienert 
demonstrate that heterosexual and homosexual men attain status and power in prison through the 
way they identify sexually, regardless of whether or not they actually perform homosexual 
activities (2009, 63-70). The man of highest status is the self-identified heterosexual man who does 
not engage in homosexual activity at all, while the least respected is the heterosexual man who 
then identifies as homosexual in prison (and acts as such). Rape culture is misogynist in that status 
is valued from most to least masculine.  
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Rape culture is not bound to a legal definition of rape, but a widespread context or 
horizon of violent, radical gender inequality. As a concept, rape culture can 
effectively highlight the normality of: an entrenched power differential between 
sexes and genders; the accepted neutrality of deeply masculinist institutions such 
as the legal system and the STEM disciplines,19 and; the prevalence of masculine 
sexual aggression and sexual expectation in the pornified epoch of Ge-stell. Even 
if one were to hypothetically accept that public spaces are neutral, non-gendered 
spaces, one must still concede that a woman alone in an urban park at night is at 
risk of rape. In a rape culture, one recognises that this woman is unequivocally at 
risk, regardless of the circumstances or choices that put her in the park alone at 
night. However, acknowledging that rape is prevalent across many patriarchal 
cultures is not the same as accepting the inevitability or normativity of this 
practice, yet this is the position that is reflected in juridical and socio-cultural 
norms within a rape culture. Manifesting in numerous historically situated 
discourses and institutions, rape culture does not necessarily exist through any 
deliberate or intentional conspiratorial enterprise any more than patriarchy or Ge-
stell. Instead, rape culture exists as a culmination and exacerbation of the invisible 
masculinist bias of the modern technological world. As an enduring result of this 
bias, the traces of outdated legal definitions and social expectations—that it is no 
longer legal or generally acceptable to rape one’s wife, for example—blur the 
lines around the presumed severity and implications of rape, assuming it to be an 
inevitable and inexorable human phenomenon, the trauma of which is lessened by 
marital or romantic familiarity with the rapist. These kinds of presumptions blur 
the lines of culpability and question the victims’ behavior, reinforcing the 
normality of the act, discussed further below. While it may be true that rape is not 
an exceptional and unexpected phenomenon, this is no reason to accept the 
prevalence of sexual aggression in mainstream culture, or to attribute it to normal 
male behaviour.20  																																																								
19 For a discussion of the masculine bias found in academia and the STEM disciplines, see Jennifer 
M. Grossman and Michelle V. Porche (2014); Sarah M. Jackson, Amy L. Hillard, and Tamera R. 
Schneider (2014); Heather Savigny (2014), and; Zachary Klein (2006).  
20 In calling out rape culture and systemic masculine violence, it is thinkers such as Andrea 
Dworkin and Gail Dines who are assuming that men have more potential than modern patriarchal 
macho tropes expect of them. Normalising any heteronormative power differential through a 
pervasive and lackadaisical ‘boys will be boys’ attitude is a socio-cultural failing that prevents men 
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‘Rape culture’ can be understood as an intentionally provocative phrase that 
affords the possibility of an en-counter. From an instrumental-calculative position, 
the idea that the modern Western world is largely defined by its attitude towards 
rape (as an extension of a valorisation of the masculine at the expense of the 
unmasculine) seems almost absurd or offensive. From the kind of compromised 
‘impartial’ position that coheres with, and is thus oblivious to, Ge-stell, a woman 
walking alone in an urban park at night is at risk of rape, and therefore she should 
modify her behaviour accordingly. By emphasising the responsibility of the 
woman in this example—note the prescriptive use of ‘should’ in the previous 
sentence—the misogynistic horizon of Ge-stell remains invisible. While it may be 
correct that a woman must modify her behaviour in order to minimise her chance 
of being attacked, such a ‘must’ is descriptive, not prescriptive. It is the broader 
cultural acceptance of male violence—juridically and socially21—that necessitates 
such a modification: she is expected to cohere with Ge-stell. It is erroneous to 
suggest that women modifying their behavior can eradicate rape culture. Any 
emphasis on the responsibility of women, silently assumes the inevitability of men 
acting as sexual predators and thus rape culture remains un-en-countered. Instead, 
by coming to understand that a woman must modify her behavior (in ways that 
many men will never have to) it becomes apparent that the woman has no choice 
in this instance; she will be at risk through no fault of her own if she does not 
modify her actions, the neutral or unchallenged assumption is the threat of rape, 
not her behaviour.22 ‘Rape culture’ is not simply a rhetorical or hyperbolic phrase. 
Interpreting rape in terms of context does not overshadow its literal or ontic 
meaning, but adds ontological complexity to the nature of such phenomena. 
Further, despite the problems of interpreting “human practices as culture” (briefly 																																																																																																																																																								
from achieving authentic human being—dwelling—by framing them into an unachievable and 
unhealthy model of masculinity. 
21 In ‘“Rape Culture” Language and the News Media: Contested versus Non-Contested Cases”, 
April Cobos presents findings that demonstrate that the use of language by The New York Times 
and The Wall Street Journal contains a bias, both against alleged instances of sexual assault in 
non-American countries (less likely to use damning language in domestic as opposed to 
international incidents), and in instances where women had been drinking (where language is more 
likely to implicate the behaviour of the victim). Where the word ‘rape’ was employed, it was more 
likely to appear in the headline and refer to an incident in a non-American country. Incidents 
within America, however, were more likely to be described in ambiguous, leading terms such as 
‘alleged sexual assault’, often providing details that emphasised the culpability of the victim (that 
she had been drinking at a party, for example). 
22 While I have used biologically sexed terms here, I do this only for demonstrative purposes. 
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discussed in Chapter One), and the way in which Heidegger believes the concept 
of ‘culture’ indicates the metaphysical alienation of human being from Being, in 
the context described, rape culture indicates something more deeply rooted than 
the isolated and exceptional acts of individuals: Dasein’s Being-in-the-world of 
Ge-stell.     
 
Victim blaming is perhaps one of the most pernicious aspects of rape culture. 
Victim blaming refers to practices that reflect the misogynist attitude of rape 
culture, in both civilian and juridical settings. As the name suggests, victim 
blaming is a practice that suggest that a victim of rape is—significantly, not 
coincidentally—complicit in the act due to his or her lack of behaviour 
modification.23 It is not the ever-present reality of rape that is under question; this 
is taken for granted, systemically accepted. Victim blaming results in a less harsh 
penalty or judgment of the rapist.24 The reality of the mainstream reception to the 
concept of rape culture is defined by the scientistic comportment of modernity: 
while a list of countless empirical examples can be compiled, accepting the notion 
of rape culture requires that these examples be understood as part of a systemic 
bias, rather than as isolated instances. In the revealing/double-concealing of Ge-
stell, the list of examples and thoughtful contributions to the concepts will need to 
continue to mount up before any kind of critical mass is achieved. The 
documented prevalence of sexism in the STEM disciplines and academia more 																																																								
23 Eliana Suarez and Tahany M. Gadalla’s ‘Stop Blaming the Victim: A Meta-Analysis on Rape 
Myths’ clearly demonstrates that what they call “rape myth acceptance” (2010) is associated with 
the kind of masculinist-misogynist attitudes that I have discussed above. One does not need to 
suffer from specifically “toxic” masculinity to accept rape culture and victim blaming, however, as 
these are aspects of the mainstream attitude that is perpetuated by Ge-stell. In this sense, the 
seemingly more benign concept of “hegemonic masculinity” (Kupers, 713) is already toxic to 
those who fall outside the hegemony. See also, Maria C. Ferrão and Gabriela Gonçalves (2015) 
and Tomas Ståhl, Daniel Eek, and Ali Kazemi (2010). 
24 This effect is widely reported. In a report published by the Australian Institute of Criminology, 
Natalie Taylor (2007) found that juror bias (and societal bias more widely), which is accounted for 
in my argument as aspects of the rape culture and victim blaming perpetuated by Ge-stell, has a 
significant effect on the juridical outcome of rape cases. Similarly, Steffen Bieneck and Barbara 
Krahé (2011) found that general attitudes towards victims of robberies were more charitable than 
towards rapes when it was revealed that the victim had been drinking or if the perpetrator and the 
victim had some prior relationship (in either rape or robbery scenarios). As Bieneck and Krahé 
state, “perpetrators are blamed less and victims are blamed more the closer the prior relationship 
between the two … [yet] … neither victim intoxication nor victim–perpetrator relationship are 
critical features of the legal definition of rape. They affect perceptions of blame because they are 
part and parcel of widely shared stereotypes about sexual assault that deny cases that involve 
victim intoxication and a prior relationship with the perpetrator the status of a ‘real rape’” (1793-
1794).  
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broadly suggests that attempts to untangle a notion such as rape culture from 
within an elite community of supposedly critical thinkers is just as difficult as it is 
in the mainstream. How, then, is the West to respond to the en-counter of rape 
culture?  
 
Moving Forward 
Heidegger’s critique of technology describes an inauthentic-unethical relation of 
human being to itself, the cosmos, and the giving-appropriating of Being. 
According to Heidegger, the Western metaphysical tradition systematically 
alienated the subject from its surroundings and from other people, placing it at the 
centre of all epistemic and metaphysical possibilities. As a result of this alienation, 
the subject became the origin of all meaning and value, but this meaning and value 
related only to him; it was subjective. This resulted in two important 
developments. First, in order to overcome the problem of subjective bias, the 
scientific method became valorised for its ability to generate objective truths. In 
the wake of the European Enlightenment, objective truth, and the method to obtain 
such, became valued and revered in a normative sense. The quantitative—that 
which can be measured and understood objectively—became qualitatively valued. 
Corollary to this development, and missing from Heidegger’s account, the subject 
came to embody the properties and characteristics that would come to be valorised 
as masculine. The specifically masculine subject was not simply the source of 
meaning and value, but was, through reason and rationality, also capable of 
objectivity and impartiality, capable of devising and employing the scientific 
method. The masculine subject thus came to value and revere its rationality, 
impartiality, and objectivity, never suspecting that these descriptions were also 
ideals, value judgments. These ideals inherently devalued unmasculine properties 
and characteristics of human being. The oblivion of Being was also, to paraphrase 
Irigaray (1987, 133-146), the oblivion of the non-masculine. 
Actively devaluing the unmasculine is not simply a masculinist bias, but is both a 
symptom and act of misogyny. In this sense, Ge-stell is not just a masculinist-
patriarchal framing of the world, its gendered violence—analogous to the violence 
of challenging and the letting of technē—is specifically misogynist. Pornification, 
the process whereby the general aesthetic of pornography is extrapolated to 
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mainstream culture, stems from the intersection of misogyny and modern 
technology. While the masculinist-patriarchal underpinnings of Ge-stell are 
exacerbated by modern technology, the kind of explicit and persistent misogyny 
found in rape culture is the exacerbation of an existing undercurrent of misogyny 
that has developed from an enduring masculinist-patriarchal horizon. Pornography 
evolved within the same masculinist-patriarchal framing of subject-object 
metaphysics, and the prevalence and easy availability of explicitly and 
intentionally misogynistic pornography in recent decades supports the notion that 
although human sexuality might well inherently involve something like 
pornography, the shape it takes in Ge-stell is highly problematic. The liberal-
libertarian position, while oblivious to the framing of Ge-stell, is significant in 
demonstrating that human sexuality is complex and varied and that it is 
problematic to assume any kind of judgemental position on how sexuality 
manifests in different people depending on their individual circumstances. 
However, this very same recognition of the importance of how people relate to 
pornography and sexuality fails to consider that human sexuality, as with any 
ontic way of being, is invariably affected by the worlding of the world. 
 
Pornification is not simply a description of the increasing amount of graphic and 
sexually explicit material in advertising, but is an aspect of the modern 
technological-misogynist worlding of the world. Ge-stell is an inherently 
misogynist framing of the world that orders human sexuality into a largely 
heteronormative (despite the prevalence of contrived gay and lesbian depictions), 
and almost exclusively masculine, perspective. As Bauer’s notes, “human beings 
can express very deep respect for one another by playing with power during 
sexual encounters” (2015, 36), and the authenticity of such play relies on the overt 
acknowledgement of a power differential in the first place. Pornification is a 
concept that helps demonstrate that the framing of Ge-stell is not simply 
technological, but peculiarly misogynistic. In Chapter Eight I will suggest that 
rape culture can be interpreted from a Heideggerian perspective in order that the 
concept reflects more than an umbrella term for a series of isolated incidents and 
phenomena. As it stands, ‘rape culture’ suggests an element of collective and 
deliberative complicity, rather than a disclosive horizon. In this sense, the concept 
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of rape culture still carries the traces of subject-object metaphysics, seeking to 
explain some kind of causal or direct connection between individual acts of 
violence and socio-cultural norms and images. Instead, I will demonstrate that the 
inherent misogyny of Ge-stell, of which rape culture is a critical aspect, offers a 
way to understand the prevalence of a sexed and gendered power differential, and 
of the inherent violence that this differential carries with it. Further, I shall argue 
that in de-centring human being and invoking the fourfold, an authentic response 
to pornography and pornification offers a way to reimagine dwelling.   
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Chapter Eight — Misogynology 
 
In this final chapter of my thesis I complete a hermeneutic turn by revisiting the 
questions raised in Chapter Six in light of the issues explored in Chapter Seven. In 
Chapter Six I argued that dwelling, as formulated by Heidegger, falters, and, in 
many cases, fails altogether. I have named this failure “the impossibility of 
dwelling”: the failure of dwelling to have any meaningful purchase for those who 
are multiply (gender, race, class) systemically oppressed by Ge-stell. However, I 
have also suggested that this failure is the result of an incomplete, rather than 
incorrect, analysis of Ge-stell. Given that Heidegger’s thinking of technology fails 
to account for the patriarchal and misogynist roots of subject-object metaphysics, 
his response to Ge-stell—dwelling—is similarly incomplete, rather than simply 
incorrect. This chapter provides a response to the questions and issues raised 
throughout the previous two chapters: what are the implications of the fact that 
people cohere with Ge-stell to varying degrees? Given the extent of the 
misogynist-technological framing of the modern world (that renders dwelling 
impossible for many people), how can dwelling gain any purchase? What is the 
nature of the obligation of dwelling? Who bears this obligation? I aim to 
demonstrate that the responses to these questions provide further evidence for my 
contention (found in Chapter Six) that the impossibility of dwelling is itself an en-
counter, and, as such, affords the possibility of reimagining dwelling in light of 
the misogynist-technological framing of Ge-stell.  
 
Before responding to the questions and issues of the two preceding chapters, I first 
discuss spirituality, and justify my use of the concept in relation to Heidegger’s 
thinking. Although I have previously introduced the threefold of existential, 
ethical, and spiritual significance—both in my Introduction and in Chapter Six—I 
reiterate and expand on the notion here in order to emphasise the efficacy and 
significance of dwelling and Heidegger’s critique of technology/recovery of the 
problem of Being in general. While I have referred to ethical and spiritual 
significance throughout the thesis, I have reserved a discussion of spirituality for 
this final chapter. Here, my discussion of the spiritual significance of Heidegger’s 
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thinking sets the tone for my response to the questions and issues of the previous 
two chapters and highlights the significance and urgency of en-countering and 
resisting the misogynist-technological framing of Ge-stell. Having outlined my 
interpretation of the concept of spirituality, I interpret the issues from Chapter 
Seven as part of the logos of Ge-stell, suggesting that Ge-stell is both 
technological and misogynological. I shift from a discussion of logos to an 
exploration of Heidegger’s account of mythos, to, again, emphasise both the 
spiritual significance and the efficacy of dwelling as a response to the techno-
misogynological framing of Ge-stell. 
 
Heidegger, Ethics, and Spirituality 
As I have discussed in the Introduction, Nancy J. Holland and Patricia 
Huntington’s Feminist Interpretations of Heidegger serves as an important 
motivation for my thesis. This also holds true with my use of the concept 
‘spirituality’. As Derrida has demonstrated—discussed briefly below—a critical 
analysis of the concept of spirit within Heidegger’s thinking is easily weighed 
down with political connotations. However, the aforementioned collection of 
feminist essays demonstrates a way—in the same sense that Capobianco speaks of 
a “Being-Way” (2014, 6)—that the concept of spirituality can be thought in 
conjunction with Heidegger’s thought, with only the barest vestige of Heidegger’s 
use of ‘spirit’. An extended study of the many ways that feminist thinkers employ 
the concept of spirituality is well outside the scope of this thesis; it is also 
unnecessary. From the outset, I have attempted to develop an account of 
Heidegger that, while rigorous, is also contextually accessible and that 
demonstrates the ongoing—perhaps increasing—significance of his thought. As 
such, the spiritual significance of dwelling must be understood within the scope of 
the material that I have covered so far. Framed in this manner, what Huntington 
refers to as the “spiritual impetus underlying Heideggerian thought … 
Heidegger’s spiritual sensibilities … Heidegger’s spirituality” (2001, 10) can best 
be understood by once again referring to the ontic-ontological ouroboros. 
Heidegger’s spirituality is both ontological, rooted in care, Sorge, and ontic in that 
it is always fuelled by concrete, worldly (understood culturally, socially) 
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phenomena. 
 
While care, Sorge can be described in neutral or purely ontological terms, the 
existential investedness of Da-sein’s ek-sistence is anything but neutral: it is 
always directed towards the world and manifests as both banal and profound 
experiences (Erfahrung). In the ontological sense, spirit is not describable in any 
sense of presence-at-hand; as such, it is not to be thought in terms of body and 
soul, or as having any “ecclesiastical overtones” (Heidegger 1982b, 178). Rather, 
spirit is “a flame that inflames, startles, horrifies, and shatters us” (179). The 
image of the flame, made in reference to the poetry of Georg Trakl, demonstrates 
the ontic-ontological ouroboros. Flame is not static, it is an active phenomena; as 
gaseous combustion, flame is an event, not a merely present-at-hand quality. 
However, flame also requires fuel, oxygen, and heat. In other words, while flame 
can be thought of in an abstract sense, each flame requires concrete, actual earthly 
(rather than merely worldly) conditions from which to arise. As such, the notion of 
spirit, and spirituality as flame is not simply an obvious reference to the 
impassioned nature of human being—which, as I have discussed in Chapter Three, 
is unavoidable for a being whose being is a matter of concern for itself—but is an 
apt metaphor for the phenomenological in-the-worldness of the mortal, belonging-
to the Fourfold. In this sense, spirit is a poetic description of the way in which care 
and each person’s in-the-worldness predisposes human being to be affected in 
various ways by events, ideas, and other phenomena.  
 
While not identical, there are parallels between the way I characterise spirituality 
and what Robert E. Wood calls “the heart” (2015, 445). For Wood, the heart plays 
an important role for thinking in terms of the kind of impassioned investedness 
that I attribute to the hermeneutic threefold of existentialism, ethics, and 
spirituality: “It is perhaps to avoid the emotional associations that Heidegger 
chooses not to employ the terms associated with heart … The heart is a prior 
orientation of the human being from which feelings emerge. Strong feelings 
emerge because there is a prior care for the objects of those feelings, a care that is 
dispositional” (448). Wood’s analysis not only alludes to Heidegger’s masculine 
bias, but also demonstrates the phenomenological interconnection of the ontic and 
Chapter Eight—Misogynology 	
	
249 
the ontological; each abstract structure of Dasein—and the totality of care, 
understood as the basis for the threefold hermeneutic of existential, ethical, and 
spiritual significance—can only be interpreted in reference to its worldly 
manifestation. It is in this same sense, and with reference to the motif of danger 
and saving power, that Heidegger claims that spirit (as flame) not only “lightens 
and calls forth radiance, but … may also go on consuming and reduce all to white 
ashes” (179). As impassioned investedness, spirit—as the completion of the 
existential and ethical threefold—carries the risk of obsession, willful ignorance, 
and outright passionate bias. It is in this sense that Derrida asks “[i]s ash the Good 
or the Evil of the flame?” (1991, 97).1 However, Heidegger’s later thinking of 
authenticity, and notions of releasement, while incomplete, and perhaps 
insufficient in many senses (as outlined in Chapter Six, for example), acts as a 
reminder that spirituality must reduce not Dasein’s ethical predisposition to ashes, 
devolving ‘thinking’ itself into inauthentic, uncritical hubris. As a hermeneutic 
threefold, ethical concerns channel existential and spiritual concerns, just as the 
latter two channel the former. I do not privilege spirit as the culmination or highest 
manifestation of these three, but, rather, identify it as the strongest term for Da-
sein’s impassioned affectedness. How, then, does such a threefold—with 
particular reference to spirituality—manifest? 
 
Throughout the thesis I have stressed the importance of interpreting Heidegger’s 
project as a response to subject-object metaphysics and, more specifically, Ge-
stell. The ethical significance of dwelling—the obligation of which is an 
unavoidably existential burden, impassioned by the ‘burning’ spirit—gains 
meaningful traction when considered in the light of Ge-stell. The issues discussed 
in Chapter Seven, for example, when thought through the fourfold, represent the 
saving power of spirit; they guide the flame by allowing the technological 
concealing of rape culture as something that profoundly matters. While it is 
possible to frame the issue of misogynology from a solely ethical perspective, the 
purpose of spirit and spirituality is to allow such ethical problems to profoundly 
matter to Da-sein; to resonate at a deep, personal or ‘gut’ level, rather than 																																																								
1 Derrida intentionally frames this question as a dichotomy in order to emphasise the possible 
connotations of Heidegger’s thinking in reference to his political. See Derrida’s Of Spirit for a 
discussion of this aspect of Heidegger’s spirituality.  
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intellectually. While one can be intellectually convinced that any given issue is 
ethically problematic, it requires something more than this to stir one to action, to 
feel as though the problem is authentically one’s own, not merely a thought 
experiment or an issue for others. This stirring represents the importance of 
understanding spirituality as inseparable from the ethical. In the sense that I am 
using it here, a spirituality that stirs without the full sense of the existential, 
ethical, and spiritual hermeneutic that is founded on the authentic mortal of the 
Fourfold, is indeed an uncritical and dangerous impassioned affectedness. 
Spirituality, then, is not simply unbridled impassioned investedness, but is the 
sense that what one does and how one is matters, that one’s belonging to Being is 
a deeply existential, ethical, and spiritual matter. Returning to the ethical 
significance of Heidegger’s thinking helps illustrate this. 
 
Despite Heidegger’s attempt to think beyond ontotheology in any form, his 
response to technology has a strong Kantian flavour. This flavour is the ethical 
component of dwelling. I have earlier defined ethical thinking as a systematic and 
logically derived series of premises and conclusions that demonstrate a distinction 
between what is right and good, and what is wrong or bad. Further to this, I have 
demonstrated that while Heidegger does not offer ‘an’ ethics in the sense just 
described, a systematic and critical analysis of his distinction between Ge-stell and 
Ereignis, technē and technology, and authenticity and inauthenticity satisfies these 
conditions in an ontological sense (a sense that redefines what it means to be, and 
thus what it means to be an ethical agent, if such language can still be employed). 
Again, the ethical dimension in Heidegger’s thought is founded in care, and can 
(should) be experienced as spiritual. In Chapter One I flagged that, for Heidegger, 
Kant allowed objects to “stand against” (Gegenstand) human being as mysterious 
and unknowable; this resonates with the idea that that which counters and limits 
human being is constitutive of human being (and is thus existentially, ethically, 
and spiritually significant). By contrast, Heidegger argued that the external world 
is reduced to instrumental-calculative properties, and thus robbed of any inherent 
value, by the Cartesian-Nietzschean subject. The reduction of the cosmos to 
standing reserve allows the free expression of human will to dominate and exploit 
the earth (and its inhabitants) with little ethical or spiritual repercussion. However, 
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for Heidegger, Cartesian metaphysics is only partially responsible for such a shift. 
The triumph of the Enlightenment and the increasing prevalence of science and 
modern technology—due to its overwhelming efficacy and pragmatic utility—
compounded and entrenched this shift in how human being relates to itself and its 
surroundings. For Heidegger, modernity heralded the culmination of metaphysics; 
modernity is the technological age proper. The matter of dignity, the notion of 
inherent value, and an (at least partially) deontological ethical position 
demonstrate Heidegger’s affinity with, and his decisive split from, much of Kant’s 
ethical thinking. 
 
While Kant’s categorical imperative is rigorously articulated, describing an 
equivalent rule or law in an ethics of dwelling remains difficult. However, by 
examining the misogynist-technological framing of the modern world, a clearer 
picture can emerge. In certain senses, Heidegger’s yardstick—privileging technē 
over technology, letting over challenging—reflects the Kantian yardstick of the 
universality of an act. Although these two formulae can generate radically 
different results, the structural similarities that underpin both Heidegger’s and 
Kant’s ethical positions allow a superficial account of Heidegger’s critique of 
technology, modernity, and—as demonstrated in Chapter Seven2—pornography, 
to be articulated in strikingly Kantian terms. Treating other people and the extant 
stuff of the world as though they are only of instrumental worth is unethical in 
both systems of thought. Kant’s debt to the Christian metaphysical tradition is 
mirrored in the spirituality of Heidegger’s thinking and the phenomenological-
ontological significance of the de-centred mortal of the fourfold. For Heidegger, 
spirituality is rooted in an originary sense of belonging to Being (though this sense 
is not solely restricted to Heidegger’s writings, as discussed above). While one 
may feel an affinity with a geographic location, or with a person, or a piece of 
technology, the affinity itself is founded on a deeper sense of human belonging. 
The sense of belonging to (or with) a place, person, or object is a factical-ontic 
manifestation of this deeper sense. The different expressions of belonging, from 
nomadic adventurer to reclusive homebody, are founded on the spiritual sense of 																																																								
2 As noted by Nancy Bauer, many anti-porn arguments are explicitly Kantian, or at least rely on 
Kantian underpinnings (2015, 27-34).  
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one’s cor-respondence. This sense of belonging is spiritual, but, again, must not be 
privileged over the existential and ethical significance of Heidegger’s thinking 
that leads to this point. Thought in isolation from the various component aspects 
of Heidegger’s thinking that contribute to the hermeneutic, spirituality can be 
understood simply as impassioned investedness; however, as I raised in Chapter 
Seven, and return to below, a sense of belonging that is derived from cohering 
with Ge-stell is largely inauthentic. Authenticity must always act to temper 
spirituality. 
 
In Of Spirit, Derrida interprets the shifting and problematic nature of Heidegger’s 
use of the word ‘spirit’, Geist. It is the concluding chapter of Derrida’s work that 
concerns me most here. The affinity between Derrida’s concluding imaginary 
dialogue, Laurence Paul Hemming’s project in Heidegger’s Atheism, and Patricia 
Huntington’s Introduction to Feminist Interpretations of Heidegger supports my 
interpretation of spirituality in Heidegger’s thinking, and my use of the concept 
beyond Heidegger’s intent. Derrida’s imaginary dialogue between Heidegger and 
a theologian demonstrates that while Heidegger’s thinking attempts to stay outside 
the confines of ontotheology, it nonetheless resonates as the primordial grounds 
for a theology. The possibility of the divine or the holy comes before any notion 
of faith or religion. The revivification of spirit that Heidegger calls for is the 
grounds for an upsurge of faith, awe, or reverence. Derrida’s theologian assures 
Heidegger that they are attempting to recover the same originary sense, “we are 
appealing to this entirely other in the memory of a promise, or the promise of a 
memory” (1987, 113). The gods are not present as a first cause, or a divine force, 
but as the “entirely other” that counters and limits the mortal of the fourfold. For 
Hemming, Heidegger’s ‘atheism’ is a conceptual play on words, in that—as I have 
demonstrated in Chapter Five—Heidegger is thinking beyond any theism-atheism 
binary. For Hemming, as with Derrida’s theologian, Heidegger’s thinking 
properly grounds the subject matter of theology. In removing the God(s) and the 
properly divine from the instrumental-calculative realm, Hemming demonstrates 
that Heidegger makes room for an authentic faith. Claiming that Ereignis and the 
notion of die Kehre within Heidegger’s thought properly belong together, 
Hemming argues that “[f]ar from abolishing the possibility of God, die Kehre is 
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that which makes my authentic, ownmost being-with God possible at all (2002, 
117).  
 
As I have previously stated, the threefoldof existentiality, the ethical, and 
spirituality, while ontological, is also always contingent on historical-factical-
ontical circumstances. That we care is the ontological condition for us to care 
about something; that we care at all is spiritual, not in any ecclesiastical or 
metaphysical sense, but in so far as human investedness at its greatest intensity is 
something more than a casual or incidental concern over one’s own being. For 
dwelling to offer a meaningful response to modern technology and the patriarchal 
framing of Ge-stell, the hermeneutic threefold of existential, ethical and spiritual 
significance that underpins the concept must be explicitly brought to light. Any 
appeal to historical-factical-ontical phenomena to make sense of modern 
technological issues must always take the ontological into account, yet the reverse 
of this is equally true. The ouroboros of the ontic-ontological must underpin the 
notion of dwelling for the sake of consistency and efficacy. Spirituality completes 
the threefold hermeneutic in that it is the impassioned investedness of each 
existentially-invested human being: that which makes phenomena matter to us in a 
profound sense. Heidegger’s critique of technology is driven by an existential, 
ethical and spiritual concern, and his spirituality is articulated in the passing by of 
the Last God (Chapter Four), the withdrawal and flight of the gods in modernity 
(Chapter Five) as well as the flame that burns inside each person. The ethical 
aspect of Heidegger’s thought tempers the flame of spirituality by reminding us of 
the importance of authentic systematic, logical, even instrumental-calculative 
thinking. The spiritual aspect of Heidegger’s thought acts as a powerful 
motivation for such ethical concerns to profoundly matter in the first place. In the 
next two sections of the chapter, I explore how the existential, ethical, and 
spiritual converge in dwelling and the fourfold. However, I will demonstrate that 
dwelling must first be reimagined in light of my augmentation of Heidegger’s 
account of Ge-stell. I will specifically analyse how such an augmentation reveals 
the logos of Ge-stell as something more than technology. 
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The logos of Ge-stell 
In Being and Time, Heidegger describes logos as “letting-something-be-seen” 
(2008a, 56), distinguishing his reading of the concept from (what he sees) as the 
more conventional historiological understanding of logos as knowledge. With this 
interpretation of logos, Heidegger emphasises the phenomenological notion that 
“[d]iscourse … lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is 
about” (56). In this sense, logos brings a thing into view as itself, from itself; it is 
alethic. What is brought forth or unconcealed by the logos always also has its 
earthly character. What is revealed in the letting-something-be-seen of logos is the 
strife between earth and world, or, more properly, the mirroring of the fourfold (or 
the conspicuous absence or distortion of such). As discussed in Chapter Five, 
Heidegger’s thinking takes for granted that human being is held in the sway of 
language; our conceptual understanding of and relation to the world is shaped 
linguistically. In ‘The Nature of Language’ Heidegger states that logos “speaks 
simultaneously as the name for Being and for Saying” (1982b, 80) and in ‘Words’ 
that “Saying, is logos: Saying which, in showing, lets beings appear in their ‘it is’” 
(155). Logos, then, names the alethic saying of Being that human being properly 
belongs-to. The belonging of human being to Being (as logos) is stated clearly in 
‘The Way to Language’: 
 
 As Showing, Saying, which consists in Appropriation, is the most proper mode of
 Appropriating … Accordingly, language always speaks according to the mode in which
 the Appropriation reveals itself or withdraws. For a thinking that pursues the
 Appropriation can still only surmise it, and yet can experience it even now in the nature
 of modern technology (Heidegger 1982b, 131). 
 
As Saying, logos, language is “the most proper mode” of appropriation, of the 
human belonging to Being and the mirroring of the fourfold. It is through the 
logos as Saying that human being comes to simultaneously understand and shape 
itself, its place in the world, and its relation to others. Language, then, constantly 
shapes and reflects historical-factical-ontic human being, where human being 
itself is a product of the prevailing mode of disclosure that is reflected in and 
perpetuated by language. Instrumental-calculative thinking is expressed in the 
value judgments of the gigantic, the same language that devalorises emotionality, 
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softness, and nurturing in favour of historically masculine characteristics. In the 
final sentence of the passage above, Heidegger makes clear that in attempting to 
think Ereignis, the nature of modern technology (the revealing of Ge-stell) offers 
the first insight into how one can understand the appropriating-giving of Being.  
 
 Within Framing, speaking turns into information. It informs itself about itself in order to
 safeguard its own procedures by information theories … the kind of communication
 which “informs” man uniformly, that is, gives him the form in which he is fitted into the
 technological-calculative universe (Heidegger 1982b, 132). 	
In Ge-stell, Saying (logos) is transformed, distorted. The logos of technology is no 
longer a letting, but is instead an ordering of truth into instrumental-calculative 
correctness. With a scientific method, one need not think critically, but only defer 
to the method. The method generates information, data. Yet the data itself need 
not be critically interpreted when the method that generates the data becomes 
qualitatively revered.3 As such, the metaphysical assumptions that underpin the 
method prevail. Technology, then, is not the Saying of technē, but something 
other. In order to supplement Heidegger’s discussion of the distinction between 
Saying and information in the passages above, I turn to Richard Capobianco’s 
discussion of Heidegger’s Heraclitus seminars from 1943 and 1944. Not yet 
published in English, Capobianco’s reading of these seminars sheds light on 
Heidegger’s understanding of logos and provides further evidence that Ereignis 
names the happening of Being in the multiple sense of alethēia, physis, and, 
finally, Logos. 
 
In the final chapter of Heidegger’s Ways of Being (2014), Capobianco introduces 
a familiar theme within Heidegger’s thinking: the technological, instrumental-
calculative understanding of logos in terms of logic (where logic is understood as 
academically-accepted metaphysical thinking that is integral to the scientism of 
modernity: logic as a noun rather than a verb). This understanding of logos as 
logic is fostered by the subject-object distinction that, for Heidegger, is already an 																																																								
3 In ‘The Nature of Language’ Heidegger quotes Nietzsche’s Will to Power, “It is not the victory of 
science that distinguishes our nineteenth century, but the victory of the scientific method over 
science … The most valuable insights are gained last of all; but the most valuable insights are the 
methods” (Heidegger 1982b, 74). 
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integral aspect of the Western tradition stemming from Plato. Understanding logos 
in terms of logic is corollary to setting mythos and logos in opposition with one 
another, rather than understanding their (according to Heidegger) essential 
sameness. For Heidegger, setting these two concepts in opposition is a 
historiological mistake:  
 
 Mythos and logos become separated and opposed only at the point where neither mythos
 or logos can keep to its original nature. In Plato’s work, this separation has already taken
 place. Historians and philologists, by virtue of a prejudice which modern rationalism
 adopted from Platonism, imagine that mythos was destroyed by logos. But nothing
 religious is ever destroyed by logic; it is destroyed only by the God’s withdrawal
 (Heidegger 2004, 10). 
 
Bearing the beckoning gestures of the gods in mind (discussed in Chapter Five), 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the sameness of mythos and logos reflects the 
mirroring of the gods of the fourfold. Both mythos and logos are concerned with 
human being and the human belonging to Being. In separating these two kinds of 
Saying, opposition is emphasised over unity. Understanding the essential 
sameness of the two allows each to support or “shelter” the other. As a result of 
this separation, logos becomes the “logos of ‘logic’ and ‘metaphysics’” 
(Capobianco 2014, 82), and mythos is resigned to the realm of fiction and fable.  
 
The significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of logos lies in the distinctions that 
Capobianco draws out from the Heraclitus seminar. Chief among these 
distinctions is between the capitalised Logos and the lowercase logos. Where 
logos is intrinsically related to human being, Logos is “primordial” (Capobianco 
2014, 83), it is a name for Being itself. This same idea, with the omission of the 
upper/lower case distinction, is expressed in the lecture series of the late 1950s, 
published as On the Way to Language. Here Heidegger states that logos “speaks 
simultaneously as the name for Being and Saying” (1982, 80) and, as such, “lets 
beings appear in their ‘it is’” (155). However, the distinction between capital and 
lower case lamda (Λ and λ respectively)—a convention found also in Heidegger’s 
treatment of Heraclitus in Early Greek Thinking—as Logos and logos is essential 
in understanding the connection and distinction between Logos as Ereignis and 
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logos as instrumental-calculative subject-object metaphysical logic in Ge-stell. 
The lowercase, human logos is a Saying in the sense of the verb legein, meaning 
both to say, but also to gather (Capobianco 2014, 83). In this sense, logos 
specifically comes to mean “homolegein” (ibid), a human saying and gathering, 
where Logos is the appropriating-giving of Being. The two, however, properly 
belong together as a unitary whole, where the human logos is the saying-gathering 
of the human relation to the Logos. In Early Greek Thinking Heidegger states that 
legein “properly means the laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself 
and others” (1984, 60), demonstrating the significance of language as a key 
feature of human belonging to Being. In this sense, modern technology is a Saying 
that frames and orders the stuff of the cosmos into standing reserve. Technology is 
a peculiarly human form of logos whose saying-gathering relies on the originary 
Logos in the same way that Ge-stell relies on (in the sense that it is) the 
appropriating-gathering of Ereignis, while at the same time actively covering over 
the Logos itself. 
 
The logos of technology reflects the alethic saying-gathering of the human 
relation to itself, its environment, and Being (as the Logos). The dominating and 
destructive human technological relation to the cosmos has been thoroughly 
explored throughout the first half of the thesis, but it is important to bear in mind 
that technology has not come to prominence in isolation from, or to the exclusion 
of, other distinctive relations. In particular, the technological age itself has 
emerged from an already established patriarchal tradition of Western thinking that 
systematically valorises the masculine experience of the world while active 
devaluing and degrading the unmasculine. Modern technological artifacts reflect 
and exacerbate the pre-existing instrumental-calculative human comportment to 
existence itself, but, even still, such artifacts, and technology itself, are something 
useful, perhaps even necessary. This is precisely why “we moderns” are in a 
position to say both yes and no to technology: in making technology (in the 
Heideggerian sense) conspicuous, the recovery of technē and a logos that seeks to 
Say and gather in harmony with—rather than as an imposition or distortion of—
Logos is made possible. However, the capacity to say both yes and no to the 
manner in which one’s embodied sex affects how one’s gender is socially 
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assigned, or to how one’s gender is perceived and valued in the worlding of Ge-
stell, is beyond the capacity of an individual. Technology affects human being in 
profound ways, and so, too, the inherently misogynist underpinnings of 
technology. 
 
In Chapter Six I introduced the notion that the subject of subject-object 
metaphysics is a specifically masculine subject. Derrida coined the term 
“phallogocentrism” (Bennington 1993, 206) in order to combine, and demonstrate 
the inherent entanglement, of the phallocentrism and the logocentrism of the 
Western tradition (including Heidegger).4 Phallocentrism names a systemic bias 
that privileges the male perspective. The phallus of phallocentrism refers to both 
the literal sexed concept of the male sexual appendage and the psychoanalytic 
notion of the phallus as symbolic of patriarchal power. Without engaging in the 
psychoanalytic symbolism of phallocentrism, the term itself serves as a concise 
and evocative description of the masculinist patriarchal bias of the Western 
tradition. Logocentrism, by contrast, is a more complex concept that I can only 
introduce here briefly in order to develop my own argument. In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida defines logocentrism “which is also a phonocentrism” 
(1997, 11) as the privileging of presence over absence: a metaphysics that “always 
assigned the origin of truth in general to the logos” (3).5 For Derrida, speech—and 
thus Heidegger’s interpretation of logos and legein as a Saying that gathers—is 
privileged over writing in the same way that Heidegger argued that extant beings 
are privileged over the appropriating-giving of Being. For Derrida, the Western 
tradition devalues written text, ignoring what is absent in the text by privileging 
the authorial intent and authority of present speech as present/presence. The 
conjunction of logocentrism and phallocentrism, phallogocentrism, signifies two 
important ways that the metaphysics of the Western tradition frames and orders 
human being. However, the manner in which phallogocentrism is conceptualised 
by Derrida and other thinkers such as Luce Irigaray, for example, is not entirely 
harmonious with the gendered account of Ge-stell that I have been working 																																																								
4 As discussed in Chapter Six, Heidegger’s assumption of Dasein’s neutrality, and, more 
obviously, his early thinking of authenticity, betrays his own masculinist phallocentric framing. 
5 With this notion, Derrida directly extends Heidegger’s critique of the Western tradition, 
privileging the technological/instrumental-calculative interpretation of entities over the non-
empirical existential-meditative understanding. 
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towards. In demonstrating the efficacy of Heidegger’s thinking in terms of an 
ethics of dwelling, I am unwilling to relinquish the importance of the logos-Logos 
(a distinction that rests on a unitary whole) and its importance to human being. 
Instead, while acknowledging the significance of the concept of phallogocentrism, 
and in keeping with the material I have covered throughout the thesis so far, I 
wish to propose a new term that resonates with Heidegger’s thinking of 
technology: misogynology. 
 
Misogynology, and the compound techno-misogynology, is a term that I believe 
captures the appropriative saying of the masculinist-patriarchal underpinnings of 
Ge-stell. In the same way that Heidegger intends ‘technology’ to resonate—as a 
revealing of the world, a logos, a gathering-saying of the world as standing 
reserve, the forgetting of technē as poiēsis, and the subject as the centre and origin 
of meaning and value—misogynology names the foundational valorisation of the 
masculine at the expense of the unmasculine that is equally characteristic of Ge-
stell. The introduction of this new term is necessary, in that existing concepts such 
as patriarchy, pornification, and rape culture, are too easily framed by 
metaphysical language and/or assumptions, or require a shared assumption around 
the historiological authority of patriarchy as something more than a descriptor. 
While phallocentrism, and phallogocentrism, are important concepts in their own 
right, they do not perform the same role as misogynology. I introduce this term to 
augment Heidegger’s thinking, to demonstrate the efficacy of Heidegger’s 
analysis of Ge-stell and its relation to Ereignis (and the ontology of ek-sistent Da-
sein as the mortal of the fourfold). My introduction of ‘misogynology’ is based on 
the idea that Heidegger’s critique of technology is fundamentally correct, but 
incomplete. As discussed in Chapter Six, modern technology is always patriarchal, 
but the reverse is not always true. However, the logos of technology and 
misogynology is shared. The compound ‘techno-misogynology’ names the 
entanglement of the two: a reminder that, as part of Heidegger’s lexicon, modern 
technology is always misogynological and, in contrast to the notion of patriarchy, 
misogynology is always also technological. However, misogynology is not simply 
another word for technology; it does not name the same revealing or the same 
phenomenon. Rather, each implicates the other while pointing to a specific aspect 
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of the modern revealing of the world. 
 
The systemic privileging of the masculine does not merely silence or devalorise 
the unmasculine by omission. The masculine framing and ordering of the world 
comes at the direct expense of the unmasculine, mirroring the violence of reducing 
a thing to standing reserve. The logos of technology and the logos of 
misogynology are one and the same, historically bound to the same metaphysical 
origin. The Saying of pornography and pornification is a misogynist gathering of 
the world. The saying-gathering of misogynology renders a concept such as rape 
culture implausible and problematic. First, the misogynological understanding of 
rape is also always technological: it is a categorical phenomenon that is defined by 
measurable—calculable—interactions of present-at-hand entities. The word and 
concept of ‘rape’ is transformed into a piece of information, juridical data that 
corresponds (or not) with the actuality of an event. Rape culture, then, is 
problematic in that it implies a widespread acceptance of such an event that is 
characteristic of an entire community. However, understood in terms of an over-
arching power differential that itself highlights the contested nature of the juridical 
concept of rape (beyond simplistic notions of consent), and taking into account 
related phenomena such as victim blaming and pornification, rape culture attempts 
to name something far greater, and yet far more difficult to articulate: the logos of 
misogynology. Misogynology supports, and perhaps clarifies, pornification and 
rape culture as phenomenological-ontological phenomena: the concepts gain more 
traction when thought within Heidegger’s framework. Ek-sistent Da-sein, the 
tranquility of the They, the belonging of human logos to the Logos all help 
establish the significance—and explain the empirical invisibility—of these 
concepts. Further, augmenting Heidegger’s account of Ge-stell allows the 
conclusions drawn by thinkers such as Lloyd, Gilligan, Dines, and Dworkin to be 
interpreted in a new light. Misogynology accounts for a sexed and gendered bias 
that is so radical, so ubiquitous, that it remains unseen. Further, misogynology 
allows the kind of subjectivation that concerns Foucault and Butler to be 
considered within a Heideggerian framework, without having to explicitly draw 
out the links between these thinkers and Heidegger’s genealogy of the Western 
tradition (including his critiques of modernity and technology). 
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The mythos of Dwelling 
Heidegger’s treatment of mythos is far less extensive than the other Greek 
concepts I have engaged with in this thesis. What little Heidegger says of mythos 
explicitly is found mostly in the 1942-43 winter lecture series Parmenides. 
Significantly, Heidegger makes no distinction between a capitalised Mythos as 
compared to a lowercase mythos as he does with Logos/logos; an equivalent 
distinction would not make sense (discussed below). In these lectures, Heidegger 
briefly describes mythos as playing a similar role as the beckoning gods of the 
fourfold as discussed in Chapter Five (1992, 58-70). In particular, in the 1933-34 
lecture series published as Being and Truth, Heidegger states “[mythos] gives 
clues and indicates … the originary [Logos] of philosophy remains bound to 
[mythos]; only with the language of science is the bond dissolved” (2010, 91-92).6 
In this same lecture series, Heidegger repeats his critique of truth as correctness, 
as I have discussed in Chapter Five. He ties this critique to mythos in so far as a 
saying that is properly mythical does not explain—in the technical sense of the 
word in the explain/understand distinction outlined in Chapter Five—or clearly 
define its content. Rather, myth is allusive; it beckons and points. Introducing his 
reading of Plato’s allegory of the cave, Heidegger states tells his audience that 
 
 Plato always speaks in [mythos] when his philosophizing wants to say something essential 
 with the greatest intensity. The [mythos] speaks of a story—and in order to understand it
 is  essential that we actually go through the story ourselves … the authentic understanding
 of the  [mythos] does not depend … upon whether you understand Greek …whether you
 know much or little or nothing at all about Plato … it depends on this alone: whether
 something unavoidable, something that has an enduring effect, speaks to you in the story
 (2010, 97-98). 
 
Mythos speaks as an obligation: an ethical and spiritual obligation to dwell. 
Mythos does not speak in a prescriptive sense, but in an originary and reverential 
sense. What Heidegger attempts to convey with this passage—and perhaps with 
most of his thinking from this period where the affect of Hölderlin’s poetry 
resonates most strongly—is that a historiological description is distinct from an 
																																																								
6 The square brackets throughout this section of the chapter indicate that I have replaced the Greek 
µύθος with mythos for the sake of consistency with the rest of the thesis. 
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historical understanding; this applies to mythos and all of the Greek concepts I 
have discussed in this thesis. An originary sense of Being is not necessarily a 
Greek sense, yet Heidegger frequently defers to the Greeks as exemplary of a 
people with a pre-metaphysical relation to Being. For Heidegger, understanding 
mythos in terms of myth, as a subject for historiological study into cultural 
narratives, “is a procedure equivalent to drawing water with the aid of a sieve” 
(70). Mythos pertains to the gods in terms of the beckonings and pointings that 
give spiritual value and meaning to a thing beyond its earthly qualities. Mythos “is 
legend, this word literally taken in the sense of essential primordial speech” (61), 
in so far as this primordial speech is “in advance experienced in such an essential 
way that just the simple change of night and day suffices to enhance the 
emergence of all essence into the preserving word [mythos]” (ibid).  
 
The everyday experience of the dawn-day-dusk-night cycle means little in modern 
comings and goings, but experienced from “the essence of the goddess [Alētheia]” 
(ibid), this cycle is a literal demonstration of how things are lit up or concealed in 
their excess and plenitude. More than this, however, understood in relation to his 
later thinking of the gods and the sky of the fourfold, the dawn-dusk cycle also 
reveals an ethical gesture suggesting that human activity (technē) must be 
sensitive to this cycle, rather than seek to challenge or overcome it. Logos is a 
gathering-saying that reveals, gives, and binds ek-sistent Da-sein to the logos as 
homolegein. By contrast, mythos is a gathering-saying that resonates with 
Dasein’s care, with the spirit, with that aspect of human being that is sensitive to 
qualitative values and is capable of being affected. Where Logos simply is, mythos 
is in a spiritual sense. While human being can have its own logos, there is no 
human equivalent of mythos. From out of an originary sense of Being, mythos is 
the unhindered, spontaneous mirroring, interplay of things in their gleaming or 
shining-forth. Perhaps more importantly, mythos is the primordial sway of such 
unhindered mirroring and gleaming in its spiritual significance to human being. It 
does not make sense to speak of either Logos or mythos as more primordial or 
fundamental from one another in the sense that it is impossible to separate out the 
distinction between the phenomenological fact that we are in-the-world (in a 
descriptive sense, in terms of the phenomenological as-structure), and also that our 
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very existence itself is a matter of the deepest spiritual significance. 
 
The logos of misogynology is a saying that has forgotten, and thus distorted the 
Logos. In such a forgetting, misogynology is properly “unmythical” (70) in that it 
only gathers the forceful will of the masculine subject. The techno-
misogynological revealing of the world provides a specific context for 
understanding the significance of mythos to dwelling. As I have developed it, the 
fourfold (and dwelling itself) is not a mythical, mythocentric, or mythological—a 
meaningless compound from Heidegger’s perspective (ibid)—endeavour, but is 
the recovery of a sense of ethical and spiritual significance to debates (and en-
counters) that have otherwise been lost to the masculine frame of the political 
subject. The mythos of dwelling is a call to recognise one’s everyday activities as 
technē, one’s everyday encounters as en-counters. What binds the alethic 
character of one’s everyday language, interactions, and activities to mythos, rather 
than solely to logos, is the de-centring of human being. As the mortal of the 
fourfold, the logos is bound to the Logos, and the mythos is founded on the notion 
that the gods are not entities in any sense, but are that which Da-sein’s 
foundational care, the basis of both ethics and spirituality, lets beckon. The 
significance of one’s own existence as belonging to Being is that each person is 
always fundamentally invested in her existence in some sense. However, the ways 
that such investedness manifests in the gathering, framing, and ordering of Ge-
stell are always also characterised by a loss or withdrawal of the gods. The 
modern logos places human being as the subject at the centre of epistemic and 
metaphysical possibilities; in this sense it opposes and conceals mythos. The 
mythos can only speak where the subject has been displaced and human being de-
centred. 
 
Returning to Chapter Seven, Wendy McElroy and Nancy Bauer both note that 
human sexuality is complex and uniquely tied to the individual. However, is this, 
in itself, a reasonable justification for people to produce and consume 
pornography as defined in the previous chapter? How does the complex and 
individual nature of sexuality play out given the techno-misogynological framing 
of Ge-stell? How is a person in a position of relative privilege within Ge-stell to 
Chapter Eight—Misogynology 	
	
264 
interpret claims that some women feel empowered by having sex for money, 
whether it be under the auspice of pornography, prostitution, or even as naked 
dancers that have no physical contact with the audience? Rather than self-
fulfillment or self-empowerment, this kind of coherence with Ge-stell reflects the 
attempt to manifest Dasein’s belonging: a sense of being at peace with existence 
itself. One does not need to resort to existential themes of angst or the 
uncanniness/not-at-home-ness of unheimlichkeit in order to develop this notion. 
Seeking to reconcile one’s existence, to feel a deep sense of belonging, is often 
couched in narratives of self-help and self-empowerment due to the metaphysics 
that underlie the Western tradition. A Heideggerian rendering of psychology, for 
example, reveals it as the saying-gathering-revealing of the self as psyche, an I 
that is distinct from the world, subjective, the centre of experience and the origin 
of meaning and value. As another example of the double concealing of Ge-stell, a 
sense of belonging is replaced with a more superficial coherence with Ge-stell. 
The push to consume, to better one’s self and one’s circumstances through 
economic means, is founded on the deeper desire to belong; not belonging in any 
kind of ontic sense, but a reconciliation with one’s own existence and existence 
itself. Seeking a sense of belonging through self-help and self-empowerment in 
the modern techno-misogynological world reflects a struggle for authenticity that 
manifests as coherence with Ge-stell. One seeks a sense of belonging to the world 
by meeting the standards that one has internalised from the worlding of the world. 
Unless the world is made visible as Ge-stell, one is framed into inauthenticity. The 
pornified models of masculinity and femininity that are visible everywhere reflect 
little more the capitalist exploitation of human being as standing reserve while 
simultaneously perpetuating impossible misogynological ideals. 
 
The logos of techno-misogynology enforces the unspoken cultural assumptions 
that stem from the subject-object distinction: the subject as the centre and origin of 
experiences and value, and the object as instrumentally-calculably exploitable. 
Dwelling seeks to counter this way of being through the en-counter of the 
fourfold. Yet dwelling is not founded solely on the possibility of the en-counter, 
but on the obligation to respond, and the response itself. The impossibility of 
dwelling stems from the fact that such obligation is meaningless to those who are 
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framed in such a way that they unable to respond in the appropriate manner, those 
for whom the factical-ontical manifestation of their Da-sein is a reflection of 
misogynology, rather than a properly poiētic response. The masculine narrative of 
self-construction—think here of Nietzsche’s Overman, or Sartre’s characterisation 
of freedom and bad faith (particularly in contrast to de Beauvoir’s account of the 
gendered nature of such freedom)—is inconsistent with Heidegger’s notion of 
authentic human being. However, as discussed in Chapter Six, Heidegger’s 
formulation of dwelling is similarly limited. The saving power of this limitation, if 
it can be thought of as such, is that in making the incompleteness of dwelling 
visible, a clear and decisive beginning point for dwelling is revealed. In revealing 
misogynology and the impossibility of dwelling as en-counter, the possibility of 
reimagining and actually dwelling emerges. Rather than simply apply the 
abstracted notion of human activity as technē to one’s everyday coming and 
goings, or to find the en-counter in a Styrofoam cup, the contemporary pornified 
rape culture of the West offers any number of concrete possibilities for en-counter.  
 
The en-counter is the becoming-visible/conspicuous of a phenomenon. Each en-
counter carries an obligation to respond, an obligation to dwell. However, the 
techno-misogynological framing of Ge-stell positions people differently. Some are 
positioned in such a way that they can not cohere with Ge-stell sufficiently to 
authentically own or modify their situation, making the concept of dwelling seem 
impossible. Others cohere with Ge-stell so completely that techno-misogynology 
remains invisible and uninterrupted. On the one hand, the impossibility of 
dwelling highlights the conditions that make it impossible—an en-counter—while 
on the other hand the prescriptive, ethical aspect of dwelling (that requires that 
one invoke the fourfold to draw out the en-counter) demands that the invisible be 
made conspicuous. Dwelling, then, takes a different form for those positioned 
differently by Ge-stell. The obligation on those for whom Heidegger’s concept of 
dwelling seems impossible is different than the obligation on those who cohere 
with Ge-stell. Indeed, the more completely one coheres with Ge-stell, the greater 
the obligation. The less one coheres with Ge-stell, the more likely one is regularly 
interrupted and en-countered. Subsequently, one is more likely to find one’s self 
thrown into the conditions for authenticity. This does not automatically mean that 
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those who do not cohere with Ge-stell are necessarily more authentic than those 
that do, but it does situate them in a different kind of obligation. If dwelling can be 
characterised as a poiētic response to the (now visible or conspicuous) techno-
misogynological framing of Ge-stell, then those who regularly en-counter, and are 
themselves countered by, such framing, are perhaps already dwelling, provided 
they do not seek to simply cohere with Ge-stell to overcome their countered 
existence. Dwelling is not a static state, but a continual choice, an ongoing 
response to the framing of Ge-stell. For those who do not cohere with Ge-stell, a 
sense of belonging—something common to most, if not all, humans—may be 
expressed in attempts to cohere with Ge-stell. The obligation on those who already 
cohere, then, is to resist and counter techno-misogynology, to destabilise and 
overthrow the framing of Ge-stell in order that the standards of such framing are 
shown as unjust, unethical, violent, and oppressive. While the obligation of 
dwelling may manifest in different ways, dwelling itself is the continual making 
visible/conspicuous of, and resistance towards, the violence of techno-
misogynology via an originary sense of Being. 
 
As an ethical position, dwelling requires that one let the fourfold presence in the 
en-counter. The importance of the fourfold as a heuristic that reveals the en-
counter increases the more one coheres with Ge-stell. In de-centring the self and 
making room for the gods, earth, and sky, a proper self-less-ness, described above 
as humility or modesty, accompanies dwelling. The fourfold provides a heuristic 
to re-think the involvement of the self with others and the world. As a matter of 
spiritual concern, dwelling is equally a religious and ethical sentiment. 
Primordially, there is no meaningful difference between the two until considered 
in their historical-factical-ontic manifestations. Dwelling is properly religious in 
the Latin sense of religare, to repeatedly bind oneself.7 In dwelling, one binds 
oneself to the fourfold, to one’s belonging; human being is de-centred and 
gathered into its fullest and most authentic form as bound to the appropriating-
giving of Being. The limitations of Heidegger’s original notion of dwelling are 																																																								
7 As outlined in a short, seminal, century-old paper titled ‘The Etymology of Religion’, there are 
several etymological roots for the modern words religion/religious, but the notion of binding in one 
form or another—such as the English word ligament—has been accepted for almost two millennia 
(Hoyt 1912). 
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accounted for in the concept of misogynology. In this sense, the polemical notion 
of ‘the impossibility of dwelling’ has a self-contained imperative. The obligation 
of authenticity is not explicitly for the benefit of the self or others, it is not aimed 
directly at a benefit at all, but is a spiritual matter of allowing the self to be, rather 
than willing self-construction. Although the spiritual end here can be characterised 
as a benefit to the self, such a characterisation relies on a kind of paradoxical 
metaphysical thinking that cannot account for an I without a subject. One does not 
say no to techno-misogynology for the sake of the subject-self or others, but for 
the sake of Ereignis itself. The binding obligation of dwelling is a ‘choosing 
oneself’ akin to ‘losing one’s self’, with the intention—if it can be thought of as 
such—to gain a sense of, and factically-ontically manifest, the human belonging 
to Being, rather than an inauthentic and superficial sense of belonging to Ge-stell. 
 
In making the violence of techno-misogynology visible, one must come to terms 
with the everyday actions and behaviours that perpetuate and sustain its framing, 
including the phenomena discussed in Chapter Seven. Revealing the alethic nature 
of pornography within the techno-misogynological framing of Ge-stell is neither a 
moralistic dismissal of sexuality as debased or immoral nor a resolute re-
imagining of how to incorporate sexually explicit material into one’s sex life. 
Instead, making the violence inherent in pornography, pornification, and rape 
culture visible through the concept of misogynology founds an obligation to resist 
such violence. In many cases this has little to do with the content of pornography 
and everything to do with the context in which it is merely encountered as part of 
the everyday experience of the world; in the absence of the framing of Ge-stell 
even explicitly violent and misogynistic imagery could foreseeably have a place in 
human sexuality. Yet while the techno-misogynological frame remains, this kind 
of material must be challenged and countered; its alethic nature revealed. A 
phenomenology of pornography must not simply yield an illustration of 
pornography as a regular and normal aspect of everyday life. While this may be 
true for many people, and men in particular, this kind of subject-centric 
descriptive phenomenology assumes that any meaning or value found in the 
material must stem from the subject. This is clearly not an honest reflection of ek-
sistent Da-sein as held into the techno-misogynology worlding of the pornified 
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world. Instead, a phenomenology of pornography reveals the mainstream 
pornification of the misogynist horizon that is accepted as neutral, invisible in its 
ubiquity. Whether or not pornography causes harmful attitudes in adolescents, or 
is correlated with violence against women are important and meaningful 
considerations that are best explored beyond the instrumental-calculative frame. 
The existence and sheer prevalence of unabashedly violent, misogynistic, racist, 
homophobic pornography is part of the logos of modernity. The continued 
existence and prevalence of such material indicates the importance of the subject 
to such a logos: supposedly valorising the political rights and freedoms of the 
sovereign subject above all else, while failing to acknowledge that the subject is 
peculiarly masculine and revealed-gathered by the logos of techno-misogynology. 
 
That the vast majority of pornography is a commercial venture is also problematic. 
One of the chief reasons that I insist that the context of pornography takes 
precedence over the content of pornography is to acknowledge and allow for the 
complexity of human sexuality. Becoming aroused by watching other people 
engage in sexual activity is undoubtedly a normal and healthy empathic response. 
But pornography, as I have discussed in Chapter Seven, is not accurately 
portrayed by a neutral description such as “people engaged in sexual activity”. 
Instead, the prevalence of racist and misogynist portrayals of human sexuality 
complicates the consumption of pornography, and risks normalising the 
acceptance of such attitudes. As a commercial venture, one has also exploited the 
standing reserve. The production of commercial pornography is a challenging-
forth: artificial, contrived, and made with the intent to make money (rather than to 
educate, or demonstrate ways that people can enhance the intimacy and intensity 
of their sex lives, for example: such material, while available, is rarely classed as 
pornography, and is certainly not the go-to choice for adolescent boys with 
portable internet devices). While there is an increasing amount of pornography 
that is marketed as ethical, or female friendly—often referred to as erotica in order 
to avoid association—the capitalist aspect of this material remains troubling. The 
necessary reduction of performers to standing reserve is a major concern here, but 
not just in the Kantian sense of treating someone with only instrumental value 
when using pornography. Instead, seen through the lens of the fourfold, one can 
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never escape (or conveniently set aside for a few short minutes) the alethic 
revealing of pornography, including the act of searching for and using said 
pornography. In the appropriation of one’s Dasein with the racist-misogynistic 
revealing of pornography, the fourfold—conspicuous in its distortion, much like 
the satellite relay of a boxing match described by Harman in Chapter Six—reveals 
one’s complicity and perpetuation of such. One’s self is revealed in a certain light 
by this same disclosure of the world; one encounters pornography as a normal part 
of everyday life, yet the en-counter is too easily, perhaps too willingly, dismissed. 
A detailed discussion of capitalism and dwelling is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
yet it is clear that many of the features of modern day capitalist economics are 
firmly entrenched in subject-object metaphysics and thus the techno-
misogynological framing of Ge-stell. While the content of pornography, 
considered in a socio-cultural vacuum and taking into account the complexity of 
human sexuality, might not be universally and unequivocally unethical, the 
pornified worlding of techno-misogynology must first be en-countered before any 
concessions to such content can be made. 
 
In the techno-misogynological age, mainstream sex work8 of almost any form is 
highly problematic. While there are instances of legitimate therapeutic value—
indeed there are sex workers who specialise in various forms of therapeutic work 
for couples, people with various physical and emotional incapacities and so on—
this is qualitatively different to the far more common and far more widespread 
practice of prostitution, especially as it occurs in urban areas of lower socio-
economic status and developing, economically fragile non-Western countries. 
There are two central issues that make mainstream sex work problematic. First, all 
things being equal, it is safe to say that for most people there is an qualitative 
difference between sex work and any other. Even in the presence of strict 
regulation, and with a number of charitable assumptions about those who purchase 																																																								
8 Debates continue over the terms ‘sex work’ and ‘sex worker’. Compared to ‘prostitute’, ‘sex 
worker’ grants an air of legitimacy and sovereignty. Similarly, referring to participants of 
pornography as actors and actresses emphasises the subject-centric consensual nature of their 
participation rather than the circumstances that led to their participation. In seeking to treat the 
individuals with dignity and respect, the language that is employed grants the phenomenon a kind 
of artistic or benign sensibility that disguises its techno-misogynological framing, hiding it behind 
the sovereignty of the autonomous subject. 
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sex,9 the kind of bodily contact and interaction that takes place during sexual 
activity is unique within the many practices of human being; unique in a way that 
makes it more significant than other practices given the misogynological horizon. 
Certainly, one might have sex without intimacy in an emotional or existential 
sense, but one does not escape the physical intimacy of this kind of activity 
without some kind of dissociation from one’s embodied existence. Second, even 
for authentically willing participants, such work, while suitable and perhaps 
empowering for that individual, actively and directly contributes to and 
perpetuates the ordering-framing of misogynology.10 The scope of the first point is 
far too broad for this thesis, implicating Marxist and post-Marxist debates on the 
nature of labour and exploitation. The second point, however, indicates that the 
qualitative difference alluded to in the first stems from something more primordial 
than the individual decision or choice of the subject. Techno-misogynology 
oppresses certain groups or classes of people in essentially similar ways, but, of 
course, individual differences occur within these groups. Not every woman is 
oppressed to the same degree as every other. The same applies for gay men, for 
gender queer or gender fluid individuals. While the unmasculine is devalued by 
misogynology, individuals will cohere with Ge-stell to varying degrees. 
Recognising the misogynological choices of those who genuinely and freely 
choose this kind of work while other options are equally and readily available to 
them is important. It calls this kind of work into question. As stated above, 
legitimately clinical-therapeutic applications of this kind of work is a far cry from 
the sex industry as it currently stands; it would be difficult to honestly argue the 
therapeutic value of child prostitution in South East Asia. 
 
In formulating a position on these kinds of issues, Amnesty International made 																																																								
9 While there are many variables to consider when researching prostitution and the 
attitudes/demographics of people who purchase sex, studies that include street prostitution, or are 
not exclusively focused on escorts and services that are available (and targeted) to the middle 
classes and beyond, demonstrate that overall the ‘johns’ are generally more aggressive, misogynist, 
and likely to commit violent crimes (Farley et al., 2015; Malarek 2009).  
10 Malarek claims that “when it comes to sexuality and prostitution, johns’ attitudes are remarkably 
consistent throughout the world. On these forums — whether in the U.S., Canada, Australia, or 
Europe — it quickly becomes apparent that the search for paid sex is all about entitlement, power, 
and control” (2009, 32). There is little doubt that even empowered, expensive escorts continue to 
perpetuate a power differential that directly contributes to the violent oppression of the 
unmasculine. 
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their document ‘Decriminalization of Sex Work: Policy Background Document’ 
from 2014 publicly available. The document attempts to outline an a-moral 
position on sex work, to acknowledge the difficulty of defining and practicing 
autonomy in circumstances of economic oppression. The position outlined is 
founded on the notion of the sovereign political subject, assuming the 
autonomous, masculine subject of subject-object metaphysics. The document, as 
with so much of the debate on sex work overall, is already framed by the techno-
misogynology of Ge-stell. Footnote 2 on page 5 of the document makes this clear, 
where it states that  
 
 [T]he organization is opposed to criminalization of all activities related to the purchase
 and sale of sex. Sexual desire and activity are a fundamental human need. To criminalize
 those who are unable or unwilling to fulfill that need through more traditionally
 recognised means and thus purchase sex, may amount to a violation of the right to privacy
 and undermine the rights to free expression and health (Amnesty International, 2014). 
 
The second and third sentences of this passage clearly demonstrate that in an 
attempt to speak at an abstract, universal level, Amnesty International have 
adopted the perspective of the masculine subject, cohering with Ge-stell. In the 
absence of suitably representative universal statistics, it is reasonable to assume 
that while some women purchase sex from men and/or women, it is men that 
constitute the vast majority of people purchasing sex because they are 
“unwilling”—and the implications of this particular clause are nothing short of 
terrifying—to fulfill this “fundamental human need” through “traditionally 
recognised means”. To highlight the misogyny that underpins this reasoning, the 
notion of “fundamental human need” itself deserves further treatment. First, 
sexual desire is an aspect of human being that has little need of pornography or 
prostitutes to exist (and has evidently existed for millennia in their absence). 
Further is contentious to classify sexual desire, or its fulfillment, as a “need”, 
unless making an existential claim that each person must experience the full range 
of sensations that are afforded to a fully functioning, physiologically sound homo 
sapiens in order to be truly human. I do not believe this is Amnesty’s intention 
with this clause. Regardless, the inference between sexual desire as a need and the 
right to purchase sex is weak and relies on a masculinist assumption around the 
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importance of sexual desire itself.11 “Sexual activity” may well be a fundamental 
human need, but, again, the inference between sexual activity—which surely must 
include masturbation, and, in context, is not simply referring to physical intimacy 
that does not involve reaching an orgasm—and the right to purchase sex is 
tenuous at best. Sexual activity is a broad term that can encompass any number of 
practices. The claim that denying access to prostitutes for sexual activity may 
violate rights to privacy, free expression, or health reflects a medicalised, 
masculinist, misogynist, heteronormative (in the sense that a 
masculine/unmasculine binary is still at play) approach to the notion of achieving 
orgasm.12 Charitably, perhaps physical intimacy with another human being is 
closer to what Amnesty International had in mind as a “fundamental human 
need”? Again, unless this clause makes an existential claim to what it means to 
truly be, having sexual intercourse with another human being is not equivalent to 
sustenance, shelter, safety, or, indeed, physical intimacy and comfort. Outside 
peer pressure and social expectations and stigmas, the claim that no human being 
can flourish without regular access to sexual intercourse—rather than physical 
intimacy, or regular masturbation, or simply with a lower than average sex 
drive—is untenable. Certainly a lack of human intimacy, physical and emotional, 
might be damaging in certain ways, but to couch this in terms of a right to access 
prostitution is a techno-misogynological response to a deeper existential, ethical, 
and spiritual problem. Physical intimacy is not what the sex trade in a country like 
Thailand, or the inner suburbs of many major cities, is based on. Framing non-
prostituted consensual sex as “traditionally recognised means” legitimises 																																																								
11 In her critical analysis of ‘The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder 
in Women’, Lori Brotto reports that many women experience extended periods of time without 
sexual desire, and that a lack of sexual desire is not a cause of distress. Often, the cause of distress 
is due to interpersonal pressures that implicate her partner or social norms (228). Further, Brotto 
reports that the experience of sexual desire for many women is “responsive … triggered” (227), i.e. 
that it is not a spontaneous urge but manifests in response to the circumstances in which a woman 
finds herself in. In the context of this thesis, Brotto’s critique of the DSM and previous studies into 
sexual desire in women reads as a critique of the masculinist assumptions that underpin them: “the 
criteria used by clinicians to diagnose a sexual dysfunction may not be relevant to how women 
themselves define whether or not they had a sexual problem … a lack of spontaneous sexual desire 
should not be pathologized” (225-227).  
12 Further to the previous footnote, the significance of social and circumstantial factors that 
surround sexual activity is often overlooked, leading to clinical and misogynist attitude towards the 
necessity of sexual intercourse and the availability of prostitutes. For example, Anita Clayton 
(2010), A. Hubin, P. De Sutter, and C. Reyneart (2010), and M. Colson (2010) all note the 
importance of interpersonal and social factors for women to have a satisfactory (by their own 
standard) sexual experience.  
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prostitution by implication: if we are to be inclusive and respectful, then we must 
consider the various ways of human being. However, this kind of inclusivity is 
systemically oppressive. It is inclusive of ideals that cohere with techno-
misogynology. Where traditionally recognised means of having sex include 
forming some kind of intimate connection with another person, treating them with 
dignity and respect in order that the two of you might enjoy consensual sexual 
activity, the alternative to this means is a cold and brutal economic transaction: a 
transaction marked by an economic and social power differential. Given the 
significance of sexual domination in rape culture as a marker of status and self 
identity, the empowerment that an educated Western woman might feel from 
undertaking sex work is only a manifestation of a belonging to Ge-stell; an 
inauthentic and fragile empowerment, one that is lost in the instant a customer 
haggles or chooses not to pay, or who interprets her vocational behavior as 
personal consent for further unsolicited activity.  
 
From the techno-misogynological perspective, the rights of a man who is 
“unwilling” to form a mutually respectful and consensual relationship with 
another human being—no matter how brief or one-dimensional the intended 
encounter—to pay for sex trumps the global rights of women (the sexed term here 
representing the unmasculine more broadly) to be freed of the techno-
misogynological frame. The kind of political, educational, and economic reforms 
that are needed to ensure that women are not economically coerced into the 
position where they must either resort to prostitution, and/or fail to see how their 
individual choice legitimises the oppression of other women who have been 
coerced into prostitution are left uninterrogated by Amnesty, and many sex worker 
advocates in general. While this thesis cannot resolve the problems of 
pornography, pornification, and the more general ordering and framing of human 
being in the epoch of techno-misogynology, it can offer a new way to think 
through these problems. The mythos of dwelling is a Saying of the existential 
significance of an originary sense of belonging to Being. The fourfold is a 
heuristic that turns the encounter into an en-counter and makes the techno-
misogynological framing of the world visible. From this perspective, the context 
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of pornography and sex work, rather than just the content, is made visible. The 
context is revealed as violent and unethical.  
 
The Spiritual En-counter of Misogynology 
In making the techno-misogynological framing of the world—including 
pornography, pornification, and rape culture—visible, I turn to the fourfold. I 
mention above that the commercial, capitalist aspect of pornography is 
problematic. It is problematic in two senses. First, as challenged-forth, sex 
workers are disclosed primarily in their instrumentality, as something less than 
human, revealing-gathering the misogyny of the world. The reduction of the 
unmasculine other to standing reserve is not simply unethical in a Kantian sense; it 
is a function of the masculine subject. The willing, self-constructed subject 
reduces others to standing reserve in order that his desires are fulfilled. Yet the 
earth and the gods counter and de-centre the mortal of the fourfold; one’s desires 
do not exist solely to be fulfilled, but also as reminders of what one already has, 
and of the mechanisms of the They that drive one to want more. The earth founds 
sexual desire, the gods channel such desire, and the sky reveals desire in its 
specificity. Lost in the logos of Ge-stell, the beckoning of the gods is consumed 
by the will of the subject, and the sky is forgotten. There is no conspicuous 
horizon, no sense of physis or technē in the simple act of an adolescent 
masturbating to, and thus learning from,13 Internet pornography. The participants 
are challenged-forth first in the production of the material, and again by the use of 
the material by the audience. The sense that the sky acts as a guiding horizon, 
while mirroring the gods and the earth, is lost in archetypal commercial 
pornography. The earth, as sexual desire, remains but is no longer a counter, now 
rather something merely to be dealt with.  
 
Again, there is nothing inauthentic or unethical about human sexuality, or in the 																																																								
13 In The Brain That Changes Itself, Norman Doidge discusses how pornography actually shapes 
the brain through its capacity for neuroplasticity. Not only do consumers explicitly learn from 
pornography that women are sexually willing, or at least in need of getting what they deserve, but 
they train themselves into a physiological response with a powerful reward: the orgasm. “Sooner 
or later the surfer finds a killer combination that presses a number of his sexual buttons at once. 
Then he reinforces the network by viewing the images repeatedly, masturbating, releasing 
dopamine and strengthening these networks” (82).  
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abstract notion of becoming aroused by watching sexual activity. However, the 
impossibility of a benign or neutral encounter with the content of pornography in 
the techno-misogynological age is of utmost significance. The en-counter of 
pornography must lead each person to examine the conditions under which the 
material was produced. How and what does the material gather or say? How does 
it disclose the world? Even if it is marketed as female friendly, or as soft-core 
erotica, does it speak in the logos of techno-misogynology? Is it even possible for 
erotica to speak outside this logos? If the techno-misogynological framing of Ge-
stell can be thought of in terms of bell hooks’ imperialist, white supremacist 
capitalist patriarchy, then how can the mortal of the fourfold reconcile commercial 
mainstream Western pornography with the sex trade of developing and third world 
nations for whom Western economics are intrinsically implicated? There is a 
historical sensibility to dwelling; one is aware of the age or epoch of one’s 
situation and of one’s entanglement in such. From one’s being in the world, one is 
obliged to see the world, to understand it, and to respond to it as the de-centred 
mortal of the fourfold. It is an existential obligation, an ethical obligation, founded 
on care: the fourfold, and the existential obligation of authenticity is a spiritual 
matter. 
 
A spiritual en-counter with pornography and the sex industry reveals the logos of 
rape culture, of techno-misogynology. It is the spiritual aspect of Heidegger’s 
thinking that helps disrupt the kind of ethical arguments that are founded on the 
masculine subject, and which continue to frame these kinds of debates. The logos 
of rape culture constitutes the invisible norms, values, and metaphysical 
assumptions that are deeply embedded in the Western tradition: without a spiritual 
en-counter, these norms and values have an in-built ethical function that, if 
questioned, positions the opponent as irrational or unreasonable. The double 
concealing of Ge-stell continues to frame itself within a hegemonic and 
metaphysical ethical position that valorises the rights of the autonomous subject 
before all else. The result of this valorisation is systemic violence and oppression. 
The en-counter of pornography makes misogynology visible. The en-counter of 
misogynology must then feed back into one’s everyday life. Pornography can no 
longer be considered a neutral or benign aspect of human sexuality, no matter how 
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ubiquitous it has become. Sex work—again, with the exception of genuine 
therapeutic applications—can no longer be legitimised as a series of isolated 
interactions between consenting adults, but as a significant manifestation of 
systemic techno-misogynology.  
 
In short, the en-counter of pornography reveals the logos of misogynology; the en-
counter of misogynology reveals the extent and implications of pornification and 
rape culture. The en-counter reveals the oppression and devalorisation of the 
unmasculine through masculine heteronormative ideals, the intersection of such 
ideals with race and class, and the manner in which the most banal and everyday 
activities contributes to such ordering-framing. In turn, the en-counter of techno-
misogynology reveals one’s self as located within the world, and implicates one’s 
thoughts, actions, and behaviours as products of the world; even behaviours that 
might be genetically imprinted factically-ontically manifest on the techno-
misogynological horizon. Dwelling as authentic human being is a belonging to 
Being, yet due to its double concealing, contemporary Western human being 
strives to belong to Ge-stell. Heidegger frequently framed the critical aspect of his 
critique of technology as a spiritual matter: while it has any number of socio-
political implications, there is something more primordially broken, a far deeper 
impropriety at play. 
 
In Chapter One I contrasted Heidegger’s phenomenology with his interpretation of 
the Western tradition. From at least Being and Time onwards, Heidegger’s 
concern with metaphysics was not simply its false or superficial framing of the 
human being as the metaphysically alienated centre of all epistemological 
possibilities, but the hubris and spiritual emptiness that came as a result of such 
ego-centrism. Heidegger contends that, as a mode of human being, authenticity—
Eigentlichkeit, always implicating Jemeinigkeit (mine-ness, in-each-case-mine), 
and, later, Ereignis—matters in an existential, ethical, and spiritual sense. 
Heidegger clearly articulates his frustration at the erroneous reduction and 
conflation of Dasein to the consciousness of the subject and of his work as a kind 
anthropological or existential ethics. One might argue that this frustration is not 
simply due to the metaphysical misinterpretation of his work, but of the profound 
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spiritual significance that is overlooked. As early as Being and Time, existing 
outside the They in anticipatory-resoluteness was a spiritual matter for Heidegger. 
Caputo demonstrates the significant influence of Kierkegaard on the content of 
Being and Time, implicating the importance of spirituality and reverence for the 
divine to Heidegger’s thinking. The concept of spirituality here has nothing to do 
with metaphysics and everything to do with the profundity of an originary sense of 
belonging to Being as an extension of care. The discussion of the development of 
the critique of technology that spans Chapters One and Two already demonstrates 
the problem that Chapter Fours discussion of Ereignis pre-empts. In belonging to 
Being, as in-the-world, inauthentic Dasein gains a sense of belonging to Ge-stell 
by cohering with the techno-misogynological world. Heidegger’s thinking is 
spiritual in the sense that it recognises that willing self-construction, the 
empowerment of the I in modernity is always founded on coherence with Ge-stell, 
and, simultaneously, dissonance with Being qua Ereignis, physis/technē, Logos, 
and alētheia. Authenticity is an obligation that stems from the interruptive 
making-visible of the en-counter.  
 
In Chapter Five I discussed the origins of the fourfold, with a particular focus on 
the notion of gods and the earth. As an essential aspect of displacing the subject 
with Da-sein, thus de-centring human being, the notion of the gods as beyond 
instrumental-calculative thinking readily demonstrates the spirituality of 
Heidegger’s thinking. Instrumental-calculative thinking exacerbates the sense of 
self as subject while reducing all else to standing reserve. Existential-meditative 
thinking, however, is sensitive to the importance of mystery and the unknowable. 
Rather than any kind of anti-scientific rhetoric, remaining sensitive to a mystery as 
mystery is an acknowledgment of the limited jurisdiction, and anti-alethic risk of 
instrumental-calculative thinking. In Chapter Five, the belonging discussed in 
Chapter Four is considered in regards to a homeland. As one of many possible 
ways that an originary sense of belonging to Being (rather than Ge-stell) can 
manifest, a literal and figurative homeland is another way to interpret the 
spirituality of Heidegger’s thinking. It is significant that the notion of the home 
can be recovered within feminist thinking, as it demonstrates that the concept, 
while owing a debt to Heidegger’s own historical-factical-ontical situation, is not 
Chapter Eight—Misogynology 	
	
278 
restricted to this situation. Further, it is significant that a thinker such as Iris 
Marion Young can draw on bell hooks to demonstrate the importance of the home 
as “the place of the preservation of the history and culture of a people in the face 
of colonizing forces of the larger society” (Young 2001, 282). Given my own 
adoption of hooks’ description of imperialist, white supremacist, capitalist 
patriarchy to describe the multiple aspects of the techno-misogynological framing 
of Ge-stell, the possibility of an overlap, no matter how marginal, between 
thinkers as disparate as bell hooks and Martin Heidegger demonstrates something 
significant about the thought itself, something too important to ignore.  
 
While my discussion in the second half of Chapter Six is intended to augment 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Western tradition, my discussion of pornification 
and rape culture revealed the framing of Ge-stell as more sinister than a simple 
masculine bias. Instead, as I have discussed above, the logos of modernity is 
explicitly misogynist. Dwelling is a spiritual matter in that it is a recovery of 
mythos, a response to the ordering and framing—a violent form of gathering and 
preserving—of techno-misogynological Ge-stell. Where I state that it is the 
context, not the content of pornography that is of concern, I attempt to recognise 
the complexity and indeed the authentic spirituality of human sexuality. However, 
this spirituality is stamped out by techno-misogynology, reduced to either an 
irrational or simply subjective form of thinking that is incompatible with 
instrumental-calculative thinking. The importance of spirituality in Heidegger’s 
thinking and in putting such thinking to work is that it emphasises, with the 
greatest intensity, that such thinking matters. It matters because it implicates every 
human on the planet, and particularly those in positions of privilege and power. 
Each encounter is a potential en-counter, no matter how banal or exceptional. In 
the techno-misogynological age of Ge-stell, the obligation of authenticity—
understood as a spiritual return to an originary sense of Being that makes visible 
and resists the violence of techno-misogynology—is one of the most pressing 
ethical and spiritual obligations in the West. For those who easily cohere with Ge-
stell, finding the en-counter is an obligation that is facilitated by the fourfold. One 
must en-counter techno-misogynology in order to make “the strife between men 
and gods” (Heidegger 1982b, 139) visible. Making the violence of Ge-stell visible 
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affords the possibility to respond to such with an originary sense of Being, this is 
the obligation: to manifest one’s Da-sein in the age of misogynology and the 
impossibility of dwelling. 		
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